JGWeissman comments on Open Thread: March 2010, part 3 - Less Wrong
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I have no preferences within the class of states of the universe that do not, and cannot evolve to, contain consciousness.
But if, for example, I was put in this situation by a cheesecake maximizer, I would choose something other than cheese cake.
Interesting. Just to be contrary?
Because, as near as I can calculate, UDT advises me too. Like what Wedrifid said.
And like Eliezer said here:
And here:
I am assuming that an agent powerful enough to put me in this situation can predict that I would behave this way.
It is also potentialy serves decision-theoretic purposes. Much like a Dutchess choosing not to pay off her blackmailer. If it is assumed that a cheesecake maximiser has a reason to force you into such a position (rather than doing it himself) then it is not unreasonable to expect that the universe may be better off if Cheesy had to take his second option.
I can't recall: do your views on consciousness have a dualist component? If consciousness is in some way transcendental (that is, as a whole somehow independent or outside of the material parts), then I understand valuing it as, for example, something that has interesting or unique potential.
If you are not dualistic about consciousness, could you describe why you value it more than cheesecake?
No, I am not a dualist.
To be precise, I value positive conscious experience more than cheesecake, and negative conscious experience less than cheesecake.
I assign value to things according to how they are experienced, and consciousness is required for this experience. This has to do with the abstract properties of conscious experience, and not with how it is implemented, whether by mathematical structure of physical arrangements, or by ontologically basic consciousness.