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Dagon comments on Newcomb's Problem: A problem for Causal Decision Theories - Less Wrong
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Comments (120)
Does decision theory still matter in a world where there's an agent who's already predicted your choices? Once Omega exists, "decision" is the wrong word - it's really a discovery mechanism for your actions.
That's the normal meaning of "decision" anyway, unless you believe in acausal free will magic.
Eliezer has a post on an isomorphic topic:
Timeless Control
You might also like Gary Drescher's treatment of choice in Good and Real.
Decisions you make now are informative (in the information-theoretic sense) about your past.
Decisions you make now are informative about the past.
I agree Dagon - and I actually specifically discussed this issue in the article I referenced in the comment I posted just before this one. Part of what I said was: "There may be one way that we could deal with this issue, and that would be to use different language to describe choices. Conventionally, if I have just picked up a glass we would say that I chose to pick it up. This whole idea of 'choosing' can cause us cognitive difficulties. Maybe it would be better to consider my 'choice' to pick up the glass as really 'finding out' that I was predisposed to pick it up." I also agree with FAWS said - that this is implied by "decision" anyway - at least to anyone who thinks about it enough.