I feel like I've already responded to this argument multiple times in various other responses I've made. If you think there's something I've overlooked in those responses let me know, but this seems like a restatement of things I've already addressed. Also, if there is something in one of the responses I've made with which you disagree and have a different reason than what's been presented, let me know.

Hunter gathers is not something sustainable for a large scale complex society. It is not a position we would favor at all and I'm struggling to see why an AI would try to make us value that set up or how you think a society with technology strong enough to make strong AI would be able to be convinced to it.

Views of killing animals is more flexible as the reason humans object to it seems to come from a level of innate compassion for life itself. So I could see that value being more manipulatable as a result. I don't see what that has to do with a doomsday set of values though.

1950s gener roles were abandoned because (1) women didn't like it (in which case maximizing people's well being would suggest not having such gender roles) and (2) it was less productive for society in that suppressing women limits the set of contributions to society.

I don't think you've presented here a set of doomsday values to which humans could be manipulated to holding by persuasion alone or demonstrated why they would be a set of values the AI would prefer humans to have for maximization.

We also didn't conquer Japan, we won the war. Those are two different things.

And as for the others? Or are you saying the AI trying to maximize well-being will try and succeed in effectively wiping out everyone and then condition future generations to have the desired easily maximized values? If so, this behavior is conditioned on the idea that the AI could be very confident in its ability to do so, because otherwise the chance of failing and the cost of war in expected value of human well-being would massively drop the expected value. I think you should also make clear what you think these values might end up being to which it will try to change human values to more easily maximize.

You're missing the point of talking about opposition. The AI doesn't want the outcome of opposition because that has terrible effects on the well-being its trying to maximize, unlike the nazis. This isn't about winning the war, its about the consequence of war on the measured well-being of people and other people who live in a society where an AI would kill people for what amounted to thought-crime.

And if the machine thinks that's the best way to make people happy (for whatever horrible reason--perhaps it is convinced by the Repugnant Conclusion and wants to maximize utility by wiping out all the immiserated Russians), we're still in trouble.

This specifically violates the assumption that the AI has well modeled how any given human measures their well-being.

However, if you're trying to describe an AI that is set to maximize human value, understands the complexities of the human mind, and won't make such mistakes, then you are describing friendly AI.

It is the assumption that it models human well-being at least as well as the best a human can model the well-being function of another. However, this constraint by itself does not solve friendly AI, because in a less constrained problem than the one I outlined, the most common response for an AI trying to maximize what humans value is that it will change and rewire what humans value to something more easy to maximize. The entire purpose of this post is to question whether it could achieve this without the ability to manually rewire human values (e.g., could this be done through persuasion?). In other words, you're claiming friendly AI is solved more easily than the constrained question I posed in the post.