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Vladimir_Nesov comments on Rationality quotes: October 2010 - Less Wrong
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What do you mean by "chooses to believe"? Maybe, "happens to believe"? A choice is a result of deliberative procedure, and since you are specifically stating that (these salient in the current conversation) explicit reasoning procedures were not the cause of your belief, the belief doesn't seem to qualify as result of a choice.
(See also Absence of Evidence Is Evidence of Absence.)
When did that become the definition of "choice"? Oh dear, we may need to change that axiom in set theory. Just as well, I never really cared for that one anyways. One sock from every pair? As a result of a deliberative procedure? Give me a break.
But perhaps you can suggest a word. Not arbitrary choice, but arbitrary __. What is that word? To be honest, "decision" is the only alternative I can think of, and to my mind to "decide" sounds far more deliberative than to "choose".
I notice you don't suggest a label for my 'theological' position.
On June 14, 2008. (I almost feel like this should be cross-posted to the EY facts thread.)
I very much enjoyed your response. But some streak of masochism forces me to take it semi-seriously and respond.
I have no complaint with Eliezer extending the meaning of "choice" to include the results of deterministic search algorithms. I just object to having the meaning restricted to exclude a response to the request "Choose a number between 1 and 10".
Oh no, don't do that! Then I'd have to defend my assertion, which is clearly untenable.
How would it exclude that?
It would exclude that if someone happened to believe Vladimir_Nesov's dictum that
Most people, when choosing a number between 1 and 10, do not utilize "explicit reasoning procedures", and hence, according to VN, are not making a choice.
It is no big deal; I understand that VN has decided not to insist upon deliberation; but that provides the background to my masochistic impulse.
Oh! That's VN's wording, not EY's - in Cyan's link:
At no point does EY propose "deliberative procedure". I think Cyan was simply assuming that the definitions matched - I know I did.
The whole discussion seems to revolve around semantics. What is the actual problem?
(I considered making my grandparent comment more precise, to indicate that I was not discussing definitions, but the reasons behind the implicit question I posed in it stemming from the words you used. Since the straightforward incorrect interpretation is also straightforwardly void, I didn't. Yet you reply with more of the dictionary stuff.)
The actual question was, what did you mean by "choosing to believe", and what kind of process for arriving at that belief you referred to.
I mean that I examined the evidence and found the evidence inconclusive. Yet, like Pascal, I found that for various practical reasons I would need to make an assumption one way or the other. So I examined the evidence again, judged most characterizations of deities I had so far encountered to be implausible, given the evidence. At this stage, many, but not all, of my practical concerns were taken care of. So, my options, as I saw it, were to call myself an agnostic, or to call myself an atheist. I chose atheist, because it seemed less wimpy to me, and at that stage of my life, my self-image required me to be "bold'.
Now, let me ask you a question. What difference does it make what the process was? Even if the process were completely irrational, I would still be an atheist. An atheist who believes for reasons not all that different from those described by many thoughtful theists. Why are today's atheists so insistent on seeing themselves as universally rational and on seeing theists as universally irrational?
First, I don't think you did anything particularly irrational. Religions' descriptions of God or gods are pretty specific. If you don't see sufficient evidence for the existence of this very specific entity, then it makes sense not to be a believer. You're not a religious believer for perfectly rational reasons. Choosing to call yourself "atheist" instead of "agnostic" is a matter of choosing what to emphasize. "Atheist" makes the point that believing in God is unjustified; "Agnostic" makes the point that God is possible. Both can be true, and it's your own choice what label you prefer.
As for why atheists call themselves rational -- some of it may be pride, but some of it is justified. "Converts" to atheism, in particular, often deliberately decided to discard things they believed that made no sense. They not only developed doubts about theology, but they decided to take their own doubts seriously, to believe their own brains. It's a rare case when people have to make a pure choice between thought and non-thought.
I remember asking myself, "Yes, this is what my brain says, this is what the evidence says, this is what my conscience says -- but who am I to believe my own thoughts?" When you say, "Yes, dammit, I believe my own thoughts, I'll bet on thought, I'll bet on my own capacity to reason, because it's all I've got," it's a determination that sticks with you, and follows you into other topics.
Which is about as crazy as believing that God is likely. The not-0%-impossible point applies to God in about the same sense as to Santa Claus. If you want to specifically make the point that Santa Claus is possible, something is still seriously wrong with you, even if you stopped making the mistake of believing that Santa Claus is most certainly real.
As SarahC intimated above, it's very unlikely that a specific deity exists. But when you suggest that the probability of God is so unlikely as to make one crazy to entertain the possibility, I wonder what your definition of 'God' is.
Over the course of writing and revising this comment, I'm recalling that the context of God here on LessWrong is almost always that of an anthropomorphic, personal, intervening, laying-out-rules-you-better-not-break god. But consider how flexible the meaning can be from one context to another. In which case, could Perplexed comment on what sort of God he is choosing not believe in without sufficient evidence? With all this discussion of what atheism means, it might also be helpful to pin down if we mean different things by 'God'.
The question is "What sort of God do I disbelieve in?" with it understood that I have already admitted that my disbelief is not based on sufficient evidence.
My answer is that I do not believe in any being with supernatural powers, including beings who control computers in which I am being simulated. Such powers would be supernatural from my viewpoint, if not from their own. I don't believe such entities exist. That is reasonable. I believe that such entities do not exist. That is less reasonable. I plead guilty to this departure from ideal rationality.
Incidentally, a philosophy blog that I sometimes read is currently half-seriously asking the "What is a god, anyways?" question.
If you know that a certain belief is unreasonable, and in what direction it is unreasonable, how do you still believe it? (I mean that both in the sense of "Why would you?" and of "How can you?".) Is that not an instance of belief in self-deception?
I don't think so. And neither should you unless you think that God exists. That posting by Eliezer is about Tarski's litany - which I think I can recite without hypocrisy.
Since I believe that God does not exist, therefore I believe I have believed what I want to believe. It sounds far more disreputable than it really is.
To be honest, I have already discussed the issue of how much my decision (to believe that God does not exist) departs from Bayesian rationality and whether that departure from rationality matters. I would prefer not to discuss it further, unless it is to discuss it with a theist. That might lead to a more interesting discussion.
I think it is problematic that there is no immediate observable difference in behavior between the beliefs. I guess this is asking -- how does Perplexed know he has the stronger belief?
[nevermind this second paragraph, omitted, the lines between actions, beliefs, and choices seem so murky to me, I don't think there's any point in pursuing them]
The deliberative procedure doesn't have to be a good or reasonable deliberative procedure. (And yes, the axiom of choice is badly named.)
Perhaps "prefer" and "preference" would get across your believed lack of deliberation.
Perhaps he noticed that someone else answered, and had no quibble.