Accordingly my "God hypothesis" posterior probability has not updated in a very long time. I am, for example, not aware of what evidence there exists AT ALL with which to update this prior, but I suppose this is just because my posterior mass, conditional on the God hypothesis, came to rest, long ago, on a very non-falsifiable, (arguably science-compatible) version of belief in God. I.e. belief in a God who "operates all in accord with His will", but who also does this exactly through the naturalistic mechanisms that we see operating all the time and not through miraculous interventions. Or, to be more precise, another indistinguishable possibility is that God is perpetrating miraculous interventions continuously, and just consistently wills to do them in exactly the way that the true but unknown "laws of nature" predict. It remains possible that God could revoke this policy at some future time: this does not require much Kolmogorov complexity.

What evidence was there in the first place to promote to your attention the hypothesis of a naturalistic god over no god at all? If you don't have any particular evidence that favors a naturalistic god over no god, surely the hypothesis of no god requires less complexity.

A Bayesian might never abandon possibilities to which he or she assigns prior mass without new evidence, but in addition to evidence that shifts the posterior, one can also revise a belief on information that suggests that an inappropriate prior was assigned to begin with.