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Unnamed comments on Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories - Less Wrong
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That's correct. See, for instance, the PhilPapers Survey of 931 philosophy professors, which found that only 21% favored one boxing vs. 31% who favored two boxing; 43% said other (mostly undecided or insufficiently familiar with the issue). Among the 31 philosophers who specialize in decision theory, there was a big shift from other (down to 13%) to two boxing (up to 61%), and still only 26% favored one boxing.
I'm not sure I actually believe this survey. Sure, these people claim they'd two box in academic papers, and in surveys - that's easy enough to do - but would any of them actually be committed enough to two-boxing to turn down $1 million if they every found themselves in the actual set-up?
My feelings are the opposite. I'm committed to one-boxing (just in case Omega is scanning my brain right now), but I'm not at all sure that I'd stick to that commitment with a box of $1000 sitting right there in front of me free for the taking. (Don't listen, Omega, move on, nothing to see here).