whpearson comments on Open Thread: January 2010 - Less Wrong

5 Post author: Kaj_Sotala 01 January 2010 05:02PM

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Comment author: whpearson 02 January 2010 01:13:09AM 3 points [-]

I found this interesting and the paper it discusses children's conception of intelligence.

The abstract to the article

Two studies explored the role of implicit theories of intelligence in adolescents' mathematics achievement. In Study 1 with 373 7th graders, the belief that intelligence is malleable (incremental theory) predicted an upward trajectory in grades over the two years of junior high school, while a belief that intelligence is fixed (entity theory) predicted a flat trajectory. A mediational model including learning goals, positive beliefs about effort, and causal attributions and strategies was tested. In Study 2, an intervention teaching an incremental theory to 7th graders (N=48) promoted positive change in classroom motivation, compared with a control group (N=43). Simultaneously, students in the control group displayed a continuing downward trajectory in grades, while this decline was reversed for students in the experimental group.

People on lesswrong commonly talk as if intelligence is a thing we can put a number too, which implies a fixed trait. Yet that is counter productive in children. Is this another example of a useful lie? I feel that this issue is at the core of some of the arguments I have had over the years.

Comment author: Nick_Tarleton 02 January 2010 08:34:52PM 3 points [-]

People on lesswrong commonly talk as if intelligence is a thing we can put a number too, which implies a fixed trait.

No, it doesn't. What about weight?

Comment author: whpearson 02 January 2010 09:22:58PM *  4 points [-]

Fair point. Would you agree with, "People on lesswrong commonly talk as if intelligence is a thing we can put a number to (without temporal qualification), which implies a fixed trait."?

We often say our weight is currently X or Y. But people rarely say their IQ is currently Z, at least in my experience.

Comment author: Nick_Tarleton 03 January 2010 04:00:40AM 0 points [-]

Would you agree with, "People on lesswrong commonly talk as if intelligence is a thing we can put a number to (without temporal qualification), which implies a fixed trait."?

Yes.

Comment author: Zack_M_Davis 02 January 2010 01:23:55AM 3 points [-]

Is this another example of a useful lie?

If it works, it can't be a lie. In any case, surely a sophisticated understanding does not say that intelligence is malleable or not-malleable. Rather, we say it's malleable to this-and-such an extent in such-and-these aspects by these-and-such methods.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 02 January 2010 01:23:13PM 2 points [-]

If it works, it can't be a lie.

"Intelligence is malleable" can be a lie and still work. Kids who believe their general intelligence to be malleable might end up exercising domain-specific skills and a general perseverance so that they don't get too easily discouraged. That leaves their general intelligence unchanged, but nonetheless improves school performance.

Comment author: whpearson 02 January 2010 11:20:55AM 0 points [-]

I was thinking of the more mathematical definitions of intelligence that just give a scalar average performance over lots of different worlds. They can still be consistant as they track the history and agents might do better in worlds they believe that their intelligence changes. As they might do better in worlds where they are given calculators.

If simple things like the ownership of calculators can change your intelligence, is it right to think of it as something stable you can apply fission like exponential growth on.

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