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TheOtherDave comments on Philosophy: A Diseased Discipline - Less Wrong
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I agree that your belief that you've coherently imagined X does not imply that X is coherently conceivable.
I agree that, if it were a fact that the zombie world were coherently conceivable, that could be evidence of something.
I don't understand your reasons for believing that the zombie world is coherently conceivable.
Are you assuming that in order for me to be able to justifiedly believe and reason from the premise that the zombie world is conceivable, I need to be able to give some independent justification for this belief? That way lies global skepticism.
I can tell you that the belief coheres well with my other beliefs, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for my being justified in believing it. There's no good reason to think that it's false. (Though again, I don't mean to suggest that this fact suffices to make it reasonable to believe.) Whether it's reasonable to believe depends, in part, on facts that cannot be agreed upon within this dialectic: namely, whether there really is any contradiction in the idea.
At the moment, I'm asking you what your reasons are for believing that the zombie world is coherently conceivable; I will defer passing judgment on them until I'm confident that I understand them, as I try to avoid judging things I don't understand.
So, no, I'm not making that assumption, though I'm not rejecting that assumption either.
Which of your other beliefs cohere better with a belief that the zombie world is coherently conceivable than with a belief that it isn't?