Kingreaper comments on Poll: What value extra copies? - Less Wrong

5 [deleted] 22 June 2010 12:15PM

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Comment author: Kingreaper 22 June 2010 01:05:14PM 2 points [-]

If the copies don't diverge their value is zero.

They are me. We are one person, with one set of thoughts, one set of emotions etc.

Comment deleted 22 June 2010 04:15:18PM [-]
Comment author: Kingreaper 23 June 2010 12:40:43AM 0 points [-]

Hmmm, probability distribution; at what level of knowledge?

I guess I should assume you mean at what is currently considered the maximum level of knowledge?

In which case, I suspect that'd be a small level of divergence. But, maybe not negligible. I'm not sure, my knowledge of how quantum effects effect macroscopic reality is rather small.

Or is it probability based on my knowledge? In which case it's a huge divergence, and I'd very much appreciate it.

Before deciding how much I value it, I'd like to see an illustration example, if possible. Perhaps take Einstein as an example: if he had been copied at age 12, what is an average level of divergence?

Comment author: Thomas 22 June 2010 01:24:13PM -1 points [-]

You are one person today and tomorrow. You don't think, that the tomorrow copy of you is useless?

Comment author: khafra 22 June 2010 01:27:44PM 2 points [-]

Me today vs. me tomorrow is divergence. If each copy exists in an identical, non-interacting world there's no divergence.

Comment author: Kingreaper 22 June 2010 02:18:47PM *  0 points [-]

If there was a time travel event, such that me and me tomorrow existed at the same time, would we have the same thoughts? No.

Would we have the same emotions? No.

We would be different.

If it was a time travel event causing diverging timelines I'd consider it a net gain in utility for mes. (especially if I could go visit the other timeline occasionally :D )

If it was a time loop, where present me will inevitably become future me? There's still precisely as many temporal mes as there would be otherwise. It is neither innately a gain nor a loss.