= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
komponisto comments on Dennett's "Consciousness Explained": Chpt 2 - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (23)
This is a traditional objection to the "behaviorism" of philosophers such as Carnap. I recall arguing in an undergraduate term paper that this was a misunderstanding of behaviorism: there is no reason that "behavior" should not encompass e.g. the behavior of neurons, which are in principle just as publicly observable as a subject's verbal behavior. So the question is whether any being could have a brain observably identical to yours and yet have different experiences.
Ok, let me try this again. I want a way to map between the internal and external views of a mind. That is, given what I know about what I'm experiencing, what can I deduce about the physical structure of my brain? And given a physical description of a mind, what can I know about what it is experiencing? Perhaps this is already considered a legitimate part of the problem of consciousness according to heterophenomenology, or "behaviorism" (are they the same thing?), but if so I think it's at least not a part of the problem that those approaches tend to emphasize. In any case, I'd appreciate it if ciphergoth could address this topic a bit in his post.
(Why am I so interested in this part of the problem? Mainly because I need the solution in order for UDT1 to be usable by human beings.)