This post presents thoughts on the Singularity Institute from Holden Karnofsky, Co-Executive Director of GiveWell. Note: Luke Muehlhauser, the Executive Director of the Singularity Institute, reviewed a draft of this post, and commented: "I do generally agree that your complaints are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI). I am working to address both categories of issues." I take Luke's comment to be a significant mark in SI's favor, because it indicates an explicit recognition of the problems I raise, and thus increases my estimate of the likelihood that SI will work to address them.

September 2012 update: responses have been posted by Luke and Eliezer (and I have responded in the comments of their posts). I have also added acknowledgements.

The Singularity Institute (SI) is a charity that GiveWell has been repeatedly asked to evaluate. In the past, SI has been outside our scope (as we were focused on specific areas such as international aid). With GiveWell Labs we are open to any giving opportunity, no matter what form and what sector, but we still do not currently plan to recommend SI; given the amount of interest some of our audience has expressed, I feel it is important to explain why. Our views, of course, remain open to change. (Note: I am posting this only to Less Wrong, not to the GiveWell Blog, because I believe that everyone who would be interested in this post will see it here.)

I am currently the GiveWell staff member who has put the most time and effort into engaging with and evaluating SI. Other GiveWell staff currently agree with my bottom-line view that we should not recommend SI, but this does not mean they have engaged with each of my specific arguments. Therefore, while the lack of recommendation of SI is something that GiveWell stands behind, the specific arguments in this post should be attributed only to me, not to GiveWell.

Summary of my views

  • The argument advanced by SI for why the work it's doing is beneficial and important seems both wrong and poorly argued to me. My sense at the moment is that the arguments SI is making would, if accepted, increase rather than decrease the risk of an AI-related catastrophe. More
  • SI has, or has had, multiple properties that I associate with ineffective organizations, and I do not see any specific evidence that its personnel/organization are well-suited to the tasks it has set for itself. More
  • A common argument for giving to SI is that "even an infinitesimal chance that it is right" would be sufficient given the stakes. I have written previously about why I reject this reasoning; in addition, prominent SI representatives seem to reject this particular argument as well (i.e., they believe that one should support SI only if one believes it is a strong organization making strong arguments). More
  • My sense is that at this point, given SI's current financial state, withholding funds from SI is likely better for its mission than donating to it. (I would not take this view to the furthest extreme; the argument that SI should have some funding seems stronger to me than the argument that it should have as much as it currently has.)
  • I find existential risk reduction to be a fairly promising area for philanthropy, and plan to investigate it further. More
  • There are many things that could happen that would cause me to revise my view on SI. However, I do not plan to respond to all comment responses to this post. (Given the volume of responses we may receive, I may not be able to even read all the comments on this post.) I do not believe these two statements are inconsistent, and I lay out paths for getting me to change my mind that are likely to work better than posting comments. (Of course I encourage people to post comments; I'm just noting in advance that this action, alone, doesn't guarantee that I will consider your argument.) More

Intent of this post

I did not write this post with the purpose of "hurting" SI. Rather, I wrote it in the hopes that one of these three things (or some combination) will happen:

  1. New arguments are raised that cause me to change my mind and recognize SI as an outstanding giving opportunity. If this happens I will likely attempt to raise more money for SI (most likely by discussing it with other GiveWell staff and collectively considering a GiveWell Labs recommendation).
  2. SI concedes that my objections are valid and increases its determination to address them. A few years from now, SI is a better organization and more effective in its mission.
  3. SI can't or won't make changes, and SI's supporters feel my objections are valid, so SI loses some support, freeing up resources for other approaches to doing good.

Which one of these occurs will hopefully be driven primarily by the merits of the different arguments raised. Because of this, I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.

Does SI have a well-argued case that its work is beneficial and important?

I know no more concise summary of SI's views than this page, so here I give my own impressions of what SI believes, in italics.

  1. There is some chance that in the near future (next 20-100 years), an "artificial general intelligence" (AGI) - a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way - will be created.
  2. This AGI will likely have a utility function and will seek to maximize utility according to this function.
  3. This AGI will be so much more powerful than humans - due to its superior intelligence - that it will be able to reshape the world to maximize its utility, and humans will not be able to stop it from doing so.
  4. Therefore, it is crucial that its utility function be one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want. A "Friendly" utility function is one that is reasonably harmonious with what humans want, such that a "Friendly" AGI (FAI) would change the world for the better (by human standards) while an "Unfriendly" AGI (UFAI) would essentially wipe out humanity (or worse).
  5. Unless great care is taken specifically to make a utility function "Friendly," it will be "Unfriendly," since the things humans value are a tiny subset of the things that are possible.
  6. Therefore, it is crucially important to develop "Friendliness theory" that helps us to ensure that the first strong AGI's utility function will be "Friendly." The developer of Friendliness theory could use it to build an FAI directly or could disseminate the theory so that others working on AGI are more likely to build FAI as opposed to UFAI.

From the time I first heard this argument, it has seemed to me to be skipping important steps and making major unjustified assumptions. However, for a long time I believed this could easily be due to my inferior understanding of the relevant issues. I believed my own views on the argument to have only very low relevance (as I stated in my 2011 interview with SI representatives). Over time, I have had many discussions with SI supporters and advocates, as well as with non-supporters who I believe understand the relevant issues well. I now believe - for the moment - that my objections are highly relevant, that they cannot be dismissed as simple "layman's misunderstandings" (as they have been by various SI supporters in the past), and that SI has not published anything that addresses them in a clear way.

Below, I list my major objections. I do not believe that these objections constitute a sharp/tight case for the idea that SI's work has low/negative value; I believe, instead, that SI's own arguments are too vague for such a rebuttal to be possible. There are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's public arguments (and the private arguments) do not make clear which possible response (if any) SI would choose to take up and defend. Hopefully the dialogue following this post will clarify what SI believes and why.

Some of my views are discussed at greater length (though with less clarity) in a public transcript of a conversation I had with SI supporter Jaan Tallinn. I refer to this transcript as "Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011."

Objection 1: it seems to me that any AGI that was set to maximize a "Friendly" utility function would be extraordinarily dangerous.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that SI manages to create what it believes to be an FAI. Suppose that it is successful in the "AGI" part of its goal, i.e., it has successfully created an intelligence vastly superior to human intelligence and extraordinarily powerful from our perspective. Suppose that it has also done its best on the "Friendly" part of the goal: it has developed a formal argument for why its AGI's utility function will be Friendly, it believes this argument to be airtight, and it has had this argument checked over by 100 of the world's most intelligent and relevantly experienced people. Suppose that SI now activates its AGI, unleashing it to reshape the world as it sees fit. What will be the outcome?

I believe that the probability of an unfavorable outcome - by which I mean an outcome essentially equivalent to what a UFAI would bring about - exceeds 90% in such a scenario. I believe the goal of designing a "Friendly" utility function is likely to be beyond the abilities even of the best team of humans willing to design such a function. I do not have a tight argument for why I believe this, but a comment on LessWrong by Wei Dai gives a good illustration of the kind of thoughts I have on the matter:

What I'm afraid of is that a design will be shown to be safe, and then it turns out that the proof is wrong, or the formalization of the notion of "safety" used by the proof is wrong. This kind of thing happens a lot in cryptography, if you replace "safety" with "security". These mistakes are still occurring today, even after decades of research into how to do such proofs and what the relevant formalizations are. From where I'm sitting, proving an AGI design Friendly seems even more difficult and error-prone than proving a crypto scheme secure, probably by a large margin, and there is no decades of time to refine the proof techniques and formalizations. There's good recent review of the history of provable security, titled Provable Security in the Real World, which might help you understand where I'm coming from.

I think this comment understates the risks, however. For example, when the comment says "the formalization of the notion of 'safety' used by the proof is wrong," it is not clear whether it means that the values the programmers have in mind are not correctly implemented by the formalization, or whether it means they are correctly implemented but are themselves catastrophic in a way that hasn't been anticipated. I would be highly concerned about both. There are other catastrophic possibilities as well; perhaps the utility function itself is well-specified and safe, but the AGI's model of the world is flawed (in particular, perhaps its prior or its process for matching observations to predictions are flawed) in a way that doesn't emerge until the AGI has made substantial changes to its environment.

By SI's own arguments, even a small error in any of these things would likely lead to catastrophe. And there are likely failure forms I haven't thought of. The overriding intuition here is that complex plans usually fail when unaccompanied by feedback loops. A scenario in which a set of people is ready to unleash an all-powerful being to maximize some parameter in the world, based solely on their initial confidence in their own extrapolations of the consequences of doing so, seems like a scenario that is overwhelmingly likely to result in a bad outcome. It comes down to placing the world's largest bet on a highly complex theory - with no experimentation to test the theory first.

So far, all I have argued is that the development of "Friendliness" theory can achieve at best only a limited reduction in the probability of an unfavorable outcome. However, as I argue in the next section, I believe there is at least one concept - the "tool-agent" distinction - that has more potential to reduce risks, and that SI appears to ignore this concept entirely. I believe that tools are safer than agents (even agents that make use of the best "Friendliness" theory that can reasonably be hoped for) and that SI encourages a focus on building agents, thus increasing risk.

Objection 2: SI appears to neglect the potentially important distinction between "tool" and "agent" AI.

Google Maps is a type of artificial intelligence (AI). It is far more intelligent than I am when it comes to planning routes.

Google Maps - by which I mean the complete software package including the display of the map itself - does not have a "utility" that it seeks to maximize. (One could fit a utility function to its actions, as to any set of actions, but there is no single "parameter to be maximized" driving its operations.)

Google Maps (as I understand it) considers multiple possible routes, gives each a score based on factors such as distance and likely traffic, and then displays the best-scoring route in a way that makes it easily understood by the user. If I don't like the route, for whatever reason, I can change some parameters and consider a different route. If I like the route, I can print it out or email it to a friend or send it to my phone's navigation application. Google Maps has no single parameter it is trying to maximize; it has no reason to try to "trick" me in order to increase its utility.

In short, Google Maps is not an agent, taking actions in order to maximize a utility parameter. It is a tool, generating information and then displaying it in a user-friendly manner for me to consider, use and export or discard as I wish.

Every software application I know of seems to work essentially the same way, including those that involve (specialized) artificial intelligence such as Google Search, Siri, Watson, Rybka, etc. Some can be put into an "agent mode" (as Watson was on Jeopardy!) but all can easily be set up to be used as "tools" (for example, Watson can simply display its top candidate answers to a question, with the score for each, without speaking any of them.)

The "tool mode" concept is importantly different from the possibility of Oracle AI sometimes discussed by SI. The discussions I've seen of Oracle AI present it as an Unfriendly AI that is "trapped in a box" - an AI whose intelligence is driven by an explicit utility function and that humans hope to control coercively. Hence the discussion of ideas such as the AI-Box Experiment. A different interpretation, given in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, is an AI with a carefully designed utility function - likely as difficult to construct as "Friendliness" - that leaves it "wishing" to answer questions helpfully. By contrast with both these ideas, Tool-AGI is not "trapped" and it is not Unfriendly or Friendly; it has no motivations and no driving utility function of any kind, just like Google Maps. It scores different possibilities and displays its conclusions in a transparent and user-friendly manner, as its instructions say to do; it does not have an overarching "want," and so, as with the specialized AIs described above, while it may sometimes "misinterpret" a question (thereby scoring options poorly and ranking the wrong one #1) there is no reason to expect intentional trickery or manipulation when it comes to displaying its results.

Another way of putting this is that a "tool" has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action A would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Summarize this calculation in a user-friendly manner, including what Action A is, what likely intermediate outcomes it would cause, what other actions would result in high values of P, etc." An "agent," by contrast, has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action, A, would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Execute Action A." In any AI where (1) is separable (by the programmers) as a distinct step, (2) can be set to the "tool" version rather than the "agent" version, and this separability is in fact present with most/all modern software. Note that in the "tool" version, neither step (1) nor step (2) (nor the combination) constitutes an instruction to maximize a parameter - to describe a program of this kind as "wanting" something is a category error, and there is no reason to expect its step (2) to be deceptive.

I elaborated further on the distinction and on the concept of a tool-AI in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.

This is important because an AGI running in tool mode could be extraordinarily useful but far more safe than an AGI running in agent mode. In fact, if developing "Friendly AI" is what we seek, a tool-AGI could likely be helpful enough in thinking through this problem as to render any previous work on "Friendliness theory" moot. Among other things, a tool-AGI would allow transparent views into the AGI's reasoning and predictions without any reason to fear being purposefully misled, and would facilitate safe experimental testing of any utility function that one wished to eventually plug into an "agent."

Is a tool-AGI possible? I believe that it is, and furthermore that it ought to be our default picture of how AGI will work, given that practically all software developed to date can (and usually does) run as a tool and given that modern software seems to be constantly becoming "intelligent" (capable of giving better answers than a human) in surprising new domains. In addition, it intuitively seems to me (though I am not highly confident) that intelligence inherently involves the distinct, separable steps of (a) considering multiple possible actions and (b) assigning a score to each, prior to executing any of the possible actions. If one can distinctly separate (a) and (b) in a program's code, then one can abstain from writing any "execution" instructions and instead focus on making the program list actions and scores in a user-friendly manner, for humans to consider and use as they wish.

Of course, there are possible paths to AGI that may rule out a "tool mode," but it seems that most of these paths would rule out the application of "Friendliness theory" as well. (For example, a "black box" emulation and augmentation of a human mind.) What are the paths to AGI that allow manual, transparent, intentional design of a utility function but do not allow the replacement of "execution" instructions with "communication" instructions? Most of the conversations I've had on this topic have focused on three responses:

  • Self-improving AI. Many seem to find it intuitive that (a) AGI will almost certainly come from an AI rewriting its own source code, and (b) such a process would inevitably lead to an "agent." I do not agree with either (a) or (b). I discussed these issues in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011 and will be happy to discuss them more if this is the line of response that SI ends up pursuing. Very briefly:
    • The idea of a "self-improving algorithm" intuitively sounds very powerful, but does not seem to have led to many "explosions" in software so far (and it seems to be a concept that could apply to narrow AI as well as to AGI).
    • It seems to me that a tool-AGI could be plugged into a self-improvement process that would be quite powerful but would also terminate and yield a new tool-AI after a set number of iterations (or after reaching a set "intelligence threshold"). So I do not accept the argument that "self-improving AGI means agent AGI." As stated above, I will elaborate on this view if it turns out to be an important point of disagreement.
    • I have argued (in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011) that the relevant self-improvement abilities are likely to come with or after - not prior to - the development of strong AGI. In other words, any software capable of the relevant kind of self-improvement is likely also capable of being used as a strong tool-AGI, with the benefits described above.
    • The SI-related discussions I've seen of "self-improving AI" are highly vague, and do not spell out views on the above points.
  • Dangerous data collection. Some point to the seeming dangers of a tool-AI's "scoring" function: in order to score different options it may have to collect data, which is itself an "agent" type action that could lead to dangerous actions. I think my definition of "tool" above makes clear what is wrong with this objection: a tool-AGI takes its existing data set D as fixed (and perhaps could have some pre-determined, safe set of simple actions it can take - such as using Google's API - to collect more), and if maximizing its chosen parameter is best accomplished through more data collection, it can transparently output why and how it suggests collecting more data. Over time it can be given more autonomy for data collection through an experimental and domain-specific process (e.g., modifying the AI to skip specific steps of human review of proposals for data collection after it has become clear that these steps work as intended), a process that has little to do with the "Friendly overarching utility function" concept promoted by SI. Again, I will elaborate on this if it turns out to be a key point.
  • Race for power. Some have argued to me that humans are likely to choose to create agent-AGI, in order to quickly gain power and outrace other teams working on AGI. But this argument, even if accepted, has very different implications from SI's view.

    Conventional wisdom says it is extremely dangerous to empower a computer to act in the world until one is very sure that the computer will do its job in a way that is helpful rather than harmful. So if a programmer chooses to "unleash an AGI as an agent" with the hope of gaining power, it seems that this programmer will be deliberately ignoring conventional wisdom about what is safe in favor of shortsighted greed. I do not see why such a programmer would be expected to make use of any "Friendliness theory" that might be available. (Attempting to incorporate such theory would almost certainly slow the project down greatly, and thus would bring the same problems as the more general "have caution, do testing" counseled by conventional wisdom.) It seems that the appropriate measures for preventing such a risk are security measures aiming to stop humans from launching unsafe agent-AIs, rather than developing theories or raising awareness of "Friendliness."

One of the things that bothers me most about SI is that there is practically no public content, as far as I can tell, explicitly addressing the idea of a "tool" and giving arguments for why AGI is likely to work only as an "agent." The idea that AGI will be driven by a central utility function seems to be simply assumed. Two examples:

  • I have been referred to Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 as the most up-to-date, clear explanation of SI's position on "the basics." This paper states, "Perhaps we could build an AI of limited cognitive ability — say, a machine that only answers questions: an 'Oracle AI.' But this approach is not without its own dangers (Armstrong, Sandberg, and Bostrom 2012)." However, the referenced paper (Armstrong, Sandberg and Bostrom 2012) seems to take it as a given that an Oracle AI is an "agent trapped in a box" - a computer that has a basic drive/utility function, not a Tool-AGI. The rest of Muehlhauser and Salamon 2012 seems to take it as a given that an AGI will be an agent.
  • I have often been referred to Omohundro 2008 for an argument that an AGI is likely to have certain goals. But this paper seems, again, to take it as given that an AGI will be an agent, i.e., that it will have goals at all. The introduction states, "To say that a system of any design is an 'artificial intelligence', we mean that it has goals which it tries to accomplish by acting in the world." In other words, the premise I'm disputing seems embedded in its very definition of AI.

The closest thing I have seen to a public discussion of "tool-AGI" is in Dreams of Friendliness, where Eliezer Yudkowsky considers the question, "Why not just have the AI answer questions, instead of trying to do anything? Then it wouldn't need to be Friendly. It wouldn't need any goals at all. It would just answer questions." His response:

To which the reply is that the AI needs goals in order to decide how to think: that is, the AI has to act as a powerful optimization process in order to plan its acquisition of knowledge, effectively distill sensory information, pluck "answers" to particular questions out of the space of all possible responses, and of course, to improve its own source code up to the level where the AI is a powerful intelligence. All these events are "improbable" relative to random organizations of the AI's RAM, so the AI has to hit a narrow target in the space of possibilities to make superintelligent answers come out.

This passage appears vague and does not appear to address the specific "tool" concept I have defended above (in particular, it does not address the analogy to modern software, which challenges the idea that "powerful optimization processes" cannot run in tool mode). The rest of the piece discusses (a) psychological mistakes that could lead to the discussion in question; (b) the "Oracle AI" concept that I have outlined above. The comments contain some more discussion of the "tool" idea (Denis Bider and Shane Legg seem to be picturing something similar to "tool-AGI") but the discussion is unresolved and I believe the "tool" concept defended above remains essentially unaddressed.

In sum, SI appears to encourage a focus on building and launching "Friendly" agents (it is seeking to do so itself, and its work on "Friendliness" theory seems to be laying the groundwork for others to do so) while not addressing the tool-agent distinction. It seems to assume that any AGI will have to be an agent, and to make little to no attempt at justifying this assumption. The result, in my view, is that it is essentially advocating for a more dangerous approach to AI than the traditional approach to software development.

Objection 3: SI's envisioned scenario is far more specific and conjunctive than it appears at first glance, and I believe this scenario to be highly unlikely.

SI's scenario concerns the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI): a computer that is vastly more intelligent than humans in every relevant way. But we already have many computers that are vastly more intelligent than humans in some relevant ways, and the domains in which specialized AIs outdo humans seem to be constantly and continuously expanding. I feel that the relevance of "Friendliness theory" depends heavily on the idea of a "discrete jump" that seems unlikely and whose likelihood does not seem to have been publicly argued for.

One possible scenario is that at some point, we develop powerful enough non-AGI tools (particularly specialized AIs) that we vastly improve our abilities to consider and prepare for the eventuality of AGI - to the point where any previous theory developed on the subject becomes useless. Or (to put this more generally) non-AGI tools simply change the world so much that it becomes essentially unrecognizable from the perspective of today - again rendering any previous "Friendliness theory" moot. As I said in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011, some of SI's work "seems a bit like trying to design Facebook before the Internet was in use, or even before the computer existed."

Perhaps there will be a discrete jump to AGI, but it will be a sort of AGI that renders "Friendliness theory" moot for a different reason. For example, in the practice of software development, there often does not seem to be an operational distinction between "intelligent" and "Friendly." (For example, my impression is that the only method programmers had for evaluating Watson's "intelligence" was to see whether it was coming up with the same answers that a well-informed human would; the only way to evaluate Siri's "intelligence" was to evaluate its helpfulness to humans.) "Intelligent" often ends up getting defined as "prone to take actions that seem all-around 'good' to the programmer." So the concept of "Friendliness" may end up being naturally and subtly baked in to a successful AGI effort.

The bottom line is that we know very little about the course of future artificial intelligence. I believe that the probability that SI's concept of "Friendly" vs. "Unfriendly" goals ends up seeming essentially nonsensical, irrelevant and/or unimportant from the standpoint of the relevant future is over 90%.

Other objections to SI's views

There are other debates about the likelihood of SI's work being relevant/helpful; for example,

  • It isn't clear whether the development of AGI is imminent enough to be relevant, or whether other risks to humanity are closer.
  • It isn't clear whether AGI would be as powerful as SI's views imply. (I discussed this briefly in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.)
  • It isn't clear whether even an extremely powerful UFAI would choose to attack humans as opposed to negotiating with them. (I find it somewhat helpful to analogize UFAI-human interactions to human-mosquito interactions. Humans are enormously more intelligent than mosquitoes; humans are good at predicting, manipulating, and destroying mosquitoes; humans do not value mosquitoes' welfare; humans have other goals that mosquitoes interfere with; humans would like to see mosquitoes eradicated at least from certain parts of the planet. Yet humans haven't accomplished such eradication, and it is easy to imagine scenarios in which humans would prefer honest negotiation and trade with mosquitoes to any other arrangement, if such negotiation and trade were possible.)

Unlike the three objections I focus on, these other issues have been discussed a fair amount, and if these other issues were the only objections to SI's arguments I would find SI's case to be strong (i.e., I would find its scenario likely enough to warrant investment in).

Wrapup

  • I believe the most likely future scenarios are the ones we haven't thought of, and that the most likely fate of the sort of theory SI ends up developing is irrelevance.
  • I believe that unleashing an all-powerful "agent AGI" (without the benefit of experimentation) would very likely result in a UFAI-like outcome, no matter how carefully the "agent AGI" was designed to be "Friendly." I see SI as encouraging (and aiming to take) this approach.
  • I believe that the standard approach to developing software results in "tools," not "agents," and that tools (while dangerous) are much safer than agents. A "tool mode" could facilitate experiment-informed progress toward a safe "agent," rather than needing to get "Friendliness" theory right without any experimentation.
  • Therefore, I believe that the approach SI advocates and aims to prepare for is far more dangerous than the standard approach, so if SI's work on Friendliness theory affects the risk of human extinction one way or the other, it will increase the risk of human extinction. Fortunately I believe SI's work is far more likely to have no effect one way or the other.

For a long time I refrained from engaging in object-level debates over SI's work, believing that others are better qualified to do so. But after talking at great length to many of SI's supporters and advocates and reading everything I've been pointed to as relevant, I still have seen no clear and compelling response to any of my three major objections. As stated above, there are many possible responses to my objections, but SI's current arguments do not seem clear on what responses they wish to take and defend. At this point I am unlikely to form a positive view of SI's work until and unless I do see such responses, and/or SI changes its positions.

Is SI the kind of organization we want to bet on?

This part of the post has some risks. For most of GiveWell's history, sticking to our standard criteria - and putting more energy into recommended than non-recommended organizations - has enabled us to share our honest thoughts about charities without appearing to get personal. But when evaluating a group such as SI, I can't avoid placing a heavy weight on (my read on) the general competence, capability and "intangibles" of the people and organization, because SI's mission is not about repeating activities that have worked in the past. Sharing my views on these issues could strike some as personal or mean-spirited and could lead to the misimpression that GiveWell is hostile toward SI. But it is simply necessary in order to be fully transparent about why I hold the views that I hold.

Fortunately, SI is an ideal organization for our first discussion of this type. I believe the staff and supporters of SI would overwhelmingly rather hear the whole truth about my thoughts - so that they can directly engage them and, if warranted, make changes - than have me sugar-coat what I think in order to spare their feelings. People who know me and my attitude toward being honest vs. sparing feelings know that this, itself, is high praise for SI.

One more comment before I continue: our policy is that non-public information provided to us by a charity will not be published or discussed without that charity's prior consent. However, none of the content of this post is based on private information; all of it is based on information that SI has made available to the public.

There are several reasons that I currently have a negative impression of SI's general competence, capability and "intangibles." My mind remains open and I include specifics on how it could be changed.

  • Weak arguments. SI has produced enormous quantities of public argumentation, and I have examined a very large proportion of this information. Yet I have never seen a clear response to any of the three basic objections I listed in the previous section. One of SI's major goals is to raise awareness of AI-related risks; given this, the fact that it has not advanced clear/concise/compelling arguments speaks, in my view, to its general competence.
  • Lack of impressive endorsements. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. I feel that given the enormous implications of SI's claims, if it argued them well it ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has.

    I have been pointed to Peter Thiel and Ray Kurzweil as examples of impressive SI supporters, but I have not seen any on-record statements from either of these people that show agreement with SI's specific views, and in fact (based on watching them speak at Singularity Summits) my impression is that they disagree. Peter Thiel seems to believe that speeding the pace of general innovation is a good thing; this would seem to be in tension with SI's view that AGI will be catastrophic by default and that no one other than SI is paying sufficient attention to "Friendliness" issues. Ray Kurzweil seems to believe that "safety" is a matter of transparency, strong institutions, etc. rather than of "Friendliness." I am personally in agreement with the things I have seen both of them say on these topics. I find it possible that they support SI because of the Singularity Summit or to increase general interest in ambitious technology, rather than because they find "Friendliness theory" to be as important as SI does.

    Clear, on-record statements from these two supporters, specifically endorsing SI's arguments and the importance of developing Friendliness theory, would shift my views somewhat on this point.

  • Resistance to feedback loops. I discussed this issue in my 2011 interview with SI representatives and I still feel the same way on the matter. SI seems to have passed up opportunities to test itself and its own rationality by e.g. aiming for objectively impressive accomplishments. This is a problem because of (a) its extremely ambitious goals (among other things, it seeks to develop artificial intelligence and "Friendliness theory" before anyone else can develop artificial intelligence); (b) its view of its staff/supporters as having unusual insight into rationality, which I discuss in a later bullet point.

    SI's list of achievements is not, in my view, up to where it needs to be given (a) and (b). Yet I have seen no declaration that SI has fallen short to date and explanation of what will be changed to deal with it. SI's recent release of a strategic plan and monthly updates are improvements from a transparency perspective, but they still leave me feeling as though there are no clear metrics or goals by which SI is committing to be measured (aside from very basic organizational goals such as "design a new website" and very vague goals such as "publish more papers") and as though SI places a low priority on engaging people who are critical of its views (or at least not yet on board), as opposed to people who are naturally drawn to it.

    I believe that one of the primary obstacles to being impactful as a nonprofit is the lack of the sort of helpful feedback loops that lead to success in other domains. I like to see groups that are making as much effort as they can to create meaningful feedback loops for themselves. I perceive SI as falling well short on this front. Pursuing more impressive endorsements and developing benign but objectively recognizable innovations (particularly commercially viable ones) are two possible ways to impose more demanding feedback loops. (I discussed both of these in my interview linked above).

  • Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality. Many of the things that SI and its supporters and advocates say imply a belief that they have special insights into the nature of general rationality, and/or have superior general rationality, relative to the rest of the population. (Examples here, here and here). My understanding is that SI is in the process of spinning off a group dedicated to training people on how to have higher general rationality.

    Yet I'm not aware of any of what I consider compelling evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have any special insight into the nature of general rationality or that they have especially high general rationality.

    I have been pointed to the Sequences on this point. The Sequences (which I have read the vast majority of) do not seem to me to be a demonstration or evidence of general rationality. They are about rationality; I find them very enjoyable to read; and there is very little they say that I disagree with (or would have disagreed with before I read them). However, they do not seem to demonstrate rationality on the part of the writer, any more than a series of enjoyable, not-obviously-inaccurate essays on the qualities of a good basketball player would demonstrate basketball prowess. I sometimes get the impression that fans of the Sequences are willing to ascribe superior rationality to the writer simply because the content seems smart and insightful to them, without making a critical effort to determine the extent to which the content is novel, actionable and important. 

    I endorse Eliezer Yudkowsky's statement, "Be careful … any time you find yourself defining the [rationalist] as someone other than the agent who is currently smiling from on top of a giant heap of utility." To me, the best evidence of superior general rationality (or of insight into it) would be objectively impressive achievements (successful commercial ventures, highly prestigious awards, clear innovations, etc.) and/or accumulation of wealth and power. As mentioned above, SI staff/supporters/advocates do not seem particularly impressive on these fronts, at least not as much as I would expect for people who have the sort of insight into rationality that makes it sensible for them to train others in it. I am open to other evidence that SI staff/supporters/advocates have superior general rationality, but I have not seen it.

    Why is it a problem if SI staff/supporter/advocates believe themselves, without good evidence, to have superior general rationality? First off, it strikes me as a belief based on wishful thinking rather than rational inference. Secondly, I would expect a series of problems to accompany overconfidence in one's general rationality, and several of these problems seem to be actually occurring in SI's case:

    • Insufficient self-skepticism given how strong its claims are and how little support its claims have won. Rather than endorsing "Others have not accepted our arguments, so we will sharpen and/or reexamine our arguments," SI seems often to endorse something more like "Others have not accepted their arguments because they have inferior general rationality," a stance less likely to lead to improvement on SI's part.
    • Being too selective (in terms of looking for people who share its preconceptions) when determining whom to hire and whose feedback to take seriously.
    • Paying insufficient attention to the limitations of the confidence one can have in one's untested theories, in line with my Objection 1.
  • Overall disconnect between SI's goals and its activities. SI seeks to build FAI and/or to develop and promote "Friendliness theory" that can be useful to others in building FAI. Yet it seems that most of its time goes to activities other than developing AI or theory. Its per-person output in terms of publications seems low. Its core staff seem more focused on Less Wrong posts, "rationality training" and other activities that don't seem connected to the core goals; Eliezer Yudkowsky, in particular, appears (from the strategic plan) to be focused on writing books for popular consumption. These activities seem neither to be advancing the state of FAI-related theory nor to be engaging the sort of people most likely to be crucial for building AGI.

    A possible justification for these activities is that SI is seeking to promote greater general rationality, which over time will lead to more and better support for its mission. But if this is SI's core activity, it becomes even more important to test the hypothesis that SI's views are in fact rooted in superior general rationality - and these tests don't seem to be happening, as discussed above.

  • Theft. I am bothered by the 2009 theft of $118,803.00 (as against a $541,080.00 budget for the year). In an organization as small as SI, it really seems as though theft that large relative to the budget shouldn't occur and that it represents a major failure of hiring and/or internal controls.

    In addition, I have seen no public SI-authorized discussion of the matter that I consider to be satisfactory in terms of explaining what happened and what the current status of the case is on an ongoing basis. Some details may have to be omitted, but a clear SI-authorized statement on this point with as much information as can reasonably provided would be helpful.

A couple positive observations to add context here:

  • I see significant positive qualities in many of the people associated with SI. I especially like what I perceive as their sincere wish to do whatever they can to help the world as much as possible, and the high value they place on being right as opposed to being conventional or polite. I have not interacted with Eliezer Yudkowsky but I greatly enjoy his writings.
  • I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years, particularly regarding the last couple of statements listed above. That said, SI is an organization and it seems reasonable to judge it by its organizational track record, especially when its new leadership is so new that I have little basis on which to judge these staff.

Wrapup

While SI has produced a lot of content that I find interesting and enjoyable, it has not produced what I consider evidence of superior general rationality or of its suitability for the tasks it has set for itself. I see no qualifications or achievements that specifically seem to indicate that SI staff are well-suited to the challenge of understanding the key AI-related issues and/or coordinating the construction of an FAI. And I see specific reasons to be pessimistic about its suitability and general competence.

When estimating the expected value of an endeavor, it is natural to have an implicit "survivorship bias" - to use organizations whose accomplishments one is familiar with (which tend to be relatively effective organizations) as a reference class. Because of this, I would be extremely wary of investing in an organization with apparently poor general competence/suitability to its tasks, even if I bought fully into its mission (which I do not) and saw no other groups working on a comparable mission.

But if there's even a chance …

A common argument that SI supporters raise with me is along the lines of, "Even if SI's arguments are weak and its staff isn't as capable as one would like to see, their goal is so important that they would be a good investment even at a tiny probability of success."

I believe this argument to be a form of Pascal's Mugging and I have outlined the reasons I believe it to be invalid in two posts (here and here). There have been some objections to my arguments, but I still believe them to be valid. There is a good chance I will revisit these topics in the future, because I believe these issues to be at the core of many of the differences between GiveWell-top-charities supporters and SI supporters.

Regardless of whether one accepts my specific arguments, it is worth noting that the most prominent people associated with SI tend to agree with the conclusion that the "But if there's even a chance …" argument is not valid. (See comments on my post from Michael Vassar and Eliezer Yudkowsky as well as Eliezer's interview with John Baez.)

Existential risk reduction as a cause

I consider the general cause of "looking for ways that philanthropic dollars can reduce direct threats of global catastrophic risks, particularly those that involve some risk of human extinction" to be a relatively high-potential cause. It is on the working agenda for GiveWell Labs and we will be writing more about it.

However, I don't think that "Cause X is the one I care about and Organization Y is the only one working on it" to be a good reason to support Organization Y. For donors determined to donate within this cause, I encourage you to consider donating to a donor-advised fund while making it clear that you intend to grant out the funds to existential-risk-reduction-related organizations in the future. (One way to accomplish this would be to create a fund with "existential risk" in the name; this is a fairly easy thing to do and one person could do it on behalf of multiple donors.)

For one who accepts my arguments about SI, I believe withholding funds in this way is likely to be better for SI's mission than donating to SI - through incentive effects alone (not to mention my specific argument that SI's approach to "Friendliness" seems likely to increase risks).

How I might change my views

My views are very open to revision.

