[link] Betting on bad futures
Garett Jones, an economist at George Mason University and guest blogger for EconLog, suggests a way for people to bet on apocalyptic events: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/09/how_to_bet_on_b.html The basic idea: Suppose Alice and Bob disagree on whether the world will end a year from tomorrow, with Alice believing it will end. If she is right, then there will be no way to settle the bet, what with the apocalypse and all that. Thus there is no way for her to collect, and so she has no incentive to bet on the apocalypse, no matter how certain she is. Or so it would seem! The way around the difficulty is simply for Alice to get her money today, and enjoy it for a year. If she turns out to have been right, then she will have been paid properly. If the world doesn't end, then of course she'll have to return the money, plus interest--plus a penalty for being wrong. The actual terms should depend on the confidence Alice and Bob place in their respective positions. Personal note: Several people at my place of work have told me that they are worried about the world ending later this year. They saw a movie about it, or something. So far, they have rejected my bet proposals.
Two points:
First, can you clarify what you mean by rational persuasion, if you are distinguishing it from logical proof? Do you mean that we can skip arguing for some premises because we can rely on our intuition to identify them as already shared? Or do you mean that we need not aim for deductive certainty--a lower confidence level is acceptable? Or something else?
Second, I appreciate this post because what Harris's disagreements with others so often need is exactly dissolution. And you've accurately described Harris's project: He is trying to persuade an ideal listener of moral claims (e.g., it's good to help people live happy and fulfilling lives), rather than trying to prove... (read more)