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cousin_it comments on Rationality Quotes March 2012 - Less Wrong
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Real intellectuals shouldn't know things that science doesn't know.
Then science would have nothing to learn from them.
Why? They could submit their tentative results to science, wait for verification, and only then become confident. In fact I think that's the right way.
What about philosophy? Science doesn't know about philosophy of science, yet a real intellectual should know about philosophy of science. Do you mean "science" in a really broad sense or "intellectual" in a really narrow sense?
I don't understand your question yet. Can you give an example statement that philosophy of science knows but science doesn't?
"A mature science, according to Kuhn, experiences alternating phases of normal science and revolutions. In normal science the key theories, instruments, values and metaphysical assumptions that comprise the disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, permitting the cumulative generation of puzzle-solutions, whereas in a scientific revolution the disciplinary matrix undergoes revision, in order to permit the solution of the more serious anomalous puzzles that disturbed the preceding period of normal science." -- SEP on Kuhn
?
This is an instance of "X said Y". Science isn't forbidden from knowing that X said Y, but such knowledge is mostly useless and I'm not sure why people should bother learning it. The only interesting question is which bits of Y stay true without the "X said".
I suspect that Will meant that "A mature science experiences alternating phases of normal science and revolutions. In normal science the key theories, instruments, values and metaphysical assumptions that comprise the disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, permitting the cumulative generation of puzzle-solutions, whereas in a scientific revolution the disciplinary matrix undergoes revision, in order to permit the solution of the more serious anomalous puzzles that disturbed the preceding period of normal science." is a statement of philosophy of science, and consequently (according to Will) something that science doesn't know, and that the "according to Kuhn" part is irrelevant.
I suspect that your response is that, insofar as that statement is true and meaningful, science does know it.
If I'm wrong about either of those suspicions I'll be very surprised and inclined to update strongly accordingly, but I'm not yet sure in what directions beyond sharply reduced confidence that I understand either of you.
Science doesn't know everything that's true. Make it "insofar as that statement is scientifically proven" :-)
Mm, yes.
And much as I ought to distrust myself for saying this after having previously said I'd be very surprised and significantly update if I was wrong: "well, yes, that's what I meant."
I am chagrined.
I think the trouble here is that 'science' is a somewhat loosely held together institution of journals, technical practices, university departments, labs, etc. It doesn't 'know' anything, any more than it speculates, opines, believes, doubts, or worries. People know things, often (perhaps entirely) by engaging with other people.
(I thought User:cousin_it was making a descriptive statement about what academia thinks intellectuals should know, 'cuz as a normative statement it's obviously wrong.)