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Confession: I always assumed (until EY's article, believe it or not!) that the "tree falling in a forest ..." philosophical dilemma was asking whether the tree makes vibrations.
That is, I thought the issue it's trying to address is, "If nothing is around to verify the vibrations, how do you know the vibrations really happen in that circumstance? What keeps you from believing that whenever nobody's around [nor e.g. any sensor], the vibrations just don't happen?"
(In yet other words, a question about belief in the implied invisible, or inaudible as the case may be.)
Over what period, exactly, was the question widely accepted to be making a point about the difference between vibrations and auditory experiences, as Eliezer seemed to imply is the common understanding?
I've encountered people asking the question with both meanings or sometimes a combination of meanings. Like many of these questions of a similar form, the questions are often so muddled as to be close to useless.