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AlephNeil comments on Bayes' Theorem Illustrated (My Way) - Less Wrong

126 Post author: komponisto 03 June 2010 04:40AM

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Comment author: AlephNeil 04 June 2010 03:05:17PM 5 points [-]

You try to maximize your expected utility. Perhaps having done your calculations, you think that action X has a 5/6 chance of earning you £1 and a 1/6 chance of killing you (perhaps someone's promised you £1 if you play Russian Roulette).

Presumably you don't base your decision entirely on the most likely outcome.

Comment author: Houshalter 04 June 2010 03:19:41PM -1 points [-]

So in this scenario you have to decide how much your life is worth in money. You can go home and not take any chance of dying or risk a 1/6 chance to earn X amount of money. Its an extension on the risk/reward problem basically, and you have to decide how much risk is worth in money before you can complete it. Thats a problem, because as far as I know, bayesianism doesn't cover that.

Comment author: AlephNeil 04 June 2010 03:39:48PM *  7 points [-]
  1. It's not the job of 'Bayesianism' to tell you what your utility function is.

  2. This [by which I mean, "the question of where the agent's utility function comes from"] doesn't have anything to do with the question of whether Bayesian decision-making takes account of more than just the most probable hypothesis.