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Jack comments on How to think like a quantum monadologist - Less Wrong
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Some questions that will probably reveal some of my ignorance but should help clear things up for everyone if answered.
You are saying that there is some monad in my head and that monad is me? No?
Does this mean the entire human brain could be a "monad"? If so why do we think that understanding the structure and function of this "monad" requires more than understanding the behavior of neurons and axons? Why bring quantum physics into the picture?
Or if the monad that is me is not my entire brain is there some surgery that could be done to remove the monad? Could we smash it in a super collider? If the monad isn't the entire brain how is it that significant changes or stimuli in any part of the brain can alter phenomenological reports? I.e. what is going on with Phineas Gage and all of neuroscience?
What work is the term "monad" doing? Its use has confused the hell out of everyone here. You wrote in a comment
All the ways I can think to interpret this either have it coming out as a term to basic to be of any interest or so weird as to make the research on face implausible so a much better elucidation what you mean by "monad" is pretty important. Especially since you're not using it in a way anyone here is used to.
Anyway, a lot of the language and ideas is awfully similar to stuff David Chalmers was and is working on. I wonder if you are familiar with his work.
Yes.
I think a concrete example of a quantum-monadological hypothesis is in order. The best-known quantum-mind theories revolve around microtubules, so let's start there.
Orthodox cognitive neuroscience revolves around synapses and action potentials. But let's suppose Stuart Hameroff is right and microtubules are relevant as well, and are not just structural molecules. Maybe there are quantum-entangled mobile electrons in the shell of the microtubule, they feel the action potential, and they affect the binding of microtubule-associated proteins, i.e. let's suppose they are causally relevant to neuronal information processing, as they had better be if they are going to be the locus of consciousness. So, some subpopulation of microtubules, in some subpopulation of neurons, contains a big set of entangled electrons - and that is the monad that is you.
Although I have described it as a "set of entangled electrons", it is to be regarded as elementary because entangled objects no longer have independent individual states - they are more like aspects of a bigger thing (at least under the interpretation of quantum theory I'm using). Mathematically, it has a large number of degrees of freedom, and I suppose that in reality, those degrees of freedom are busy being your conscious thoughts, perceptions, and so forth.
Does that make things clearer?
I certainly know about David Chalmers's work and I generally agree with it. I just think we need to go even further and say, not just that "raw sensory qualities" aren't present in physics as normally conceived, but that they are bound together in consciousness in a way which suggests an underlying ontological unity beyond that possessed by a collection of spatial parts.
Thanks, that is quite a bit clearer. How would a quantum-monadological hypothesis make sense of split-brain cases? Surely the slicing of a corpus callosum can't divide a monad.
Whoa, how do you get to make the jump to the degrees of freedom being my conscious thoughts? Whenever anyone else does that, you call it a deficient ontology, denying reality of experience, vaguing out, etc. But you're doing the exact same thing!
You have no standing on which to object to someone saying, "The brain state consistent with a certain wavelength of EM radiation hitting my eyes is my conscious experience of blue."
I plead guilty to talking in a way which is ambiguous about the relationship between the actual thing and its mathematical description. I am frankly not sure what the right way to do so is. My objection to the similar identity statements that people produce is that they can't explain how the identity could be true, and will even define away the phenomenon they are supposed to be explaining.