I'm having trouble with this post.

First I was like wha because I didn't see a clear way for a judgment to be a rationalization. It took me awhile to figure out what was meant. If anyone else happens to be similarly confused, Greene's explanation is: "Deontology, then, is a kind of moral confabulation. We have strong feelings that tell us in clear and uncertain terms that some things simply cannot be done and that other things simply must be done. But it is not obvious how to make sense of these feelings, and so we, with the help of some especially creative philosophers, make up a rationally appealing story: There are these things called 'rights' which people have, and when someone has a right you can’t do anything that would take it away."

The emphasis on common folk strikes me as unfortunate in itself. Such focus makes me wary; equivocation becomes too easy, as do apparent victories. Even when data about common folk isn't used for propaganda the mind still treats it as an example of stupidity, any reversal of which gets bonus points.

But the equivocation is my real problem. I dislike the terminology and think it is insidious. "Utilitarian" and "deontological" modules? "Deontological" judgment? The connection between the folk morality of the common man and the deontologies of the philosophers is not well-made in this post; hinting that the same neurological processes could perhaps lead to both, based on a few studies, just isn't enough to justify the provocative terminology. Indeed, the key link is basically skipped over:

First, it could be that both kinds of moral judgment are generally 'cognitive', as Kohlberg’s theories suggest (Kohlberg, 1971). At the other extreme, it could be that both kinds of moral judgment are primarily emotional, as Haidt’s view suggests (Haidt, 2001). Then there is the historical stereotype, according to which consequentialism is more emotional (emerging from the 'sentimentalist' tradition of David Hume (1740) and Adam Smith (1759) while deontology is more 'cognitive' [including the Kantian 'rationalist' tradition: see Kant (1785)]. Finally, there is the view for which I will argue, that deontology is more emotionally driven while consequentialism is more 'cognitive.'

We have already seen the neuroscientific evidence in favor of Greene's view. Now, let us turn to further evidence from the work of Jon Haidt.

I do not see how the evidence supports Greene's view. It can be argued that it does, but the obvious arguments do not seem particularly strong. I do not find the relevant parts of Greene's "The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul" very persuasive---indeed I find them mildly anti-persuasive. ('I'm sure that the proponents of the philosophical position I am tarring with low status associations would disagree with me, but you see, religious people would act similarly and would also be wrong' is a really obnoxious approach to conceptual gardening.)

Individuals who are (1) high in "need for cognition" and low in "faith in intuition", or (2) score well on the Cognitive Reflection Test, or (3) have unusually high working memory capacity... all give more utilitarian judgments.

I would bet that most deontologist philosophers fit those specifications, especially the most influential ones.

The experiments were done over very short timescales. Philosophers think over very long timescales. It's not clear to what extent data from the former can tell us about the reasons of the latter.

bla bla words bla equivocation something bla too tired to write in a way that humans can understand, organizing points too difficult, stupid signalling constantly so as not to tread on toes. bla bla complaints about terminology. bla meta level stuff about being cautious, principle of charity, bla. insert some placating thing or another.

ETA: TLDR: This post seems to implicitly bully a half-straw man and I don't see what it's supposed to teach us. Luke, might you explain your motivations a little more?