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ArisKatsaris comments on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 11 - Less Wrong
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Comments (1174)
I don't mind the downvote -- but consider reversing it if my theory is proven right next chapter. :-)
If I know Vladimir at all then he will not - because to do so would be an error. Overconfidence is a function of your confidence and the information that you have available at the time. Vladimir finding out that it so happens that Eliezer writes the same solution that you do does not significantly alter his perception of how much information you had at the time you wrote that comment.
Even if you win a lottery buying the lottery ticket was still a bad decision.
I understand your point, but I'm not sure the analogy is quite correct. In the case of the lottery, where the probabilities are well known, to make a bad bet is just bad (even if chances goes your way).
In this case however, our estimated probabilities derive ultimately from our models of Eliezer in his authoring capacity. If Vladimir derives a lower probability than the one I derived on Harry using the solution I stated, and it ends up my theory is indeed correct, that is evidence that his model of Eliezer is worse than mine. So he should update his model accordingly, and indeed reconsider whether I was actually overconfident or not. (Ofcourse he may reach the conclusion that even with his updated model, I was still overconfident)
I think Eliezer's policy as expressed here is better.
And, looking at the context, not particularly relevant.
When they are not yet shown to be right downvoting is perfectly reasonable. Changing your votes retrospectively is not always correct.
Unless Eliezer believes the information available to AK is sufficient to justify being 'Very Sure' I do not believe Eliezer's actual or expressed policy suggests reversing votes if he is lucky. In fact my comment about lottery mistakes is a massively understated reference to what he has written on the subject (if I recall correctly).
Not that I advocate deferring to Eliezer here. If he thinks you can't be overconfident and right at the same time he is just plain wrong. This is one of the most prevalent human biases.
I believe Eliezer's policy is to criticize people when they're wrong. If they say something right for the wrong reason, wait; they'll say something wrong soon enough.
A number of reviewers said they learned important lessons in rationality from the exercise, seeing the reasoning that got it right contrasted to the reasoning that got it wrong. Did you?
What do you mean by 'right' here? Do you mean "made correct predictions about which decisions Eliezer would choose for Harry?" While exploring the solutions I am rather careful to keep evaluations of how practical, rational (and, I'll admit, "how awesome") a solution is completely distinct from predictions about which particular practical, rational and possibly awesome solution an author will choose. I tend to focus on the former far more because I hate guessing passwords.
I'll respond again when I've had a chance to do more than skim the chapter and evaluate the reasoning properly.
How sure are you?
85%
Bet?
I don't know you. Can you get someone whose word I reasonably trust, like Alicorn or Nancylebov or Yvain or Eliezer to vouch for you?
Your concern is reasonable. The only person on these forums who has any reason to trust me with money is Mitchell_Porter. Would his word be sufficient?
If Mitchell vouches for you, I'm willing to make a bet specified as follows:
- I'm willing to bet 7 of my dollars to every 3 of yours (to provide me with sufficient margin to make the bet profitable for me, including any uncertainty of followthrough) from a minimum of $35 of mine ($15 of yours), up to a maximum of $210 of mine (90$ of yours)
- If invoking the debt Lucius owes to Harry is only part of Harry's solution, that still counts as a successful prediction for me. It also doesn't need be called a "life-debt", if it's a lesser type of debt, that still counts. If Harry only threatens to invoke or redeem it, but doesn't actually officially "invoke" or "redeem", that still counts. If Harry claims it for a debt but the Wizengamot disagrees it is one, that still counts. (And if Eliezer states outright I figured it out, ofcourse I win then too)
- Paypal would be my preferred method of money transfer.
I will take this bet, with the following stipulations:
Done.
Please PM paypal info.
You're obviously a sock puppet (not a bad one, just an anonymous one.) So I just pictured Eliezer making a sock puppet account specifically to take bets on what's going to happen in HPMoR.
My model of EY says that isn't something he would do, but I find the concept hilarious, nonetheless. (And had many giggles while imagining scheming!Eliezer posting good plot ideas he DIDN'T use under a sock account, and then swooping in as another sock to offer bets on said idea, while laughing evilly (can't ignore the Evil Laugh), and raking in the dough :P)
At Anna and Carl's wedding, I advanced a MoR prediction, which Eliezer offered to confirm/deny iff I first made bets with all present, and I won something like $50 =)
I vouch. :-)
Voting up all comments in this exchange for being virtuous.
The great thing about being the author is that you get to go "BUURRRNNN" seven days before everyone else.
More seriously - I don't think Aris Katsaris was being overconfident. Methods is meant to be solvable; correct solutions should snap firmly into place. The vast amount of overcomplication and hint-denial and stretching that goes on elsewhere shouldn't make people less confident if they're perceiving actual solutions, because those still snap just as firmly into place.