wedrifid comments on Existential Risk and Public Relations - Less Wrong

36 Post author: multifoliaterose 15 August 2010 07:16AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (613)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: wedrifid 19 November 2010 06:25:44PM 2 points [-]

As stated the argument is "Person x believes y, therefore person x is wrong about z." this is so obviously wrong it makes my head hurt.

It would be wrong if it were a logical deduction instead of an inference. That is, if WrongBot actually wrote 'therefore' or otherwise signaled absolute deductive certainty then he would be mistaken. As is he presents it as evidence, which it in fact is.

WrongBot's point is that someone has to have a poor reasoning capacity to believe in psy. But since he didn't provide any evidence to that effect it reduces to 'I disagree with Goertzel about psy'.

There is a clear implied premise 'psychic phenomenon are well known to be bullshit'. Not all baseline premises must be supported in an argument. Instead, the argument should be considered stronger or weaker depending on how reliable the premises are. I don't think WrongBot loses too much credibility in this case by dismissing psychic phenomenon.

Comment author: Jack 19 November 2010 06:38:59PM 0 points [-]

It would be wrong if it were a logical deduction instead of an inference. That is, if WrongBot actually wrote 'therefore' or otherwise signaled absolute deductive certainty then he would be mistaken. As is he presents it as evidence, which it in fact is.

It isn't even evidence until you include a premise about the likelihood of y, which we agree is the implied premise.

There is a clear implied premise 'psychic phenomenon are well known to be bullshit'. Not all baseline premises must be supported in an argument. Instead, the argument should be considered stronger or weaker depending on how reliable the premises are. I don't think WrongBot loses too much credibility in this case by dismissing psychic phenomenon.

I think I'm just restating the exchange I had with komponisto on this point. Goertzel's position isn't that of someone who is doesn't know any physics or Enlightenment-style rationality. It is clearly a contrarian position which should be treated rather differently since we can assume he is familiar with the reasons why psychic phenomena are 'well known to be bullshit'. It is a fully generalizable tactic which can be used against all and any contrarian thinkers. Try "Robin Hanson thinks we should cut health care spending 50%, therefore he is less likely to be right about fertility rate."

Comment author: wedrifid 19 November 2010 06:52:19PM 0 points [-]

It isn't even evidence until you include a premise about the likelihood of y, which we agree is the implied premise.

This is obviously going to be the case when trying to convince an individual of something. The beliefs (crackpot or otherwise) of the target audience are always going to be relevant to persuasively. As a comment directed in part to the wider lesswrong audience the assumed premises will be different.

Try "Robin Hanson thinks we should cut health care spending 50%, therefore he is less likely to be right about fertility rate."

If I were a reader who thought Robin's position on health care was as implausible as belief in magic and thought that making claims about the fertility was similar to AI strategy then I would take this seriously. As it stands the analogy is completely irrelevant.