CronoDAS comments on Rationality quotes: June 2010 - Less Wrong

4 Post author: Morendil 01 June 2010 06:07PM

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Comment author: CronoDAS 08 June 2010 03:33:33AM *  4 points [-]

There is no mutually exclusive distinction between "is" and "ought". There is only a distinction between "is" and "is not". If "ought" cannot find a home in what "is", then "ought" is something that "is not".

-- Alonzo Fyfe

Comment author: savageorange 08 June 2010 05:24:51AM 3 points [-]

I find this rather gnomic. Is he admonishing us to only say 'ought' in reference to existing parts of reality? Or simply classifying ought as a nonsensical notion?

Comment author: CronoDAS 08 June 2010 05:29:37AM *  1 point [-]

Some more context, from the link:

I consider the claim that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' to be a very remarkable claim. It suggests that there something . . . 'oughtness' . . . that is totally distinct and separate from things that exist in the real world . . . 'isness' . . . yet is supposed to have relevance in the real world. It is referred to as a part of the real-world explanations for the movement of real matter through space-time. Yet, we are told, this 'ought' or 'should' that we are making a reference to and that has these owers is something distinct and separate from anything in the world of 'is'.

[...]

My position is that 'ought' is relevant in the real world because 'ought' is a species of 'is', and there is no mystery as to how 'is' can be relevant in the real world.

So, when I put you cannot derive 'ought' from 'is' up against 'ought' can interact with 'is' because it is a species of 'is', and I realize that one of them must be mistaken, it seems far more likely that we will find the error in the first proposition rather than the second. I would be far less surprised by a discovery that 'ought' is relevant to 'is' because 'ought' is a subset of 'is' than that there is a realm of 'ought' separate and distinct from 'is' but still relevant in the world of 'is'.

Comment author: Jack 08 June 2010 05:56:42AM 3 points [-]

This seems... confused. The is-ought distinction is the distinction between preference and fact.

Comment author: CronoDAS 08 June 2010 03:30:43PM *  2 points [-]

"Preferences" are also facts about minds.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 June 2010 03:36:48PM *  3 points [-]

"Preferences" are also facts about minds.

Not directly, there is no fixed "preference mapping" from minds to preferences that works in general. We can only hope for one that works for humans, constructed for searching preference of humans, because it won't need to work for any almost-humans or not-humans-at-all. I look at a mind and see that its preference is X, you look at the same mind and say it's Y. There is no factual disagreement, the sense of "preference" was different; and if it was the same, the purpose was lost.

Comment author: Simulation_Brain 12 June 2010 06:37:25AM 0 points [-]

Well, yes; it's not straightforward to go from brains to preferences. But for any particular definition of preference, a given brain's "preference" is just a fact about that brain. If this is true, it's important to understanding morality/ethics/volition.

Comment author: orthonormal 22 June 2010 05:44:38AM 2 points [-]

Hello! You seem to know your way around already, but it doesn't hurt to introduce yourself on the Welcome page...

Comment author: wedrifid 18 June 2010 12:47:17PM 2 points [-]

Wow. If he keeps playing around with words like that it should only take him two more paragraphs to 'prove' the existence of God.

Comment author: simplicio 19 June 2010 04:10:25AM 0 points [-]

Really?

I interpret him to be saying something fairly non-dualistic - namely, that morality is not an ontologically basic thing separate from physics.

He also may be saying that moral claims reduce to fact claims in some sense, which is almost true (you need to throw some values in as well).

Are you coming at this from the perspective of a moral nihilist?

Comment author: wedrifid 19 June 2010 10:23:41AM 2 points [-]

I interpret him to be saying something fairly non-dualistic - namely, that morality is not an ontologically basic thing separate from physics.

I did not like the particular way he was trying to make morality relate to physics. I thought it asserted a confused relationship between 'is' and 'ought'.

He also may be saying that moral claims reduce to fact claims in some sense, which is almost true (you need to throw some values in as well).

I think that was a point that he was at least trying to make and it is something I agree with.

Are you coming at this from the perspective of a moral nihilist?

No. That's for people who realise that God doesn't tell them what morality is and get all emo about it. I more take a 'subjectively objective' position (probably similar to what you expressed in the previous paragraph).

Comment author: Blueberry 19 June 2010 04:26:13PM 2 points [-]

That's for people who realise that God doesn't tell them what morality is and get all emo about it.

Succinctly stated. I love it.

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