ArisKatsaris comments on A sense of logic - Less Wrong
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The relative in question already only considers the issues of belief vs disbelief, existence vs non-existence, as motivated by reward and punishment.
If God doesn't exist, the issue is moot (for the relative) If belief doesn't matter either way, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative). If reward and punishment isn't related to it, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative).
What I asked was therefore contingent to the following givens: 1) God exists 2) Belief in god matters 3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief.
And I mentioned the hypothesis that seemed to be missing from the whole above reasoning: "Why does the relative assume that belief will be rewarded and disbelief punished? Why can't it be the other way around?"
I think you might find that the reason that hypothesis is missing is because "belief is rewarded, disbelief punished" is taken as given #4. This relative appears to simply take whatever they want as a given, if we are starting at "1) God exists 2) Belief in god matters 3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief."