Perplexed comments on Open Thread, August 2010 - Less Wrong

4 Post author: NancyLebovitz 01 August 2010 01:27PM

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Comment author: Perplexed 25 August 2010 08:46:18PM 4 points [-]

My own view is that (ignoring simulations for the time being) MWI ideas have no conflict with our usual ethical intuitions and reasonings. Yes, it is the case that when I choose between evil action A and good action B, there will be two branches of the universe - one in which I choose A and one in which I choose B. This will be the case regardless of which choice I make. But this does not make my choice morally insignificant, because I split too, along with the rest of the universe. The version of me that chose evil act A will have to live thereafter with the consequences of that choice. And the version of me that chose B must live with quite different consequences.

What, more than that, could a believer in the moral significance of actions want of his universe?

The situation with respect to simulations is a bit trickier. Suppose I am deciding whether to (A) pull the plug on a simulation which contains millions of sentient (simulated) beings, or (B) allow the simulation to continue. So, I choose, and the universe branches. If I chose A, I must live with the consequences. I don't have that simulation to kick around any more. But, if I were to worry about all the simulated lives that I have so ruthlessly terminated, I can easily reassure myself that I have only terminated a redundant copy of those lives. The (now) master copy of the simulation plays on, over in that parallel universe where I chose B.

Is it wrong to create a simulation and then torture the inhabitants? Well, that is an ethical question, whereas this is a meta-ethical analysis. But the meta-ethical answer to that ethical question is that if you torture simulated beings, then you must live with the consequences of that.

Comment author: ata 25 August 2010 08:58:51PM 1 point [-]

That's not how MWI works, unless human brains have a quantum randomness source that they use to make decisions (which does not appear to be the case).

Comment author: Perplexed 25 August 2010 09:25:13PM 2 points [-]

I'm not sure it matters to the analysis. Whether we have a Tegmark multiverse, or Everett MWI with some decisions depending on quantum randomness and others classically determined, or whether the multiple worlds are purely subjective fictions created to have a model of Bayesianism; regardless of what you think is a possible reduction of "possibly"; it is still the case that you have to live in the reality which you helped to create by way of your past actions.

Comment author: h-H 26 August 2010 04:31:48AM 0 points [-]

agreed, it's not like scientific analysis requires the laws of physics to have no quantum randomness source etc, rather it is satisfied with finding the logical necessities between what is used to describe the observable universe.

Comment author: GuySrinivasan 25 August 2010 09:12:26PM 0 points [-]
Comment author: [deleted] 25 August 2010 09:31:35PM 1 point [-]

Yes, MWI ideas have no conflict with usual ethical intuitions. And they also help you make better sense of those intuitions. Counterfactuals really do exist, for example; they're not just some hypothetical that is in point of fact physically impossible.

Comment author: h-H 26 August 2010 03:50:26AM 0 points [-]

but we shouldn't concern ourselves with counter factuals if they aren't part of our observed universe.

Comment author: Perplexed 26 August 2010 04:14:06AM 2 points [-]

My impression is that sometimes we do need to deal with them in order to make the math come out right, even though the only thing we are really concerned about is our observed universe. Just as we sometimes need to deal with negative numbers of sheep - however difficult we may find this to visualize if we work as a shepherd.

Comment author: h-H 04 September 2010 04:02:07AM 0 points [-]

true, but there are no 'negative sheep', only numbers arbitrarily representing them.

Comment author: Perplexed 05 September 2010 01:23:35AM 1 point [-]

but we shouldn't concern ourselves with numbers if they aren't part of our observed universe.

