Can we at least agree that these three imperatives
are not identical? There seems to a be "rationality thesis" here that the best way to go about 2. and 3. is to sort out 1. first. I would like to see this thesis stated more clearly.
This may very well be the case today, or in our society, but it's not really difficult to imagine a society in which you have to 'hold' really crazy idea in order to win. Also, believing true things is an endeavour which is never completed per se: it surely is not possible to have it sorted out simpliciter before attaining 2 (the third imperative I really see as a subgoal of the second one).
The thesis after all conflicts with basically all history of humanity: homo sapiens has won more and more without attaining a perfect accuracy. However it seems to me t...
Today's post, The Martial Art of Rationality was originally published on November 22, 2006. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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