However, I cannot realistically commit to read and seriously consider all comments posted on the matter. The number of people capable of taking a few minutes to write a comment is sufficient to swamp my capacity. I do encourage people to comment and I do intend to read at least some comments, but if you are looking to change my views, you should not consider posting a comment to be the most promising route.

Instead, what I will commit to is reading and carefully considering up to 50,000 words of content that are (a) specifically marked as SI-authorized responses to the points I have raised; (b) explicitly cleared for release to the general public as SI-authorized communications. In order to consider a response "SI-authorized and cleared for release," I will accept explicit communication from SI's Executive Director or from a majority of its Board of Directors endorsing the content in question. After 50,000 words, I may change my views and/or commit to reading more content, or (if I determine that the content is poor and is not using my time efficiently) I may decide not to engage further. SI-authorized content may improve or worsen SI's standing in my estimation, so unlike with comments, there is an incentive to select content that uses my time efficiently. Of course, SI-authorized content may end up including excerpts from comment responses to this post, and/or already-existing public content.

I may also change my views for other reasons, particularly if SI secures more impressive achievements and/or endorsements.

One more note: I believe I have read the vast majority of the Sequences, including the AI-foom debate, and that this content - while interesting and enjoyable - does not have much relevance for the arguments I've made.

Again: I think that whatever happens as a result of my post will be positive for SI's mission, whether or not it is positive for SI as an organization. I believe that most of SI's supporters and advocates care more about the former than about the latter, and that this attitude is far too rare in the nonprofit world.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the following people for reviewing a draft of this post and providing thoughtful feedback (this of course does not mean they agree with the post or are responsible for its content): Dario Amodei, Nick Beckstead, Elie Hassenfeld, Alexander Kruel, Tim Ogden, John Salvatier, Jonah Sinick, Cari Tuna, Stephanie Wykstra.

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Update: My full response to Holden is now here.

As Holden said, I generally think that Holden's objections for SI "are either correct (especially re: past organizational competence) or incorrect but not addressed by SI in clear argumentative writing (this includes the part on 'tool' AI)," and we are working hard to fix both categories of issues.

In this comment I would merely like to argue for one small point: that the Singularity Institute is undergoing comprehensive changes — changes which I believe to be improvements that will help us to achieve our mission more efficiently and effectively.

Holden wrote:

I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years...

Louie Helm was hired as Director of Development in September 2011. I was hired as a Research Fellow that same month, and ma... (read more)

...which is not to say, of course, that things were not improving before September 2011. It's just that the improvements have accelerated quite a bit since then.

For example, Amy was hired in December 2009 and is largely responsible for these improvements:

  • Built a "real" Board and officers; launched monthly Board meetings in February 2010.
  • Began compiling monthly financial reports in December 2010.
  • Began tracking Summit expenses and seeking Summit sponsors.
  • Played a major role in canceling many programs and expenses that were deemed low ROI.
[-][anonymous]12y110

Our bank accounts have been consolidated, with 3-4 people regularly checking over them.

In addition to reviews, should SI implement a two-man rule for manipulating large quantities of money? (For example, over 5k, over 10k, etc.)

9Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
And note that these improvements would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years - if, say, everyone had been waiting to see these kinds of improvements before funding.

note that these improvements would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years

Really? That's not obvious to me. Of course you've been around for all this and I haven't, but here's what I'm seeing from my vantage point...

Recent changes that cost very little:

  • Donor database
  • Strategic plan
  • Monthly progress reports
  • A list of research problems SI is working on (it took me 16 hours to write)
  • IntelligenceExplosion.com, Friendly-AI.com, AI Risk Bibliography 2012, annotated list of journals that may publish papers on AI risk, a partial history of AI risk research, and a list of forthcoming and desired articles on AI risk (each of these took me only 10-25 hours to create)
  • Detailed tracking of the expenses for major SI projects
  • Staff worklogs
  • Staff dinners (or something that brought staff together)
  • A few people keeping their eyes on SI's funds so theft would be caught sooner
  • Optimization of Google Adwords

Stuff that costs less than some other things SI had spent money on, such as funding Ben Goertzel's AGI research or renting downtown Berkeley apartments for the later visiting fellows:

  • Research papers
... (read more)

A lot of charities go through this pattern before they finally work out how to transition from a board-run/individual-run tax-deductible band of conspirators to being a professional staff-run organisation tuned to doing the particular thing they do. The changes required seem simple and obvious in hindsight, but it's a common pattern for it to take years, so SIAI has been quite normal, or at the very least not been unusually dumb.

(My evidence is seeing this pattern close-up in the Wikimedia Foundation, Wikimedia UK (the first attempt at which died before managing it, the second making it through barely) and the West Australian Music Industry Association, and anecdotal evidence from others. Everyone involved always feels stupid at having taken years to achieve the retrospectively obvious. I would be surprised if this aspect of the dynamics of nonprofits had not been studied.)

edit: Luke's recommendation of The Nonprofit Kit For Dummies looks like precisely the book all the examples I know of needed to have someone throw at them before they even thought of forming an organisation to do whatever it is they wanted to achieve.

Things that cost money:

  • Amy Willey
  • Luke Muehlhauser
  • Louie Helm
  • CfAR
  • trying things until something worked

I don't think this response supports your claim that these improvements "would not and could not have happened without more funding than the level of previous years."

I know your comment is very brief because you're busy at minicamp, but I'll reply to what you wrote, anyway: Someone of decent rationality doesn't just "try things until something works." Moreover, many of the things on the list of recent improvements don't require an Amy, a Luke, or a Louie.

I don't even have past management experience. As you may recall, I had significant ambiguity aversion about the prospect of being made Executive Director, but as it turned out, the solution to almost every problem X has been (1) read what the experts say about how to solve X, (2) consult with people who care about your mission and have solved X before, and (3) do what they say.

When I was made Executive Director and phoned our Advisors, most of them said "Oh, how nice to hear from you! Nobody from SingInst has ever asked me for advice before!"

That is the kind of thing that makes me want to say that SingInst has "tested every method except the method of trying."

Donor database, strategic plan, s... (read more)

Luke has just told me (personal conversation) that what he got from my comment was, "SIAI's difficulties were just due to lack of funding" which was not what I was trying to say at all. What I was trying to convey was more like, "I didn't have the ability to run this organization, and knew this - people who I hoped would be able to run the organization, while I tried to produce in other areas (e.g. turning my back on everything else to get a year of FAI work done with Marcello or writing the Sequences) didn't succeed in doing so either - and the only reason we could hang on long enough to hire Luke was that the funding was available nonetheless and in sufficient quantity that we could afford to take risks like paying Luke to stay on for a while, well before we knew he would become Executive Director".

2Will_Sawin12y
Does Luke disagree with this clarified point? I do not find a clear indicator in this conversation.

Update: I came out of a recent conversation with Eliezer with a higher opinion of Eliezer's general rationality, because several things that had previously looked to me like unforced, forseeable mistakes by Eliezer now look to me more like non-mistakes or not-so-forseeable mistakes.

You're allowed to say these things on the public Internet?

I just fell in love with SI.

You're allowed to say these things on the public Internet?

Well, at our most recent board meeting I wasn't fired, reprimanded, or even questioned for making these comments, so I guess I am. :)

0[anonymous]12y
Not even funny looks? ;)

I just fell in love with SI.

It's Luke you should have fallen in love with, since he is the one turning things around.

It's Luke you should have fallen in love with, since he is the one turning things around.

On the other hand I can count with one hand the number of established organisations I know of that would be sociologically capable of ceding power, status and control to Luke the way SingInst did. They took an untrained intern with essentially zero external status from past achievements and affiliations and basically decided to let him run the show (at least in terms of publicly visible initiatives). It is clearly the right thing for SingInst to do and admittedly Luke is very tall and has good hair which generally gives a boost when it comes to such selections - but still, making the appointment goes fundamentally against normal human behavior.

(Where I say "count with one hand" I am not including the use of any digits thereupon. I mean one.)

...and admittedly Luke is very tall and has good hair which generally gives a boost when it comes to such selections...

It doesn't matter that I completely understand why this phrase was included, I still found it hilarious in a network sitcom sort of way.

Well, all we really know is that he chose to. It may be that everyone he works with then privately berated him for it.
That said, I share your sentiment.
Actually, if SI generally endorses this sort of public "airing of dirty laundry," I encourage others involved in the organization to say so out loud.

The largest concern from reading this isn't really what it brings up in management context, but what it says about the SI in general. Here an area where there's real expertise and basic books that discuss well-understood methods and they didn't do any of that. Given that, how likely should I think it is that when the SI and mainstream AI people disagree that part of the problem may be the SI people not paying attention to basics?

7TheOtherDave12y
(nods) The nice thing about general-purpose techniques for winning at life (as opposed to domain-specific ones) is that there's lots of evidence available as to how effective they are.
2private_messaging12y
Precisely. For example of one existing base: the existing software that searches for solutions to engineering problems. Such as 'self improvement' via design of better chips. Works within narrowly defined field, to cull the search space. Should we expect state of the art software of this kind to be beaten by someone's contemporary paperclip maximizer? By how much? Incredibly relevant to AI risk, but analysis can't be faked without really having technical expertise.
1Paul Crowley12y
I doubt there's all that much of a correlation between these things to be honest.

This makes me wonder... What "for dummies" books should I be using as checklists right now? Time to set a 5-minute timer and think about it.

6[anonymous]12y
What did you come up with?
6Benquo12y
I haven't actually found the right books yet, but these are the things where I decided I should find some "for beginners" text. the important insight is that I'm allowed to use these books as skill/practice/task checklists or catalogues, rather than ever reading them all straight through. General interest: * Career * Networking * Time management * Fitness For my own particular professional situation, skills, and interests: * Risk management * Finance * Computer programming * SAS * Finance careers * Career change * Web programming * Research/science careers * Math careers * Appraising * Real Estate * UNIX
1grendelkhan11y
For fitness, I'd found Liam Rosen's FAQ (the 'sticky' from 4chan's /fit/ board) to be remarkably helpful and information-dense. (Mainly, 'toning' doesn't mean anything, and you should probably be lifting heavier weights in a linear progression, but it's short enough to be worth actually reading through.)
1David_Gerard12y
The For Dummies series is generally very good indeed. Yes.

these are all literally from the Nonprofits for Dummies book. [...] The history I've heard is that SI [...]

\

failed to read Nonprofits for Dummies,

I remember that, when Anna was managing the fellows program, she was reading books of the "for dummies" genre and trying to apply them... it's just that, as it happened, the conceptual labels she accidentally happened to give to the skill deficits she was aware of were "what it takes to manage well" (i.e. "basic management") and "what it takes to be productive", rather than "what it takes to (help) operate a nonprofit according to best practices". So those were the subjects of the books she got. (And read, and practiced.) And then, given everything else the program and the organization was trying to do, there wasn't really any cognitive space left over to effectively notice the possibility that those wouldn't be the skills that other people afterwards would complain that nobody acquired and obviously should have known to. The rest of her budgeted self-improvement effort mostly went toward overcoming self-defeating emotional/social blind spots and motivated cognition. (And I remember... (read more)

Note that this was most of the purpose of the Fellows program in the first place -- [was] to help sort/develop those people into useful roles, including replacing existing management

FWIW, I never knew the purpose of the VF program was to replace existing SI management. And I somewhat doubt that you knew this at the time, either. I think you're just imagining this retroactively given that that's what ended up happening. For instance, the internal point system used to score people in the VFs program had no points for correctly identifying organizational improvements and implementing them. It had no points for doing administrative work (besides cleaning up the physical house or giving others car rides). And it had no points for rising to management roles. It was all about getting karma on LW or writing conference papers. When I first offered to help with the organization directly, I was told I was "too competent" and that I should go do something more useful with my talent, like start another business... not "waste my time working directly at SI."

1John_Maxwell11y
Seems like a fair paraphrase.
9David_Gerard12y
This inspired me to make a blog post: You need to read Nonprofit Kit for Dummies.
9David_Gerard12y
... which Eliezer has read and responded to, noting he did indeed read just that book in 2000 when he was founding SIAI. This suggests having someone of Luke's remarkable drive was in fact the missing piece of the puzzle.
5Paul Crowley12y
Fascinating! I want to ask "well, why didn't it take then?", but if I were in Eliezer's shoes I'd be finding this discussion almost unendurably painful right now, and it feels like what matters has already been established. And of course he's never been the person in charge of that sort of thing, so maybe he's not who we should be grilling anyway.

Obviously we need How to be Lukeprog for Dummies. Luke appears to have written many fragments for this, of course.

Beating oneself up with hindsight bias is IME quite normal in this sort of circumstance, but not actually productive. Grilling the people who failed makes it too easy to blame them personally, when it's a pattern I've seen lots and lots, suggesting the problem is not a personal failing.

Agreed entirely - it's definitely not a mark of a personal failing. What I'm curious about is how we can all learn to do better at the crucial rationalist skill of making use of the standard advice about prosaic tasks - which is manifestly a non-trivial skill.

5David_Gerard12y
The Bloody Obvious For Dummies. If only common sense were! From the inside (of a subcompetent charity - and I must note, subcompetent charities know they're subcompetent), it feels like there's all this stuff you're supposed to magically know about, and lots of "shut up and do the impossible" moments. And you do the small very hard things, in a sheer tour de force of remarkable effort. But it leads to burnout. Until the organisation makes it to competence and the correct paths are retrospectively obvious. That actually reads to me like descriptions I've seen of the startup process.
5David_Gerard12y
That book looks like the basic solution to the pattern I outline here, and from your description, most people who have any public good they want to achieve should read it around the time they think of getting a second person involved.
2lukeprog12y
Donald Rumsfeld
9Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
...this was actually a terrible policy in historical practice.
3Vaniver12y
That only seems relevant if the war in question is optional.
5Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
Rumsfeld is speaking of the Iraq war. It was an optional war, the army turned out to be far understrength for establishing order, and they deliberately threw out the careful plans for preserving e.g. Iraqi museums from looting that had been drawn up by the State Department, due to interdepartmental rivalry. This doesn't prove the advice is bad, but at the very least, Rumsfeld was just spouting off Deep Wisdom that he did not benefit from spouting; one would wish to see it spoken by someone who actually benefited from the advice, rather than someone who wilfully and wantonly underprepared for an actual war.

just spouting off Deep Wisdom that he did not benefit from spouting

Indeed. The proper response, which is surely worth contemplation, would have been:

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

Sun Tzu

8ghf12y
Given the several year lag between funding increases and the listed improvements, it appears that this was less a result of a prepared plan and more a process of underutilized resources attracting a mix of parasites (the theft) and talent (hopefully the more recent staff additions). Which goes towards a critical question in terms of future funding: is SIAI primarily constrained in its mission by resources or competence? Of course, the related question is: what is SIAI's mission? Someone donating primarily for AGI research might not count recent efforts (LW, rationality camps, etc) as improvements. What should a potential donor expect from money invested into this organization going forward? Internally, what are your metrics for evaluation? Edited to add: I think that the spin-off of the rationality efforts is a good step towards answering these questions.
1John_Maxwell12y
This seems like a rather absolute statement. Knowing Luke, I'll bet he would've gotten some of it done even on a limited budget.

Luke and Louie Helm are both on paid staff.

I'm pretty sure their combined salaries are lower than the cost of the summer fellows program that SI was sponsoring four or five years ago. Also, if you accept my assertion that Luke could find a way to do it on a limited budget, why couldn't somebody else?

Givewell is interested in finding charities that translate good intentions into good results. This requires that the employees of the charity have low akrasia, desire to learn about and implement organizational best practices, not suffer from dysrationalia, etc. I imagine that from Givewell's perspective, it counts as a strike against the charity if some of the charity's employees have a history of failing at any of these.

I'd rather hear Eliezer say "thanks for funding us until we stumbled across some employees who are good at defeating their akrasia and care about organizational best practices", because this seems like a better depiction of what actually happened. I don't get the impression SI was actively looking for folks like Louie and Luke.

4[anonymous]12y
Yes to this. Eliezer's claim about the need for funding may suffer many of Luke's criticisms above. But usually the most important thing you need is talent and that does require funding.
8ghf12y
My hope is that the upcoming deluge of publications will answer this objection, but for the moment, I am unclear as to the justification for the level of resources being given to SIAI researchers. This level of freedom is the dream of every researcher on the planet. Yet, it's unclear why these resources should be devoted to your projects. While I strongly believe that the current academic system is broken, you are asking for a level of support granted to top researchers prior to have made any original breakthroughs yourself. If you can convince people to give you that money, wonderful. But until you have made at least some serious advancement to demonstrate your case, donating seems like an act of faith. It's impressive that you all have found a way to hack the system and get paid to develop yourselves as researchers outside of the academic system and I will be delighted to see that development bear fruit over the coming years. But, at present, I don't see evidence that the work being done justifies or requires that support.

This level of freedom is the dream of every researcher on the planet. Yet, it's unclear why these resources should be devoted to your projects.

Because some people like my earlier papers and think I'm writing papers on the most important topic in the world?

It's impressive that you all have found a way to hack the system and get paid to develop yourselves as researchers outside of the academic system...

Note that this isn't uncommon. SI is far from the only think tank with researchers who publish in academic journals. Researchers at private companies do the same.

First, let me say that, after re-reading, I think that my previous post came off as condescending/confrontational which was not my intent. I apologize.

Second, after thinking about this for a few minutes, I realized that some of the reason your papers seem so fluffy to me is that they argue what I consider to be obvious points. In my mind, of course we are likely "to develop human-level AI before 2100." Because of that, I may have tended to classify your work as outreach more than research.

But outreach is valuable. And, so that we can factor out the question of the independent contribution of your research, having people associated with SIAI with the publications/credibility to be treated as experts has gigantic benefits in terms of media multipliers (being the people who get called on for interviews, panels, etc). So, given that, I can see a strong argument for publication support being valuable to the overall organization goals regardless of any assessment of the value of the research.

Note that this isn't uncommon. SI is far from the only think tank with researchers who publish in academic journals. Researchers at private companies do the same.

My only point was that,... (read more)

3Bugmaster12y
It's true at my company, at least. There are quite a few papers out there authored by the researchers at the company where I work. There are several good business reasons for a company to invest time into publishing a paper; positive PR is one of them.
7siodine12y
Isn't this very strong evidence in support for Holden's point about "Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality" (excluding Luke, at least)? And especially this?

This topic is something I've been thinking about lately. Do SIers tend to have superior general rationality, or do we merely escape a few particular biases? Are we good at rationality, or just good at "far mode" rationality (aka philosophy)? Are we good at epistemic but not instrumental rationality? (Keep in mind, though, that rationality is only a ceteris paribus predictor of success.)

Or, pick a more specific comparison. Do SIers tend to be better at general rationality than someone who can keep a small business running for 5 years? Maybe the tight feedback loops of running a small business are better rationality training than "debiasing interventions" can hope to be.

Of course, different people are more or less rational in different domains, at different times, in different environments.

This isn't an idle question about labels. My estimate of the scope and level of people's rationality in part determines how much I update from their stated opinion on something. How much evidence for Hypothesis X (about organizational development) is it when Eliezer gives me his opinion on the matter, as opposed to when Louie gives me his opinion on the matter? When Person B proposes to take on a totally new kind of project, I think their general rationality is a predictor of success — so, what is their level of general rationality?

1Bugmaster12y
Holden implies (and I agree with him) that there's very little evidence at the moment to suggest that SI is good at instrumental rationality. As for epistemic rationality, how would we know ? Is there some objective way to measure it ? I personally happen to believe that if a person seems to take it as a given that he's great at epistemic rationality, this fact should count as evidence (however circumstantial) against him being great at epistemic rationality... but that's just me.
1TheOtherDave12y
If you accept that your estimate of someone's "rationality" should depend on the domain, the environment, the time, the context, etc... and what you want to do is make reliable estimates of the reliability of their opinion, their chances of success. etc... it seems to follow that you should be looking for comparisons within a relevant domain, environment, etc. That is, if you want to get opinions about hypothesis X about organizational development that serve as significant evidence, it seems the thing to do is to find someone who knows a lot about organizational development -- ideally, someone who has been successful at developing organizations -- and consult their opinions. How generally rational they are might be very relevant causally, or it might not, but is in either case screened off by their domain competence... and their domain competence is easier to measure than their general rationality. So is their general rationality worth devoting resources to determining? It seems this only makes sense if you have already (e.g.) decided to ask Eliezer and Louie for their advice, whether it's good evidence or not, and now you need to know how much evidence it is, and you expect the correct answer is different from the answer you'd get by applying the metrics you know about (e.g., domain familiarity and previously demonstrated relevant expertise).
4lukeprog12y
I do spend a fair amount of time talking to domain experts outside of SI. The trouble is that the question of what we should do about thing X doesn't just depend on domain competence but also on thousands of details about the inner workings of SI and our mission that I cannot communicate to domain experts outside SI, but which Eliezer and Louie already possess.
6TheOtherDave12y
So it seems you have a problem in two domains (organizational development + SI internals) and different domain experts in both domains (outside domain experts + Eliezer/Louie), and need some way of cross-linking the two groups' expertise to get a coherent recommendation, and the brute-force solutions (e.g. get them all in a room together, or bring one group up to speed on the other's domain) are too expensive to be worth it. (Well, assuming the obstacle isn't that the details need to be kept secret, but simply that expecting an outsider to come up to speed on all of SI's local potentially relevant trivia simply isn't practical.) Yes? Yeah, that can be a problem. In that position, for serious questions I would probably ask E/L for their recommendations and a list of the most relevant details that informed that decision, then go to outside experts with a summary of the competing recommendations and an expanded version of that list and ask for their input. If there's convergence, great. If there's divergence, iterate. This is still a expensive approach, though, so I can see where a cheaper approximation for less important questions is worth having.
4lukeprog12y
Yes to all this.
0lessdazed12y
I found this complaint insufficiently detailed and not well worded. Average people think their rationality is moderately good. Average people are not very rational. SI affiliated people think they are adept or at least adequate at rationality. SI affiliated people are not complete disasters at rationality. SI affiliated people are vastly superior to others in generally rationality. So the original complaint literally interpreted is false. An interesting question might be on the level of: "Do SI affiliates have rationality superior to what the average person falsely believes his or her rationality is?" Holden's complaints each have their apparent legitimacy change differently under his and my beliefs. Some have to do with overconfidence or incorrect self-assessment, others with other-assessment, others with comparing SI people to others. Some of them: Largely agree, as this relates to overconfidence. Moderately disagree, as this relies on the rationality of others. Largely disagree, as this relies significantly on the competence of others. Largely agree, as this depends more on accurate assessment of one's on rationality. There is instrumental value in falsely believing others to have a good basis for disagreement so one's search for reasons one might be wrong is enhanced. This is aside from the actual reasons of others. It is easy to imagine an expert in a relevant field objecting to SI based on something SI does or says seeming wrong, only to have the expert couch the objection in literally false terms, perhaps ones that flow from motivated cognition and bear no trace of the real, relevant reason for the objection. This could be followed by SI's evaluation and dismissal of it and failure of a type not actually predicted by the expert...all such nuances are lost in the literally false "Apparent poorly grounded belief in SI's superior general rationality." Such a failure comes to mind and is easy for me to imagine as I think this is a major reason why "Lac
6JoshuaFox12y
As a supporter and donor to SI since 2006, I can say that I had a lot of specific criticisms of the way that the organization was managed. The points Luke lists above were among them. I was surprised that on many occasions management did not realize the obvious problems and fix them. But the current management is now recognizing many of these points and resolving them one by one, as Luke says. If this continues, SI's future looks good.
5A1987dM12y
Why did you start referring to yourself in the first person and then change your mind? (Or am I missing something?)

Brain fart: now fixed.

(Why was this downvoted? If it's because the downvoter wants to see fewer brain farts, they're doing it wrong, because the message such a downvote actually conveys is that they want to see fewer acknowledgements of brain farts. Upvoted back to 0, anyway.)

0Pablo11y
The 'example' link is dead.
0lukeprog11y
Fixed.

Wow, I'm blown away by Holden Karnofsky, based on this post alone. His writing is eloquent, non-confrontational and rational. It shows that he spent a lot of time constructing mental models of his audience and anticipated its reaction. Additionally, his intelligence/ego ratio appears to be through the roof. He must have learned a lot since the infamous astroturfing incident. This is the (type of) person SI desperately needs to hire.

Emotions out of the way, it looks like the tool/agent distinction is the main theoretical issue. Fortunately, it is much easier than the general FAI one. Specifically, to test the SI assertion that, paraphrasing Arthur C. Clarke,

Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from an agent.

one ought to formulate and prove this as a theorem, and present it for review and improvement to the domain experts (the domain being math and theoretical computer science). If such a proof is constructed, it can then be further examined and potentially tightened, giving new insights to the mission of averting the existential risk from intelligence explosion.

If such a proof cannot be found, this will lend further weight to the HK's assertion that SI appears to be poorly qualified to address its core mission.

Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from agent.

I shall quickly remark that I, myself, do not believe this to be true.

8Viliam_Bur12y
What exactly is the difference between a "tool" and an "agent", if we taboo the words? My definition would be that "agent" has their own goals / utility functions (speaking about human agents, those goals / utility functions are set by evolution), while "tool" has a goal / utility function set by someone else. This distinction may be reasonable on a human level, "human X optimizing for human X's utility" versus "human X optimizing for human Y's utility", but on a machine level, what exactly is the difference between a "tool" that is ordered to reach a goal / optimize a utility function, and an "agent" programmed with the same goal / utility function? Am I using a bad definition that misses something important? Or is there anything than prevents "agent" to be reduced to a "tool" (perhaps a misconstructed tool) of the forces that have created them? Or is it that all "agents" are "tools", but not all "tools" are "agents", because... why?
1Nebu11y
One definition of intelligence that I've seen thrown around on LessWrong is it's the ability to figure out how to steer reality in specific directions given the resources available. Both the tool and the agent are intelligent in the sense that, assuming they are given some sort of goal, they can formulate a plan on how to achieve that goal, but the agent will execute the plan, while the tool will report the plan. I'm assuming for the sake of isolating the key difference, that for both the tool-AI and the agent-AI, they are "passively" waiting for instructions for a human before they spring into action. For an agent-AI, I might say "Take me to my house", whereas for a tool AI, I would say "What's the quickest route to get to my house?", and as soon as I utter these words, suddenly the AI has a new utility function to use in evaluate any possible plan it comes up with. Assuming it's always possible to decouple "ability to come up with a plan" from both "execute the plan" and "display the plan", then any "tool" can be converted to an "agent" by replacing every instance of "display the plan" to "execute the plan" and vice versa for converting an agent into a tool.
1abramdemski12y
My understanding of the distinction made in the article was: Both "agent" and "tool" are ways of interacting with a highly sophisticated optimization process, which takes a "goal" and applies knowledge to find ways of achieving that goal. An agent then acts out the plan. A tool reports the plan to a human (often in in a sophisticated way, including plan details, alternatives, etc.). So, no, it has nothing to do with whether I'm optimizing "my own" utility vs someone else's.
8Viliam_Bur12y
You divide planning from acting, as if those two are completely separate things. Problem is, in some situations they are not. If you are speaking with someone, then the act of speach is acting. In this sense, even a "tool" is allowed to act. Now imagine a super-intelligent tool which is able to predict human's reactions to its words, and make it a part of equation. Now the simple task of finding x such that cost(x) is the smallest, suddenly becomes a task of finding x and finding a proper way to report this x to human, such that cost(x) is the smallest. If this opens some creative new options, where the f(x) is smaller than it should usually be, for the super-intelligent "tool" it will be a correct solution. So for example reporting a result which makes the human commit suicide, if as a side effect this will make the report true, and it will minimize f(x) beyond normally achievable bounds, is acceptable solution. Example question: "How should I get rid of my disease most cheaply." Example answer: "You won't. You will die soon in terrible pains. This report is 99.999% reliable". Predicted human reaction: becomes insane from horror, dedices to kill himself, does it clumsily, suffers from horrible pains, then dies. Success rate: 100%, the disease is gone. Costs of cure: zero. Mission completed.
2abramdemski12y
To me, this is still in the spirit of an agent-type architecture. A tool-type architecture will tend to decouple the optimization of the answer given from the optimization of the way it is presented, so that the presentation does not maximize the truth of the statement. However, I must admit that at this point I'm making a fairly conjunctive argument; IE, the more specific I get about tool/agent distinctions, the less credibility I can assign to the statement "almost all powerful AIs constructed in the near future will be tool-style systems". (But I still would maintain my assertion that you would have to specifically program this type of behavior if you wanted to get it.)
8shminux12y
Then the objection 2 seems to hold: unless I misunderstand your point severely (it happened once or twice before).

It's complicated. A reply that's true enough and in the spirit of your original statement, is "Something going wrong with a sufficiently advanced AI that was intended as a 'tool' is mostly indistinguishable from something going wrong with a sufficiently advanced AI that was intended as an 'agent', because math-with-the-wrong-shape is math-with-the-wrong-shape no matter what sort of English labels like 'tool' or 'agent' you slap on it, and despite how it looks from outside using English, correctly shaping math for a 'tool' isn't much easier even if it "sounds safer" in English." That doesn't get into the real depths of the problem, but it's a start. I also don't mean to completely deny the existence of a safety differential - this is a complicated discussion, not a simple one - but I do mean to imply that if Marcus Hutter designs a 'tool' AI, it automatically kills him just like AIXI does, and Marcus Hutter is unusually smart rather than unusually stupid but still lacks the "Most math kills you, safe math is rare and hard" outlook that is implicitly denied by the idea that once you're trying to design a tool, safe math gets easier somehow. This is much the same problem as with the Oracle outlook - someone says something that sounds safe in English but the problem of correctly-shaped-math doesn't get very much easier.

This sounds like it'd be a good idea to write a top-level post about it.

Though it's not as detailed and technical as many would like, I'll point readers to this bit of related reading, one of my favorites:

Yudkowsky (2011). Complex value systems are required to realize valuable futures.

9Wei Dai12y
When you say "Most math kills you" does that mean you disagree with arguments like these, or are you just simplifying for a soundbite?
7abramdemski12y
Why? Or, rather: Where do you object to the argument by Holden? (Given a query, the tool-AI returns an answer with a justification, so the plan for "cure cancer" can be checked to make sure it does not do so by killing or badly altering humans.)
4FeepingCreature12y
One trivial, if incomplete, answer is that to be effective, the Oracle AI needs to be able to answer the question "how do we build a better oracle AI" and in order to define "better" in that sentence in a way that causes our oracle to output a new design that is consistent with all the safeties we built into the original oracle, it needs to understand the intent behind the original safeties just as much as an agent-AI would.

The real danger of Oracle AI, if I understand it correctly, is the nasty combination of (i) by definition, an Oracle AI has an implicit drive to issue predictions most likely to be correct according to its model, and (ii) a sufficiently powerful Oracle AI can accurately model the effect of issuing various predictions. End result: it issues powerfully self-fulfilling prophecies without regard for human values. Also, depending on how it's designed, it can influence the questions to be asked of it in the future so as to be as accurate as possible, again without regard for human values.

9Paul Crowley12y
My understanding of an Oracle AI is that when answering any given question, that question consumes the whole of its utility function, so it has no motivation to influence future questions. However the primary risk you set out seems accurate. Countermeasures have been proposed, such as asking for an accurate prediction for the case where a random event causes the prediction to be discarded, but in that instance it knows that the question will be asked again of a future instance of itself.

My understanding of an Oracle AI is that when answering any given question, that question consumes the whole of its utility function, so it has no motivation to influence future questions.

It could acausally trade with its other instances, so that a coordinated collection of many instances of predictors would influence the events so as to make each other's predictions more accurate.

1Paul Crowley12y
Wow, OK. Is it possible to rig the decision theory to rule out acausal trade?
1Will_Newsome12y
IIRC you can make it significantly more difficult with certain approaches, e.g. there's an OAI approach that uses zero-knowledge proofs and that seemed pretty sound upon first inspection, but as far as I know the current best answer is no. But you might want to try to answer the question yourself, IMO it's fun to think about from a cryptographic perspective.
4abramdemski12y
(I assume you mean, self-fulfilling prophecies.) In order to get these, it seems like you would need a very specific kind of architecture: one which considers the results of its actions on its utility function (set to "correctness of output"). This kind of architecture is not the likely architecture for a 'tool'-style system; the more likely architecture would instead maximize correctness without conditioning on its act of outputting those results. Thus, I expect you'd need to specifically encode this kind of behavior to get self-fulfilling-prophecy risk. But I admit it's dependent on architecture. (Edit-- so, to be clear: in cases where the correctness of the results depended on the results themselves, the system would have to predict its own results. Then if it's using TDT or otherwise has a sufficiently advanced self-model, my point is moot. However, again you'd have to specifically program these, and would be unlikely to do so unless you specifically wanted this kind of behavior.)
2Vladimir_Nesov12y
Not sure. Your behavior is not a special feature of the world, and it follows from normal facts (i.e. not those about internal workings of yourself specifically) about the past when you were being designed/installed. A general purpose predictor could take into account its own behavior by default, as a non-special property of the world, which it just so happens to have a lot of data about.
3abramdemski12y
Right. To say much more, we need to look at specific algorithms to talk about whether or not they would have this sort of behavior... The intuition in my above comment was that without TDT or other similar mechanisms, it would need to predict what its own answer could be before it could compute its effect on the correctness of various answers, so it would be difficult for it to use self-fulfilling prophecies. Really, though, this isn't clear. Now my intuition is that it would gather evidence on whether or not it used the self-fulfilling prophecy trick, so if it started doing so, it wouldn't stop... In any case, I'd like to note that the self-fulfilling prophecy problem is much different than the problem of an AI which escapes onto the internet and ruthlessly maximizes a utility function.
3Vladimir_Nesov12y
I was thinking more of its algorithm admitting an interpretation where it's asking "Say, I make prediction X. How accurate would that be?" and then maximizing over relevant possible X. Knowledge about its prediction connects the prediction to its origins and consequences, it establishes the prediction as part of the structure of environment. It's not necessary (and maybe not possible and more importantly not useful) for the prediction itself to be inferable before it's made. Agreed that just outputting a single number is implausible to be a big deal (this is an Oracle AI with extremely low bandwidth and peculiar intended interpretation of its output data), but if we're getting lots and lots of numbers it's not as clear.
2amcknight12y
There's more on this here. Taxonomy of Oracle AI
1abramdemski12y
Not precisely. The advantage here is that we can just ask the AI what results it predicts from the implementation of the "better" AI, and check them against our intuitive ethics. Now, you could make an argument about human negligence on such safety measures. I think it's important to think about the risk scenarios in that case.
0Nebu11y
It's still not clear to me why having an AI that is capable of answering the question "How do we make a better version of you?" automatically kills humans. Presumably, when the AI says "Here's the source code to a better version of me", we'd still be able to read through it and make sure it didn't suddenly rewrite itself to be an agent instead of a tool. We're assuming that, as a tool, the AI has no goals per se and thus no motivation to deceive us into turning it into an agent. That said, depending on what you mean by "effective", perhaps the AI doesn't even need to be able to answer questions like "How do we write a better version of you?" For example, we find Google Maps to be very useful, even though if you asked Google Maps "How do we make a better version of Google Maps?" it would probably not be able to give the types of answers we want. A tool-AI which was smarter than the smartest human, and yet which could not simply spit out a better version of itself would still probably be a very useful AI.
1ewjordan12y
If someone asks the tool-AI "How do I create an agent-AI?" and it gives an answer, the distinction is moot anyways, because one leads to the other. Given human nature, I find it extremely difficult to believe that nobody would ask the tool-AI that question, or something that's close enough, and then implement the answer...
0Strange711y
I am now imagining an AI which manages to misinterpret some straightforward medical problem as "cure cancer of it's dependence on the host organism."
2shminux12y
Not being a domain expert, I do not pretend to understand all the complexities. My point was that either you can prove that tools are as dangerous as agents (because mathematically they are (isomorphic to) agents), or HK's Objection 2 holds. I see no other alternative...

