MileyCyrus comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012) - Less Wrong
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It's a lot more hard-edged than intelligence. Of all the animals (I'm talking about individual animals, not species) in the world, practically all are really close to 0% or 100% human. On the other hand, there is a broad range of intelligence among animals, and even in humans. So if you want a standard that draws a clean line, humanity is better than intelligence.
I can tell the difference between an uploaded/frozen human, and a pig. Even a uploaded/frozen pig. Transhumans are in the preferential treatment category, but transpigs aren't..
This is a fully general counter-argument. Any standard of moral worth will have certain objects that meet the standard and certain objects that fail. If you say "All objects that have X property have moral worth", I can immediately accuse you of eugenics against objects that do not have X property.
And a question for you :If you think that more intelligence equals more moral worth, does that mean that AI superintelligences have super moral worth? If existed, would you try and maximize the number of paperclips in order to satisfy the wants a superior intelligence?
It was a question, not an objection, one which you didn't quite answer. Do you get less and less preferential treatment as you become less and less human?
Again, this was a question, not an objection, and again you didn't quite answer the question. What's the standard against which beings are compared to determine how "human" they are? In what sense are uploaded humans still humans?
Also, I'll believe you can tell the difference between an uploaded adult human and an uploaded pig, at least given five minutes' conversation, but I'm much less certain you could tell the difference between an uploaded pig and an uploaded baby.
Not quite the way I meant it. My objection is this: I'm OK with beings being treated less well because they are less people. I'm not OK with people being treated less well because they are less human. In particular, the prospect that we might both agree something is completely a person but you might think it deserves less moral weight because it isn't human is, frankly, scary - especially because we might disagree on whether or not it is human, even without disagreeing about whether or not it's a person.