timtyler comments on Should we discount extraordinary implications? - Less Wrong

9 Post author: XiXiDu 29 December 2011 02:51PM

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Comment author: timtyler 31 December 2011 01:40:48PM *  0 points [-]

It has nothing to do with recourse limitations, the problem is that Solomonoff induction itself can't handle Pascal's mugging.

In what way? You think that Solomonoff induction would predict enormous torture with a non-negligible propbability if it observed the mugger not being paid? Why do you think that? That conclusion seems extremely unlikely to me - assumung that the Solomonoff induction had had a reasonable amount of previous exposure of the world. It would, like any sensible agent, assume that the mugger was lying.

That's why the original Pascal's mugging post post directed its criticism at "some bounded analogue of Solomonoff induction".

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 31 December 2011 06:58:25PM 2 points [-]

In what way? You think that Solomonoff induction would predict enormous torture with a non-negligible propbability if it observed the mugger not being paid?

Because Solomonoff induction bases its priors on minimum message length and it's possible to encode enormous numbers like 3^^^3 in a message of length much less then 3^^^3.

Why do you think that?

Because I understand mathematics. ;)

That's why the original Pascal's mugging post post directed its criticism at "some bounded analogue of Solomonoff induction".

What Eliezer was referring to is the fact that an unbounded agent would attempt to incorporate all possible versions of Pascal's wager and Pascal's mugging simultaneously and promptly end up with an ∞ − ∞ error.

Comment author: timtyler 02 January 2012 12:39:19AM *  0 points [-]

You think that Solomonoff induction would predict enormous torture with a non-negligible propbability if it observed the mugger not being paid?

Because Solomonoff induction bases its priors on minimum message length and it's possible to encode enormous numbers like 3^^^3 in a message of length much less then 3^^^3.

Sure - but the claim there are large numbers of people waiting to be tortured also decreases in probability with the number of people involved.

I figure that Solomonoff induction would give a (correct) tiny probability for this hypothesis being correct.

Your problem is actually not with Solomonoff induction - despite what you say - I figure. Rather you are complaining about some decision theory application of Solomonoff induction - involving the concept of "utility".

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 02 January 2012 04:27:06AM 2 points [-]

Because Solomonoff induction bases its priors on minimum message length and it's possible to encode enormous numbers like 3^^^3 in a message of length much less then 3^^^3.

Sure - but the claim there are large numbers of people waiting to be tortured also decreases in probability with the number of people involved.

What does this have to do with my point.

I figure that Solomonoff induction would give a (correct) tiny probability for this hypothesis being correct.

It does, just not tiny enough to override the 3^^^3 utility difference.

Your problem is actually not with Solomonoff induction - despite what you say - I figure. Rather you are complaining about some decision theory application of Solomonoff induction - involving the concept of "utility".

I don't have a problem with anything, I'm just trying to correct misconceptions about Pascal's mugging.

Comment author: timtyler 02 January 2012 12:11:36PM 1 point [-]

I'm just trying to correct misconceptions about Pascal's mugging.

Well, your claim was that "Solomonoff induction itself can't handle Pascal's mugging" - which appears to be unsubstantiated nonsense. Solomonoff induction will give the correct answer based on Occamian priors and its past experience - which is the best that anyone could reasonably expect from it.