orthonormal comments on The Savage theorem and the Ellsberg paradox - Less Wrong
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I wonder if people's responses will change if they can verify that the unknown proportion of green/blue was chosen using "fair" randomness. When I imagine a bastard experimenter in the loop, I lean toward Nash equilibrium considerations like "choosing red is less exploitable than choosing green" and "choosing green+blue is less exploitable than choosing red+blue".
This is exactly my reaction too: when faced with any situation where another agent might influence outcomes, people naturally think more in terms of game theory and minimaxing than probabilities. (Of course, here minimaxing is applied to probabilistic gambles, but the volunteer presumes the "30 red balls" rule to be less subject to manipulation than the balance of green vs. blue.)