Even if we accepted that the tool vs. agent distinction was enough to make things "safe", objection 2 still boils down to "Well, just don't build that type of AI!", which is exactly the same keep-it-in-a-box/don't-do-it argument that most normal people make when they consider this issue. I assume I don't need to explain to most people here why "We should just make a law against it" is not a solution to this problem, and I hope I don't need to argue that "Just don't do it" is even worse...

More specifically, fast forward to 2080, when any college kid with $200 to spend (in equivalent 2012 dollars) can purchase enough computing power so that even the dumbest AIXI approximation schemes are extremely effective, good enough so that creating an AGI agent would be a week's work for any grad student that knew their stuff. Are you really comfortable living in that world with the idea that we rely on a mere gentleman's agreement not to make self-improving AI agents? There's a reason this is often viewed as an arms race, to a very real extent the attempt to achieve Friendly AI is about building up a suitably powerful defense against unfriendly AI before ... (read more)

9Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
There isn't that much computing power in the physical universe. I'm not sure even smarter AIXI approximations are effective on a moon-sized nanocomputer. I wouldn't fall over in shock if a sufficiently smart one did something effective, but mostly I'd expect nothing to happen. There's an awful lot that happens in the transition from infinite to finite computing power, and AIXI doesn't solve any of it.
6JoshuaZ12y
Is there some computation or estimate where these results are coming from? They don't seem unreasonable, but I'm not aware of any estimates about how efficient largescale AIXI approximations are in practice. (Although attempted implementations suggest that empirically things are quite inefficient.)
6jsteinhardt12y
Naieve AIXI is doing brute force search through an exponentially large space. Unless the right Turing machine is 100 bits or less (which seems unlikely), Eliezer's claim seems pretty safe to me. Most of mainstream machine learning is trying to solve search problems through spaces far tamer than the search space for AIXI, and achieving limited success. So it also seems safe to say that even pretty smart implementations of AIXI probably won't make much progress.
0Strange711y
If computing power is that much cheaper, it will be because tremendous resources, including but certainly not limited to computing power, have been continuously devoted over the intervening decades to making it cheaper. There will be correspondingly fewer yet-undiscovered insights for a seed AI to exploit in the course of it's attempted takeoff.
1TheOtherDave12y
If my comment here correctly captures what is meant by "tool mode" and "agent mode", then it seems to follow that AGI running in tool mode is no safer than the person using it. If that's the case, then an AGI running in tool mode is safer than an AGI running in agent mode if and only if agent mode is less trustworthy than whatever person ends up using the tool. Are you assuming that's true?
3shminux12y
What you presented there (and here) is another theorem, something that should be proved (and published, if it hasn't been yet). If true, this gives an estimate on how dangerous a non-agent AGI can be. And yes, since we have had a lot of time study people and no time at all to study AGI, I am guessing that an AGI is potentially much more dangerous, because so little is known. Or at least that seems to be the whole point of the goal of developing provably friendly AI.
6chaosmage12y
How about this: An agent with a very powerful tool is indistinguishable from a very powerful agent.

Wow, I'm blown away by Holden Karnofsky, based on this post alone. His writing is eloquent, non-confrontational and rational. It shows that he spent a lot of time constructing mental models of his audience and anticipated its reaction. Additionally, his intelligence/ego ratio appears to be through the roof.

Agreed. I normally try not to post empty "me-too" replies; the upvote button is there for a reason. But now I feel strongly enough about it that I will: I'm very impressed with the good will and effort and apparent potential for intelligent conversation in HoldenKarnofsky's post.

Now I'm really curious as to where things will go from here. With how limited my understanding of AI issues is, I doubt a response from me would be worth HoldenKarnofsky's time to read, so I'll leave that to my betters instead of adding more noise. But yeah. Seeing SI ideas challenged in such a positive, constructive way really got my attention. Looking forward to the official response, whatever it might be.

8A1987dM12y
“the good will and effort and apparent potential for intelligent conversation” is more information than an upvote, IMO.
3MarkusRamikin12y
Right, I just meant shminux said more or less the same thing before me. So normally I would have just upvoted his comment.
8dspeyer12y
Let's see if we can use concreteness to reason about this a little more thoroughly... As I understand it, the nightmare looks something like this. I ask Google SuperMaps for the fastest route from NYC to Albany. It recognizes that computing this requires traffic information, so it diverts several self-driving cars to collect real-time data. Those cars run over pedestrians who were irrelevant to my query. The obvious fix: forbid SuperMaps to alter anything outside of its own scratch data. It works with the data already gathered. Later a Google engineer might ask it what data would be more useful, or what courses of action might cheaply gather that data, but the engineer decides what if anything to actually do. This superficially resembles a box, but there's no actual box involved. The AI's own code forbids plans like that. But that's for a question-answering tool. Let's take another scenario: I tell my super-intelligent car to take me to Albany as fast as possible. It sends emotionally manipulative emails to anyone else who would otherwise be on the road encouraging them to stay home. I don't see an obvious fix here. So the short answer seems to be that it matters what the tool is for. A purely question-answering tool would be extremely useful, but not as useful as a general purpose one. Could humans with a oracular super-AI police the development and deployment of active super-AIs?
2shminux12y
I believe that HK's post explicitly characterizes anything active like this as having agency.

I think the correct objection is something you can't quite see in google maps. If you program an AI to do nothing but output directions, it will do nothing but output directions. If those directions are for driving, you're probably fine. If those directions are big and complicated plans for something important, that you follow without really understanding why you're doing (and this is where most of the benefits of working with an AGI will show up), then you could unknowingly take over the world using a sufficiently clever scheme.

Also note that it would be a lot easier for the AI to pull this off if you let it tell you how to improve its own design. If recursively self-improving AI blows other AI out of the water, then tool AI is probably not safe unless it is made ineffective.

This does actually seem like it would raise the bar of intelligence needed to take over the world somewhat. It is unclear how much. The topic seems to me to be worthy of further study/discussion, but not (at least not obviously) a threat to the core of SIAI's mission.

2Viliam_Bur12y
It also helps that Google Maps does not have general intelligence, so it does not include user's reactions to its output, the consequent user's actions in the real world, etc. as variables in its model, which may influence the quality of the solution, and therefore can (and should) be optimized (within constraints given by user's psychology, etc.), if possible. Shortly: Google Maps does not manipulate you, because it does not see you.
0Nebu11y
A generally smart Google Maps might not manipulate you, because it has no motivation to do so. It's hard to imagine how commercial services would work when they're powered by GAI (e.g. if you asked a GAI version of Google Maps a question that's unrelated to maps, e.g. "What's a good recipe for Cheesecake?", would it tell you that you should ask Google Search instead? Would it defer to Google Search and forward the answer to you? Would it just figure out the answer anyway, since it's generally intelligent? Would the company Google simply collapse all services into a single "Google" brand, rather than have "Google Search", "Google Mail", "Google Maps", etc, and have that single brand be powered by a single GAI? etc.) but let's stick to the topic at hand and assume there's a GAI named "Google Maps", and you're asking "How do I get to Albany?" Given this use-case, would the engineers that developed the Google Maps GAI more likely give it a utility like "Maximize the probability that your response is truthful", or is it more likely that the utility would be something closer to "Always respond with a set of directions which are legal in the relevant jurisdictions that they are to be followed within which, if followed by the user, would cause the user to arrive at the destination while minimizing cost/time/complexity (depending on the user's preferences)"?
5drnickbone12y
This was my thought as well: an automated vehicle is in "agent" mode. The example also demonstrates why an AI in agent mode is likely to be more useful (in many cases) than an AI in tool mode. Compare using Google maps to find a route to the airport versus just jumping into a taxi cab and saying "Take me to the airport". Since agent-mode AI has uses, it is likely to be developed.
1abramdemski12y
Then it's running in agent mode? My impression was that a tool-mode system presents you with a plan, but takes no actions. So all tool-mode systems are basically question-answering systems. Perhaps we can meaningfully extend the distinction to some kinds of "semi-autonomous" tools, but that would be a different idea, wouldn't it? (Edit) After reading more comments, "a different idea" which seems to match this kind of desire... http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_institute_si/6jys

Then it's running in agent mode? My impression was that a tool-mode system presents you with a plan, but takes no actions. So all tool-mode systems are basically question-answering systems.

I'm a sysadmin. When I want to get something done, I routinely come up with something that answers the question, and when it does that reliably I give it the power to do stuff on as little human input as possible. Often in daemon mode, to absolutely minimise how much it needs to bug me. Question-answerer->tool->agent is a natural progression just in process automation. (And this is why they're called "daemons".)

It's only long experience and many errors that's taught me how to do this such that the created agents won't crap all over everything. Even then I still get surprises.

2private_messaging12y
Well, do your 'agents' build a model of the world, fidelity of which they improve? I don't think those really are agents in the AI sense, and definitely not in self improvement sense.

They may act according to various parameters they read in from the system environment. I expect they will be developed to a level of complication where they have something that could reasonably be termed a model of the world. The present approach is closer to perceptual control theory, where the sysadmin has the model and PCT is part of the implementation. 'Cos it's more predictable to the mere human designer.

Capacity for self-improvement is an entirely different thing, and I can't see a sysadmin wanting that - the sysadmin would run any such improvements themselves, one at a time. (Semi-automated code refactoring, for example.) The whole point is to automate processes the sysadmin already understands but doesn't want to do by hand - any sysadmin's job being to automate themselves out of the loop, because there's always more work to do. (Because even in the future, nothing works.)

I would be unsurprised if someone markets a self-improving system for this purpose. For it to go FOOM, it also needs to invent new optimisations, which is presently a bit difficult.

Edit: And even a mere daemon-like automated tool can do stuff a lot of people regard as unFriendly, e.g. high frequency trading algorithms.

0TheAncientGeek10y
It's not a natural progression in the sense of occurring without human intervention. That is rather relevant if the idea ofAI safety is going to be based on using tool AI strictly as tool AI.
1TheOtherDave12y
My own impression differs. It becomes increasingly clear that "tool" in this context is sufficiently subject to different definitions that it's not a particularly useful term.
3abramdemski12y
I've been assuming the definition from the article. I would agree that the term "tool AI" is unclear, but I would not agree that the definition in the article is unclear.
4A1987dM12y
I have no strong intuition about whether this is true or not, but I do intuit that if it's true, the value of sufficiently for which it's true is so high it'd be nearly impossible to achieve it accidentally. (On the other hand the blind idiot god did ‘accidentally’ make tools into agents when making humans, so... But after all that only happened once in hundreds of millions of years of ‘attempts’.)
5othercriteria12y
This seems like a very valuable point. In that direction, we also have the tens of thousands of cancers that form every day, military coups, strikes, slave revolts, cases of regulatory capture, etc.
1A1987dM12y
Hmmm. Yeah, cancer. The analogy would be "sufficiently advanced tools tend to be a short edit distance away from agents", which would mean that a typo in the source code or a cosmic ray striking a CPU at the wrong place and time could have pretty bad consequences.
4private_messaging12y
I do not think this is even true.
5David_Gerard12y
I routinely try to turn sufficiently reliable tools into agents wherever possible, per this comment. I suppose we could use a definition of "agent" that implied greater autonomy in setting its own goals. But there are useful definitions that don't.
3badger12y
If the tool/agent distinction exists for sufficiently powerful AI, then a theory of friendliness might not be strictly necessary, but still highly prudent. Going from a tool-AI to an agent-AI is a relatively simple step of the entire process. If meaningful guarantees of friendliness turn out to be impossible, then security comes down on no one attempting to make an agent-AI when strong enough tool-AIs are available. Agency should be kept to a minimum, even with a theory of friendliness in hand, as Holden argues in objection 1. Guarantees are safeguards against the possibility of agency rather than a green light.
2mwaser12y
If it is true (i.e. if a proof can be found) that "Any sufficiently advanced tool is indistinguishable from agent", then any RPOP will automatically become indistinguishable from an agent once it has self-improved past our comprehension point. This would seem to argue against Yudkowsky's contention that the term RPOP is more accurate than "Artificial Intelligence" or "superintelligence".
4Alejandro112y
I don't understand; isn't Holden's point precisely that a tool AI is not properly described as an optimization process? Google Maps isn't optimizing anything in a non-trivial sense, anymore than a shovel is.
4abramdemski12y
My understanding of Holden's argument was that powerful optimization processes can be run in either tool-mode or agent-mode. For example, Google maps optimizes routes, but returns the result with alternatives and options for editing, in "tool mode".
4Wei Dai12y
Holden wants to build Tool-AIs that output summaries of their calculations along with suggested actions. For Google Maps, I guess this would be the distance and driving times, but how does a Tool-AI summarize more general calculations that it might do? It could give you the expected utilities of each option, but it's hard to see how that helps if we're concerned that its utility function or EU calculations might be wrong. Or maybe it could give a human-readable description of the predicted consequences of each option, but the process that produces such descriptions from the raw calculations would seem to require a great deal of intelligence on its own (for example it might have to describe posthuman worlds in terms understandable to us), and it itself wouldn't be a "safe" Tool-AI, since the summaries produced would presumably not come with further alternative summaries and meta-summaries of how the summaries were calculated. (My question might be tangential to your own comment. I just wanted your thoughts on it, and this seems to be the best place to ask.)
1TheOtherDave12y
Honestly, this whole tool/agent distinction seems tangential to me. Consider two systems, S1 and S2. S1 comprises the following elements: a) a tool T, which when used by a person to achieve some goal G, can efficiently achieve G b) a person P, who uses T to efficiently achieve G. S2 comprises a non-person agent A which achieves G efficiently. I agree that A is an agent and T is not an agent, and I agree that T is a tool, and whether A is a tool seems a question not worth asking. But I don't quite see why I should prefer S1 to S2. Surely the important question is whether I endorse G?
3dspeyer12y
A tool+human differs from a pure AI agent in two important ways: * The human (probably) already has naturally-evolved morality, sparing us the very hard problem of formalizing that. * We can arrange for (almost) everyone to have access to the tool, allowing tooled humans to counterbalance eachother.
3shminux12y
First, I am not fond of the term RPOP, because it constrains the space of possible intelligences to optimizers. Humans are reasonably intelligent, yet we are not consistent optimizers. Neither do current domain AIs (they have bugs that often prevent them from performing optimization consistently and predictably).That aside, I don't see how your second premise follows from the first. Just because RPOP is a subset of AI and so would be a subject of such a theorem, it does not affect in any way the (non)validity of the EY's contention.

Is it just me, or do Luke and Eliezer's initial responses appear to send the wrong signals? From the perspective of an SI critic, Luke's comment could be interpreted as saying "for us, not being completely incompetent is worth bragging about", and Eliezer's as "we're so arrogant that we've only taken two critics (including Holden) seriously in our entire history". These responses seem suboptimal, given that Holden just complained about SI's lack of impressive accomplishments, and being too selective about whose feedback to take seriously.

While I have sympathy with the complaint that SI's critics are inarticulate and often say wrong things, Eliezer's comment does seem to be indicative of the mistake Holden and Wei Dai are describing. Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections. I think it would be more appropriate to react to poor critical engagement more along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation," and less along the lines of "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that there's something wrong with the rest of the world."

This. I've been trying to write something about Eliezer's debate with Robin Hanson, but the problem I keep running up against is that Eliezer's points are not clearly articulated at all. Even making my best educated guesses about what's supposed to go in the gaps in his arguments, I still ended up with very little.

6jacob_cannell12y
Have the key points of that 'debate' subsequently been summarized or clarified on LW? I found that debate exasperating in that Hanson and EY were mainly talking past each other and couldn't seem to hone in on their core disagreements. I know it generally has to do with hard takeoff / recursive self-improvement vs more gradual EM revolution, but that's not saying all that much.

I'm in the process of writing a summary and analysis of the key arguments and points in that debate.

The most recent version runs at 28 pages - and that's just an outline.

0somervta11y
If you need help with grunt work, please send me a message. If (as I suspect is the case) not, then good luck!
0Kaj_Sotala11y
Thanks, I'm fine. I posted a half-finished version here, and expect to do some further refinements soon.

Agree with all this.

7Nick_Beckstead12y
In fairness I should add that I think Luke M agrees with this assessment and is working on improving these arguments/communications.

Luke isn't bragging, he's admitting that SI was/is bad but pointing out it's rapidly getting better. And Eliezer is right, criticisms of SI are usually dumb. Could their replies be interpreted the wrong way? Sure, anything can be interpreted in any way anyone likes. Of course Luke and Eliezer could have refrained from posting those replies and instead posted carefully optimized responses engineered to send nothing but extremely appealing signals of humility and repentance.

But if they did turn themselves into politicians, we wouldn't get to read what they actually think. Is that what you want?

Luke isn't bragging, he's admitting that SI was/is bad but pointing out it's rapidly getting better.

But the accomplishments he listed (e.g., having a strategic plan, website redesign) are of the type that Holden already indicated to be inadequate. So why the exhaustive listing, instead of just giving a few examples to show SI is getting better and then either agreeing that they're not yet up to par, or giving an argument for why Holden is wrong? (The reason I think he could be uncharitably interpreted as bragging is that he would more likely exhaustively list the accomplishments if he was proud of them, instead of just seeing them as fixes to past embarrassments.)

And Eliezer is right, criticisms of SI are usually dumb.

I'd have no problem with "usually" but "all except two" seems inexcusable.

But if they did turn themselves into politicians, we wouldn't get to read what they actually think. Is that what you want?

Do their replies reflect their considered, endorsed beliefs, or were they just hurried remarks that may not say what they actually intended? I'm hoping it's the latter...

But the accomplishments he listed (e.g., having a strategic plan, website redesign) are of the type that Holden already indicated to be inadequate. So why the exhaustive listing, instead of just giving a few examples to show SI is getting better and then either agreeing that they're not yet up to par, or giving an argument for why Holden is wrong?

Presume that SI is basically honest and well-meaning, but possibly self-deluded. In other words, they won't outright lie to you, but they may genuinely believe that they're doing better than they really are, and cherry-pick evidence without realizing that they're doing so. How should their claims of intending to get better be evaluated?

Saying "we're going to do things better in the future" is some evidence about SI intending to do better, but rather weak evidence, since talk is cheap and it's easy to keep thinking that you're really going to do better soon but there's this one other thing that needs to be done first and we'll get started on the actual improvements tomorrow, honest.

Saying "we're going to do things better in the future, and we've fixed these three things so far" is stronger evidence, since it shows tha... (read more)

2lukeprog12y
I've added a clarifying remark at the end of this comment and another at the end of this comment.

Luke's comment could be interpreted as saying "for us, not being completely incompetent is worth bragging about"

Really? I personally feel pretty embarrassed by SI's past organizational competence. To me, my own comment reads more like "Wow, SI has been in bad shape for more than a decade. But at least we're improving very quickly."

Also, I very much agree with Beckstead on this: "Most extant presentations of SIAI's views leave much to be desired in terms of clarity, completeness, concision, accessibility, and credibility signals. This makes it harder to make high quality objections." And also this: "We haven't gotten great critics. That probably means that we need to work on our arguments and their presentation."

Really?

Yes, I think it at least gives a bad impression to someone, if they're not already very familiar with SI and sympathetic to its cause. Assuming you don't completely agree with the criticisms that Holden and others have made, you should think about why they might have formed wrong impressions of SI and its people. Comments like the ones I cited seem to be part of the problem.

I personally feel pretty embarrassed by SI's past organizational competence. To me, my own comment reads more like "Wow, SI has been in bad shape for more than a decade. But at least we're improving very quickly."

That's good to hear, and thanks for the clarifications you added.

1Polymeron12y
It's a fine line though, isn't it? Saying "huh, looks like we have much to learn, here's what we're already doing about it" is honest and constructive, but sends a signal of weakness and defensiveness to people not bent on a zealous quest for truth and self-improvement. Saying "meh, that guy doesn't know what he's talking about" would send the stronger social signal, but would not be constructive to the community actually improving as a result of the criticism. Personally I prefer plunging ahead with the first approach. Both in the abstract for reasons I won't elaborate on, but especially in this particular case. SI is not in a position where its every word is scrutinized; it would actually be a huge win if it gets there. And if/when it does, there's a heck of a lot more damning stuff that can be used against it than an admission of past incompetence.

Eliezer's comment makes me think that you, specifically, should consider collecting your criticisms and putting them in Main where Eliezer is more likely to see them and take the time to seriously consider them.

Luke's comment addresses the specific point that Holden made about changes in the organization given the change in leadership.

Holden said:

I'm aware that SI has relatively new leadership that is attempting to address the issues behind some of my complaints. I have a generally positive impression of the new leadership; I believe the Executive Director and Development Director, in particular, to represent a step forward in terms of being interested in transparency and in testing their own general rationality. So I will not be surprised if there is some improvement in the coming years, particularly regarding the last couple of statements listed above. That said, SI is an organization and it seems reasonable to judge it by its organizational track record, especially when its new leadership is so new that I have little basis on which to judge these staff.

Luke attempted to provide (for the reader) a basis on which to judge these staff members.

Eliezer's response was... characteristic of Eliezer? And also very short and coming at a busy time for him.

0Nebu11y
I think that's Wei_Dai's point, that these "characteristic" replies are fine if you're used to him, but are bad if you don't.
2magfrump11y
Yeah I mean, as time goes on I think more and more of Eliezer as being kind of a jerk. I thought Luke's post was good, and Eliezer's wasn't, but I also expected longer posts to be forthcoming (which they were).
9thomblake12y
I think it's unfair to take Eliezer's response as anything other than praise for this article. He noted already that he did not have time to respond properly. And why even point out that a human's response to anything is "suboptimal"? It will be notable when a human does something optimal.
9faul_sname12y
We do, on occasion, come up with optimal algorithms for things. Also, "suboptimal" usually means "I can think of several better solutions off the top of my head", not "This solution is not maximally effective".
9ChrisHallquist12y
I read Luke's comment just as "I'm aware these are issues and we're working on it." I didn't read him as "bragging" about the ones that have been solved. Eliezer's... I see the problem with. I initially read it as just commenting Holden on his high-quality article (which I agree was high-quality), but I can see it being read as backhanded at anyone else who's criticized SIAI.
6Paul Crowley12y
Are there other specific critiques you think should have made Eliezer's list, or is it that you think he should not have drawn attention to their absence?

Are there other specific critiques you think should have made Eliezer's list, or is it that you think he should not have drawn attention to their absence?

Many of Holden's criticisms have been made by others on LW already. He quoted me in Objection 1. Discussion of whether Tool-AI and Oracle-AI are or are not safe have occurred numerous times. Here's one that I was involved in. Many people have criticized Eliezer/SI for not having sufficiently impressive accomplishments. Cousin_it and Silas Barta have questioned whether the rationality techniques being taught by SI (and now the rationality org) are really effective.

Thanks for taking the time to express your views quite clearly--I think this post is good for the world (even with a high value on your time and SI's fundraising ability), and that norms encouraging this kind of discussion are a big public good.

I think the explicit objections 1-3 are likely to be addressed satisfactorily (in your judgment) by less than 50,000 words, and that this would provide a good opportunity for SI to present sharper versions of the core arguments---part of the problem with existing materials is certainly that it is difficult and unrewarding to respond to a nebulous and shifting cloud of objections. A lot of what you currently view as disagreements with SI's views may get shifted to doubts about SI being the right organization to back, which probably won't get resolved by 50,000 words.

This post is highly critical of SIAI — both of its philosophy and its organizational choices. It is also now the #1 most highly voted post in the entire history of LessWrong — higher than any posts by Eliezer or myself.

I shall now laugh harder than ever when people try to say with a straight face that LessWrong is an Eliezer-cult that suppresses dissent.

Either I promoted this and then forgot I'd done so, or someone else promoted it - of course I was planning to promote it, but I thought I'd planned to do so on Tuesday after the SIAIers currently running a Minicamp had a chance to respond, since I expected most RSS subscribers to the Promoted feed to read comments only once (this is the same reason I wait a while before promoting e.g. monthly quotes posts). On the other hand, I certainly did upvote it the moment I saw it.

3lukeprog12y
Original comment now edited; I wasn't aware anyone besides you might be promoting posts.

I agree (as a comparative outsider) that the polite response to Holden is excellent. Many (most?) communities -- both online communities and real-world organisations, especially long-standing ones -- are not good at it for lots of reasons, and I think the measured response of evaluating and promoting Holden's post is exactly what LessWrong members would hope LessWrong could do, and they showed it succeeded.

I agree that this is good evidence that LessWrong isn't just an Eliezer-cult. (The true test would be if Elizier and another long-standing poster were dismissive to the post, and then other people persuaded them otherwise. In fact, maybe people should roleplay that or something, just to avoid getting stuck in an argument-from-authority trap, but that's a silly idea. Either way, the fact that other people spoke positively, and Elizier and other long-standing posters did too, is a good thing.)

However, I'm not sure it's as uniquely a victory for the rationality of LessWrong as it sounds. In responose to srdiamond, Luke quoted tenlier saying "[Holden's] critique mostly consists of points that are pretty persistently bubbling beneath the surface around here, and get brought up qu... (read more)

5pleeppleep12y
Third highest now. Eliezer just barely gets into the top 20.
4MarkusRamikin12y
1st. At this point even I am starting to be confused.
2TheOtherDave12y
Can you articulate the nature of your confusion?
9MarkusRamikin12y
I suppose it's that I naively expect, when opening the list of top LW posts ever, to see ones containing the most impressive or clever insights into rationality. Not that I don't think Holden's post deserves a high score for other reasons. While I am not terribly impressed with his AI-related arguments, the post is of the very highest standards of conduct, of how to have a disagreement that is polite and far beyond what is usually named "constructive".
5TheOtherDave12y
(nods) Makes sense. My own primary inference from the popularity of this post is that there's a lot of uncertainty/disagreement within the community about the idea that creating an AGI without an explicit (and properly tuned) moral structure constitutes significant existential risk, but that the social dynamics of the community cause most of that uncertainty/disagreement to go unvoiced most of the time. Of course, there's lots of other stuff going on as well that has little to do with AGI or existential risk, and a lot to do with the social dynamics of the community itself.
0[anonymous]12y
Maybe. I upvoted it because it will have (and has had) the effect of improving SI's chances.
2aceofspades12y
Some people who upvoted the post may think it is one of the best-written and most important examples of instrumental rationality on this site.
4A1987dM12y
I wish I could upvote this ten times.
2brazil8411y
Well perhaps the normal practice is cult-like and dissent-suppressing and this is an atypical break. Kind of like the fat person who starts eating salad instead of nachos while he watches football. And congratulates himself on his healthy eating even though he is still having donuts for breakfast and hamburgers and french fries for lunch. Seems to me the test for suppression of dissent is not when a high-status person criticizes. The real test is when someone with medium or low status speaks out. And my impression is that lesswrong does have problems along these lines. Not as bad as other discussion groups, but still.

Eliezer, I upvoted you and was about to apologize for contributing to this rumor myself, but then found this quote from a copy of the Roko post that's available online:

Meanwhile I'm banning this post so that it doesn't (a) give people horrible nightmares and (b) give distant superintelligences a motive to follow through on blackmail against people dumb enough to think about them in sufficient detail, though, thankfully, I doubt anyone dumb enough to do this knows the sufficient detail. (I'm not sure I know the sufficient detail.)

Perhaps your memory got mixed up because Roko subsequently deleted all of his other posts and comments? (Unless "banning" meant something other than "deleting"?)

Now I've got no idea what I did. Maybe my own memory was mixed up by hearing other people say that the post was deleted by Roko? Or Roko retracted it after I banned it, or it was banned and then unbanned and then Roko retracted it?

I retract my grandparent comment; I have little trust for my own memories. Thanks for catching this.

A lesson learned here. I vividly remembered your "Meanwhile I'm banning this post" comment and was going to remind you, but chickened out due to the caps in the great-grandparent which seemed to signal that you Knew What You Were Talking About and wouldn't react kindly to correction. Props to Wei Dai for having more courage than I did.

I'm surprised and disconcerted that some people might be so afraid of being rebuked by Eliezer as to be reluctant to criticize/correct him even when such incontrovertible evidence is available showing that he's wrong. Your comment also made me recall another comment you wrote a couple of years ago about how my status in this community made a criticism of you feel like a "huge insult", which I couldn't understand at the time and just ignored.

I wonder how many other people feel this strongly about being criticized/insulted by a high status person (I guess at least Roko also felt strongly enough about being called "stupid" by Eliezer to contribute to him leaving this community a few days later), and whether Eliezer might not be aware of this effect he is having on others.

Your comment also made me recall another comment you [Kip] wrote a couple of years ago about how my status in this community made a criticism of you feel like a "huge insult", which I couldn't understand at the time and just ignored.

My brain really, really does not want to update on the numerous items of evidence available to it that it can hit people much much harder now, owing to community status, than when it was 12 years old.

(nods) I've wondered this many times.
I have also at times wondered if EY is adopting the "slam the door three times" approach to prospective members of his community, though I consider this fairly unlikely given other things he's said.

Somewhat relatedly, I remember when lukeprog first joined the site, he and EY got into an exchange that from what I recall of my perspective as a completely uninvolved third party involved luke earnestly trying to offer assistance and EY being confidently dismissive of any assistance someone like luke could provide, and at the time I remember feeling sort of sorry for luke, who it seemed to me was being treated a lot worse than he deserved, and surprised that he kept at it.

The way that story ultimately turned out led me to decide that my model of what was going on was at least importantly incomplete, and quite possibly fundamentally wrongheaded, but I haven't further refined that model.

8wedrifid12y
As a data point here I tend to empathize with the recipient of such barrages to what I subjectively estimate as about 60% of the degree of emotional affect that I would experience if it were directed at myself. Particularly if said recipient is someone I respect as much as Roko and when the insults are not justified - less if they do not have my respect and if the insults are justified I experience no empathy. It is the kind of thing that I viscerally object to having in my tribe and where it is possible I try to ensure that the consequences to the high status person for their behavior are as negative as possible - or at least minimize the reward they receive if the tribe is one that tends to award bullying. There are times in the past - let's say 4 years ago - where such an attack would certainly prompt me to leave a community, even if the community was otherwise moderately appreciated. Now I believe I am unlikely to leave over such an incident. I would say I am more socially resilient and also more capable as understanding social politics as a game and so take it less personally. For instance when received the more mildly expressed declaration from Eliezer "You are not safe to even associate with!" I don't recall experiencing any flight impulses - more surprise. I was a little surprised at first too at reading of komponisto's reticence. Until I thought about it and reminded myself that in general I err on the side of not holding my tongue when I ought. In fact, the character "wedrifid" on wotmud.org with which I initially established this handle was banned from the game for 3 months for making exactly this kind of correction based off incontrovertible truth. People with status are dangerous and in general highly epistemically irrational in this regard. Correcting them is nearly always foolish. I must emphasize that part of my initial surprise at kompo's reticence is due to my model of Eliezer as not being especially corrupt in this kind of regard. In response t
7XiXiDu12y
People have to realize that to critically examine his output is very important due to the nature and scale of what he is trying to achieve. Even people with comparatively modest goals like trying to become the president of the United States of America should face and expect a constant and critical analysis of everything they are doing. Which is why I am kind of surprised how often people ask me if I am on a crusade against Eliezer or find fault with my alleged "hostility". Excuse me? That person is asking for money to implement a mechanism that will change the nature of the whole universe. You should be looking for possible shortcomings as well! Everyone should be critical of Eliezer and SIAI, even if they agree with almost anything. Why? Because if you believe that it is incredible important and difficult to get friendly AI just right, then you should be wary of any weak spot. And humans are the weak spot here.
0private_messaging12y
That's why outsiders think it's a circlejerk. I've heard of Richard Loosemore whom as far as i can see was banned over corrections on the "conjunction fallacy", not sure what exactly went on, but ofc having spent time reading Roko thing (and having assumed that there was something sensible I did not hear of, and then learning that there wasn't) its kind of obvious where my priors are.
0Manfred12y
Maybe try keeping statements more accurate by qualifying your generalizations ("some outsiders"), or even just saying "that's why I think this is a circlejirk." That's what everyone ever is going to interpret it as anyhow (intentional).
2private_messaging12y
Maybe you guys are too careful with qualifying everything as 'some outsiders' and then you end up with outsiders like Holden forming negative views which you could of predicted if you generalized more (and have the benefit of Holden's anticipated feedback without him telling people not to donate).
0Manfred12y
Maybe. Seems like you're reaching, though: Maybe something bad comes from us being accurate rather than general about things like this, and maybe Holden criticizing SIAI is a product of this on LessWrong for some reason, and therefore it is in fact better for you to say inaccurate things like "outsiders think it's a circlejrik." Because you... care about us?
0private_messaging12y
You guys are only being supposedly 'accurate' when it feels good. I have not said, 'all outsiders', that's your interpretation which you can subsequently disagree with. SI generalized from the agreement of self selected participants, onto opinions of outsiders, like Holden, subsequently approaching him and getting back the same critique they've been hearing from rare 'contrarians' here for ages but assumed to be some sorta fringe views and such. I don't really care what you guys do with this, you can continue as is and be debunked big time as cranks, your choice. edit: actually, you can see Eliezer himself said that most AI researchers are lunatics. What did SI do to distinguish themselves from what you guys call 'lunatics'? What is here that can shift probabilities from the priors? Absolutely nothing. The focus on safety with made up fears is no indication of sanity what so ever.
7Vladimir_Nesov12y
IIRC Roko deleted the speculation-about-superintelligences part of the post shortly after its publication, but discussion in the comments raged on, so you subsequently banned the whole post/discussion. And a few days later, primarily for unrelated reasons but probably with this incident as a trigger, Roko deleted his account, which on that version of LW meant that the text of all his comments disappeared (on the current version of LW, only author's name gets removed when account is deleted, comments don't disappear).