Comment author: h-H 05 September 2010 07:44:10AM *  1 point [-]

numbers are quite useful, so we don't/shouldn't do away with them, but the math is never a complete substitute for the observable universe.

writing down '20 sheep' doesn't physically equal 20 sheep, rather it's a method we use for simplicity. as it stands, no two sheep are alike to every last detail as far as anyone can tell, yet we still have a category called 'sheep'. this is so given the observed recurrence of 'sheep' like entities, similar enough for us to categorize them for practicality's sake, but that doesn't mean they're physically all alike to every detail.

it could be argued that sometimes the math does equate with reality, as in 'Oxygen atom' is a category consisting of entirely similar things, but even that is not confirmed, simply an assertion; no human has observed all 'Oxygen atoms' in existence to be similar in every detail, or even in some arbitrarily 'essential' detail/s. yet it is enough for the purposes of science to consider them all similar, and so we go with it,otherwise we'd never have coherent thought let alone science.

it might very well be that all Oxygen atoms in existence are physically the same in some ways, but we have no way of actually knowing. this doesn't mean that there are 'individual atoms', but it doesn't negate it either.

ETA: as pengvado said in below post, replace 'atom' with 'particle'.

Comment author: pengvado 05 September 2010 08:29:50AM *  3 points [-]

This doesn't mean that there are 'individual atoms', but it doesn't negate it either.

No Individual Particles. The fact that measurements of their mass/charge/etc have always come out the same, is not the only evidence we have for all particles of a given type being identical.

(A whole oxygen atom is a bad example, though. Atoms have degrees of freedom beyond the types of particles they're made of.)

Comment author: h-H 05 September 2010 09:45:39AM *  0 points [-]

yes, I had that specific post in mind when I presented the atom example. you're correct here though, I should have said particles,I shouldn't write so late after midnight I guess..

now I admit that my understanding of quantum mechanics is not that much above a lay persons', so maybe I just need to apply myslef more and It'll click, but let's consider my arguement first:- here's what EY said in reply to a post in that thread-emphasis mine: "There can be properties of the particles we don't know about yet, but our existing experiments already show those new properties are also identical, unless the observed universe is a lie."

and then: "Undiscovering this would be like undiscovering that atoms were made out of nucleons and electrons.

It's in this sense that I say that the observed universe would have to be a lie."

here I believe he's making a mistake/displaying a bias; the math-of Quantum Mechanics in this particular instance- does not determine physical reality, rather it describes it to some degree or other.

to suggest that the mathematics of quantum mechanics is the end of the road is too strong a claim IMO.

Comment author: pengvado 06 September 2010 12:57:05AM 0 points [-]

I don't have any arguments that weren't discussed in that post; so far as I can tell, it already adequately addressed your objection:

QM doesn't have to be the end of the road. If QM is a good approximation of reality on the scales it claims to predict in the situations we have already tested it in -- if the math of QM does describe reality to some degree or other -- then that's enough for the quantum tests of particle identity to work exactly.

Comment author: Perplexed 05 September 2010 01:56:20PM 1 point [-]

Uhmm. I hate to explain my own jokes, but ... You did notice the formal similarity between my "we shouldn't concern ourselves" comment and its great grandparent, right?

Comment author: h-H 06 September 2010 03:02:28AM 0 points [-]

I noticed, but there was a clear difference that I felt was necessary to point out regardless.

Comment author: wedrifid 05 September 2010 01:45:48PM 0 points [-]

it might very well be that all Oxygen atoms in existence are physically the same in some ways, but we have no way of actually knowing. this doesn't mean that there are 'individual atoms', but it doesn't negate it either.

True (only) in the sense that our numbers are part of our map and not the territory. In the same sense we have no way of actually knowing there are patterns in the universe appropriately named Oxygen. Or Frog.

Comment author: h-H 06 September 2010 03:03:52AM *  0 points [-]

good point about the map/territory distinction, that was what I intended to say but couldn't put into so few words, thanks :)

and no, it seems that not even Frog can escape this, I'm not sure about it's significance here though?

Comment author: Perplexed 25 August 2010 08:54:22PM 1 point [-]

Is it wrong to create a simulation and then torture the inhabitants? Well, that is an ethical question, whereas this is a meta-ethical analysis. But the meta-ethical answer to that ethical question is that if you torture simulated beings, then you must live with the consequences of that.

I should add that it is impossible to erase your sin by deciding to terminate the simulation, so as to "euthanize" the victims of your torture. Because there is always a branch where you don't so decide, and the victims of your torture live on.