Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread - Less Wrong
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Time travel in this universe has a consistent single line; once McGonagall sees Harry disappear, he can't undo it.
Sounds like UDT might be applicable here. Here's a time-traveling version of Counterfactual Mugging:
Harry appears to McGonagall and tells her, "If you give me 1 Galleon now, I'll go back in time and hand you 100 Galleons an hour ago." Suppose McGonagall does not recall being handed 100 Galleons an hour ago. What should she do?
Here's my analysis. Suppose McGonagall decides not to give Harry 1 Galleon, then there are two possible consistent timelines for this universe. One where McGonagall gets 100 Galleons, and one where she doesn't. How does the universe "choose" which one becomes reality? I don't know but let's say that the two possibilities have equal chance of being true, or get equal amount of "reality juice".
Given the above it seems clear that McGonagall would prefer to have pre-committed to "give 1 Galleon even if not handed 100 Galleons an hour ago" since that would make the "not get 100 Galleons" timeline inconsistent. I think that's also UDT's output (although I haven't written down the math to make sure).
ETA: I didn't follow the previous discussion closely, so this might not apply at all to it. Hopefully, in that case the above is of interest in its own right. :)
Seems straightforward to me. McGonagall knows that she does not recall being handed 100 Galleons an hour ago, so the three states of the world with high probability are: 1) She is not in a universe where she will hand Harry 1 Galleon, 2) She is in a universe where she hands Harry 1 Galleon and Harry breaks the agreement, or 3) She is in a universe where she hands Harry 1 Galleon and Harry keeps the agreement in a way that leaves her unable to recall this happening. By not handing Harry a Galleon, she will ensure that she is in universe 1. By handing Harry a Galleon, she will find herself in universe 2 or 3. She should therefore give Harry a Galleon if she judges it less than 99 times more likely that Harry will break the agreement than fulfil it in a way consistent with her experience.
As Harry has access to a time machine, he doesn't need to decide to give her 100 Galleons before he gets the 1 Galleon, so the situation is quite different to one based on predicting her actions, as Omega does in the Counterfactual Mugging. Rather it has most of the properties of the forward-time version of the gambit: "If you give me 1 Galleon now, I'll hand you 100 Galleons in one hour", except that McGonagall has a big piece of evidence that the promise will be broken, namely that she doesn't remember it being kept.
Precommit, give him the Galleon, then reach in her bag to get the 100 Galleons. (She must have been Obliviated; otherwise, she would remember.)
You can actually get around a lot of the problems with time travel by taking advantage of the difference between observation and reality. For instance, if you see one of your friends die, you can go back in time, save him, then plant a fake double so you still have the same observations.
Vladmir and I agree with the applicability of UDT and have suggested time-travel-with-consistency is a good way to consider Newcomblike problems and the the decision theories that can handle them.
Only because you termed that event "real", but the characters can't know that it is.
Is information in other minds what gets stabilized?