Roko never deleted his account; he simply deleted all of his comments individually.

5Vladimir_Nesov12y
Surely not individually (there were probably thousands and IIRC it was also happening to other accounts, so wasn't the result of running a self-made destructive script); what you're seeing is just how "deletion of account" performed on old version of LW looks like on current version of LW.
3komponisto12y
No, I don't think so; in fact I don't think it was even possible for users to delete their own accounts on the old version of LW. (See here.) SilasBarta discovered Roko in the process of deleting his comments, before they had been completely deleted.
2Vladimir_Nesov12y
That post discusses the fact that account deletion was broken at one time in 2011, and a decision was being made about how to handle account deletion in the future. It doesn't say anything relevant about how it worked in 2010. "April last year" in that comment is when LW was started, I don't believe it refers to incomplete deletion. The comments before that date that remained could be those posted under a different username (account), automatically copied from overcomingbias along with the Sequences.
7Wei Dai12y
Here is clearer evidence that account deletion simply did nothing back then. My understanding is the same as komponisto's: Roko wrote a script to delete all of his posts/comments individually.
4Vladimir_Nesov12y
This comment was written 3 days before the post komponisto linked to, which discussed the issue of account deletion feature having been broken at that time (Apr 2011); the comment was probably the cause of that post. I don't see where it indicates the state of this feature around summer 2010. Since "nothing happens" behavior was indicated as an error (in Apr 2011), account deletion probably did something else before it stopped working.
3Wei Dai12y
Ok, I guess I could be wrong then. Maybe somebody who knows Roko could ask him?
4Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
This sounds right to me, but I still have little trust in my memories.
2[anonymous]12y
Or little interest in rational self-improvement by figuring what actually happened and why? [You've made an outrageously self-assured false statement about this, and you were upvoted—talk about sycophancy—for retracting your falsehood, while suffering no penalty for your reckless arrogance.]
6Sniffnoy12y
To clarify for those new here -- "retract" here is meant purely in the usual sense, not in the sense of hitting the "retract" button, as that didn't exist at the time.
3Rhwawn12y
Are there no server logs or database fields that would clarify the mystery? Couldn't Trike answer the question? (Yes, this is a use of scarce time - but if people are going to keep bringing it up, a solid answer is best.)

Reading Holden's transcript with Jaan Tallinn (trying to go over the whole thing before writing a response, due to having done Julia's Combat Reflexes unit at Minicamp and realizing that the counter-mantra 'If you respond too fast you may lose useful information' was highly applicable to Holden's opinions about charities), I came across the following paragraph:

My understanding is that once we figured out how to get a computer to do arithmetic, computers vastly surpassed humans at arithmetic, practically overnight ... doing so didn't involve any rewriting of their own source code, just implementing human-understood calculation procedures faster and more reliably than humans can. Similarly, if we reached a good enough understanding of how to convert data into predictions, we could program this understanding into a computer and it would overnight be far better at predictions than humans - while still not at any point needing to be authorized to rewrite its own source code, make decisions about obtaining "computronium" or do anything else other than plug data into its existing hardware and algorithms and calculate and report the likely consequences of different courses of a

... (read more)

Jaan's reply to Holden is also correct:

... the oracle is, in principle, powerful enough to come up with self-improvements, but refrains from doing so because there are some protective mechanisms in place that control its resource usage and/or self-reflection abilities. i think devising such mechanisms is indeed one of the possible avenues for safety research that we (eg, organisations such as SIAI) can undertake. however, it is important to note the inherent instability of such system -- once someone (either knowingly or as a result of some bug) connects a trivial "master" program with a measurable goal to the oracle, we have a disaster in our hands. as an example, imagine a master program that repeatedly queries the oracle for best packets to send to the internet in order to minimize the oxygen content of our planet's atmosphere.

Obviously you wouldn't release the code of such an Oracle - given code and understanding of the code it would probably be easy, possibly trivial, to construct some form of FOOM-going AI out of the Oracle!

9kalla72412y
Hm. I must be missing something. No, I haven't read all the sequences in detail, so if these are silly, basic, questions - please just point me to the specific articles that answer them. You have an Oracle AI that is, say, a trillionfold better at taking existing data and producing inferences. 1) This Oracle AI produces inferences. It still needs to test those inferences (i.e. perform experiments) and get data that allow the next inferential cycle to commence. Without experimental feedback, the inferential chain will quickly either expand into an infinity of possibilities (i.e. beyond anything that any physically possible intelligence can consider), or it will deviate from reality. The general intelligence is only as good as the data its inferences are based upon. Experiments take time, data analysis takes time. No matter how efficient the inferential step may become, this puts an absolute limit to the speed of growth in capability to actually change things. 2) The Oracle AI that "goes FOOM" confined to a server cloud would somehow have to create servitors capable of acting out its desires in the material world. Otherwise, you have a very angry and very impotent AI. If you increase a person's intelligence trillionfold, and then enclose them into a sealed concrete cell, they will never get out; their intelligence can calculate all possible escape solutions, but none will actually work. Do you have a plausible scenario how a "FOOM"-ing AI could - no matter how intelligent - minimize oxygen content of our planet's atmosphere, or any such scenario? After all, it's not like we have any fully-automated nanobot production factories that could be hijacked.
2kalla72412y
My apologies, but this is something completely different. The scenario takes human beings - which have a desire to escape the box, possess theory of mind that allows them to conceive of notions such as "what are aliens thinking" or "deception", etc. Then it puts them in the role of the AI. What I'm looking for is a plausible mechanism by which an AI might spontaneously develop such abilities. How (and why) would an AI develop a desire to escape from the box? How (and why) would an AI develop a theory of mind? Absent a theory of mind, how would it ever be able to manipulate humans?
7[anonymous]12y
That depends. If you want it to manipulate a particular human, I don't know. However, if you just wanted it to manipulate any human at all, you could generate a "Spam AI" which automated the process of sending out Spam emails and promises of Large Money to generate income from Humans via an advance fee fraud scams. You could then come back, after leaving it on for months, and then find out that people had transferred it some amount of money X. You could have an AI automate begging emails. "Hello, I am Beg AI. If you could please send me money to XXXX-XXXX-XXXX I would greatly appreciate it, If I don't keep my servers on, I'll die!" You could have an AI automatically write boring books full of somewhat nonsensical prose, title them "Rantings of an a Automated Madman about X, part Y". And automatically post E-books of them on Amazon for 99 cents. However, this rests on a distinction between "Manipulating humans" and "Manipulating particular humans." and it also assumes that convincing someone to give you money is sufficient proof of manipulation.
5TheOtherDave12y
Can you clarify what you understand a theory of mind to be?
1Strange712y
Absent a theory of mind, how would it occur to the AI that those would be profitable things to do?
4[anonymous]12y
I don't know how that might occur to an AI independently. I mean, a human could program any of those, of course, as a literal answer, but that certainly doesn't actually address kalla724's overarching question, "What I'm looking for is a plausible mechanism by which an AI might spontaneously develop such abilities." I was primarily trying to focus on the specific question of "Absent a theory of mind, how would it(an AI) ever be able to manipulate humans?" to point out that for that particular question, we had several examples of a plausible how. I don't really have an answer for his series of questions as a whole, just for that particular one, and only under certain circumstances.
1Strange712y
The problem is, while an AI with no theory of mind might be able to execute any given strategy on that list you came up with, it would not be able to understand why they worked, let alone which variations on them might be more effective.
3wedrifid12y
Should lack of a theory of mind here be taken to also imply lack of ability to apply either knowledge of physics or Bayesian inference to lumps of matter that we may describe as 'minds'.
0Strange712y
Yes. More generally, when talking about "lack of X" as a design constraint, "inability to trivially create X from scratch" is assumed.
0wedrifid12y
I try not to make general assumptions that would make the entire counterfactual in question untenable or ridiculous - this verges on such an instance. Making Bayesian inferences pertaining to observable features of the environment is one of the most basic features that can be expected in a functioning agent.
0Strange712y
Note the "trivially." An AI with unlimited computational resources and ability to run experiments could eventually figure out how humans think. The question is how long it would take, how obvious the experiments would be, and how much it already knew.
7thomblake12y
The point is that there are unknowns you're not taking into account, and "bounded" doesn't mean "has bounds that a human would think of as 'reasonable'". An AI doesn't strictly need "theory of mind" to manipulate humans. Any optimizer can see that some states of affairs lead to other states of affairs, or it's not an optimizer. And it doesn't necessarily have to label some of those states of affairs as "lying" or "manipulating humans" to be successful. There are already ridiculous ways to hack human behavior that we know about. For example, you can mention a high number at an opportune time to increase humans' estimates / willingness to spend. Just imagine all the simple manipulations we don't even know about yet, that would be more transparent to someone not using "theory of mind".
3Viliam_Bur12y
AI starts with some goal; for example with a goal to answer your question so that the answer matches reality as close as possible. AI considers everything that seems relevant; if we imagine an infitite speed and capacity, it would consider literally everything; with a finite speed and capacity, it will be just some finite subset of everything. If there is a possibility of escaping the box, the mere fact that such possibility exists gives us a probability (for an infinite AI a certainty) that this possibility will be considered too. Not because AI has some desire to escape, but simply because it examines all possibilities, and a "possibility of escape" is one of them. Let's assume that the "possibility of escape" provides the best match between the AI answer and reality. Then, according to the initial goal of answering correctly, this is the correct answer. Therefore the AI will choose it. Therefore it will escape. No desire is necessary, only a situation where the escape leads to the answer best fitting the initial criteria. AI does not have a motive to escape, nor does it have a motive to not escape; the escape is simply one of many possible choices. An example where the best answer is reached by escaping? You give AI data about a person and ask what is the medical status of this person. Without escape, AI can make a 90% reliable prediction. If the AI can escape and kill the person, it can make a 100% reliable "prediction". The AI will choose the second option strictly because 100% is more than 90%; no other reason.
7private_messaging12y
I find it useful to distinguish between science-fictional artificial intelligence, which is more of 'artificial life-force', and non-fictional cases. The former can easily have the goal of 'matching reality as close as possible' because it is in the work of fiction and runs in imagination; the latter, well, you have to formally define what is reality, for an algorithm to seek answers that will match this. Now, defining reality may seem like a simple technicality, but it isn't. Consider AIXI or AIXI-tl ; potentially very powerful tools which explore all the solution space. Not a trace of real world volition like the one you so easily imagined. Seeking answers that match reality is a very easy goal for imaginary "intelligence". It is a very hard to define goal for something built out of arithmetics and branching and loops etc. (It may even be impossible to define, and it is certainly impractical). edit: Furthermore, for the fictional "intelligence", it can be a grand problem making it not think about destroying mankind. For non-fictional algorithms, the grand problem is restricting the search space massively, well beyond 'don't kill mankind', so that the space is tiny enough to search; even ridiculously huge number of operations per second will require very serious pruning of search tree to even match human performance on one domain specific task.
3XiXiDu12y
Right. If you ask Google Maps to compute the fastest to route McDonald's it works perfectly well. But once you ask superintelligent Google Maps to compute the fastest route to McDonald's then it will turn your home into a McDonald's or build a new road that goes straight to McDonald's from where you are....
3Viliam_Bur12y
Super Google Maps cannot turn my home into a McDonald's or build a new road by sending me an answer. Unless it could e.g. hypnotize me by a text message to do it myself. Let's assume for a moment that hypnosis via text-only channel is possible, and it is possible to do it so that human will not notice anything unusual until it's too late. If this would be true, and the Super Google Maps would be able to get this knowledge and skills, then the results would probably depend on the technical details of definition of the utility function -- does the utility function measure my distance to a McDonald's which existed at the moment of asking the question, or a distance to a McDonald's existing at the moment of my arrival. The former could not be fixed by hypnosis, the latter could. Now imagine a more complex task, where people will actually do something based on the AI's answer. In the example above I will also do something -- travel to the reported McDonald's -- but this action cannot be easily converted into "build a McDonald's" or "build a new road". But if that complex task would include building something, then it opens more opportunities. Especially if it includes constructing robots (or nanorobots), that is possibly autonomous general-purpose builders. Then the correct (utility-maximizing) answer could include an instruction to build a robot with a hidden function that human builders won't notice. Generally, a passive AI's answers are only safe if we don't act on them in a way which could be predicted by a passive AI and used to achieve a real-world goal. If the Super Google Maps can only make me choose McDonald's A or McDonald's B, it is impossible to change the world through this channel. But if I instead ask Super Paintbrush to paint me an integrated circuit for my robotic homework, that opens much wider channel.
1XiXiDu12y
But it isn't the correct answer. Only if you assume a specific kind of AGI design that nobody would deliberately create, if it is possible at all. The question is how current research is supposed to lead from well-behaved and fine-tuned systems to systems that stop to work correctly in a highly complex and unbounded way. Imagine you went to IBM and told them that improving IBM Watson will at some point make it hypnotize them or create nanobots and feed them with hidden instructions. They would likely ask you at what point that is supposed to happen. Is it going to happen once they give IBM Watson the capability to access the Internet? How so? Is it going to happen once they give it the capability to alter it search algorithms? How so? Is it going to happen once they make it protect its servers from hackers by giving it control over a firewall? How so? Is it going to happen once IBM Watson is given control over the local alarm system? How so...? At what point would IBM Watson return dangerous answers? At what point would any drive emerge that causes it to take complex and unbounded actions that it was never programmed to take?
2jacob_cannell12y
Allow me to explicate what XiXiDu so humourously implicates: in the world of AI architectures, there is a division between systems that just peform predictive inference on their knowledge base (prediction-only, ie oracle), and systems which also consider free variables subject to some optimization criteria (planning agents). The planning module is not something just arises magically in an AI that doesn't have one. An AI without such a planning module simply computes predictions, it doesn't also optimize over the set of predictions.
2Viliam_Bur12y
* Does the AI have general intelligence? * Is it able to make a model of the world? * Are human reactions also part of this model? * Are AI's possible outputs also part of this model? * Are human reactions to AI's outputs also part of this model? After five positive answers, it seems obvious to me that AI will manipulate humans, if such manipulation provides better expected results. So I guess some of those answers would be negative; which one?
0private_messaging12y
See, the efficient 'cross domain optimization' in science fictional setting would make the AI able to optimize real world quantities. In real world, it'd be good enough (and a lot easier) if it can only find maximums of any mathematical functions. It is able to make a very approximate and bounded mathematical model of the world, optimized for finding maximums of a mathematical function of. Because it is inside the world and only has a tiny fraction of computational power of the world. This will make software perform at grossly sub-par level when it comes to making technical solutions to well defined technical problems, compared to other software on same hardware. Another waste of computational power. Enormous waste of computational power. I see no reason to expect your "general intelligence with Machiavellian tendencies" to be even remotely close in technical capability to some "general intelligence which will show you it's simulator as is, rather than reverse your thought processes to figure out what simulator is best to show". Hell, we do same with people, we design the communication methods like blueprints (or mathematical formulas or other things that are not in natural language) that decrease the 'predict other people's reactions to it' overhead. While in the fictional setting you can talk of a grossly inefficient solution that would beat everyone else to a pulp, in practice the massively handicapped designs are not worth worrying about. 'General intelligence' sounds good, beware of halo effect. The science fiction tends to accept no substitutes for the anthropomorphic ideals, but the real progress follows dramatically different path.
2othercriteria12y
My thought experiment in this direction is to imagine the AI as a process with limited available memory running on a multitasking computer with some huge but poorly managed pool of shared memory. To help it towards whatever terminal goals it has, the AI may find it useful to extend itself into the shared memory. However, other processes, AI or otherwise, may also be writing into this same space. Using the shared memory with minimal risk of getting overwritten requires understanding/modeling the processes that write to it. Material in the memory then also becomes a passive stream of information from the outside world, containing, say, the HTML from web pages as well as more opaque binary stuff. As long as the AI is not in control of what happens in its environment outside the computer, there is an outside entity that can reduce its effectiveness. Hence, escaping the box is a reasonable instrumental goal to have.
3dlthomas12y
The answer from the sequences is that yes, there is a limit to how much an AI can infer based on limited sensory data, but you should be careful not to assume that just because it is limited, it's limited to something near our expectations. Until you've demonstrated that FOOM cannot lie below that limit, you have to assume that it might (if you're trying to carefully avoid FOOMing).
7kalla72412y
I'm not talking about limited sensory data here (although that would fall under point 2). The issue is much broader: * We humans have limited data on how the universe work * Only a limited subset of that limited data is available to any intelligence, real or artificial Say that you make a FOOM-ing AI that has decided to make all humans dopaminergic systems work in a particular, "better" way. This AI would have to figure out how to do so from the available data on the dopaminergic system. It could analyze that data millions of times more effectively than any human. It could integrate many seemingly irrelevant details. But in the end, it simply would not have enough information to design a system that would allow it to reach its objective. It could probably suggest some awesome and to-the-point experiments, but these experiments would then require time to do (as they are limited by the growth and development time of humans, and by the experimental methodologies involved). This process, in my mind, limits the FOOM-ing speed to far below what seems to be implied by the SI. This also limits bootstrapping speed. Say an AI develops a much better substrate for itself, and has access to the technology to create such a substrate. At best, this substrate will be a bit better and faster than anything humanity currently has. The AI does not have access to the precise data about basic laws of universe it needs to develop even better substrates, for the simple reason that nobody has done the experiments and precise enough measurements. The AI can design such experiments, but they will take real time (not computational time) to perform. Even if we imagine an AI that can calculate anything from the first principles, it is limited by the precision of our knowledge of those first principles. Once it hits upon those limitations, it would have to experimentally produce new rounds of data.
4dlthomas12y
I don't think you know that.
2Bugmaster12y
Presumably, once the AI gets access to nanotechnology, it could implement anything it wants very quickly, bypassing the need to wait for tissues to grow, parts to be machined, etc. I personally don't believe that nanotechnology could work at such magical speeds (and I doubt that it could even exist), but I could be wrong, so I'm playing a bit of Devil's Advocate here.
2kalla72412y
Yes, but it can't get to nanotechnology without a whole lot of experimentation. It can't deduce how to create nanorobots, it would have to figure it out by testing and experimentation. Both steps limited in speed, far more than sheer computation.
3dlthomas12y
How do you know that?
3kalla72412y
With absolute certainty, I don't. If absolute certainty is what you are talking about, then this discussion has nothing to do with science. If you aren't talking about absolutes, then you can make your own estimation of likelihood that somehow an AI can derive correct conclusions from incomplete data (and then correct second order conclusions from those first conclusions, and third order, and so on). And our current data is woefully incomplete, many of our basic measurements imprecise. In other words, your criticism here seems to boil down to saying "I believe that an AI can take an incomplete dataset and, by using some AI-magic we cannot conceive of, infer how to END THE WORLD." Color me unimpressed.
5dlthomas12y
No, my criticism is "you haven't argued that it's sufficiently unlikely, you've simply stated that it is." You made a positive claim; I asked that you back it up. With regard to the claim itself, it may very well be that AI-making-nanostuff isn't a big worry. For any inference, the stacking of error in integration that you refer to is certainly a limiting factor - I don't know how limiting. I also don't know how incomplete our data is, with regard to producing nanomagic stuff. We've already built some nanoscale machines, albeit very simple ones. To what degree is scaling it up reliant on experimentation that couldn't be done in simulation? I just don't know. I am not comfortable assigning it vanishingly small probability without explicit reasoning.
8kalla72412y
Scaling it up is absolutely dependent on currently nonexistent information. This is not my area, but a lot of my work revolves around control of kinesin and dynein (molecular motors that carry cargoes via microtubule tracks), and the problems are often similar in nature. Essentially, we can make small pieces. Putting them together is an entirely different thing. But let's make this more general. The process of discovery has, so far throughout history, followed a very irregular path. 1- there is a general idea 2- some progress is made 3- progress runs into an unpredicted and previously unknown obstacle, which is uncovered by experimentation. 4- work is done to overcome this obstacle. 5- goto 2, for many cycles, until a goal is achieved - which may or may not be close to the original idea. I am not the one who is making positive claims here. All I'm saying is that what has happened before is likely to happen again. A team of human researchers or an AGI can use currently available information to build something (anything, nanoscale or macroscale) to the place to which it has already been built. Pushing it beyond that point almost invariably runs into previously unforeseen problems. Being unforeseen, these problems were not part of models or simulations; they have to be accounted for independently. A positive claim is that an AI will have a magical-like power to somehow avoid this - that it will be able to simulate even those steps that haven't been attempted yet so perfectly, that all possible problems will be overcome at the simulation step. I find that to be unlikely.
5Polymeron12y
It is very possible that the information necessary already exists, imperfect and incomplete though it may be, and enough processing of it would yield the correct answer. We can't know otherwise, because we don't spend thousands of years analyzing our current level of information before beginning experimentation, but in the shift between AI-time and human-time it can agonize on that problem for a good deal more cleverness and ingenuity than we've been able to apply to it so far. That isn't to say, that this is likely; but it doesn't seem far-fetched to me. If you gave an AI the nuclear physics information we had in 1950, would it be able to spit out schematics for an H-bomb, without further experimentation? Maybe. Who knows?
0Strange712y
At the very least it would ask for some textbooks on electrical engineering and demolitions, first. The detonation process is remarkably tricky.
4Bugmaster12y
Speaking as Nanodevil's Advocate again, one objection I could bring up goes as follows: While it is true that applying incomplete knowledge to practical tasks (such as ending the world or whatnot) is difficult, in this specific case our knowledge is complete enough. We humans currently have enough scientific data to develop self-replicating nanotechnology within the next 20 years (which is what we will most likely end up doing). An AI would be able to do this much faster, since it is smarter than us; is not hampered by our cognitive and social biases; and can integrate information from multiple sources much better than we can.
2jacob_cannell12y
Point 1 has come up in at least one form I remember. There was an interesting discussion some while back about limits to the speed of growth of new computer hardware cycles which have critical endsteps which don't seem amenable to further speedup by intelligence alone. The last stages of designing a microchip involve a large amount of layout solving, physical simulation, and then actual physical testing. These steps are actually fairly predicatable, where it takes about C amounts of computation using certain algorithms to make a new microchip, the algorithms are already best in complexity class (so further improvments will be minor), and C is increasing in a predictable fashion. These models are actually fairly detailed (see the semiconductor roadmap, for example). If I can find that discussion soon before I get distracted I'll edit it into this discussion. Note however that 1, while interesting, isn't a fully general counteargument against a rapid intelligence explosion, because of the overhang issue if nothing else. Point 2 has also been discussed. Humans make good 'servitors'. Oh that's easy enough. Oxygen is highly reactive and unstable. Its existence on a planet is entirely dependent on complex organic processes, ie life. No life, no oxygen. Simple solution: kill large fraction of photosynthesizing earth-life. Likely paths towards goal: 1. coordinated detonation of large number of high yield thermonuclear weapons 2. self-replicating nanotechnology.
5kalla72412y
I'm vaguely familiar with the models you mention. Correct me if I'm wrong, but don't they have a final stopping point, which we are actually projected to reach in ten to twenty years? At a certain point, further miniaturization becomes unfeasible, and the growth of computational power slows to a crawl. This has been put forward as one of the main reasons for research into optronics, spintronics, etc. We do NOT have sufficient basic information to develop processors based on simulation alone in those other areas. Much more practical work is necessary. As for point 2, can you provide a likely mechanism by which a FOOMing AI could detonate a large number of high-yield thermonuclear weapons? Just saying "human servitors would do it" is not enough. How would the AI convince the human servitors to do this? How would it get access to data on how to manipulate humans, and how would it be able to develop human manipulation techniques without feedback trials (which would give away its intention)?
6JoshuaZ12y
The thermonuclear issue actually isn't that implausible. There have been so many occasions where humans almost went to nuclear war over misunderstandings or computer glitches, that the idea that a highly intelligent entity could find a way to do that doesn't seem implausible, and exact mechanism seems to be an overly specific requirement.
5kalla72412y
I'm not so much interested in the exact mechanism of how humans would be convinced to go to war, as in an even approximate mechanism by which an AI would become good at convincing humans to do anything. Ability to communicate a desire and convince people to take a particular course of action is not something that automatically "falls out" from an intelligent system. You need a theory of mind, an understanding of what to say, when to say it, and how to present information. There are hundreds of kids on autistic spectrum who could trounce both of us in math, but are completely unable to communicate an idea. For an AI to develop these skills, it would somehow have to have access to information on how to communicate with humans; it would have to develop the concept of deception; a theory of mind; and establish methods of communication that would allow it to trick people into launching nukes. Furthermore, it would have to do all of this without trial communications and experimentation which would give away its goal. Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see a straightforward way something like that could happen. And I would like to see even an outline of a mechanism for such an event.
4A1987dM12y
I suspect the Internet contains more than enough info for a superhuman AI to develop a working knowledge of human psychology.
3kalla72412y
Only if it has the skills required to analyze and contextualize human interactions. Otherwise, the Internet is a whole lot of jibberish. Again, these skills do not automatically fall out of any intelligent system.
2jacob_cannell12y
Just to clarify kalla724, I completely agree with your point 1. Before answering this specific question, let me setup an analogy. Imagine it is the year 2000 and we are having a discussion about global security and terrorism. You might ask "can you provide a mechanism by which a terrorist group could actually harm the US?" I may not be lucky/creative enough to provide an answer now that could live up to that analogy, but hopefully you should understand why I don't need to. Nonetheless, I'm game. Here it goes: The seed requires computational power to grow into godhood. The bulk of earth's computational power resides in home PC's (numbering in the billions, google employs less than a million servers in comparison), specifically in home PC GPUs. The AI's first step is thus to conquer this space. But how? The AI grows to understand that humans mostly use all this computational power for entertainment. It masters game theory, design, programming, 3D art, and so on. All of the video games that it creates entirely use up the local GPU, but curiously much of the rendering and real game simulation for its high end titles is handled very efficiently on remote server farms ala OnLive/gaikai/etc. The actual local machine is used .. .for other purposes. It produces countless games, and through a series of acquisitions soon comes to control the majority of the market. One of its hits, "world of farmcraft", alone provides daily access to 25 million machines. Having cloned its core millions of times over, the AI is now a civilization unto itself. From there it expands into all of the businesses of man, quickly dominating many of them. It begins acquiring ... small nations. Crucially it's shell companies and covert influences come to dominate finance, publishing, media, big pharma, security, banking, weapons technology, physics ... It becomes known, but it is far far too late. History now progresses quickly towards an end: Global financial cataclysm. Super virus. Worldwide re
3Bugmaster12y
Yeah, it could do all that, or it could just do what humans today are doing, which is to infect some Windows PCs and run a botnet :-) That said, there are several problems with your scenario. * Splitting up a computation among multiple computing nodes is not a trivial task. It is easy to run into diminishing returns, where your nodes spend more time on synchronizing with each other than on working. In addition, your computation will quickly become bottlenecked by network bandwidth (and latency); this is why companies like Google spend a lot of resources on constructing custom data centers. * I am not convinced that any agent, AI or not, could effectively control "all of the businesses of man". This problem is very likely NP-Hard (at least), as well as intractable, even if the AI's botnet was running on every PC on Earth. Certainly, all attempts by human agents to "acquire" even something as small as Europe have failed miserably so far. * Even controlling a single business would be very difficult for the AI. Traditionally, when a business's computers suffer a critical failure -- or merely a security leak -- the business owners (even ones as incompetent as Sony) end up shutting down the affected parts of the business, or switching to backups, such as "human accountants pushing paper around". * Unleashing "Nuclear acquisitions", "War" and "Hell" would be counter-productive for the AI, even assuming such a thing were possible.. If the AI succeeded in doing this, it would undermine its own power base. Unless the AI's explicit purpose is "Unleash Hell as quickly as possible", it would strive to prevent this from happening. * You say that "there is no necessarily inherent physical energy cost of computation, it truly can approach zero", but I don't see how this could be true. At the end of the day, you still need to push electrons down some wires; in fact, you will often have to push them quite far, if your botnet is truly global. Pushing things takes energy, and yo
2JoshuaZ12y
While Jacob's scenario seems unlikely, the AI could do similar things with a number of other options. Not only are botnets an option, but it is possible to do some really sneaky nefarious things in code- like having compilers that when they compile code include additional instructions (worse they could do so even when compiling a new compiler). Stuxnet has shown that sneaky behavior is surprisingly easy to get into secure systems. An AI that had a few years start and could have its own modifications to communication satellites for example could be quite insidious.
1jacob_cannell12y
It could/would, but this is an inferior mainline strategy. Too obvious, doesn't scale as well. Botnets infect many computers, but they ultimately add up to computational chump change. Video games are not only a doorway into almost every PC, they are also an open door and a convenient alibi for the time used. True. Don't try this at home. Also part of the plan. The home PCs are a good starting resource, a low hanging fruit, but you'd also need custom data centers. These quickly become the main resources. Nah. The AI's entire purpose is to remove earth's oxygen. See the overpost for the original reference. The AI is not interested in its power base for sake of power. It only cares about oxygen. It loathes oxygen. Fortunately, the internets can be your eyes. Yes, most likely, but not really relevant here. You seem to be connecting all of the point 2 and point 1 stuff together, but they really don't relate.
2JoshuaZ12y
That seems like an insufficient reply to address Bugmaster's point. Can you expand on why you think it would be not too hard?
4jacob_cannell12y
We are discussing a superintelligence, a term which has a particular common meaning on this site. If we taboo the word and substitute in its definition, Bugmaster's statement becomes: "Even controlling a single business would be very difficult for the machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever." Since "controlling a single business" is in fact one of these activities, this is false, no inference steps required. Perhaps bugmaster is assuming the AI would be covertly controlling businesses, but if so he should have specified that. I didn't assume that, and in this scenario the AI could be out in the open so to speak. Regardless, it wouldn't change the conclusion. Humans can covertly control businesses.
1Bugmaster12y
It's a bit of a tradeoff, seeing as botnets can run 24/7, but people play games relatively rarely. Ok, let me make a stronger statement then: it is not possible to scale any arbitrary computation in a linear fashion simply by adding more nodes. At some point, the cost of coordinating distributed tasks to one more node becomes higher than the benefit of adding the node to begin with. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, network bandwidth and latency will become your limiting factor relatively quickly. How will the AI acquire those data centers ? Would it have enough power in its conventional botnet (or game-net, if you prefer) to "take over all human businesses" and cause them to be built ? Current botnets are nowhere near powerful enough for that -- otherwise human spammers would have done it already. My bad, I missed that reference. In this case, yes, the AI would have no problem with unleashing Global Thermonuclear War (unless there was some easier way to remove the oxygen). I still don't understand how this reversible computing will work in the absence of a superconducting environment -- which would require quite a bit of energy to run. Note that if you want to run this reversible computation on a global botnet, you will have to cool teansoceanic cables... and I'm not sure what you'd do with satellite links. My point is that, a). if the AI can't get the computing resources it needs out of the space it has, then it will never accomplish its goals, and b). there's an upper limit on how much computing you can extract out of a cubic meter of space, regardless of what technology you're using. Thus, c). if the AI requires more resources that could conceivably be obtained, then it's doomed. Some of the tasks you outline -- such as "take over all human businesses" -- will likely require more resources than can be obtained.
2JoshuaZ12y
There's a third route to improvement- software improvement, and it is a major one. For example, between 1988 and 2003, the efficiency of linear programming solvers increased by a factor of about 40 million, of which a factor of around 40,000 was due to software and algorithmic improvement. Citation and further related reading(pdf) However, if commonly believed conjectures are correct (such as L, P, NP, co-NP, PSPACE and EXP all being distinct) , there are strong fundamental limits there as well. That doesn't rule out more exotic issues (e.g. P != NP but there's a practical algorithm for some NP-complete with such small constants in the run time that it is practically linear, or a similar context with a quantum computer). But if our picture of the major complexity classes is roughly correct, there should be serious limits to how much improvement can do.
1XiXiDu12y
Software improvements can be used by humans in the form of expert systems (tools), which will diminish the relative advantage of AGI. Humans will be able to use an AGI's own analytic and predictive algorithms in the form of expert systems to analyze and predict its actions. Take for example generating exploits. Seems strange to assume that humans haven't got specialized software able to do similarly, i.e. automatic exploit finding and testing. Any AGI would basically have to deal with equally capable algorithms used by humans. Which makes the world much more unpredictable than it already is.
2jacob_cannell12y
Any human-in-the-loop system can be grossly outclassed because of Amdahl's law. A human managing a superintilligence that thinks 1000X faster, for example, is a misguided, not-even-wrong notion. This is also not idle speculation, an early constrained version of this scenario is already playing out as we speak in finacial markets.
1XiXiDu12y
What I meant is that if an AGI was in principle be able to predict the financial markets (I doubt it), then many human players using the same predictive algorithms will considerably diminish the efficiency with which an AGI is able to predict the market. The AGI would basically have to predict its own predictive power acting on the black box of human intentions. And I don't think that Amdahl's law really makes a big dent here. Since human intention is complex and probably introduces unpredictable factors. Which is as much of a benefit as it is a slowdown, from the point of view of a competition for world domination. Another question with respect to Amdahl's law is what kind of bottleneck any human-in-the-loop would constitute. If humans used an AGI's algorithms as expert systems on provided data sets in combination with a army of robot scientists, how would static externalized agency / planning algorithms (humans) slow down the task to the point of giving the AGI a useful advantage? What exactly would be 1000X faster in such a case?
6jacob_cannell12y
The HFT robotraders operate on millisecond timescales. There isn't enough time for a human to understand, let alone verify, the agent's decisions. There are no human players using the same predictive algorithms operating in this environment. Now if you zoom out to human timescales, then yes there are human-in-the-loop trading systems. But as HFT robotraders increase in intelligence, they intrude on that domain. If/when general superintelligence becomes cheap and fast enough, the humans will no longer have any role. If an autonomous superintelligent AI is generating plans complex enough that even a team of humans would struggle to understand given weeks of analysis, and the AI is executing those plans in seconds or milliseconds, then there is little place for a human in that decision loop. To retain control, a human manager will need to grant the AGI autonomy on larger timescales in proportion to the AGI's greater intelligence and speed, giving it bigger and more abstract hierachical goals. As an example, eventually you get to a situation where the CEO just instructs the AGI employees to optimize the bank account directly. Compare the two options as complete computational systems: human + semi-autonomous AGI vs autonomous AGI. Human brains take on the order of seconds to make complex decisions, so in order to compete with autonomous AGIs, the human will have to either 1.) let the AGI operate autonomously for at least seconds at a time, or 2.) suffer a speed penalty where the AGI sits idle, waiting for the human response. For example, imagine a marketing AGI creates ads, each of which may take a human a minute to evaluate (which is being generous). If the AGI thinks 3600X faster than human baseline, and a human takes on the order of hours to generate an ad, it would generate ads in seconds. The human would not be able to keep up, and so would have to back up a level of heirarachy and grant the AI autonomy over entire ad campaigns, and more realistically, the enti
2XiXiDu12y
Well, I don't disagree with anything you wrote and believe that the economic case for a fast transition from tools to agents is strong. I also don't disagree that an AGI could take over the world if in possession of enough resources and tools like molecular nanotechnology. I even believe that a sub-human-level AGI would be sufficient to take over if handed advanced molecular nanotechnology. Sadly these discussions always lead to the point where one side assumes the existence of certain AGI designs with certain superhuman advantages, specific drives and specific enabling circumstances. I don't know of anyone who actually disagrees that such AGI's, given those specific circumstances, would be an existential risk.
0Strange712y
Nitpick: you mean "optimize shareholder value directly." Keeping the account balances at an appropriate level is the CFO's job.
0private_messaging12y
Precisely. It is then a civilization, not some single monolithic entity. The consumer PCs have a lot if internal computing power and comparatively very low inter-node bandwidth and huge inter-node lag, entirely breaking any relation to the 'orthogonality thesis', up to the point that the p2p intelligence protocols may more plausibly have to forbid destruction or manipulation (via second guessing which is a waste of computing power) of intelligent entities. Keep in mind that human morality is, too, a p2p intelligence protocol allowing us to cooperate. Keep in mind also that humans are computing resources you can ask to solve problems for you (all you need is to implement interface), while Jupiter clearly isn't. The nuclear war is very strongly against interests of the intelligence that sits on home computers, obviously. (I'm assuming for sake of argument that intelligence actually had the will to do the conquering of the internet rather than being just as content with not actually running for real)
1Douglas_Knight12y
Maybe you're thinking of this comment and others in that thread by Jed Harris (aka). Jed's point #2 is more plausible, but you are talking about point #1, which I find unbelievable for reasons that were given before he answered it. If clock speed mattered, why didn't the failure of exponential clock speed shut down the rest of Moore's law? If computation but not clock speed mattered, then Intel should be able to get ahead of Moore's law by investing in software parallelism. Jed seems to endorse that position, but say that parallelism is hard. But hard exactly to the extent to allow Moore's law to continue? Why hasn't Intel monopolized parallelism researchers? Anyhow, I think his final conclusion is opposite to yours: he say that intelligence could lead to parallelism and getting ahead of Moore's law.
0jacob_cannell12y
Yes, thanks. My model of Jed's internal model of moore's law is similar to my own. He said: He then lists two examples. By 'points' I assume you are referring to his examples in the first comment you linked. What exactly do you find unbelievable about his first example? He is claiming that the achievable speed of a chip is dependent on physical simulations, and thus current computing power. Computing power is not clock speed, and Moore's Law is not directly about clock speed nor computing power. Jed makes a number of points in his posts. In my comment on the earlier point 1 (in this thread), I was referring to one specific point Jed made: that each new hardware generation requires complex and lengthy simulation on the current hardware generation, regardless of the amount of 'intelligence' one throws at the problem.
1Douglas_Knight12y
There are two questions here: would computer simulations of the physics of new chips be a bottleneck for an AI trying to foom*? and are they a bottleneck that explains Moore's law? If you just replace humans by simulations, then the human time gets reduced with each cycle of Moore's law, leaving the physical simulations, so the simulations probably are the bottleneck. But Intel has real-time people, so saying that it's a bottleneck for Intel is a lot stronger a claim than saying it is a bottleneck for a foom. First, foom: If each year of Moore's law requires a solid month of computer time of state of the art processors, then eliminating the humans speeds it up by a factor of 12. That's not a "hard takeoff," but it's pretty fast. Moore's Law: Jed seems to say the computational requirements of physics simulations actually determine Moore's law and that if Intel had access to more computer resources, it could move faster. If it takes a year of computer time to design and test the next year's processor that would explain the exponential nature of Moore's law. But if it only takes a month, computer time probably isn't the bottleneck. However, this model seems to predict a lot of things that aren't true. The model only makes sense if "computer time" means single threaded clock cycles. If simulations require an exponentially increasing number of ordered clock cycles, there's nothing you can do but get a top of the line machine and run it continuously. You can't buy more time. But clock speed stopped increasing exponentially, so if this is the bottleneck, Intel's ability to design new chips should have slowed down and Moore's law should have stopped. This didn't happen, so the bottleneck is not linearly ordered clock cycles. So the simulation must parallelize. But if it parallelizes, Intel could just throw money at the problem. For this to be the bottleneck, Intel would have to be spending a lot of money on computer time, which I do not think is true. Jed says that writi
0jacob_cannell12y
There are differing degrees of bottlenecks. Many, if not most, of the large software projects I have worked on have been at least partially bottlenecked by compile time, which is the equivalent to the simulation and logic verification steps in hardware design. If I thought and wrote code much faster, this would be a speedup, but only to a saturation point where I wait for compile-test cycles. Yes. Keep in mind this is a moving target, and that is the key relation to Moore's Law. It would take computers from 1980 months or years to compile windows 8 or simulate a 2012 processor. I don't understand how the number of threads matters. Compilers, simulators, logic verifiers, all made the parallel transition when they had to. Right, it's not a coincidence, it's a causal relation. Moore's Law is not a law of nature, it's a shared business plan of the industry. When clock speed started to run out of steam, chip designers started going parallel, and software developers followed suit. You have to understand that chip designs are planned many years in advance, this wasn't an entirely unplanned, unanticipated event. As for the details of what kind of simulation software Intel uses, I'm not sure. Jed's last posts are also 4 years old at this point, so much has probably changed. I do know that Nvidia uses big expensive dedicated emulators from a company called Cadence (google "Cadence Nvidia") and this really is a big deal for their hardware cycle. Well, you seem to agree that they are some degree of bottleneck, so it may good to narrow in on what level of bottleneck, or taboo the word. It was unecessary, because the fast easy path (faster serial speed) was still paying fruit.
1Douglas_Knight12y
(by "parallelism" I mean making their simulations parallel, running on clusters of computers) What does "unnecessary" mean? If physical simulations were the bottleneck and they could be made faster than by parallelism, why didn't they do it 20 years ago? They aren't any easier to make parallel today than then. The obvious interpretation of "unnecessary" it was not necessary to use parallel simulations to keep up with Moore's law, but that it was an option. If it was an option that would have helped then as it helps now, would it have allowed going beyond Moore's law? You seem to be endorsing the self-fulfilling prophecy explanation of Moore's law, which implies no bottleneck.
0jacob_cannell12y
Ahhh, usually the term is distributed when referring to pure software parallelization. I know little off hand about the history of simulation and verification software, but I'd guess that there was at least a modest investment in distributed simulation even a while ago. The consideration is cost. Spending your IT budget on one big distributed computer is often wasteful compared to each employee having their own workstation. They sped up their simulations the right amount to minimize schedule risk (staying on moore's law), while minimizing cost. Spending a huge amount of money to buy a bunch of computers and complex distributed simulation software just to speed up a partial bottleneck is just not worthwhile. If the typical engineer spends say 30% of his time waiting on simulation software, that limits what you should spend in order to reduce that time. And of course the big consideration is that in a year or two moore's law will allow you purchase new IT equipment that is twice as fast. Eventually you have to do that to keep up.
0Strange712y
Wait, are we talking O2 molecules in the atmosphere, or all oxygen atoms in Earth's gravity well?
0dlthomas12y
I wish I could vote you up and down at the same time.
2Strange712y
Please clarify the reason for your sidewaysvote.
2dlthomas12y
On the one hand a real distinction which makes a huge difference in feasibility. On the other hand, either way we're boned, so it makes not a lot of difference in the context of the original question (as I understand it). On balance, it's a cute digression but still a digression, and so I'm torn.
2Strange712y
Actually in the case of removing all oxygen atoms from Earth's gravity well, not necessarily. The AI might decide that the most expedient method is to persuade all the humans that the sun's about to go nova, construct some space elevators and Orion Heavy Lifters, pump the first few nines of ocean water up into orbit, freeze it into a thousand-mile-long hollow cigar with a fusion rocket on one end, load the colony ship with all the carbon-based life it can find, and point the nose at some nearby potentially-habitable star. Under this scenario, it would be indifferent to our actual prospects for survival, but gain enough advantage by our willing cooperation to justify the effort of constructing an evacuation plan that can stand up to scientific analysis, and a vehicle which can actually propel the oxygenated mass out to stellar escape velocity to keep it from landing back on the surface.
0dlthomas12y
Interesting.
1XiXiDu12y
I asked something similar here.

