Strictly speaking, Kant does not say we have no information about reality, he says we cannot know if we have or not.

I don't think that Kant makes the distinction between "knowing" and "having information about" that you and I would make. If he doesn't outright deny that we have any information about the world beyond our senses, he certainly comes awfully close.

On A380, Kant writes,

If, therefore, as the present critique obviously requires of us, we remain true to the rule established earlier not to press our questions be­yond that with which possible experience and its objects can supply us, then it will not occur to us to seek information about what the objects of our senses may be in themselves, i.e., apart from any relation to the senses.

And, on A703/B731, he writes,

[I]f charming and plau­sible prospects did not lure us to reject the compulsion of these doc­trines [i.e., doctrines for which Kant has argued], then of course we might have been able to dispense with our painstaking examination of the dialectical witnesses which a transcen­dent reason brings forward on behalf of its pretensions; for we already knew beforehand with complete certainty that all their allegations, while perhaps honestly meant, had to be absolutely null and void, be­cause they dealt with information which no human being can ever get.

(Emphasis added. These are from the Guyer–Wood translation.)