All civilizations in the history of the world conquered some of their neighbours at some point. Since the earliest conquests are primarily people very similar to the ones doing the conquering and since they spend so much time together after the event, some of these events are later called unifications. Often the reason behind the similarities is the influence of previously existing empires! (the unification of Italy, the various unifications of China ect.)
What is an outside holding, the term I used in my previous post, is of course open for debate or rather definition since this is not a binary matter. However let me emphasise several ways the Japanese early expansion that you mention differ from say British expansion in Africa or India.
With the exception of Taiwan (even that region today barley musters 1/6 of Japans population) the regions are demographically irrelevant, for the purpose of "exploiting" masses of cheap foreign labour. Also even if they weren't, this wouldn't be a point in favour of the theory erratio presents since they are also all part of the first world today. The Ryuku language to top it off is very similar to Japanese having branched off a little after the 7th century. French control of Corsica or perhaps Spanish control of the Balearic Islands is perhaps comparable on the outside/inside scale. Is this really what first comes to mind when hearing the word colonialism?
The African medieval states I'll link to in a moment expanded far more in terms of sheer square km, I'm also willing to bet that they had a greater proportion of "conquered peoples" compared to Japan (the only time where this may not be true is during the height of Japanese occupation of China, but by then Japan was a developed nation):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali_Empire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Songhai_Empire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Empire
I will however admit that the expansion into Sakhalin is comparable to British settlements in North America or perhaps Australia, being mostly a process of settling and taking new land with little use for the natives beyond small scale trade.
Several Less Wrong posters [1], [2], [3] have cited the interview with James Shikwati titled "For God's Sake, Please Stop the Aid!" as evidence that Western aid to Africa is actively destructive to Africa. According to the wikipedia page on James Shikwati:
I think it's important for those interested in the question of whether developing world aid is effective to look to those who can point to formal studies about the effectiveness of African aid rather than basing their judgments on quotes from individuals whose opinions may very well have been heavily skewed by selection bias and/or driven by ideological considerations which have nothing to do with the available evidence.
Engaging with the evidence in detail is a very time-consuming task and one beyond the scope of this blog entry. I will however quote various experts with links to useful references.
Divided Views On Overall Impact of Developing World Aid:
I've found Paul Collier to be apparently even-handed. Readers interested in studying the the effectiveness of developing world aid may like to study Paul Collier's papers on the subject. Paul Collier summarizes his views in his recent book titled The Bottom Billion.
An economist who is skeptical of Collier's analysis William Easterly, the author of The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. For those who are interested in the topic of the effectiveness of developing world aid, Easterly's papers are also worth taking a look at. In an article for Boston Review, Easterly writes:
My overall impression is that there's a fair amount of controversy as to whether African aid has increased economic growth in Africa. Different economists have different views and the evidence available does not seem sufficiently robust to support a confident belief that the net effect of aid has been positive or negative.
Much less controversial is the view that the best health Western interventions can and do systematically improve health in Africa.
The Case of Health:
In his article titled Can The West Save Africa? Easterly writes
According to the GiveWell page titled Why do we look for charities implementing proven programs:
Charities working on improving health in the developing world have variable effectiveness. It's plausible that by donating to one of GiveWell's top-rated charities one can have a substantially stronger positive effect than the one associated to a random such charity. In Charity Isn't About Helping? Holden says:
A Note on Malthusian Problems:
Those who are concerned about possible future Malthusian problems attached to saving lives should see Holden's email to the GiveWell research mailing list titled Population growth & health, the video linked therein, and papers by the speaker Hans Rosling. I presently believe that while it's possible that saving lives in the developing world does more harm than good on account of Malthusian problem, this is fairly unlikely and the expected value of saving lives in the developing world is strongly positive. Of course, my belief is subject to change with incoming evidence.
The Giving What We Can (GWWC) Myths About Aid page provides a suggestion for donors who are concerned about future Malthusian problems:
GWWC and GiveWell differ in that GWWC's top recommended charities are Schistosomiasis Control Initiative and Deworm the World which focus on neglected tropical diesease whereas GiveWell does not recommend these organizations. Holden explains GiveWell's position in Neglected Tropical Disease charities: Schistosomiasis Control Initiative, Deworm The World.
A Note on Overcorrecting Bias:
Many people's initial naive reaction to developing world aid is that it's a very good idea. This was certainly my own reaction as a child when I learned of Unicef. As Eliezer suggests in Can't Say No To Spending, there's a natural bias in favor of saying "yes" when asked to donate money help poor people - saying 'no' feels cold-hearted. Reading an author like Shikwati can dispel this bias by making possible unintended negative consequences salient, but often at the cost of giving rise to a new bias against developing world aid. Reading Sachs' remarks on Shikwati quoted in the introduction of this article can dispel this bias at the cost of introducing a new bias in favor of developing world aid. But Sachs' own position has garnered seemingly valid criticism from William Easterly and others - learning of this introduces a bias against Sachs and his views and in favor of Easterly and his views. There's the usual issue of there being a halo effect as described in Yvain's excellent article titled The Trouble with "Good" - when person X debunks person Y's apparently erroneous claim, this makes person X look unwarrentedly superior to person Y overall.
It's difficult to know who to trust when ostensible experts disagree, any of whom may be exhibiting motivated cognition or even engaging in outright conscious self-serving deception. Nevertheless, one can reasonably can hope to arrive at a fairly good epistemological state by:
Habits (1)-(4) are conducive to converging on a relatively accurate epistemological position on a given matter.
Acknowledgment: Thanks to Carl Shulman for useful references and discussion about the subject of this article.