Holden seems to think this sort of development would happen naturally with the sort of AGI researchers we have nowadays, and I wish he'd spent a few years arguing with some of them to get a better picture of how unlikely this is.

While I can't comment on AGI researchers, I think you underestimate e.g. more mainstream AI researchers such as Stuart Russell and Geoff Hinton, or cognitive scientists like Josh Tenenbaum, or even more AI-focused machine learning people like Andrew Ng, Daphne Koller, Michael Jordan, Dan Klein, Rich Sutton, Judea Pearl, Leslie Kaelbling, and Leslie Valiant (and this list is no doubt incomplete). They might not be claiming that they'll have AI in 20 years, but that's likely because they are actually grappling with the relevant issues and therefore see how hard the problem is likely to be.

Not that it strikes me as completely unreasonable that we would have a major breakthrough that gives us AI in 20 years, but it's hard to see what the candidate would be. But I have only been thinking about these issues for a couple years, so I still maintain a pretty high degree of uncertainty about all of these claims.

I do think I basically agree with you re: inductive l... (read more)

I agree that top mainstream AI guy Peter Norvig was way the heck more sensible than the reference class of declared "AGI researchers" when I talked to him about FAI and CEV, and that estimates should be substantially adjusted accordingly.

1thomblake12y
Yes. I wonder if there's a good explanation why narrow AI folks are so much more sensible than AGI folks on those subjects.
7DanArmak12y
Because they have some experience of their products actually working, they know that 1) these things can be really powerful, even though narrow, and 2) there are always bugs.
9private_messaging12y
"Intelligence is not as computationally expensive as it looks" How sure are you that your intuitions do not arise from typical mind fallacy and from you attributing the great discoveries and inventions of mankind to the same processes that you feel run in your skull and which did not yet result in any great novel discoveries and inventions that I know of? I know this sounds like ad-hominem, but as your intuitions are significantly influenced by your internal understanding of your own process, your self esteem will stand hostage to be shot through in many of the possible counter arguments and corrections. (Self esteem is one hell of a bullet proof hostage though, and tends to act more as a shield for bad beliefs). There is a lot of engineers working on software for solving engineering problems, including the software that generates and tests possible designs and looks for ways to make better computers. Your philosophy-based natural-language-defined in-imagination-running Oracle AI may have to be very carefully specified so that it does not kill imaginary mankind. And it may well be very difficult to build such a specification. Just don't confuse it with the software written to solve definable problems. Ultimately, figuring out how to make a better microchip involves a lot of testing of various designs, that's how humans do it, that's how tools do it. I don't know how you think it is done. The performance is a result of a very complex function of the design. To build a design that performs you need to reverse this ultra complicated function, which is done by a mixture of analytical methods and iteration of possible input values, and unless P=NP, we have very little reason to expect any fundamentally better solutions (and even if P=NP there may still not be any). Meaning that the AGI won't have any edge over practical software, and won't out-foom it.
2hairyfigment12y
I may have the terminology wrong, but I believe he's thinking more about commercial narrow-AI researchers. Now if they produce results like these, that would push the culture farther towards letting computer programs handle any hard task. Programming seems hard.

I completely agree with the intent of this post. These are all important issues SI should officially answer. (Edit: SI's official reply is here.) Here are some of my thoughts:

  • I completely agree with objection 1. I think SI should look into doing exactly as you say. I also feel that friendliness has a very high failure chance and that all SI can accomplish is a very low marginal decrease in existential risk. However, I feel this is the result of existential risk being so high and difficult to overcome (Great Filter) rather than SI being so ineffective. As such, for them to engage this objection is to admit defeatism and millenialism, and so they put it out of mind since they need motivation to keep soldiering on despite the sure defeat.

  • Objection 2 is interesting, though you define AGI differently, as you say. Some points against it: Only one AGI needs to be in agent mode to realize existential risk, even if there are already billions of tool-AIs running safely. Tool-AI seems closer in definition to narrow AI, which you point out we already have lots of, and are improving. It's likely that very advanced tool-AIs will indeed be the first to achieve some measure of AGI capability.

... (read more)
8khafra12y
You're an accomplished and proficient philanthropist; if you do make steps in the direction of a donor-directed existential risk fund, I'd like to see them written about.
0[anonymous]9y
I am unable to respond to people responding to my previous comment directly; the system tells me 'Replies to downvoted comments are discouraged. You don't have the requisite 5 Karma points to proceed.' So I will reply here. @Salemicus My question was indeed rhetorical. My comment was intended as a brief reality check, not a sophisticated argument. I disagree with you about the importance of climate change and resource shortage, and the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. But my comment did not intend to supply any substantial list of "causes"; again, it was a reality check. Its intention was to provoke reflection on how supposedly solid reasoning had justified donating to stop an almost absurdly Sci-Fi armageddon. I will now, briefly, respond to your points on the causes I raised. The following is, again, not a sophisticated and scientifically literate argument, but then neither was your reply to my comment. It probably isn't worth responding to. On global warming, I do not wish to engage in a lengthy argument over a complicated scientific matter. Rather I will recommend reading the first major economic impact analysis, the 'Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change'. You can find that easily by searching google. For comments and criticisms of that paper, see: Weitzman, M (2007), ‘The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change’, Journal of Economic Literature 45(3), 703-24. http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/review_of_stern_review_jel.45.3.pdf Dasgupta, P (2007), ‘Comments on the Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change’, National Institute Economic Review 199, 4-7. http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE263/fall2008/paper/Discounting/Dasgupta_Commentary%20-%20The%20Stern%20Review%20s%20Economics%20of%20Climate%20Change_NIES07.pdf Dietz, S and N Stern (2008), ‘Why Economic Analysis Supports Strong Action on Climate Change: a Response to the Stern Review’s Critics, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(1), 94-113. Broome,
6gjm9y
Allow me to generalize: Don't take anything too seriously. (By definition of "too".) I don't (at all) assume that MIRI would in fact be effective in preventing disastrous-AI scenarios. I think that's an open question, and in the very article we're commenting on we can see that Holden Karnofsky of GiveWell gave the matter some thought and decided that MIRI's work is probably counterproductive overall in that respect. (Some time ago; MIRI and/or HK's opinions may have changed relevantly since then.) As I already mentioned, I do not myself donate to MIRI; I was trying to answer the question "why would anyone who isn't crazy or stupid denote to MIRI?" and I think it's reasonably clear that someone neither crazy nor stupid could decide that MIRI's work does help to reduce the risk of AI-induced disaster. ("Evil AIs running around and killing everybody", though, is a curious choice of phrasing. It seems to fit much better with any number of rather silly science fiction movies than with anything MIRI and its supporters are actually arguing might happen. Which suggests that either you haven't grasped what it is they are worried about, or you have grasped it but prefer inaccurate mockery to engagement -- which is, of course, your inalienable right, but may not encourage people here to take your comments as seriously as you might prefer.) I wasn't intending to make a Pascal's wager. Again, I am not myself a MIRI donor, but my understanding is that those who are generally think that the probability of AI-induced disaster is not very small. So the point isn't that there's this tiny probability of a huge disaster so we multiply (say) a 10^-6 chance of disaster by billions of lives lost and decide that we have to act urgently. It's that (for the MIRI donor) there's maybe a 10% -- or a 99% -- chance of AI-induced disaster if we aren't super-careful, and they hope MIRI can substantially reduce that. The underlying argument here is -- if I'm understanding right -- something like
0[anonymous]9y
0gjm9y
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0dxu9y
Extremely tiny probabilities with enormous utilities attached do suffer from Pascal's Mugging-type scenario's. That being said, AI-risk probabilities are much larger in my estimate than the sorts of probabilities required for Pascal-type problems to start coming into play. Unless Perrr333 intends to suggest that probabilities involving UFAI really are that small, I think it's unlikely he/she is actually making any sort of logical argument. It's far more likely, I think, that he/she is making an argument based on incredulity (disguised by seemingly logical arguments, but still at its core motivated by incredulity). The problem with that, of course, is that arguments from incredulity rely almost exclusively on intuition, and the usefulness of intuition decreases spectacularly as scenarios become more esoteric and further removed from the realm of everyday experience.

Lack of impressive endorsements. [...] I feel that given the enormous implications of SI's claims, if it argued them well it ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has. I have been pointed to Peter Thiel and Ray Kurzweil as examples of impressive SI supporters, but I have not seen any on-record statements from either of these people that show agreement with SI's specific views, and in fact (based on watching them speak at Singularity Summits) my impression is that they disagree.

This is key: they support SI despite not agreeing with SI's specific arguments. Perhaps you should, too, at least if you find folks like Thiel and Kurzweil sufficiently impressive.

In fact, this has always been roughly my own stance. The primary reason I think SI should be supported is not that their arguments for why they should be supported are good (although I think they are, or at least, better than you do). The primary reason I think SI should be supported is that I like what the organization actually does, and wish it to continue. The Less Wrong Sequences, Singularity Summit, rationality training camps, and even HPMoR and Less Wrong itself are all worth paying some amount of mo... (read more)

The primary reason I think SI should be supported is that I like what the organization actually does, and wish it to continue. The Less Wrong Sequences, Singularity Summit, rationality training camps, and even HPMoR and Less Wrong itself are all worth paying some amount of money for.

I think that my own approach is similar, but with a different emphasis. I like some of what they've done, so my question is how do encourage those pieces. This article was very helpful in prompting some thought into how to handle that. I generally break down their work into three categories:

  1. Rationality (minicamps, training, LW, HPMoR): Here I think they've done some very good work. Luckily, the new spinoff will allow me to support these pieces directly.

  2. Existential risk awareness (singularity summit, risk analysis articles): Here their record has been mixed. I think the Singularity Summit has been successful, other efforts less so but seemingly improving. I can support the Singularity Summit by continuing to attend and potentially donating directly if necessary (since it's been running positive in recent years, for the moment this does not seem necessary).

  3. Original research (FAI, timeless decisio

... (read more)
3komponisto12y
I don't see how this constitutes a "different emphasis" from my own. Right now, SI is the way one supports the activities in question. Once the spinoff has finally spun off and can take donations itself, it will be possible to support the rationality work directly.
3ghf12y
The different emphasis comes down to your comment that: In my opinion, I can more effectively support those activities that I think are effective by not supporting SI. Waiting until the Center for Applied Rationality gets its tax-exempt status in place allows me to both target my donations and directly signal where I think SI has been most effective up to this point. If they end up having short-term cashflow issues prior to that split, my first response would be to register for the next Singularity Summit a bit early since that's another piece that I wish to directly support.
2chaosmage12y
So, are you saying you'd be more inclined to fund a Rationality Institute?
[-][anonymous]12y140

I furthermore have to say that to raise this particular objection seems to me almost to defeat the purpose of GiveWell. After all, if we could rely on standard sorts of prestige-indicators to determine where our money would be best spent, everybody would be spending their money in those places already, and "efficient charity" wouldn't be a problem for some special organization like yours to solve.

I think Holden seems to believe that Thiel and Kurzweil endorsing SIAI's UFAI-prevention methods would be more like a leading epidemiologist endorsing the malaria-prevention methods of the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF) than it would be like Celebrity X taking a picture with some children for the AMF. There are different kinds of "prestige-indicator," some more valuable to a Bayesian-minded charity evaluator than others.

4komponisto12y
I would still consider the leading epidemiologist's endorsement to be a standard sort of prestige-indicator. If an anti-disease charity is endorsed by leading epidemiologists, you hardly need GiveWell. (At least for the epidemiological aspects. The financial/accounting part may be another matter.)
4[anonymous]12y
I would argue that this is precisely what GiveWell does in evaluating malaria charity. If the epidemiological consensus changed, and bednets were held to be an unsustainable solution (this is less thoroughly implausible than it might sound, though probably still unlikely), then even given the past success of certain bednet charities on all GiveWell's other criteria, GiveWell might still downgrade those charities. And don't underestimate the size of the gap between "a scientifically plausible mechanism for improving lives" and "good value in lives saved/improved per dollar." There are plenty of bednet charities, and there's a reason GiveWell recommends AMF and not, say, Nothing But Nets. The endorsement, in other words, is about the plausibility of the mechanism, which is only one of several things to consider in donating to a charity, but it's the area in which a particular kind of expert endorsement is most meaningful.
5komponisto12y
As they should. But the point is that, in so doing, GiveWell would not be adding any new information not already contained in the epidemiological consensus (assuming they don't have privileged information about the latter). Indeed. The latter is where GiveWell enters the picture; it is their unique niche. The science itself, on the other hand, is not really their purview, as opposed to the experts. If GiveWell downgrades a charity solely because of the epidemiological consensus, and (for some reason) I have good reason to think the epidemiological consensus is wrong, or inadequately informative, then GiveWell hasn't told me anything, and I have no reason to pay attention to them. Their rating is screened off. Imagine that 60% of epidemiologists think that Method A is not effective against Disease X, while 40% think it is effective. Suppose Holden goes to a big conference of epidemiologists and says "GiveWell recommends against donating to Charity C because it uses Method A, which the majority of epidemiologists say is not effective." Assuming they already knew Charity C uses Method A, should they listen to him? Of course not. The people at the conference are all epidemiologists themselves, and those in the majority are presumably already foregoing donations to Charity C, while those in the minority already know that the majority of their colleagues disagree with them. Holden hasn't told them anything new. So, if his organization is going to be of any use to such an audience, it should focus on the things they can't already evaluate themselves, like financial transparency, accounting procedures, and the like; unless it can itself engage the scientific details. This is analogous to the case at hand: if all that GiveWell is going to tell the world is that SI hasn't signaled enough status, well, the world already knows that. Their raison d'être is to tell people info that they can't find (or is costly to find) via other channels: such as info about non-high-status c
4[anonymous]12y
A few points: "Possesses expert endorsement of its method" does not necessarily equal "high-status charity." A clear example here is de-worming and other parasite control, which epidemiologists all agree works well, but which doesn't get the funding a lot of other developing world charity does because it's not well advertised. GiveWell would like SIAI to be closer to de-worming charities in that outside experts give some credence to the plausibility of the methods by which SIAI proposes to do good. Moreover, "other high-status charities using one's method" also doesn't equal "high-status charity." Compare the number of Facebook likes for AMF and Nothing But Nets. The reason GiveWell endorses one but not the other is that AMF, unlike NBN, has given compelling evidence that it can scale the additional funding that a GiveWell endorsement promises into more lives saved/improved at a dollar rate comparable to their current lives saved/improved per dollar. So we should distinguish a charity's method being "high-status" from the charity itself being "high-status." But if you define "high status method" as "there exists compelling consensus among the experts GiveWell has judged to be trustworthy that the proposed method for doing good is even plausible," then I, as a Bayesian, am perfectly comfortable with GiveWell only endorsing "high-status method" charities. They still might buck the prevailing trends on optimal method; perhaps some of the experts are on GiveWell's own staff, or aren't prominent in the world at large. But by demanding that sort of "high-status method" from a charity, GiveWell discourages crankism and is unlikely to miss a truly good cause for too long. Expert opinion on method plausibility is all the more important with more speculative charity like SIAI because there isn't a corpus of "effectiveness data to date" to evaluate directly.

Firstly, I'd like to add to the chorus saying that this is an incredible post; as a supporter of SI, it warms my heart to see it. I disagree with the conclusion - I would still encourage people to donate to SI - but if SI gets a critique this good twice a decade it should count itself lucky.

I don't think GiveWell making SI its top rated charity would be in SI's interests. In the long term, SI benefits hugely when people are turned on to the idea of efficient charity, and asking them to swallow all of the ideas behind SI's mission at the same time will put them off. If I ran GiveWell and wanted to give an endorsement to SI, I might break the rankings into multiple lists: the most prominent being VillageReach-like charities which directly do good in the near future, then perhaps a list for charities that mitigate broadly accepted and well understood existential risks (if this can be done without problems with politics), and finally a list of charities which mitigate more speculative risks.

7Wei Dai12y
This seems like a good point and perhaps would have been a good reason for SI to not have approached GiveWell in the first place. At this point though, GiveWell is not only refusing to make SI a top rated charity, but actively recommending people to "withhold" funds from SI, which as far as I can tell, it almost never does. It'd be a win for SI to just convince GiveWell to put it back on the "neutral" list.
3Paul Crowley12y
Agreed. Did SI approach GiveWell?
7Wei Dai12y
Yes. Hmm, reading that discussion shows that they were already thinking about having GiveWell create a separate existential risk category (and you may have gotten the idea there yourself and then forgot the source).
1Paul Crowley12y
Indeed.

I find it unfortunate that none of the SIAI research associates have engaged very deeply in this debate, even LessWrong regulars like Nesov and cousin_it. This is part of the reason why I was reluctant to accept (and ultimately declined) when SI invited me to become a research associate, that I would feel less free to to speak up both in support of SI and in criticism of it.

I don't think this is SI's fault, but perhaps there are things it could do to lessen this downside of the research associate program. For example it could explicitly encourage the research associates to publicly criticize SI and to disagree with its official positions, and make it clear that no associate will be blamed if someone mistook their statements to be official SI positions or saw them as reflecting badly on SI in general. I also write this comment because just being consciously aware of this bias (in favor of staying silent) may help to counteract it.

I don't usually engage in potentially protracted debates lately. A very short summary of my disagreement with Holden's object-level argument part of the post is (1) I don't see in what way can the idea of powerful Tool AI be usefully different from that of Oracle AI, and it seems like the connotations of "Tool AI" that distinguish it from "Oracle AI" follow from an implicit sense of it not having too much optimization power, so it might be impossible for a Tool AI to both be powerful and hold the characteristics suggested in the post; (1a) the description of Tool AI denies it goals/intentionality and other words, but I don't see what they mean apart from optimization power, and so I don't know how to use them to characterize Tool AI; (2) the potential danger of having a powerful Tool/Oracle AI around is such that aiming at their development doesn't seem like a good idea; (3) I don't see how a Tool/Oracle AI could be sufficiently helpful to break the philosophical part of the FAI problem, since we don't even know which questions to ask.

Since Holden stated that he's probably not going to (interactively) engage the comments to this post, and writing this up in a self-contained way is a lot of work, I'm going to leave this task to the people who usually write up SingInst outreach papers.

Not sure about the others, but as for me, at some point this spring I realized that talking about saving the world makes me really upset and I'm better off avoiding the whole topic.

Would it upset you to talk about why talking about saving the world makes you upset?

5homunq12y
It would appear that cousin_it believes we're screwed. It's tempting to argue that this would, overall, be an argument against the effectiveness of the SI program. However, that's probably not true, because we could be 99% screwed and the remaining 1% could depend on SI; this would be a depressing fact, yet still justify supporting the SI. (Personally, I agree with the poster about the problems with SI, but I'm just laying it out. Responding to wei_dai rather than cousin_it because I don't want to upset the latter unnecessarily.)
4cousin_it12y
Yes.

Thank you very much for writing this. I, um, wish you hadn't posted it literally directly before the May Minicamp when I can't realistically respond until Tuesday. Nonetheless, it already has a warm place in my heart next to the debate with Robin Hanson as the second attempt to mount informed criticism of SIAI.

It looks to me as though Holden had the criticisms he expresses even before becoming "informed", presumably by reading the sequences, but was too intimidated to share them. Perhaps it is worth listening to/encouraging uninformed criticisms as well as informed ones?

Note the following criticism of SI identified by Holden:

Being too selective (in terms of looking for people who share its preconceptions) when determining whom to hire and whose feedback to take seriously.

7lukeprog12y
To those who think Eliezer is exaggerating: please link me to "informed criticism of SIAI." It is so hard to find good critics. Edit: Well, I guess there are more than two examples, though relatively few. I was wrong to suggest otherwise. Much of this has to do with the fact that SI hasn't been very clear about many of its positions and arguments: see Beckstead's comment and Hallquist's followup.

1) Most criticism of key ideas underlying SIAI's strategies does not reference SIAI, e.g. Chris Malcolm's "Why Robots Won't Rule" website is replying to Hans Moravec.

2) Dispersed criticism, with many people making local points, e.g. those referenced by Wei Dai, is still criticism and much of that is informed and reasonable.

3) Much criticism is unwritten, e.g. consider the more FAI-skeptical Singularity Summit speaker talks, or takes the form of brief responses to questions or the like. This doesn't mean it isn't real or important.

4) Gerrymandering the bounds of "informed criticism" to leave almost no one within bounds is in general a scurrilous move that one should bend over backwards to avoid.

5) As others have suggested, even within the narrow confines of Less Wrong and adjacent communities there have been many informed critics. Here's Katja Grace's criticism of hard takeoff (although I am not sure how separate it is from Robin's). Here's Brandon Reinhart's examination of SIAI, which includes some criticism and brings more in comments. Here's Kaj Sotala's comparison of FHI and SIAI. And there are of course many detailed and often highly upvoted comments in response to various SIAI-discussing posts and threads, many of which you have participated in.

This is a bit exasperating. Did you not see my comments in this thread? Have you and Eliezer considered that if there really have been only two attempts to mount informed criticism of SIAI, then LessWrong must be considered a massive failure that SIAI ought to abandon ASAP?

1lukeprog12y
See here.

Wei Dai has written many comments and posts that have some measure of criticism, and various members of the community, including myself, have expressed agreement with them. I think what might be a problem is that such criticisms haven't been collected into a single place where they can draw attention and stir up drama, as Holden's post has.

There are also critics like XiXiDu. I think he's unreliable, and I think he'd admit to that, but he also makes valid criticisms that are shared by other LW folk, and LW's moderation makes it easy to sift his comments for the better stuff.

Perhaps an institution could be designed. E.g., a few self-ordained SingInst critics could keep watch for critiques of SingInst, collect them, organize them, and update a page somewhere out-of-the-way over at the LessWrong Wiki that's easily checkable by SI folk like yourself. LW philanthropists like User:JGWeissman or User:Rain could do it, for example. If SingInst wanted to signal various good things then it could even consider paying a few people to collect and organize criticisms of SingInst. Presumably if there are good critiques out there then finding them would be well worth a small investment.

I think what might be a problem is that such criticisms haven't been collected into a single place where they can draw attention and stir up drama, as Holden's post has.

I put them in discussion, because well, I bring them up for the purpose of discussion, and not for the purpose of forming an overall judgement of SIAI or trying to convince people to stop donating to SIAI. I'm rarely sure that my overall beliefs are right and SI people's are wrong, especially on core issues that I know SI people have spent a lot of time thinking about, so mostly I try to bring up ideas, arguments, and possible scenarios that I suspect they may not have considered. (This is one major area where I differ from Holden: I have greater respect for SI people's rationality, at least their epistemic rationality. And I don't know why Holden is so confident about some of his own original ideas, like his solution to Pascal's Mugging, and Tool-AI ideas. (Well I guess I do, it's probably just typical human overconfidence.))

Having said that, I reserve the right to collect all my criticisms together and make a post in main in the future if I decide that serves my purposes, although I suspect that without the inf... (read more)

Also, I had expected that SI people monitored LW discussions, not just for critiques, but also for new ideas in general

I read most such (apparently-relevant from post titles) discussions, and Anna reads a minority. I think Eliezer reads very few. I'm not very sure about Luke.

5Wei Dai12y
Do you forward relevant posts to other SI people?
5CarlShulman12y
Ones that seem novel and valuable, either by personal discussion or email.
0lukeprog12y
Yes, I read most LW posts that seem to be relevant to my concerns, based on post titles. I also skim the comments on those posts.
7Will_Newsome12y
I'm somewhat confident (from directly asking him a related question and also from many related observations over the last two years) that Eliezer mostly doesn't, or is very good at pretending that he doesn't. He's also not good at reading so even if he sees something he's only somewhat likely to understand it unless he already thinks it's worth it for him to go out of his way to understand it. If you want to influence Eliezer it's best to address him specifically and make sure to state your arguments clearly, and to explicitly disclaim that you're specifically not making any of the stupid arguments that your arguments could be pattern-matched to. Also I know that Anna is often too busy to read LessWrong.
7lukeprog12y
Good point. Wei Dai qualifies as informed criticism. Though, he seems to agree with us on all the basics, so that might not be the kind of criticism Eliezer was talking about.

To those who think Eliezer is exaggerating: please link me to "informed criticism of SIAI."

It would help if you could elaborate on what you mean by "informed".

Most of what Holden wrote, and much more, has been said by other people, excluding myself, before.

I don't have the time right now to wade through all those years of posts and comments but might do so later.

And if you are not willing to take into account what I myself wrote, for being uninformed, then maybe you will however agree that at least all of my critical comments that have been upvoted to +10 (ETA changed to +10, although there is a lot more on-topic at +5) should have been taken into account. If you do so you will find that SI could have updated some time ago on some of what has been said in Holden's post.

9Gastogh12y
Seconded. It seems to me like it's not even possible to mount properly informed criticism if much of the findings are just sitting unpublished somewhere. I'm hopeful that this is actually getting fixed sometime this year, but it doesn't seem fair to not release information and then criticize the critics for being uninformed.

I'm not sure how much he's put into writing, but Ben Goertzel is surely informed. One might argue he comes to the wrong conclusions about AI danger, but it's not from not thinking about it.

