Something has been bothering me about Newcomb's problem, and I recently figured out what it is.
It seems to simultaneously postulate that backwards causality is impossible and that you have repeatedly observed backwards causality. If we allow your present decision to affect the past, the problem disappears, and you pick the million dollar box.
In real life, we have a strong expectation that the future can't affect the past, but in the Newcomb problem we have pretty good evidence that it can.
Short answer: Yup. Because Omega is a perfect or near-perfect predictor, your decision is logically antecedent, but not chronologically antecedent, to Omega's decision. People like Michael Vassar, Vladimir Nesov, and Will Newsome think and talk about this sort of thing more often than the average lesswronger.
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.
(I plan to make these threads from now on. Downvote if you disapprove. If I miss one, feel free to do it yourself.)