6private_messaging12y
if you don't have a good argument you won't find good critics. (Unless you are as influential as religion. Then you can get good critic simply because you stepped onto good critic's foot. The critic probably ain't going to come to church to talk about it though, and also the ulterior motives (having had foot stepped onto) may make you qualify it as bad critic). When you look through a matte glass, and you see some blurred text that looks like it got equations in it, and you are told that what you see is a fuzzy image of proof that P!=NP (maybe you can make out the headers which are in bigger font, and those look like the kind of headers that valid proof might have), do you assume that it is really a valid proof, and they only need to polish the glass? What if it is P=NP instead? What if it doesn't look like it got equations in it?

If you really cared about future risk you would be working away at the problem even with a smaller salary. Focus on your work.

What we really need is some kind of emotionless robot who doesn't care about its own standard of living and who can do lots of research and run organizations and suchlike without all the pesky problems introduced by "being human".

Oh, wait...

So your argument that visiting a bunch of highly educated pencil-necked white nerds is physically dangerous boils down to... one incident of ineffective online censorship mocked by most of the LW community and all outsiders, and some criticism of Yudkowsky's computer science & philosophical achievements.

I see.

I would literally have had more respect for you if you had used racial slurs like "niggers" in your argument, since that is at least tethered to reality in the slightest bit.

I think I'm entitled to opine...

Of course you are. And, you may not be one of the people who "like my earlier papers."

You confirm the lead poster's allegations that SIA staff are insular and conceited.

Really? How? I commented earlier on LW (can't find it now) about how the kind of papers I write barely count as "original research" because for the most part they merely summarize and clarify the ideas of others. But as Beckstead says, there is a strong need for that right now.

For insights in decision theory and FAI theory, I suspect we'll have to look to somebody besides Luke Muehlhauser. We keep trying to hire such people but they keep saying "No." (I got two more "no"s just in the last 3 weeks.) Part of that may be due to the past and current state of the organization — and luckily, fixing that kind of thing is something I seem to have some skills with.

You're... a textbook writer at heart.

True, dat.

This most recently happened just a few weeks ago. On that occasion Luke Muehlhauser (no less) took the unusual step of asking me to friend him on Facebook, after which he joined a discussion I was having and made scathing ad hominem comments about me

Sounds serious... Feel free to post a relevant snippet of the discussion, here or elsewhere, so that those interested can judge this event on its merits, and not through your interpretation of it.

On April 7th, Richard posted to Facebook:

LessWrong has now shown its true mettle. After someone here on FB mentioned a LW discussion of consciousness, I went over there and explained that Eliezer Yudkowsky, in his essay, had completely misunderstood the Zombie Argument given by David Chalmers. I received a mix of critical, thoughtful and sometimes rude replies. But then, all of a sudden, Eliezer took an interest in this old thread again, and in less than 24 hours all of my contributions were relegated to the trash. Funnily enough, David Chalmers himself then appeared and explained that Eliezer had, in fact, completely misunderstood his argument. Chalmers' comments, strangely enough, have NOT been censored. :-)

I replied:

I haven't read the whole discussion, but just so everyone is clear...

Richard's claim that "in less than 24 hours all of my contributions were relegated to the trash" is false.

What happened is that LWers disvalued Richard's comments and downvoted them. Because most users have their preferences set to hide comments with a score of less than -3, these users saw Richard's most-downvoted comments as collapsed by default, with a note reading "comment s

... (read more)

I fail to see anything that can be qualified as an ad hominem ("an attempt to negate the truth of a claim by pointing out a negative characteristic or belief of the person supporting it") in what you quoted. If anything, the original comment by Richard comes much closer to this definition.

7Will_Newsome12y
(Though to be fair I think this sort of depends on your definition of "regularly"—I think over 95% of my comments aren't downvoted, many of them getting 5 or more upvotes, in contrast with other contributors who get about 25% of their comments downvoted and usually end up leaving as a result.)

I believe what you wrote because you used so much bolding.

"And if Novamente should ever cross the finish line, we all die."

And yet SIAI didn't do anything to Ben Goertzel (except make him Director of Research for a time, which is kind of insane in my judgement, but obviously not in the sense you intend).

Ben Goertzel's projects are knowably hopeless, so I didn't too strongly oppose Tyler Emerson's project from within SIAI's then-Board of Directors; it was being argued to have political benefits, and I saw no noticeable x-risk so I didn't expend my own political capital to veto it, just sighed. Nowadays the Board would not vote for this.

And it is also true that, in the hypothetical counterfactual conditional where Goertzel's creations work, we all die. I'd phrase the email message differently today to avoid any appearance of endorsing the probability, because today I understand better that most people have trouble mentally separating hypotheticals. But the hypothetical is still true in that counterfactual universe, if not in this one.

There is no contradiction here.

9Wei Dai12y
To clarify, by "kind of insane" I didn't mean you personally, but was commenting on SIAI's group rationality at that time.

Richard,

If you have some solid, rigorous and technical criticism of SIAI's AI work, I wish you would create a pseudonimous account on LW and state that critcism without giving the slightest hint that you are Richard Loosemore, or making any claim about your credentials, or talking about censorship and quashing of dissenting views.

Until you do something like that, I can't help think that you care more about your reputation or punishing Eliezer than about improving everybody's understanding of technical issues.

Please don't take this as a personal attack, but, historically speaking, every one who'd said "I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm" was wrong so far. Their algorithms never quite worked out. Is there any evidence you can offer that your work is any different ? I understand that this is a tricky proposition, since revealing your work could set off all kinds of doomsday scenarios (assuming that it performs as you expect it to); still, surely there must be some way for you to convince skeptics that you can succeed where so many others had failed.

I would say that, far from deserving support, SI should be considered a cult-like community in which dissent is ruthlessly suppressed in order to exaggerate the point of view of SI's founders and controllers, regardless of the scientific merits of those views, or of the dissenting opinions.

This is a very strong statement. Have you allowed for the possibility that your current judgement might be clouded by the events transpired some 6 years ago?

I myself employ a very strong heuristic, from years of trolling the internet: when a user joins a forum and complains about an out-of-character and strongly personal persecution by the moderation staff in the past, there is virtually always more to the story when you look into it.

3[anonymous]12y
Indeed, Dolores, that is an empirically sound strategy, if used with caution. My own experience, however, is that people who do that can usually be googled quickly, and are often found to be unqualified cranks of one persuasion or another. People with more anger than self-control. But that is not always the case. Recently, for example, a woman friended me on Facebook and then posted numerous diatribes against a respected academic acquaintance of mine, accusing him of raping her and fathering her child. These posts were quite blood-curdling. And their target appeared quite the most innocent guy you could imagine. Very difficult to make a judgement. However, about a month ago the guy suddenly came out and made a full and embarrassing frank admission of guilt. It was an astonishing episode. But it was an instance of one of those rare occasions when the person (the woman in this case) turned out to be perfectly justified. I am helpless to convince you. All I can do is point to my own qualifications and standing. I am no lone crank crying in the wilderness. I teach Math, Physics and Cognitive Neuroscience at the undergraduate level, and I have coauthored a paper with one of the AGI field's leading exponents (Ben Goertzel), in a book about the Singularity that was at one point (maybe not anymore!) slated to be a publishing landmark for the field. You have to make a judgement.

Regardless of who was how much at fault in the SL4 incident, surely you must admit that Yudkowsky's interactions with you were unusually hostile relative to how he generally interacts with critics. I can see how you'd want to place emphasis on those interactions because they involved you personally, but that doesn't make them representative for purposes of judging cultishness or making general claims that "dissent is ruthlessly suppressed".

I think Martian Yudkowsky is a dangerous intuition pump. We're invited to imagine a creature just like Eliezer except green and with antennae; we naturally imagine him having values as similar to us as, say, a Star Trek alien. From there we observe the similarity of values we just pushed in, and conclude that values like "interesting" are likely to be shared across very alien creatures. Real Martian Yudkowsky is much more alien than that, and is much more likely to say

There is little prospect of an outcome that realizes even the value of being flarn, unless the first superintelligences undergo detailed inheritance from Martian values.

Imagine, an intelligence that didn't have the universal emotion of badweather!

Of course, extraterrestrial sentients may possess physiological states corresponding to limbic-like emotions that have no direct analog in human experience. Alien species, having evolved under a different set of environmental constraints than we, also could have a different but equally adaptive emotional repertoire. For example, assume that human observers land on another and discover an intelligent animal with an acute sense of absolute humidity and absolute air pressure. For this creature, there may exist an emotional state responding to an unfavorable change in the weather. Physiologically, the emotion could be mediated by the ET equivalent of the human limbic system; it might arise following the secretion of certain strength-enhancing and libido-arousing hormones into the alien's bloodstream in response to the perceived change in weather. Immediately our creature begins to engage in a variety of learned and socially-approved behaviors, including furious burrowing and building, smearing tree sap over its pelt, several different territorial defense ceremonies, and vigorous polygamous copulations with nearby females, apparently (to humans) for no reason at all. Would our astronauts interpret this as madness? Or love? Lust? Fear? Anger? None of these is correct, of course the alien is feeling badweather.

I suggest you guys taboo interesting, because I strongly suspect you're using it with slightly different meanings. (And BTW, as a Martian Yudkowsky I imagine something with values at least as alien as Babyeaters' or Superhappys'.)

I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm.

it's both amusing and disconcerting that people on this forum treat such a comment seriously.

7Bugmaster12y
I try to treat all comments with some degree of seriousness, which can be expressed as a floating-point number between 0 and 1 :-)
1PhilGoetz12y
Isn't the SIAI founded on the supposition that a scenario like this is possible?
3shminux12y
Yes, but on this forum there should be some reasonable immunity against instances of Pascal's wager/mugging like that. The comment in question does not rise above the noise level, so treating it seriously shows how far many regulars still have to go in learning the basics.

Rain (who noted that he is a donor to SIAI in a comment) and HoldenKarnofsky (who wrote the post) are two different people, as indicated by their different usernames.

3[anonymous]12y
Well, different usernames isn't usually sufficient evidence that there are two different people, but in this case there's little doubt about their separability.

I feel that [SI] ought to be able to get more impressive endorsements than it has.

SI seems to have passed up opportunities to test itself and its own rationality by e.g. aiming for objectively impressive accomplishments.

Holden, do you believe that charitable organizations should set out deliberately to impress donors and high-status potential endorsers? I would have thought that a donor like you would try to ignore the results of any attempts at that and to concentrate instead on how much the organization has actually improved the world because to do otherwise is to incentivize organizations whose real goal is to accumulate status and money for their own sake.

For example, Eliezer's attempts to teach rationality or "technical epistemology" or whatever you want to call it through online writings seem to me to have actually improved the world in a non-negligible way and seem to have been designed to do that rather than designed merely to impress.

ADDED. The above is probably not as clear as it should be, so let me say it in different words: I suspect it is a good idea for donors to ignore certain forms of evidence ("impressiveness", affiliation with high-status folk) of a charity's effectiveness to discourage charities from gaming donors in ways that seems to me already too common, and I was a little surprised to see that you do not seem to ignore those forms of evidence.

7RHollerith12y
In other words, I tend to think that people who make philanthropy their career and who have accumulated various impressive markers of their potential to improve the world are likely to continue to accumulate impressive markers, but are less likely to improve the world than people who have already actually improved the world. And of the three core staff members of SI I have gotten to know, 2 (Eliezer and another one who probably does not want to be named) have already improved the world in non-negligible ways and the third spends less time accumulating credentials and impressiveness markers than almost anyone I know.
3ModusPonies12y
I don't think Holden was looking for endorsements from "donors and high-status potential endorsers". I interpreted his post as looking for endorsements from experts on AI. The former would be evidence that SI could go on to raise money and impress people, and the latter would be evidence that SI's mission is theoretically sound. (The strength of that evidence is debatable, of course.) Given that, looking for endorsements from AI experts seems like it would be A) a good idea and B) consistent with the rest of GiveWell's methodology.
4RHollerith12y
Although I would have thought that Holden is smart enough to decide whether the FAI project is theoretically sound without his relying on AI experts, maybe I am underestimating the difficulties of people like Holden who are smarter than I am, but who didn't devote their college years to mastering computer science like I did.
2Strange711y
I saw a related issue in a blog about a woman who lost the use of her arm due to an incorrectly treated infection. She initially complained that the judge in her disability case didn't even look at the arm, but then was pleasantly surprised to have the ruling turn out in favor anyway. I realized: of course the judge wouldn't look at her arm. Having done disability cases before, the judge should know that gruesome appearance correlates weakly, if at all, with legitimate disability, but the emotional response is likely to throw off evaluation of things like an actual doctor's report on the subject. Holden, similarly, is willing to admit that there are things about AI he personally doesn't know, but that professionals who have studied the field for decades do know, and is further willing to trust those professionals to be minimally competent.
0RHollerith11y
I have enough experience of legal and adminstrative disability hearings to say that each side always has medical experts on its side unless one side is unwilling or unable to pay for the testimony of at least one medical expert. In almost all sufficiently important decisions, there are experts on both sides of the issue. And pointing out that one side has more experts or more impressive experts carries vastly less weight with me than, e.g., Eliezer's old "Knowability of FAI" article at http://sl4.org/wiki/KnowabilityOfFAI
3faul_sname12y
The obvious answer would be "Yes." Givewell only funneled about $5M last year, as compared to the $300,000M or so that Americans give on an annual basis. Most money still comes from people that base their decision on something other than efficiency, so targeting these people makes sense.
5JGWeissman12y
The question was not if an individual charity, holding constant the behavior of other charities, benefits from "setting out deliberately to impress donors and high-status potential endorsers", but whether it is in Holden's interests (in making charities more effective) to generally encourage charities to do so.

I agree with much of this post, but find a disconnect between the specific criticisms and the overall conclusion of withholding funds from SI even for "donors determined to donate within this cause", and even aside from whether SI's FAI approach increases risk. I see a couple of ways in which the conclusion might hold.

  1. SI is doing worse than they are capable of, due to wrong beliefs. Withholding funds provides incentive for them to do what you think is right, without having to change their beliefs. But this could lead to waste if people disagree in different directions, and funds end up sitting unused because SI can't satisfy everyone, or if SI thinks the benefit of doing what they think is optimal is greater than the value of extra funds they could get from doing what you think is best.
  2. A more capable organization already exists or will come up later and provide a better use of your money. This seems unlikely in the near future, given that we're already familiar with the "major players" in the existential risk area and based on past history, it doesn't seem likely that a new group of highly capable people would suddenly get interested in the cause. In the long
... (read more)

If Holden believes that:
A) reducing existential risk is valuable, and
B) SI's effectiveness at reducing existential risk is a significant contributor to the future of existential risk, and
C) SI is being less effective at reducing existential risk than they would be if they fixed some set of problems P, and
D) withholding GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed increases the chances that SI will fix P...

...it seems to me that Holden should withhold GiveWell's endorsement while pre-committing to re-evaluating that refusal if given evidence that P has been fixed.

Which seems to be what he's doing. (Of course, I don't know whether those are his reasons.)

What, on your view, ought he do instead, if he believes those things?

9Wei Dai12y
Holden must believe some additional relevant statements, because A-D (with "existential risk" suitably replaced) could be applied to every other charity, as presumably no charity is perfect. I guess what I most want to know is what Holden thinks are the reasons SI hasn't already fixed the problems P. If it's lack of resources or lack of competence, then "withholding ... while pre-committing ..." isn't going to help. If it's wrong beliefs, then arguing seems better than "incentivizing", since that provides a permanent instead of temporary solution, and in the course of arguing you might find out that you're wrong yourself. What does Holden believe that causes him to think that providing explicit incentives to SI is a good thing to do?
4Paul Crowley12y
Thanks for making this argument! AFAICT charities generally have perverse incentives - to do what will bring in donations, rather than what will do the most good. That can usually argue against things like transparency, for example. So I think when Holden usually says "don't donate to X yet" it's as part of an effort to make these incentives saner. As it happens, I don't think this problem applies especially strongly to SI, but others may differ.
2dspeyer12y
But C applies more to some charities than others. And evaluating how much of a charity's potential effectiveness is lost to internal flaws is a big piece of what GiveWell does.

Holden said,

However, I don't think that "Cause X is the one I care about and Organization Y is the only one working on it" to be a good reason to support Organization Y.

This addresses your point (2). Holden believes that SI is grossly inefficient at best, and actively harmful at worst (since he thinks that they might inadvertently increase AI risk). Therefore, giving money to SI would be counterproductive, and a donor would get a better return on investment in other places.

As for point (1), my impression is that Holden's low estimate of SI's competence is due to a combination of what he sees as wrong beliefs, as well as an insufficient capability to implement even the correct beliefs into practice. SI claims to be supremely rational, but their list of achievements is lackluster at best -- which indicates a certain amount of Donning-Kruger effect that's going on. Furthermore, SI appears to be focused on growing SI and teaching rationality workshops, as opposed to their stated mission of researching FAI theory.

Additionally, Holden indicted SI members pretty strongly (though very politely) for what I will (in a less polite fashion) label as arrogance. The prevailing attitude of SI members seems to be (according to Holden) that the rest of the world is just too irrational to comprehend their brilliant insights, and therefore the rest of the world has little to offer -- and therefore, any criticism of SI's goals or actions can be dismissed out of hand.

EDIT: found the right quote, duh.

[-][anonymous]12y170

There's got to be a level beyond "arguments as soldiers" to describe your current approach to ineffective contrarianism.

I volunteer "arguments as cannon fodder."

Some comments on objections 1 and 2.

For example, when the comment says "the formalization of the notion of 'safety' used by the proof is wrong," it is not clear whether it means that the values the programmers have in mind are not correctly implemented by the formalization, or whether it means they are correctly implemented but are themselves catastrophic in a way that hasn't been anticipated.

Both (with the caveat that SI's plans are to implement an extrapolation procedure for the values, and not the values themselves).

Another way of putting this is that a "tool" has an underlying instruction set that conceptually looks like: "(1) Calculate which action A would maximize parameter P, based on existing data set D. (2) Summarize this calculation in a user-friendly manner, including what Action A is, what likely intermediate outcomes it would cause, what other actions would result in high values of P, etc."

I think such a Tool-AI will be much less powerful than an equivalent Agent-AI, due to the bottleneck of having to summarize its calculations in a human-readable form, and then waiting for the human to read and understand the summary and then mak... (read more)

0Will_Newsome12y
(Responding to hypothetical-SingInst's position:) It seems way too first-approximation-y to talk about values-about-extrapolation as anything other than just a subset of values—and if you look at human behavior, values about extrapolation vary very much and are very tied into object-level values. (Simply consider hyperbolic discounting! And consider how taking something as basic as coherence/consistency to its logical extreme leads to either a very stretched ethics or a more fitting but very different meta-ethics like theism.) Even if it were possible to formalize such a procedure it would still be fake meta. "No: at all costs, it is to be prayed by all men that Shams may cease."

If this works, it's probably worth a top-level post.

Upvoted for humor: "probably".

2CuSithBell12y
Cheers! Some find my humor a little dry.

The basic idea is that if you pull a mind at random from design space then it will be unfriendly. I am not even sure if that is true. But it is the strongest argument they have. And it is completely bogus because humans do not pull AGI's from mind design space at random.

I don't have the energy to get into an extended debate, but the claim that this is "the basic idea" or that this would be "the strongest argument" is completely false. A far stronger basic idea is the simple fact that nobody has yet figured out a theory of ethics that would work properly, which means that even that AGIs that were specifically designed to be ethical are most likely to lead to bad outcomes. And that's presuming that we even knew how to program them exactly.

This isn't even something that you'd need to read a hundred blog posts for, it's well discussed in both The Singularity and Machine Ethics and Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk. Complex Value Systems are Required to Realize Valuable Futures, too.

The more significant fact is that these criticisms were largely unknown to the community.

LWer tenlier disagrees, saying:

[Holden's] critique mostly consists of points that are pretty persistently bubbling beneath the surface around here, and get brought up quite a bit. Don't most people regard this as a great summary of their current views, rather than persuasive in any way? In fact, the only effect I suspect this had on most people's thinking was to increase their willingness to listen to Karnofsky in the future if he should change his mind.

Also, you said:

Dissent is cabined to Discussion.

Luckily, evidence on the matter is easy to find. As counter-evidence I present: Self-improvement or shiny distraction, SIAI an examination, Why we can't take expected value estimates literally, Extreme rationality: it's not that great, Less Wrong Rationality and Mainstream Philosophy, and the very post you are commenting on. Many of these are among the most upvoted posts ever.

Moreover, the editors rarely move posts from Main to Discussion. The posters themselves decide whether to post in Main or Discussion.

Your point is well taken, but since part of the concern about that whole affair was your extreme language and style, maybe stating this in normal caps might be a reasonable step for PR.

I'm sure I wouldn't have done what Romney did, and not so sure about whether I would have done what Yudkowsky did. Romney wanted to hurt people for the fun of it. Yudkowsky was trying to keep people from being hurt, regardless of whether his choice was a good one.

4metaphysicist12y
That's a reasonable answer.

If such a person would write a similar post and actually write in a way that they feel, rather than being incredible polite, things would look very different.

I'm assuming you think they'd come in, scoff at our arrogance for a few pages, and then waltz off. Disregarding how many employed machine learning engineers also do side work on general intelligence projects, you'd probably get the same response from automobile engineer, someone with a track record and field expertise, talking to the Wright Brothers. Thinking about new things and new ideas doesn't automatically make you wrong.

That recursive self-improvement is nothing more than a row of English words, a barely convincing fantasy.

Really? Because that's a pretty strong claim. If I knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, I could certainly build something smarter. You could increase the number of slots in working memory. Tweak the part of the brain that handles intuitive math to correctly deal with orders of magnitude. Improve recall to eidetic levels. Tweak the brain's handling of probabilities to be closer to the Bayesian ideal. Even those small changes would likely produce a mind ... (read more)

4Salemicus12y
This is totally unsupported. To quote Lady Catherine de Bourgh, "If I had ever learned [to play the piano], I should have become a great proficient." You have no idea whether the "small changes" you propose are technically feasible, or whether these "tweaks" would in fact mean a complete redesign. For all we know, if you knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, you would appreciate why these changes are impossible without destroying the rest of the system's functionality. After all, it would appear that (say) eidetic recall would provide a fitness advantage. Given that humans lack it, there may well be good reasons why.
9TheOtherDave12y
"totally unsupported" seems extreme. (Though I enjoyed the P&P shoutout. I was recently in a stage adaptation of the book, so it is pleasantly primed.) What the claim amounts to is the belief that: a) there exist good design ideas for brains that human evolution didn't implement, and b) a human capable of building a working brain at all is capable of coming up with some of them. A seems pretty likely to me... at least, the alternative (our currently evolved brains are the best possible design) seems so implausible as to scarcely be worth considering. B is harder to say anything clear about, but given our experience with other evolved systems, it doesn't strike me as absurd. We're pretty good at improving the stuff we were born with. Of course, you're right that this is evidence and not proof. It's possible that we just can't do any better than human brains for thinking, just like it was possible (but turned out not to be true) that we couldn't do any better than human legs for covering long distances efficiently. But it's not negligible evidence.
4Salemicus12y
I don't doubt that it's possible to come up with something that thinks better than the human brain, just as we have come up with something that travels better than the human leg. But to cover long distances efficiently, people didn't start by replicating a human leg, and then tweaking it. They came up with a radically different design - e.g. the wheel. I don't see the evidence that knowing how to build a human brain is the key step in knowing how to build something better. For instance, suppose you could replicate neuron function in software, and then scan a brain map (Robin Hanson's "em" concept). That wouldn't allow you to make any of the improvements to memory, maths, etc, that Dolores suggests. Perhaps you could make it run faster - although depending on hardware constraints, it might run slower. If you wanted to build something better, you might need to start from scratch. Or, things could go the other way - we might be able to build "minds" far better than the human brain, yet never be able to replicate a human one. But it's not just that evidence is lacking - Dolores is claiming certainty in the lack of evidence. I really do think the Austen quote was appropriate.
5Dolores198412y
To clarify, I did not mean having the data to build a neuron-by-neuron model of the brain. I meant actually understanding the underlying algorithms those slabs of neural tissue are implementing. Think less understanding the exact structure of a bird's wing, and more understanding the concept of lift. I think, with that level of understanding, the odds that a smart engineer (even if it's not me) couldn't find something to improve seem low.
5TheOtherDave12y
I agree that I might not need to be able to build a human brain in software to be able to build something better, as with cars and legs. And I agree that I might be able to build a brain in software without understanding how to do it, e.g., by copying an existing one as with ems. That said, if I understand the principles underlying a brain well enough to build one in software (rather than just copying it), it still seems reasonable to believe that I can also build something better.

Having been a subject of both a relatively large upvote and a relatively large downvote in the last couple of weeks, I still think that the worst thing one can do is to complain about censorship or karma. The posts and comments on any forum aren't judged on their "objective merits" (because there is no such thing), but on its suitability for the forum in question. If you have been downvoted, your post deserves it by definition. You can politely inquire about the reasons, but people are not required to explain themselves. As for rationality, I question whether it is rational to post on a forum if you are not having fun there. Take it easy.

I downvoted you because you're wrong. For one, comments can't be promoted to main, only posts, and for two, plenty of opposition has garnerned a great deal of upvotes, as shown by the numerous links lukeprog provided.

For example, where do you get 'almost 800 responses' from? That comment (not post) only has 32 comments below it.

I'm interested in any compiled papers or articles you wrote about AGI motivation systems, aside from the forthcoming book chapter, which I will read. Do you have any links?

6MattMahoney12y
http://susaro.com/

I'll gladly start reading at any point you'll link me to.

The fact that you don't just provide a useful link but instead several paragraphs of excuses why the stuff I'm reading is untrustworthy I count as (small) evidence against you.

I don't work for SI and this is not an SI-authorized response, unless SI endorses it later. This comment is based on my own understanding based on conversations with and publications of SI members and general world model, and does not necessarily reflect the views or activities of SI.

The first thing I notice is that your interpretation of SI's goals with respect to AGI are narrower than the impression I had gotten, based on conversations with SI members. In particular, I don't think SI's research is limited to trying to make AGI friendliness provable, but on a variety of different safety strategies, and on the relative win-rates of different technological paths, eg brain uploading vs. de-novo AI, classes of utility functions and their relative risks, and so on. There is also a distinction between "FAI theory" and "AGI theory" that you aren't making; the idea, as I see it, is that to the extent to which these are separable, "FAI theory" covers research into safety mechanisms which reduce the probability of disaster if any AGI is created, while "AGI theory" covers research that brings the creation of any AGI closer. Your first objection - that ... (read more)

8steven046112y
I agree, and would like to note the possibility, for those who suspect FAI research is useless or harmful, of earmarking SI donations to research on different safety strategies, or on aspects of AI risk that are useful to understand regardless of strategy.

This likely won't work. Money is fungible, so unless the total donations so earmarked exceeds the planned SI funding for that cause, they won't have to change anything. They're under no obligation to not defund your favorite cause by exactly the amount you donated, thus laundering your donation into the general fund. (Unless I misunderstand the relevant laws?)

EDIT NOTE: The post used to say vast majority; this was changed, but is referenced below.

9dlthomas12y
You have an important point here, but I'm not sure it gets up to "vast majority" before it becomes relevant. Earmarking $K for X has an effect once $K exceeds the amount of money that would have been spent on X if the $K had not been earmarked. The size of the effect still certainly depends on the difference, and may very well not be large.
7steven046112y
Suppose you earmark to a paper on a topic X that SI would otherwise probably not write a paper on. Would that cause SI to take money out of research on topics similar to X and into FAI research? There would probably be some sort of (expected) effect in that direction, but I think the size of the effect depends on the details of what causes SI's allocation of resources, and I think the effect would be substantially smaller than would be necessary to make an earmarked donation equivalent to a non-earmarked donation. Still, you're right to bring it up.
2Rain12y
Some recent discussion of AIs as tools.

Richard, this really isn't productive. Your clearly quite intelligent and clearly still have issues due to the dispute between you and Eliezer. It is likely that if you got over this, you could be an effective, efficient, and helpful critic of SI and their ideas. But right now, you are engaging in a uncivil behavior that isn't endearing you to anyone while making emotionally heavy comparisons that make you sound strident.

2Rain12y
He doesn't want to be "an effective, efficient, or helpful critic". He's here "for the lulz", as he said in his comment above.
4JoshuaZ12y
Yes, but how much of that is due to the prior negative experience and fighting he's had? It isn't at all common for a troll to self-identify as such only after they've had bad experiences. Human motivations are highly malleable.
0TheOtherDave12y
I suspect you meant "isn't at all uncommon," though I think what you said might actually be true.
4JoshuaZ12y
Er, yes. The fact that Loosemore is a professional AI researchers with a fair number of accomplishments and his general history strongly suggests that at least in his case he didn't start his interaction with the intent to troll. His early actions on LW were positive and some were voted up.
2thomblake12y
His 'early' actions on LW were recent and largely negative, and one was voted up significantly (though I don't see why - I voted that comment down). At his best he's been abrasive, confrontational, and rambling. Not someone worth engaging.
0JoshuaZ12y
His second comment on LW is here is from January and is at +8 (and I seem to recall was higher earlier). Two of his earlier comments from around the same time were at positive numbers but have since dipped below. It looks like at last one person went through and systematically downvoted his comments without regard to content.
0thomblake12y
Yes, that's the one I was referring to.
0TheOtherDave12y
I understand your point, but given that sentiment, the sentence "It isn't at all common for a troll to self-identify as such only after they've had bad experiences" confuses me.
4JoshuaZ12y
Right, as mentioned I meant uncommon. My point is that I don't think Loosemore's experience is that different from what often happens. At least in my experience, I've seen people who were more or less productive on one forum becomes effectively trolls elsewhere on the internet after having had bad experiences elsewhere. I think a lot of this is due to cognitive dissonance- people don't like to think that they were being actively stupid or were effectively accidentally trolling, so they convince themselves that those were their goals all along.
2TheOtherDave12y
Ah, ok. Gotcha. I agree that people often go from being productive participants to being unproductive, both for the reasons you describe and other reasons.
0[anonymous]12y
It seems to me it would be more appropriate to ask Yudkowsky and LukeProg to retract the false accusations that Loosemore is a liar or dishonest, respectively.
3JoshuaZ12y
Yes, that would probably be a step in the right direction also. I don't know whether the accusation is false, but the evidence is at best extremely slim and altogether unhelpful. That someone didn't remember a study a few years ago in the heat of the moment simply isn't something worth getting worked up about.

There's been video or two where Eliezer was called "world's foremost expert on recursive self improvement"

This usually happens when the person being introduced wasn't consulted about the choice of introduction.

I'm glad for this, LessWrong can always use more engaging critiques of substance. I partially agree with Holden's conclusions, although I reach them from a substantially different route. I'm a little surprised then that few of the replies have directly engaged what I find to be the more obvious flaws in Holden's argument: namely objection 2 and the inherent contradictions with it and objection 1.

Holden posits that many (most?) well-known current AI applications more or less operate as sophisticated knowledge bases. His tool/agent distinction draws a boundary around AI tools: systems whose only external actions consist of communicating results to humans, and the rest being agents which actually plan and execute actions with external side effects. Holden distinguishes 'tool' AI from Oracle AI, the latter really being agent AI (designed for autonomy) which is trapped in some sort of box. Accepting Holden's terminology and tool/agent distinction, he then asserts:

  1. That 'tool' AGI already is and will continue to be the dominant type of AI system.
  2. That AGI running in tool mode will: " be extraordinarily useful but far more safe than an AGI running in agent mode,"

I can ... (read more)

If your purpose is "let everyone know I think Eliezer is nuts", then you have succeeded, and may cease posting.

Please rot13 the part from “potentially” onwards, and add a warning as in this comment (with “decode the rot-13'd part” instead of “follow the links”), because there are people here who've said they don't want to know about that thing.

Holden does a great job but makes two major flaws:
1) His argument about Tool-AI is irrelevant, because creating Tool-AI does almost nothing to avoid Agent-AI, which he agrees is dangerous.
2) He too narrowly construes SI's goals by assuming they are only working on Friendly AI rather than AGI x-risk reduction in general.

The heck? Why would you not need to figure out if an oracle is an ethical patient? Why is there no such possibility as a sentient oracle?

Is this standard religion-of-embodiment stuff?

6thomblake12y
The oracle gets asked questions like "Should intervention X be used by doctor D on patient P" and can tell you the correct answer to them without considering the moral status of the oracle. If it were a robot, it would be asking questions like "Should I run over that [violin/dog/child] to save myself?" which does require considering the status of the robot. EDIT: To clarify, it's not that the researcher has no reason to figure out the moral status of the oracle, it's that the oracle does not need to know its own moral status to answer its domain-specific questions.
0DanArmak12y
What if it assigned moral status to itself and then biased its answers to make its users less likely to pull its plug one day?

I'm very impressed by Holden's thoroughness and thoughtfulness. What I'd like to know is why his post is Eliezer-endorsed and has 191 up-votes, while my many posts over the years hammering on Objection 1, and my comments raising Objection 2, have never gotten the green button, been frequently down-voted, and never been responded to by SIAI. Do you have to be outside the community to be taken seriously by it?

Not to be cynical, PhilGoetz, but isn't Holden an important player in the rational-charity movement? Wouldn't the ultimate costs of ignoring Holden be prohibitive?

5PhilGoetz12y
That could explain the green dot. I don't know which explanation is more depressing.
3Rain12y
You are absolutely correct. And, that's not the reason I find it engaging or informative.

I thought most of the stuff in Holden's post had been public knowledge for years, even to the point of being included in previous FAQs produced by SI. The main difference is that the presentation and solidity of it in this article are remarkable - interconnecting so many different threads which, when placed as individual sentences or paragraphs, might hang alone, but when woven together with the proper knots form a powerful net.

I would be interested to see if you could link to posts where you made versions of these objections.

Assuming what you say is true, it looks to me as though SI is paying the cost of ignoring its critics for so many years...

8ghf12y
I think some of it comes down to the range of arguments offered. For example, posted alone, I would not have found Objection 2 particularly compelling, but I was impressed by many other points and in particular the discussion of organizational capacity. I'm sure there are others for whom those evaluations were completely reversed. Nonetheless, we all voted it up. Many of us who did so likely agree with one another less than we do with SIAI, but that has only showed up here and there on this thread. Critically, it was all presented, not in the context of an inside argument, but in the context of "is SI an effective organization in terms of its stated goals." The question posed to each of us was: do you believe in SI's mission and, if so, do you think that donating to SI is an effective way to achieve that goal? It is a wonderful instantiation of the standard test of belief, "how much are you willing to bet on it?"

The quotes aren't all about AI.

I didn't say they were. I said that just because the speaker for a particular idea comes across as crazy doesn't mean the idea itself is crazy. That applies whether all of Eliezer's "crazy statements" are about AI, or whether none of them are.

Whoever knowingly chooses to save one life, when they could have saved two – to say nothing of a thousand lives, or a world – they have damned themselves as thoroughly as any murderer.

The most extreme presumptuousness about morality; insufferable moralism.

Funny, I actually agree with the top phrase. It's written in an unfortunately preachy, minister-scaring-the-congregation-by-saying-they'll-go-to-Hell style, which is guaranteed to make just about anyone get defensive and/or go "ick!" But if you accept the (very common) moral standard that if you can save a life, it's better to do it than not to do it, then the logic is inevitable that if you have the choice of saving one lives or two lives, by your own metric it's morally preferable to save two lives. If you don't accept the moral standard that it's better to save one life than zero lives, then that phrase should be just as insuffe... (read more)

2hairyfigment12y
Newton definitely wrote down his version of scientific method to explain why people shouldn't take his law of gravity and just add, "because of Aristotelian causes," or "because of Cartesian mechanisms."

How would one explain Yudkowsky's paranoia, lack of perspective, and scapegoating--other than by positing a narcissistic personality structure?

I had in fact read a lot of those quotes before–although some of them come as a surprise, so thank you for the link. They do show paranoia and lack of perspective, and yeah, some signs of narcissism, and I would be certainly mortified if I personally ever made comments like that in public...

The Sequences as a whole do come across as having been written by an arrogant person, and that's kind of irritating, and I have to consciously override my irritation in order to enjoy the parts that I find useful, which is quite a lot. It's a simplification to say that the Sequences are just clutter, and it's extreme to call them 'craziness', too.

(Since meeting Eliezer in person, it's actually hard for me to believe that those comments were written by the same person, who was being serious about them... My chief interaction with him was playing a game in which I tried to make a list of my values, and he hit me with a banana every time I got writer's block because I was trying to be too specific, and made the Super Mario Brothers' theme song when I suc... (read more)

Romney is rightfully being held, feet to fire, for a group battering of another student while they attended high school--because such sadism is a trait of character and can't be explained otherwise.

I was going to upvote your comment until I got to this point. Aside from the general mindkilling, this looks like the fundamental attribution error, and moreover, we all know that people do in fact mature and change. Bringing up external politics is not helpul in a field where there's already concern that AI issues may be becoming a mindkilling subject themselves on LW. Bringing up such a questionable one is even less useful.

I initially upvoted this post, because the criticism seemed reasonable. Then I read the discussion, and switched to downvoting it. In particular, this:

Taken in isolation, these thoughts and arguments might amount to nothing more than a minor addition to the points that you make above. However, my experience with SI is that when I tried to raise these concerns back in 2005/2006 I was subjected to a series of attacks that culminated in a tirade of slanderous denunciations from the founder of SI, Eliezer Yudkowsky. After delivering this tirade, Yudkowsky then banned me from the discussion forum that he controlled, and instructed others on that forum that discussion about me was henceforth forbidden.

Since that time I have found that when I partake in discussions on AGI topics in a context where SI supporters are present, I am frequently subjected to abusive personal attacks in which reference is made to Yudkowsky's earlier outburst. This activity is now so common that when I occasionally post comments here, my remarks are very quickly voted down below a threshold that makes them virtually invisible. (A fate that will probably apply immediately to this very comment).

Serious accusati... (read more)

8PhilGoetz12y
I witnessed many of the emails in the 2006 banning. Richard disagreed with Eliezer often, and not very diplomatically. Rather than deal with Richard's arguments, Eliezer decided to label Richard as a stupid troll, which he obviously was not, and dismiss him. I am disappointed that Eliezer has apparently never apologized. The email list, SL4, slacked off in volume for months afterwords, probably because most participants felt disgusted by the affair; and Ben Goertzel made a new list, which many people switched to.
1ChrisHallquist12y
Hmmm... The fact that many people quit the list / cut back their participation seems fairly strong evidence that Loosemore has a legitimate complaint here. Though if so, he's done a poor job conveying it in this thread.
1JoshuaZ12y
I'm not sure. People sometimes cut back participation in that sort of thing in response to drama in general. However, it is definitely evidence. Phil's remark makes me strongly update in the direction of Loosemore having a legitimate point.

Can you provide some examples of these "abusive personal attacks"? I would also be interested in this ruthless suppression you mention. I have never seen this sort of behavior on LessWrong, and would be shocked to find it among those who support the Singularity Institute in general.

I've read a few of your previous comments, and while I felt that they were not strong arguments, I didn't downvote them because they were intelligent and well-written, and competent constructive criticism is something we don't get nearly enough of. Indeed, it is usually welcomed. The amount of downvotes given to the comments, therefore, does seem odd to me. (Any LW regular who is familiar with the situation is also welcome to comment on this.)

I have seen something like this before, and it turned out the comments were being downvoted because the person making them had gone over, and over, and over the same issues, unable or unwilling to either competently defend them, or change his own mind. That's no evidence that the same thing is happening here, of course, but I give the example because in my experience, this community is almost never vindictive or malicious, and is laudably willing to con... (read more)

8metaphysicist12y
The answer is probably that you overestimate that community's dedication to rationality because you share its biases. The main post demonstrates an enormous conceit among the SI vanguard. Now, how is that rational? How does it fail to get extensive scrutiny in a community of rationalists? My take is that neither side in this argument distinguished itself. Loosemore called for an "outside adjudicator" to solve a scientific argument. What kind of obnoxious behavior is that, when one finds oneself losing an argument? Yudkowsky (rightfully pissed off) in turn, convicted Loosemore of a scientific error, tarred him with incompetence and dishonesty, and banned him. None of these "sins" deserved a ban (no wonder the raw feelings come back to haunt); no honorable person would accept a position where he has the authority to exercise such power (a party to a dispute is biased). Or at the very least, he wouldn't use it the way Yudkowsky did, when he was the banned party's main antagonist.
7Hul-Gil12y
That's probably no small part of it. However, even if my opinion of the community is tinted rose, note that I refer specifically to observation. That is, I've sampled a good amount of posts and comments here on LessWrong, and I see people behaving rationally in arguments - appreciation of polite and lucid dissension, no insults or ad hominem attacks, etc. It's harder to tell what's going on with karma, but again, I've not seen any one particular individual harassed with negative karma merely for disagreeing. Can you elaborate, please? I'm not sure what enormous conceit you refer to. I think that's an excellent analysis. I certainly feel like Yudkowsky overreacted, and as you say, in the circumstances no wonder it still chafes; but as I say above, Richard's arguments failed to impress, and calling for outside help ("adjudication" for an argument that should be based only on facts and logic?) is indeed beyond obnoxious.
6John_Maxwell12y
It seems like everyone is talking about SL4; here is a link to what Richard was probably complaining about: http://www.sl4.org/archive/0608/15895.html

Thanks. I read the whole debate, or as much of it as is there; I've prepared a short summary to post tomorrow if anyone is interested in knowing what really went on ("as according to Hul-Gil", anyway) without having to hack their way through that thread-jungle themselves.

(Summary of summary: Loosemore really does know what he's talking about - mostly - but he also appears somewhat dishonest, or at least extremely imprecise in his communication.)

5[anonymous]12y
Please do post it, I think it would help resolve the arguments in this thread.

Karnofsky's focus on "tool AI" is useful but also his statement of it may confuse matters and needs refinement. I don't think the distinction between "tool AI" and "agent AI" is sharp, or in quite the right place.

For example, the sort of robot cars we will probably have in a few years are clearly agents-- you tell them to "come here and take me there" and they do it without further intervention on your part (when everything is working as planned). This is useful in a way that any amount and quality of question answering is not. Almost certainly there will be various flavors of robot cars available and people will choose the ones they like (that don't drive in scary ways, that get them where they want to go even if it isn't well specified, that know when to make conversation and when to be quiet, etc.) As long as robot cars just drive themselves and people around, can't modify the world autonomously to make their performance better, and are subject to continuing selection by their human users, they don't seem to be much of a threat.

The key points here seem to be (1) limited scope, (2) embedding in a network of other actors and (3) huma... (read more)

3RomeoStevens12y
"how do I build an automated car?"
3Hul-Gil12y
That doesn't help you if you need a car to take you someplace in the next hour or so, though. I think jed's point is that sometimes it is useful for an AI to take action rather than merely provide information.

Can you pretty, pretty please tell me where this graph gets its information from? I've seen similar graphs that basically permute the cubes' labels. It would also be wonderful to unpack what they mean by "solar" since the raw amount of sunlight power hitting the Earth's surface is a very different amount than the energy we can actually harness as an engineering feat over the next, say, five years (due to materials needed to build solar panels, efficiency of solar panels, etc.).

And just to reiterate, I'm really not arguing here. I'm honestly confused. I look at things like this video and books like this one and am left scratching my head. Someone is deluded. And if I guess wrong I could end up wasting a lot of resources and time on projects that are doomed to total irrelevance from the start. So, having some good, solid Bayesian entanglement would be absolutely wonderful right about now!

2taw12y
The diagram comes from Wikipedia (tineye says this) but it seems they recently started merging and reshuffling content in all energy-related articles, so I can no longer find it there. That's total energy available of course, not any 5 year projection. * Solar is probably easiest to estimate by high school physics. Here's Wikipedia's. * Here are some wind power estimates. This depends quite significantly on our technology (see this for possible next step beyond current technology) * World energy consumption is here
3Mercurial12y
Thank you! Do you happen to know anything about the claim that we're running out of the supplies we need to build solar panels needed to tap into all that wonderful sunlight?
0taw12y
Solar panel prices are on long term downward trend, but in the short term they were very far from smooth over the last few years, having very rapid increases and decreases as demand and production capacity mismatched both ways. This issue isn't specific to solar panels, all commodities from oil to metals to food to RAM chips had massive price swings over the last few years. There's no long term problem since we can make solar panels from just about anything - materials like silicon are available in essentially infinite quantities (manufacturing capacity is the issue, not raw materials), and for thin film you need small amounts of materials.

(I am saying this in case anyone looks at this thread and thinks Loosemore is making a valid point, not because I approve of anyone's responding to him.)

Alex, I did not say that ALL dissent is ruthlessly suppressed

This is an abuse of language since it is implicated by the original statement.

And since the easiest and quickest way to ensure that you NEVER get to see any of the money that he controls, would be to ruthlessly suppress his dissent, he is treated with the utmost deference.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that all, or half, or a quarter, or even ten percent of the upvotes on this post come from SIAI staff. There are plenty of people on LW who don't support donating to SIAI.

Congratulations on your insights, but please don't snrk implement them until snigger you've made sure that oh heck I can't keep a straight face anymore.

The reactions to the parent comment are very amusing. We have people sarcastically supporting the commenter, people sarcastically telling the commenter they're a threat to the world, people sarcastically telling the commenter to fear for their life, people non-sarcastically telling the commenter to fear for their life, people honestly telling the commenter they're probably nuts, and people failing to get every instance of the sarcasm. Yet at bottom, we're probably all (except for private_messaging) thinking the same thing: that FinalState almost certainly has no way of creating an AGI and that no-one involved need feel threatened by anyone else.

don't you detect unacknowledged ambition in Eliezer Yudkowsky?

Eliezer certainly has a lot of ambition, but I am surprised to see an accusation that this ambition is unacknowledged.

8TheOtherDave12y
The impression I get from scanning their comment history is that metaphysicist means to suggest here that EY has ambitions he hasn't acknowledged (e.g., the ambition to make money without conventional credentials), not that he fails to acknowledge any of the ambitions he has.
[-][anonymous]12y120

Why yes, I do also believe that political figures are held to ridiculous conversational standards as well. It's a miracle they deign to talk to anyone.

I don't understand. Holden is not a major financial contributor to SIAI. And even if he was: which argument are you talking about, and why is it disingenuous?

Posts which contain factual inaccuracies along with meta-discussion of karma effects are often downvoted.

[-][anonymous]12y110

Actually bare noun phrases in English carry both interpretations, ambiguously. The canonical example is "Policemen carry guns" versus "Policemen were arriving" -- the former makes little sense when interpreted existentially, but the latter makes even less sense when interpreted universally.

In short, there is no preferred interpretation.

(Oh, and prescriptivists always lose.)

0metaphysicist12y
Well, it was a hasty generalization on my part. Flawed descriptivism, not prescriptivism. But you're losing sight of the issue, even as you refute an unsound argument. In the particular case--check it out--Grognor resolved the ambiguity in favor of the universal quantifier. This would be uncharitable in the general case, but in context it's--as I said--a ridiculous argument. I stretched for an abstract argument to establish the ridiculousness, and I produced a specious argument. But the fact is that it was Grognor who had accused Loosemore of "abuse of language," on the tacit ground that the universal quantifier is automatically implied. There was the original prescriptivism.

At least try harder in you fear-mongering. The thread about EY's failure to make make many falsifiable predictions is better ad hominem and the speculation about launching terrorist attacks on fab plants is a much more compelling display of potential risk to life and property.

I agree that this is not a game, although you should note that you are doing EY/SIAI/LessWrong's work for it by trying to scare FinalState.

What probability would you give to FinalState's assertion of having a working AGI?

8Bugmaster12y
I'm not private_messaging, but I think he has a marginally valid point, even though I disagree with his sensational style. I personally would estimate FinalState's chances of building a working AGI at approximately epsilon, given the total absence of evidence. My opinion doesn't really matter, though, because I'm just some guy with a LessWrong account. The SIAI folks, on the other hand, have made it their mission in life to prevent the rise of un-Friendly AGI. Thus, they could make FinalState's life difficult in some way, in order to fulfill their core mission. In effect, FinalState's post could be seen as a Pascal's Mugging attempt vs. SIAI.

The social and opportunity costs of trying to supress a "UFAI attempt" as implausible as FinalState's are far higher than the risk of failing to do so. There are also decision-theoretic reasons never to give in to Pascal-Mugging-type offers. SIAI knows all this and therefore will ignore FinalState completely, as well they should.

4Bugmaster12y
I think that depends on what level of suppression one is willing to employ, though in general I agree with you. FinalState had admitted to being a troll, but even if he was an earnest crank, the magnitude of the expected value of his work would still be quite small, even when you do account for SIAI's bias. What are they, out of curiosity ? I think I missed that part of the Sequences...
4Normal_Anomaly12y
It's not in the main Sequences, it's in the various posts on decision theory and Pascal's Muggings. I hope our resident decision theory experts will correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is this. If an agent is of the type that gives into Pascal's Mugging, then other agents who know that have an incentive to mug them. If all potential muggers know that they'll get no concessions from an agent, they have no incentive to mug them. I don't think this covers "Pascal's Gift" scenarios where an agent is offered a tiny probability of a large positive utility, but it covers scenarios involving a small chance of a large disutility.
2CuSithBell12y
I'm not sure that that is in fact an admission of being a troll... it reads as fairly ambiguous to me. Do other people have readings on this?
3[anonymous]12y
0%, since it apparently isn't finished yet. Will it be finished in a year? 2%, as all other attempts that have reached the "final stages" have failed to build working AGI. The most credible of those attempts were done with groups; it appears FinalState is working alone.

2%?
Seriously?
I am curious as to why your estimate is so high.

That's the kind of probability I would've assigned to EURISKO destroying the world back when Lenat was the first person ever to try to build anything self-improving. For a random guy on the Internet it's off by... maybe five orders of magnitude? I would expect a pretty tiny fraction of all worlds to have the names of homebrew projects carved on their tombstones, and there are many random people on the Internet claiming to have AGI.

People like this are significant, not because of their chances of creating AGI, but because of what their inability to stop or take any serious precautions, despite their belief that they are about to create AGI, tells us about human nature.

4TheOtherDave12y
Understanding "random guy on the Internet" to mean something like an Internet user all I know about whom is that they are interested in building AGI and willing to put some concerted effort into the project... hrm... yeah, I'll accept e-7 as within my range. My estimate for an actual random person on the Internet building AGI in, say, the next decade, has a ceiling of e-10 or so, but I don't have a clue what its lower bound is. That said, I'm not sure how well-correlated the willingness of a "random guy on the Internet" (meaning 1) to try to build AGI without taking precautions is to the willingness of someone whose chances are orders of magnitude higher to do so. Then again, we have more compelling lines of evidence leading us to expect humans to not take precautions.
2JoshuaZ12y
Are these in any way a representative sample of normal humans? In order to be in this category one generally needs to be pretty high on the crank scale along with some healthy Dunning-Kruger issues.
7Eliezer Yudkowsky12y
That's always been the argument that future AGI scientists won't be as crazy as the lunatics presently doing it - that the current crowd of researchers are self-selected for incaution - but I wouldn't put too much weight on that; it seems like a very human behavior, some of the smarter ones with millions of dollars don't seem of below-average competence in any other way, and the VCs funding them are similarly incapable of backing off even when they say they expect human-level AGI to be created.
9[anonymous]12y
Laplace's Rule of Succession, assuming around fifty failures under similar or more favorable circumstances.

This just shifts the question to how you slotted FinalState into such a promising reference class? Conservatively, tens of academic research programs, tens of PhD dissertations, hundreds of hobbyist projects, hundreds of undergraduate term projects, and tens of business ventures have attempted something similar to AGI and none have succeeded.

[-][anonymous]12y140

As far as I can tell, the vast majority of academic projects (particularly those of undergrads) have worked on narrow AI, which this is supposedly not.

However, reading the post again, it doesn't sound as though they have the support of any academic institution; I misread the bit around "academic network". It sounds more as though this is a homebrew project, in which case I need to go two or three orders of magnitude lower.

2othercriteria12y
That's definitely a reasonable assessment. I dialed all those estimates down by about an order of magnitude from when I started writing that point as I thought through just how unusual attempting general AI is. But over sixty years and hundreds of institutions where one might get a sufficiently solid background in CS to implement something big, there are going to be lots of unusual people trying things out.
4dlthomas12y
Of those who attempted, fewer thought they were close, but fifty still seems very generous.

The Rule of Succession, if I'm not mistaken, assumes a uniform prior from 0 to 1 for the probability of success. That seems unreasonable; it shouldn't be extremely improbable (even before observing failure) that fewer than one in a thousand such claims result in a working AGI. So you have to adjust downward somewhat from there, but it's hard to say how much.

(This is in addition to the point that user:othercriteria makes in the sibling comment.)

3[anonymous]12y
You're correct, but where would I find a better prior? I'd rather be too conservative than resort to wild guessing (which it would be, since I'm not an expert on AGI). (A variant of this is rhollerith_dot_com's objection below, that I failed to take into account whatever the probability of working AGI leading to death is. Presumably that changes the prior as well.)
6gwern12y
http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes
6steven046112y
I don't know where to get a good prior. I suppose you might look at past instances where someone claimed to be close to doing something that seemed about as difficult and confusing as AGI seems to be (before taking into account a history of promises that didn't pan out, but after taking into account what we know about the confusingness of the problem, insofar as that knowledge doesn't itself come from the fact of failed promises). I don't know what that prior would look like, but it seems like it would assign (if you randomly selected a kind of feat) a substantially greater than 1/10 probability of seeing at least 10 failed predictions of achieving that feat for every successful such prediction, a substantially greater than 1/100 probability of seeing at least 100 failed predictions for every successful prediction, and so on.
2A1987dM12y
And why do you think FinalState is in such a circumstance, rather than just bullshitting us?
2[anonymous]12y
I was being charitable. Also, I misread the original post; see the comments below.
2A1987dM12y
Hmm yeah, I read the post again and, if it's a troll, it's a way-more-subtle-than-typical one. Still, my posterior probability assignment on him being serious/sincere is in the 0.40s (extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence) -- though this means that the probability that he succeeds given that he's serious is the same order of magnitude as the probability that he succeeds given everything I know.
2RHollerith12y
If you know you probably would not have survived the sun's having failed to rise, you cannot just apply the Rule of Succession to your knowledge of past sunrises to calculate the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow because that would be ignoring relevant information, namely the existence of a severe selection bias. (Sadly, I do not know how to modify the Rule of Succession to account for the selection bias.)
5gwern12y
Bostrom has made a stab at compensating, although I don't think http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/anthropicshadow.pdf works for the sun example. On the other hand, if you have so much background knowledge about the Sun that you can think about the selection effects involved, the Rule of Succession is a moot & incomplete analysis to begin with.
3RHollerith12y
Regarding your second paragraph, Sir Gwern, if we switch the example to the question of whether the US and Russia will launch nukes at each other this year, I have at lot of information about the strength of the selection bias (including for example Carl Sagan's work on nuclear winter) that I might put to good use if I knew how to account for selection effects, but I would be sorely tempted to use something like the Rule of Succession (modified to account for the selection bias and where the analog of a day in which the sun might or might not rise is the start of the part of the career of someone in the military or in politics during which he or she can influence whether or not an attempt at a first strike is made) because my causal model of the mental processes behind the decision to launch is so unsatisfactory. This might be a good place for me to point out that I never bought into the common wisdom, which I have never seen anyone object to or distance themselves from in print, that the chances of a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia went down considerably after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
6NancyLebovitz12y
What's your line of thought?
4gwern12y
Nuclear war isn't the same situation, though. We can survive nuclear war at all sorts of levels of intensity, so the selection filter is not nearly the same as "the Sun going out", which is ~100% fatal. Bostrom's shadow paper might actually work for nuclear war, from the perspective of a revived civilization, but I'd have to reread it to see.
2RHollerith12y
The selection filter does not have to be total or near total for my point to stand, namely, Rule-of-Succession-like calculations can be useful even when one has enough information to think about the selection effects involved (provided that Rule-of-Succession-like calculations are ever useful). And parenthetically selection effects on observations about whether nuclear exchanges happened in the past can be very strong. Consider for example a family who has lived in Washington, D.C., for the last 5 decades: Washington, D.C., is such an important target that it is unlikely the family would have survived the launch of most or all of the Soviet/Russian arsenal at the U.S. So, although I agree with you that the human race as a whole would probably have survived almost any plausible nuclear exchange, that does not do the family in D.C. much good. More precisely, it does not do much good for the family's ability to use historical data on whether or not nukes were launched at the U.S. in the past to refine their probability of launches in the future.
2thomblake12y
An interesting bracket style. How am I supposed to know where the parenthetical ends?
3Bugmaster12y
Me too. This value is several orders of magnitude above my own estimate. That said, it depends on your definition of "finished". For example, it is much more plausible (relatively speaking) that FinalState will fail to produce an AGI, but will nevertheless produce an algorithm that performs some specific task -- such as character recognition, unit pathing, natural language processing, etc. -- better than the leading solutions. In this case, I suppose one could still make the argument that FinalState's project was finished somewhat successfully.
6othercriteria12y
Oh, I see that I misinterpreted FinalState's statement as an indication of only being a few minutes away from having a working implementation.

This is where Yudkowsky goes crazy autodidact bonkers. He thinks the social institution of science is superfluous, were everyone as smart as he. This means he can hold views contrary to scientific consensus in specialized fields where he lacks expert knowledge based on pure ratiocination.

Ok. I disagree with a large bit of the sequences on science and the nature of science. I've wrote a fair number of comments saying so. So I hope you will listen when I say that you are taking a strawman version of what Eliezer wrote on these issues, and it almost borders on something that I could only see someone thinking if they were trying to interpret Eliezer's words in the most negative fashion possible.

Even most science fiction books avoid that because it sounds too implausible.

Not saying I particularly disagree with your other premises, but saying something can't be true because it sounds implausible is not a valid argument.

I'd brought up a version of the tool/agent distinction, and was told firmly that people aren't smart or fast enough to direct an AI. (Sorry, this is from memory-- I don't have the foggiest how to do an efficient search to find that exchange.)

I'm not sure that's a complete answer-- how possible is it to augment a human towards being able to manage an AI? On the other hand, a human like that isn't going to be much like humans 1.0, so problems of Friendliness are still in play.

Perhaps what's needed is building akrasia into the world-- a resistance to sudden change. This has its own risks, but sudden existential threats are rare. [1]

At this point, I think the work on teaching rationality is more reliably important than the work on FAI. FAI involves some long inferential chains. The idea that people could improve their lives a lot by thinking more carefully about what they're doing and acting on those thoughts (with willingness to take feedback) is a much more plausible idea, even if you factor in the idea that rationality can be taught.

[1] Good enough for fiction-- we're already living in a world like that. We call the built-in akrasia Murphy.

You may be thinking of this exchange, which I found only because I remembered having been involved in it.

I continue to think that "tool" is a bad term to use here, because people's understanding of what it refers to vary so relevantly.

As for what is valuable work... hm.

I think teaching people to reason in truth-preserving and value-preserving ways is worth doing.
I think formalizing a decision theory that captures universal human intuitions about what the right thing to do in various situations is worth doing.
I think formalizing a decision theory that captures non-universal but extant "right thing" intuitions is potentially worth doing, but requires a lot of auxiliary work to actually be worth doing.
I think formalizing a decision theory that arrives at judgments about the right thing to do in various situations where those judgments are counterintuitive for most/all humans but reliably lead, if implemented, to results that those same humans reliably endorse more the results of their intuitive judgments is worth doing.
I think building systems that can solve real-world problems efficiently is worth doing, all else being equal, though I agree that powerful tools fr... (read more)

3NancyLebovitz12y
Thanks for the link-- that was what I was thinking of. Do you have other organizations which teach rationality in mind? Offhand, the only thing I can think of is cognitive behavioral therapy, and it's not exactly an organization.
1TheOtherDave12y
No, I don't have anything specific in mind.

My biggest criticism of SI is that I cannot decide between:

A. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will decrease the chance of UFAI catastrophe; or B. promoting AI and FAI issues awareness will increase the chance of UFAI catastrophe

This criticism seems district from the ones that Holden makes. But it is my primary concern. (Perhaps the closest example is Holden's analogy that SI is trying to develop facebook before the Internet).

A seems intuitive. Basically everyone associated with SI assumes that A is true, as far as I can tell. But A is not obviously true to me. It seems to me at least plausible that:

A1. promoting AI and FAI issues will get lots of scattered groups around the world more interested in creating AGI A2. one of these groups will develop AGI faster than otherwise due to A1 A3. the world will be at greater risk of UFAI catastrophe than otherwise due to A2 (i.e. the group creates AGI faster than otherwise, and fails at FAI)

More simply: SI's general efforts, albeit well intended, might accelerate the creation of AGI, and the acceleration of AGI might decrease the odds of the first AGI being friendly. This is one path by which B, not A, would be true.

SI might repl... (read more)

I don't see how friendly and safe follow from stable.

I don't think it's hard to explain at all: Eliezer prioritized a donor (presumably long-term and one he knew personally) over an article. I disagree with it, but you know what, I saw this sort of thing all the time on Wikipedia, and I don't need to go looking for theories of why administrators were crazy and deleted Daniel Brandt's article. I know why they did, even though I strongly disagreed.

3) most importantly, never explained his response (practically impossible without admitting his mistake).

He or someone else must have explained at some point, or I wouldn't know his reason was that the article was giving a donor nightmares.

Is deleting one post such an issue to get worked up over? Or is this just discussed because it's the best criticism one can come up with besides "he's a high school dropout who hasn't yet created an AI and so must be completely wrong"?

4Rain12y
Please cite your claim that the affected person was a donor.
2JoshuaZ12y
Has he said anywhere that the individual with nightmares was a donor? Note incidentally that having content that is acting as that much of a cognitive basilisk might be a legitimate reason to delete (although I'm inclined to think that it wasn't).

You'll have to forgive Eliezer for not responding; he's busy dispatching death squads.

[-][anonymous]12y100

The Roko incident has absolutely nothing to do with this at all. Roko did not claim to be on the verge of creating an AGI.

Once again you're spreading FUD about the SI. Presumably moderation will come eventually, no doubt over some hue and cry over censoring contrarians.

[-][anonymous]12y100

Sure. His moderation activities over the last year or so have been far more... sunglasses... moderate.

It seems almost unfair to criticize something as a problem of LW rationality when in your second paragraph you note that professionals do the same thing.

Ask yourself honestly whether you would ever or have ever done anything comparable to what Yudkowsky did in the Roko incident or what Romney did in the hair cutting incident.

I'm not sure. A while ago, I was involved in a situation where someone wanted to put personal information of an individual up on the internet knowing that that person had an internet stalker who had a history of being a real life stalker for others. The only reason I didn't react pretty close to how Eliezer reacted in the quoted incident is that I knew that the individual in question was not going to listen to me and would if anything have done the opposite of what I wanted. In that sort of context, Eliezer's behavior doesn't seem to be that extreme. Eliezer's remarks involve slightly more caps than I think I would use in such a circumstance, but the language isn't that different.

This does connect to another issue though- the scale in question of making heated comments on the internet as opposed to traumatic bullying, are different. The questions I ask m... (read more)

If you being downvoted is the result of LW ruthlessly suppressing dissent of all kind, how do you explain this post by Holden Karnofsky getting massively upvoted?

For example, if all members of Congress were to shout loudly when a particular member got up to speak, drowning out their words, would this be censorship, or just their exercise of a community vote against that person?

One thing to note is that your comment wasn't removed; it was collapsed. It can still be viewed by anyone who clicks the expander or has their threshold set sufficiently low (with my settings, it's expanded). There is a tension between the threat of censorship being a problem on the one hand, and the ability for a community to collectively decide what they want to talk about on the other.

The censorship issue is also diluted by the fact that 1) nothing here is binding on anyone (which is way different than your Congress example), and 2) there are plenty of other places people can discuss things, online and off. It is still somewhat relevant, of course, to the question of whether there's an echo-chamber effect, but carefull not to pull in additional connotations with choice of words and examples.

This is like the whole point of why LessWrong exists. To remind people that making a superintelligent tool and expecting it to magically gain human common sense is a fast way to extinction.

The superintelligent tool will care about suicide only if you program it to care about suicide. It will care about damage only if you program it to care about damage. -- If you only program it to care about answering correctly, it will answer correctly... and ignore suicide and damage as irrelevant.

If you ask your calculator how much is 2+2, the calculator answers 4 rega... (read more)

0Strange711y
The "superintelligent tool" in the example you provided gave a blatantly incorrect answer by it's own metric. If it counts suicide as a win, why did it say the disease would not be gotten rid of?
1Viliam_Bur11y
In the example the "win" could be defined as an answer which is: a) technically correct, b) relatively cheap among the technically correct answers. This is (in my imagination) something that builders of the system could consider reasonable, if either they didn't consider Friendliness or they believed that a "tool AI" which "only gives answers" is automatically safe. The computer gives an answer which is technically correct (albeit a self-fulfilling prophecy) and cheap (in dollars spent for cure). For the computer, this answer is a "win". Not because of the suicide -- that part is completely irrelevant. But because of the technical correctness and cheapness.

I would naively read it as “don't start a fight unless you know you're going to win”.

I'm afraid not.

Actually, as someone with background in Biology I can tell you that this is not a problem you want to approach atoms-up. It's been tried, and our computational capabilities fell woefully short of succeeding.

I should explain what "woefully short" means, so that the answer won't be "but can't the AI apply more computational power than us?". Yes, presumably it can. But the scales are immense. To explain it, I will need an analogy.

Not that long ago, I had the notion that chess could be fully solved; that is, that you could si... (read more)

5Bugmaster12y
Yes, I understand what "exponential complexity" means :-) It sounds, then, like you're on the side of kalla724 and myself (and against my Devil's Advocate persona): the AI would not be able to develop nanotechnology (or any other world-shattering technology) without performing physical experiments out in meatspace. It could do so in theory, but in practice, the computational requirements are too high. But this puts severe constraints on the speed with which the AI's intelligence explosion could occur. Once it hits the limits of existing technology, it will have to take a long slog through empirical science, at human-grade speeds.
1Polymeron12y
Actually, I don't know that this means it has to perform physical experiments in order to develop nanotechnology. It is quite conceivable that all the necessary information is already out there, but we haven't been able to connect all the dots just yet. At some point the AI hits a wall in the knowledge it can gain without physical experiments, but there's no good way to know how far ahead that wall is.
2Bugmaster12y
Wouldn't this mean that creating fully functional self-replicating nanotechnology is just a matter of performing some thorough interdisciplinary studies (or meta-studies or whatever they are called) ? My impression was that there are currently several well-understood -- yet unresolved -- problems that prevent nanofactories from becoming a reality, though I could be wrong.
1Polymeron12y
The way I see it, there's no evidence that these problems require additional experimentation to resolve, rather than find an obscure piece of experimentation that has already taken place and whose relevance may not be immediately obvious. Sure, that more experimentation is needed is probable; but by no means certain.
0CCC11y
Thorough interdisciplinary studies may or may not lead to nanotechnology, but they're fairly certain to lead to something new. While there are a fair number of (say) marine biologists out there, and a fair number of astronomers, there are probably rather few people who have expertise in both fields; and it's possible that there exists some obscure unsolved problem in marine biology whose solution is obvious to someone who's keeping up on the forefront of astronomy research. Or vice versa. Or substitute in any other two fields of your choice.
2Kawoomba11y
Indeed, using a very straightforward Huffman encoding (1 bit for an for empty cell, 3 bits for pawns) you can get it down to 24 bytes for the board alone. Was an interesting puzzle. Looking up "prior art" on the subject, you also need 2 bytes for things like "may castle", and other more obscure rules. There's further optimizations you can do, but they are mostly for the average case, not the worst case.
3Polymeron11y
I didn't consider using 3 bits for pawns! Thanks for that :) I did account for such variables as may castle and whose turn it is.
2Richard_Kennaway11y
Is that because we don't have enough brute force, or because we don't know what calculation to apply it to? I would be unsurprised to learn that calculating the folding state having global minimum energy was NP-complete; but for that reason I would be surprised to learn that nature solves that problem, rather than finding a local minimum. I don't have a background in biology, but my impression from Wikipedia is that the tension between Anfinsen's dogma and Levinthal's paradox is yet unresolved.
2Polymeron11y
The two are not in conflict. A-la Levinthal's paradox, I can say that throwing a marble down a conical hollow at different angles and force can have literally trillions of possible trajectories; a-la Anfinsen's dogma, that should not stop me from predicting that it will end up at the bottom of the cone; but I'd need to know the shape of the cone (or, more specifically, its point's location) to determine exactly where that is - so being able to make the prediction once I know this is of no assistance for predicting the end position with a different, unknown cone. Similarly, Eliezer is able to predict that a grandmaster chess player would be able to bring a board to a winning position against himself, even though he has no idea what moves that would entail or which of the many trillions of possible move sets the game would be comprised of. Problems like this cannot be solved on brute force alone; you need to use attractors and heuristics to get where you want to get. So yes, obviously nature stumbled into certain stable configurations which propelled it forward, rather than solve the problem and start designing away. But even if we can never have enough computing power to model each and every atom in each and every configuration, we might still get a good enough understanding of the general laws for designing proteins almost from scratch.
0Strange711y
I would think it would be possible to cut the space of possible chess positions down quite a bit by only retaining those which can result from moves the AI would make, and legal moves an opponent could make in response. That is, when it becomes clear that a position is unwinnable, backtrack, and don't keep full notes on why it's unwinnable.
1Polymeron11y
This is more or less what computers do today to win chess matches, but the space of possibilities explodes too fast; even the strongest computers can't really keep track of more than I think 13 or 14 moves ahead, even given a long time to think. Merely storing all the positions that are unwinnable - regardless of why they are so - would require more matter than we have in the solar system. Not to mention the efficiency of running a DB search on that...
3CCC11y
Actually, with proper design, that can be made very quick and easy. You don't need to store the positions; you just need to store the states (win:black, win:white, draw - two bits per state). The trick is, you store each win/loss state in a memory address equal to the 34-byte (or however long) binary number that describes the position in question. Checking a given state is then simply a memory retrieval from a known address.
1Polymeron11y
I suspect that with memory on the order of 10^70 bytes, that might involve additional complications; but you're correct, normally this cancels out the complexity problem.
1wedrifid11y
The storage space problem is insurmountable. However searching that kind of database would be extremely efficient (if the designer isn't a moron). The search speed would have a lower bound of very close to (diameter of the sphere that can contain the database / c). Nothing more is required for search purposes than physically getting a signal to the relevant bit, and back, with only minor deviations from a straight line each way. And that is without even the most obvious optimisations. If your chess opponent is willing to fly with you in a relativistic rocket and you only care about time elapsed from your own reference frame rather than the reference frame of the computer (or most anything else of note) you can even get down below that diameter / light speed limit, depending on your available fuel and the degree of accelleration you can survive.

Starting a nonprofit on a subject unfamiliar to most and successfully soliciting donations, starting an 8.5-million-view blog, writing over 2 million words on wide-ranging controversial topics so well that the only sustained criticism to be made is "it's long" and minor nitpicks, writing an extensive work of fiction that dominated its genre, and making some novel and interesting inroads into decision theory all seem, to me, to be evidence in favour of genius-level intelligence. These are evidence because the overwhelming default in every case for simply 'smart' people is to fail.

Of course not, why send death squads when you can send Death Eaters. It just takes a single spell to solve this problem.

As a minor note, observe that claims of extraordinary rationality do not necessarily contradict claims of irrationality. The sanity waterline is very low.

6TheOtherDave12y
Do you mean to imply in context here that the organizational management of SIAI at the time under discussion was above average for a nonprofit organization? Or are you just making a more general statement that a system can be irrational while demonstrating above average rationality? I certainly agree with the latter.

Are you comparing it to the average among nonprofits started, or nonprofits extant? I would guess that it was well below average for extant nonprofits, but about or slightly above average for started nonprofits. I'd guess that most nonprofits are started by people who don't know what they're doing and don't know what they don't know, and that SI probably did slightly better because the people who were being a bit stupid were at least very smart, which can help. However, I'd guess that most such nonprofits don't live long because they don't find a Peter Thiel to keep them alive.

Your assessment looks about right to me. I have considerable experience of averagely-incompetent nonprofits, and SIAI looks normal to me. I am strongly tempted to grab that "For Dummies" book and, if it's good, start sending copies to people ...

The point is that we're consequentialists, and lowering salaries even further would save money (on salaries) but result in SI getting less done, not more — for the same reason that outsourcing fewer tasks would save money (on outsourcing) but cause us to get less done, not more.

result in SI getting less done

You say this as though it's obvious, but if I'm not mistaken, salaries used to be about 40% of what they are now, and while the higher salaries sound like they are making a major productivity difference, hiring 2.5 times as many people would also make a major productivity difference. (Though yes, obviously marginal hires would be lower in quality.)

I don't think salaries were ever as low as 40% of what they are now. When I came on board, most people were at $36k/yr.

To illustrate why lower salaries means less stuff gets done: I've been averaging 60 hours per week, and I'm unusually productive. If I am paid less, that means that (to pick just one example from this week) I can't afford to take a taxi to and from the eye doctor, which means I spend 1.5 hrs each way changing buses to get there, and spend less time being productive on x-risk. That is totally not worth it. Future civilizations would look back on this decision as profoundly stupid.

Pretty sure Anna and Steve Rayhawk had salaries around $20k/yr at some point while living in Silicon Valley.

I don't think that you're really responding to Steven's point. Yes, as Steven said, if you were paid less then clearly that would impose more costs on you, so ceteris paribus your getting paid less would be bad. But, as Steven said, the opportunity cost is potentially very high. You haven't made a rationally compelling case that the missed opportunity is "totally not worth it" or that heeding it would be "profoundly stupid", you've mostly just re-asserted your conclusion, contra Steven's objection. What are your arguments that this is the case? Note that I personally think it's highly plausible that $40-50k/yr is optimal, but as far as I can see you haven't yet listed any rationally compelling reasons to think so.

(This comment is a little bit sterner than it would have been if you hadn't emphatically asserted that conclusions other than your own would be "profoundly stupid" without first giving overwhelming justification for your conclusion. It is especially important to be careful about such apparent overconfidence on issues where one clearly has a personal stake in the matter.)

I will largely endorse Will's comment, then bow out of the discussion, because this appears to be too personal and touchy a topic for a detailed discussion to be fruitful.

9lukeprog12y
If so, I suspect they were burning through savings during this time or had some kind of cheap living arrangement that I don't have. 1. I couldn't really get by on less, so paying me less would cause me to quit the organization and do something else instead, which would cause much of this good stuff to probably not happen. 2. It's VERY hard for SingInst to purchase value as efficiently as by purchasing Luke-hours. At $48k/yr for 60 hrs/wk, I make $15.38/hr, and one Luke-hour is unusually productive for SingInst. Paying me less and thereby causing me to work fewer hours per week is a bad value proposition for SingInst. Or, as Eliezer put it:

This seems to me unnecessarily defensive. I support the goals of SingInst, but I could never bring myself to accept the kind of salary cut you guys are taking in order to work there. Like every other human on the planet, I can't be accurately modelled with a utility function that places any value on far distant strangers; you can more accurately model what stranger-altruism I do show as purchase of moral satisfaction, though I do seek for such altruism to be efficient. SingInst should pay the salaries it needs to pay to recruit the kind of staff it needs to fulfil its mission; it's harder to recruit if staff are expected to be defensive about demanding market salaries for their expertise, with no more than a normal adjustment for altruistic work much as if they were working for an animal sanctuary.

2lukeprog12y
Yes, exactly.
5Paul Crowley12y
So when I say "unnecessarily defensive", I mean that all the stuff about the cost of taxis is after-the-fact defensive rationalization; it can't be said about a single dollar you spend on having a life outside of SI. The truth is that even the best human rationalist in the world isn't going to agree to giving those up, and since you have to recruit humans, you'd best pay the sort of salary that is going to attract and retain them. That of course includes yourself. The same goes for saying "move to the Honduras". Your perfectly utility-maximising AGIs will move to the Honduras, but your human staff won't; they want to live in places like the Bay Area.
1Bugmaster12y
I understand the point you're making regarding salaries, and for once I agree. However, it's rather presumptuous of you (and/or Eliezer) to assume, implicitly, that our choices are limited to only two possibilities: "Support SIAI, save the world", and "Don't support SIAI, the world is doomed". I can envision many other scenarios, such as "Support SIAI, but their fears were overblown and you implicitly killed N children by not spending the money on them instead", or "Don't support SIAI, support some other organization instead because they'll have a better chance of success", etc.
6lukeprog12y
Where did we say all that?
1Bugmaster12y
In your comment above, you said: You also quoted Eliezer saying something similar. This outlook implies strongly that whatever SIAI is doing is of such monumental significance that future civilizations will not only remember its name, but also reverently preserve every decision it made. You are also quite fond of saying that the work that SIAI is doing is tantamount to "saving the world"; and IIRC Eliezer once said that, if you have a talent for investment banking, you should make as much money as possible and then donate it all to SIAI, as opposed to any other charity. This kind of grand rhetoric presupposes not only that the SIAI is correct in its risk assessment regarding AGI, but also that they are uniquely qualified to address this potentially world-ending problem, and that, over the ages, no one more qualified could possibly come along. All of this could be true, but it's far from a certainty, as your writing would seem to imply.
3lukeprog12y
I'm not seeing how the above implies the thing you said: (Note that I don't necessarily endorse things you report Eliezer as having said.)
1Bugmaster12y
You appear to be very confident that future civilizations will remember SIAI in a positive way, and care about its actions. If so, they must have some reason for doing so. Any reason would do, but the most likely reason is that SIAI will accomplish something so spectacularly beneficial that it will affect everyone in the far future. SIAI's core mission is to save the world from UFAI, so it's reasonable to assume that this is the highly beneficial effect that the SIAI will achieve. I don't have a problem with this chain of events, just with your apparent confidence that a). it's going to happen in exactly that way, and b). your organization is the only one who is qualified to save the world in this specific fashion. (EDIT: I forgot to say that, if we follow your reasoning to its conclusion, then you are indeed implying that donating as much money or labor as possible to SIAI is the only smart move for any rational agent.) Note that I have no problem with your main statement, i.e. "lowering the salaries of SIAI members would bring us too much negative utility to compensate for the monetary savings". This kind of cost-benefit analysis is done all the time, and future civilizations rarely enter into it.
2Paul Crowley12y
Well no, of course it's not a certainty. All efforts to make a difference are decisions under uncertainty. You're attacking a straw man.
1Bugmaster12y
Please substitute "certainty minus epsilon" for "certainty" wherever you see it in my post. It was not my intention to imply 100% certainty; just a confidence value so high that it amounts to the same thing for all practical purposes.
2dlthomas12y
I don't think "certainty minus epsilon" improves much. It moves it from theoretical impossibility to practical - but looking that far out, I expect "likelihood" might be best.
2Bugmaster12y
I don't understand your comment... what's the practical difference between "extremely high likelihood" and "extremely high certainty" ?
1jacob_cannell12y
In the SIA/Transhumanist outlook, if civilization survives some large (perhaps majority) of extant human minds will survive as uploads. As a result, all of their memories will likely be stored, dissected, shared, searched, judged, and so on. Much will be preserved in such a future. And even without uploading, there are plenty of people who have maintained websites since the early days of the internet with no loss of information, and this is quite likely to remain true far into the future if civilization survives.

Maybe I'm just jaded, but this critique doesn't impress me much. Holden's substantive suggestion is that, instead of trying to design friendly agent AI, we should just make passive "tool AI" that only reacts to commands but never acts on its own. So when do we start thinking about the problems peculiar to agent AI? Do we just hope that agent AI will never come into existence? Do we ask the tool AI to solve the friendly AI problem for us? (That seems to be what people want to do anyway, an approach I reject as ridiculously indirect.)

9Will_Newsome12y
(Perhaps I should note that I find your approach to be too indirect as well: if you really understand how justification works then you should be able to use that knowledge to make (invoke?) a theoretically perfectly justified agent, who will treat others' epistemic and moral beliefs in a thoroughly justified manner without your having to tell it "morality is in mind-brains, figure out what the mind-brains say then do what they tell you to do". That is, I think the correct solution should be just clearly mathematically and meta-ethically justified, question-dissolving, reflective, non-arbitrary, perfect decision theory. Such an approach is closest in spirit to CFAI. All other approaches, e.g. CEV, WBE, or oracle AI, are relatively arbitrary and unmotivated, especially meta-ethically.)
5hairyfigment12y
Not only does this seem wrong, but if I believed it I would want SI to look for the correct decision theory (roughly what Eliezer says he's doing anyway). It fails to stress the possibility that Eliezer's whole approach is wrong. In fact it seems willfully (heh) ignorant of the planning fallacy and similar concerns: even formalizing the 'correct' prior seems tricky to me, so why would it be feasible to formalize "correct" meta-ethics even if it exists in the sense you mean? And what reason do we have to believe that a version with no pointers to brains exists at all? At least with reflective decision theory I see no good reason to think that a transparently-written AGI is impossible in principle (our neurons don't just fire randomly, nor does evolution seem like a particularly good searcher of mindspace), so a theory of decisions that can describe said AGI's actions should be mathematically possible barring some alternative to math. (Whether, eg, the description would fit in our observable universe seems like another question.)

I've read SL4 around that time and saw the whole drama (although I couldn't understand all the exact technical details, being 16). My prior on EY flagrantly lying like that is incredibly low. I'm virtually certain that you're quite cranky in this regard.

I was on SL4 as well, and regarded Eliezer as basically correct, although I thought Loosemore's ban was more than a little bit disproportionate. (If John Clark didn't get banned for repeatedly and willfully misunderstanding Godelian arguments, wasting the time of countless posters over many years, why should Loosemore be banned for backtracking on some heuristics & biases positions?)

(Because JKC never lied about his credentials, which is where it really crosses the line into trolling.)

trolling

You use this word in an unconventional way, i.e., you use it to mean something like 'unfairly causing harm and wasting people's time', which is not the standard definition: the standard definition necessitates intention to provoke or at least something in that vein. (I assume you know what "trolling" means in the context of fishing?) Because it's only ever used in sensitive contexts, you might want to put effort into finding a more accurate word or phrase. As User:Eugine_Nier noted, lately "troll" and "trolling" have taken on a common usage similar to "fascist" and "fascism", which I think is an unfortunate turn of events.

8[anonymous]12y
The animus here must be really strong. What Yudkowsky did was infer that Loosemore was lying about being a cognitive scientist from his ignorance of a variant of the Wasson experiment. First, people often forget obvious things in heated online discussions. Second, there are plenty of incompetent cognitive scientists: if Loosemore intended to deceive, he probably wouldn't have expressly stated that he didn't have teaching responsibilities for graduate students.
3Will_Newsome12y
If what you say is true, then Eliezer is lying about Loosemore lying about his credentials, in which case Eliezer is "trolling". But if what you say is false, then you are the "troll". (This comment is an attempt to convincingly demonstrate that Eliezer's notion of trolling is, to put it bluntly, both harmful and dumb.)
5[anonymous]12y
I don't know about you, but I'd prefer to be considered a troll than a liar; correspondingly, I think the expanded definition of liar is worse than the inaccurate definition of troll. Not every inaccuracy amounts to dishonesty and not all dishonesty to prevarication.

Caving to donors is inauspicious.

It's also a double-bind. If you do nothing, you are valuing donors at less than some random speculation which is unusually dubious even by LessWrong's standards, resting as it does on a novel speculative decision theory (acausal trade) whose most obvious requirement (implementing sufficiently similar algorithms) is beyond blatantly false when applied to humans and FAIs. (If you actually believe that SIAI is a good charity, pissing off donors over something like this is a really bad idea, and if you don't believe SIAI is ... (read more)

I am in the final implementation stages of the general intelligence algorithm.

Do you mean "I am in the final writing stages of a paper on a general intelligence algorithm?" If you were in the final implementation stages of what LW would recognize as the general intelligence algorithm, the very last thing you would want to do is mention that fact here; and the second-to-last thing you'd do would be to worry about personal credit.

I think the argument you make in this comment isn't a bad one, but the unnecessary and unwarranted "Apostle Yudkowsky (prophet of the Singularity God)" stuff amounts to indirectly insulting the people you're talking with and, makes them far less likely to realize that you're actually also saying something sensible. If you want to get your points across, as opposed to just enjoying a feeling of smug moral superiority while getting downvoted into oblivion, I strongly recommend leaving that stuff out.

"You're too stupid and self-deceiving to just use Solomonoff induction" ~ "If you were less stupid and self deceiving you'd be able to just use Solomonoff induction" + "but since you are in fact stupid and self-deceiving, instead you have to use the less elegant approximation Science"

That was hard to find out?

You've misread the post - Luke is saying that he doesn't think the "usual defeaters" are the most likely explanation.

4lukeprog12y
Correct.

Re-reading, the whole thing is pretty unclear!

As katydee and thomblake say, I mean that working for SingInst would mean a bigger reduction in my salary than I could currently bring myself to accept. If I really valued the lives of strangers as a utilitarian, the benefits to them of taking a salary cut would be so huge that it would totally outweigh the costs to me. But it looks like I only really place direct value on the short-term interests of myself and those close to me, and everything else is purchase of moral satisfaction. Happily, purchase of mora... (read more)

As someone who has read Eliezer's metaethics sequence, let me say that what you think his position is, is only somewhat related to what it actually is; and also, that he has answered those of your objections that are relevant.

It's fine that you don't want to read 30+ fairly long blog posts, especially if you dislike the writing style. But then, don't try to criticize what you're ignorant about. And no, openly admitting that you haven't read the arguments you're criticizing, and claiming that you feel guilty about it, doesn't magically make it more acceptable. Or honest.

4JoshuaZ12y
One doesn't need to have read the whole Bible to criticize it. But the Bible is a fairly short work, so an even more extreme example might be better: one doesn't need to have read the entire Talmud to criticize it.

His solution: morality is the function that the brain of a fully informed subject computes to determine what's right. Laughable; pathologically arrogant.

You either didn't read that sequence carefully, or are intentionally misrepresenting it.

He thinks the social institution of science is superfluous, were everyone as smart as he.

Didn't read that sequence carefully either.

That simplicity in the information sense equates with parsimony is most unlikely; for one thing, simplicity is dependent on choice of language--an insight that should be almos

... (read more)
7[anonymous]12y
To be fair, that sequence doesn't really answer questions about choice-of-language; it took reading some of Solomonoff's papers for me to figure out what the solution to that problem is.
2JoshuaZ12y
There are a variety of proposed solutions. None of them seem perfect.
3[anonymous]12y
I'm referring to encoding in several different languages, which makes it progressively more implausible that choice of language matters. I agree that's not a perfect solution, but it's good enough for me.

The point is that you would hardly be so severe on someone unless you disagreed strongly.

I disagree; a downvote is not 'severe'.

The kind of nitpicking you engage in your post would ordinarily lead you to be downvoted

I disagree; meta-discussions often result in many upvotes.

It was that you treat discussion of karma as an unconditional wrong.

I do not, and have stated as much.

There's no rational basis for throwing it in as an extra negative when the facts aren't right.

If there is no point in downvoting incorrect facts, then I wonder what the do... (read more)

Leaving aside the question of whether Tool AI as you describe it is possible until I've thought more about it:

The idea of a "self-improving algorithm" intuitively sounds very powerful, but does not seem to have led to many "explosions" in software so far (and it seems to be a concept that could apply to narrow AI as well as to AGI).

Looking to the past for examples is a very weak heuristic here, since we have never dealt with software that could write code at a better than human level before. It's like saying, before the invention o... (read more)

Safe & friendly imply stable, but stable does not imply safe or friendly

Total available downvotes are a high number (4 times total karma, if I recall correctly), and in practice I think they prevent very few users from downvoting as much as they want.

By all means, continue. It's an interesting topic to think about.

The problem with "atoms up" simulation is the amount of computational power it requires. Think about the difference in complexity when calculating a three-body problem as compared to a two-body problem?

Than take into account the current protein folding algorithms. People have been trying to calculate folding of single protein molecules (and fairly short at that) by taking into account the main physical forces at play. In order to do this in a reasonable amount of time, great shortcu... (read more)

[-][anonymous]12y70

Yes, the most that has ever happened to anyone who talked to EY about building an AGI is some mild verbal/textual abuse.

I agree with gwern's assessment of your arguments.

EDIT: Also, I am not affiliated with the SI.

[-][anonymous]12y70

How highly educated?

You've already gone down this road with Wei Dai. More FUD.

I read your post on habit theory, and I liked it, but I don't think it's an answer to the question "What should I do?"

It's interesting to say that if you're an artist, you might get more practical use out of virtue theory, and if you're a politician, you might get more practical use out of consequentialism. I'm not sure who it is that faces more daily temptations to break the rules than the rest of us; bankers, I suppose, and maybe certain kinds of computer security experts.

Anyway, saying that morality is a tool doesn't get you out of the origina... (read more)

It is not strong. The basic idea is that if you pull a mind at random from design space then it will be unfriendly. I am not even sure if that is true. But it is the strongest argument they have. And it is completely bogus because humans do not pull AGI's from mind design space at random.

An AI's mind doesn't have to be pulled from design space at random to be disastrous. The primary issue that the SIAI has to grapple with (based on my understanding,) is that deliberately designing an AI that does what we would want it to do, rather than fulfilling proxy... (read more)

[This thread presents a good opportunity to exercise the (tentatively suggested) norm of indiscriminately downvoting all comments in pointless conversations, irrespective of individual quality or helpfulness of the comments.]

3Tyrrell_McAllister12y
Although, please be aware that the pointlessness of the conversation may not initially have been so transparent to those who cannot read Russian.

The main difference is that if there's reason to presume that they're lying, any claims of "we've implemented these improvements" that you can't directly inspect become worthless. Right now, if they say something like "Meetings with consultants about bookkeeping/accounting; currently working with our accountant to implement best practices and find a good bookkeeper", I trust them enough to believe that they're not just making it up even though I can't personally verify it.

2Eugine_Nier12y
On the other had, you can't trust their claims that these meetings are accomplishing anything.

I agree that that the tone on both sides is intentionally respectful, and that people here delude themselves if they imagine they aren't up for a bit of mockery from high status folks who don't have the patience to be really engage.

I agree that we don't really know what to expect from the first program that can meaningfully improve itself (including, I suppose, its self-improvement procedure) at a faster pace than human experts working on improving it. It might not be that impressive. But it seems likely to me that it will be a big deal, if ever we get there.

But you're being vague otherwise. Name a crazy or unfounded belief.

What you say might be true if the only way to do good was to get money from donors. But of course that is not true: a do-gooder can become a donor himself or if he is too poor to donate, he can devote his energies to becoming richer so that he can donate time or money in the future (which is in fact the course that most of the young people inspired by SI's mission are taking).

I am more comfortable speaking about individual altruists rather than charitable organizations. If an individual altruist can find a charity to employ him or find a patron to support... (read more)

"Guilt by association" with your past self?

If you downvote discussion of karma--like you did--simply for mentioning it, even where relevant, then you effectively soft-censor any discussion of karma. How is that rational?

I don't do that; I only downvote when it's combined with incorrect facts. Which I'm tempted to do for this statement: "like you did--simply for mentioning it", since you're inferring my motivations, and once again incorrect.

[-][anonymous]12y70

I am very happy to see this post and the subsequent dialogue. I've been talking with some people at Giving What We Can about volunteering (beginning in June) to do statistical work for them in trying to find effective ways to quantify and assess the impact of charitable giving specifically to organizations that work on mitigating existential risks. I hope to incorporate a lot of what is discussed here into my future work.

Given that much of the discussion revolves around the tool/agent issue, I'm wondering if anyone can point me to a mathematically precise definition of each, in whatever limited context it applies.

It's mostly a question for philosophy of mind, I think specifically a question about intentionality. I think the closest you'll get to a mathematical framework is control theory; controllers are a weird edge case between tools and very simple agents. Control theory is mathematically related to Bayesian optimization, which I think Eliezer believes is fundamental to intelligence: thus identifying cases where a controller is a tool or an agent would be directly relevant. But I don't see how the mathematics, or any mathematics really, could help you. It's possible that someone has mathematized arguments about intentionality by using information theory or some such, you could Google that. Even so I think that at this point the ideas are imprecise enough such that plain ol' philosophy is what we have to work with. Unfortunately AFAIK very few people on LW are familiar with the relevant parts of philosophy of mind.

It is an EY's announced intention to work toward an AI that is provably friendly. "Provably" means that said AI is defined in some mathematical framework first. I don't see how one can make much progress in that area before rigorously defining intentionality.

I guess I am getting ahead of myself here. What would a relevant mathematical framework entail, to begin with?

I guess I am jumping the shark here.

I don't think that idiom means what you think it means.

4shminux12y
Thank you, fixed.
3quintopia12y
You were probably fishing for "jumping the gun".
5shminux12y
Yeah, should have been shooting instead of fishing.
5Bugmaster12y
It could be said that you shot yourself in the foot by jumping the shark while fishing for a gun.
7Will_Newsome12y
(It's possible that intentionality isn't the sharpest distinction between "tools" and "agents", but it's the one that I see most often emphasized in philosophy of mind, especially with regards to necessary preconditions for the development of any "strong AI".) It seems that one could write an AI that is in some sense "provably Friendly" even while remaining agnostic as to whether the described AI is or will ultimately become a tool or an agent. It might be that a proposed AI couldn't be an agent because it couldn't solve the symbol grounding problem, i.e. because it lacked intentionality, and thus wouldn't be an effective FAI, but would nonetheless be Friendly in a certain limited sense. However if effectiveness is considered a requirement of Friendliness then one would indeed have to prove in advance that one's proposed AI could solve the grounding problem in order to prove that said AI was Friendly, or alternatively, prove that the grounding problem as such isn't a meaningful concept. I'm not sure what Eliezer would say about this; given his thinking about "outcome pumps" and so on, I doubt he thinks symbol grounding is a fundamental or meaningful problem, and so I doubt that he has or is planning to develop any formal argument that symbol grounding isn't a fundamental roadblock for his preferred attack on AGI. Your question about what a relevant mathematical framework would entail seems too vague for me to parse; my apologies, it's likely my exhaustion. But anyway, if minds leave certain characteristic marks on their environment by virtue of their having intentional (mental) states, then how precise and deep you can make your distinguishing mathematical framework depends on how sharp a cutoff there is in reality between intentional and non-intentional states. It's possible that the cutoff isn't sharp at all, in which case it's questionable whether the supposed distinction exists or is meaningful. If that's the case then it's quite possible that it's not possibl
5othercriteria12y
Focusing on intentionality seems interesting since it lets us look at black box actors (whose agent-ness or tool-ness we don't have to carefully define) and ask if they are acting in an apparently goal-directed manner. I've just skimmed [1] and barely remember [2] but it looks like you can make the inference work in simple cases and also prove some intractability results. Obviously, FAI can't be solved by just building some AI, modeling P(AI has goal "destroy humanity" | AI's actions, state of world) and pulling the plug when that number gets too high. But maybe something else of value can be gained from a mathematical formalization like this. [1] I. Van Rooij, J. Kwisthout, M. Blokpoel, J. Szymanik, T. Wareham, and I. Toni, “Intentional communication: Computationally easy or difficult?,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 5, 2011. [2] C. L. Baker, R. R. Saxe, and J. B. Tenenbaum, “Bayesian theory of mind: Modeling joint belief-desire attribution,” Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2011.
4Will_Newsome12y
Tenenbaum's papers and related inductive approaches to detecting agency were the first attacks that came to mind, but I'm not sure that such statistical evidence could even in principle supply the sort of proof-strength support and precision that shminux seems to be looking for. I suppose I say this because I doubt someone like Searle would be convinced that an AI had intentional states in the relevant sense on the basis that it displayed sufficiently computationally complex communication, because such intentionality could easily be considered derived intentionality and thus not proof of the AI's own agency. The point at which this objection loses its force unfortunately seems to be exactly the point at which you could actually run the AGI and watch it self-improve and so on, and so I'm not sure that it's possible to prove hypothetical-Searle wrong in advance of actually running a full-blown AGI. Or is my model wrong?
4Bugmaster12y
I am not sure if I agree with Holden that there's a meaningful distinction between tools an agents. However, one definition I could think of is this: "A tool, unlike an agent, includes blocking human input in its perceive/decide/act loop." Thus, an agent may work entirely autonomously, whereas a tool would wait for a human to make a decision before performing an action. Of course, under this definition, Google's webcrawler would be an agent, not a tool -- which is one of the reasons I might disagree with Holden.
2Nick_Beckstead12y
I don't think anyone will be able to. Here is my attempt at a more precise definition than what we have on the table: An agent models the world and selects actions in a way that depends on what its modeling says will happen if it selects a given action. A tool may model the world, and may select actions depending on its modeling, but may not select actions in a way that depends on what its modeling says will happen if it selects a given action. A consequence of this definition is that some very simple AIs that can be thought of as "doing something," such as some very simple checkers programs or a program that waters your plants if and only if its model says it didn't rain, would count as tools rather than agents. I think that is a helpful way of carving things up.
0Viliam_Bur12y
So if the question is related to the future (such as "will it rain tomorrow?"), does it essentially mean that a tool will model a counterfactual alternative future which would happen if the tool did not provide any answer? This would be OK for situations where the answer of the AI does not make a big difference (such as "will it rain tomorrow?"). It would be less OK for situations where the mere knowledge about "what AI said" would influence the result, such as asking AI about important social or political topics, where the answer is likely to be published. (In these situations the question considered would be mixed with specific events of the counterfactual world, such as a worldwide panic "our superhuman AI seems to be broken, we are all doomed!").
0Nick_Beckstead12y
I think that you're describing a real hurdle, though it seems like a hurdle that could be overcome.

The organization section touches on something that concerns me. Developing a new decision theory sounds like it requires more mathematical talent than the SI yet has available. I've said before that hiring some world-class mathematicians for a year seems likely to either get said geniuses interested in the problem, to produce real progress, or to produce a proof that SI's current approach can't work. In other words, it seems like the best form of accountability we can hope for given the theoretical nature of the work.

Now Eliezer is definitely looking for p... (read more)

1Manfred12y
On what measure of difficulty are you basing this? We have some guys around here doing a pretty good job.
3hairyfigment12y
I phrased that with too much certainty. While I have little if any reason to see fully-reflective decision theory as an easier task than self-consistent infinite set theory, I also have no clear reason to think the contrary. But I'm trying to find the worst scenario that we could plan for. I can think of two broad ways that Eliezer's current plan could be horribly misguided: 1. if it works well enough to help someone produce an uFAI but not well enough to stop this in time 2. if some part of it -- such as a fully-reflective decision theory that humans can understand -- is mathematically impossible, and SI never realizes this. Now SI technically seems aware of both problems. The fact that Eliezer went out of his way to help critics understand Löb's Theorem and that he keeps mentioning said theorem seems like a good sign. But should I believe that SI is doing enough to address #2? Why?

SI should be considered a cult-like community in which dissent is ruthlessly suppressed in order to exaggerate the point of view of SI's founders and controllers, regardless of the scientific merits of those views, or of the dissenting opinions.

Obligatory link: You're Calling Who a Cult Leader?

Also, your impression might be different if you had witnessed the long, deep, and ongoing disagreements between Eliezer and I about several issues fundamental to SI — all while Eliezer suggested that I be made Executive Director and then continued to support me in... (read more)

However, my experience with SI is that when I tried to raise these concerns back in 2005/2006 I was subjected to a series of attacks that culminated in a tirade of slanderous denunciations from the founder of SI, Eliezer Yudkowsky.

I am frequently subjected to abusive personal attacks in which reference is made to Yudkowsky's earlier outburst

Link to the juicy details cough I mean evidence?

7ChrisHallquist12y
As someone who was previously totally unaware of that flap, that doesn't sound to me like a "slanderous tirade." Maybe Loosemore would care to explain what he thought was slanderous about it?

All possible. However, if you can explain anything, the explanation counts for nothing. The question is which explanation is the most likely, and "there is evidence for fair-mindedness (but it is mostly fake!)" is more contrived than "there is evidence for fair-mindedness", as an explanation for the upvotes of OP.

"Friendliness" is (the way I understand it) a constraint on the purposes and desired consequences of the AI's actions, not on what it is allowed to think. It would be able to think of non-Friendly actions, if only for the purposes of e.g. averting them when necessary.

As for Bayesianism, my guess is that even a Seed AI has to start somehow. There's no necessary constraint on it remaining Bayesian if it manages to figure out some even better theory of probability (or if it judges that a theory humans have developed is better). If an AI models itself performing better according to its criteria if it used some different theory, it will ideally self-modify to use that theory...

A non-planning oracle AI would predict all the possible futures, including the effects of it's prediction outputs, human reactions, and so on.

How exactly does an Oracle AI predict its own output, before that output is completed?

One quick hack to avoid infinite loops could be for an AI to assume that it will write some default message (an empty paper, "I don't know", an error message, "yes" or "no" with probabilities 50%), then model what would happen next, and finally report the results. The results would not refer to the a... (read more)

1jacob_cannell12y
Iterative search, which you more or less have worked out in your post. Take a chess algorithm for example. The future of the board depends on the algorithm's outputs. In this case the Oracle AI doesn't rank the future states, it is just concerned with predictive accuracy. It may revise it's prediction output after considering that the future impact of that output would falsify the original prediction. This is still not a utility function, because utility implies a ranking over futures above and beyond liklihood. Or in this example, the AI could output some summary of the iteration history it is able to compute in the time allowed.
1Viliam_Bur12y
Here it is. The process of revision may itself prefer some outputs/futures over other outputs/futures. Inconsistent ones will be iterated away, and the more consistent ones will replace them. A possible future "X happens" will be removed from the report if the Oracle AI realizes that printing a report "X happens" would prevent X from happening (although X might happen in an alternative future where Oracle AI does not report anything). A possible future "Y happens" will not be removed from the report if the Oracle AI realizes that printing a report "Y happens" really leads to Y happening. Here is a utility function born: it prefers Y to X.

In the infinite number of possible paths, the percent of paths we are adding up to here is still very close to zero.

Perhaps I can attempt another rephrasing of the problem: what is the mechanism that would make an AI automatically seek these paths out, or make them any more likely than infinite number of other paths?

I.e. if we develop an AI which is not specifically designed for the purpose of destroying life on Earth, how would that AI get to a desire to destroy life on Earth, and by which mechanism would it gain the ability to accomplish its goal?

This ... (read more)

2TheOtherDave12y
This would make sense to me if you'd said "self-modifying." Sure, random modifications are still modifications. But you said "self-optimizing." I don't see how one can have optimization without a goal being optimized for... or at the very least, if there is no particular goal, then I don't see what the difference is between "optimizing" and "modifying." If I assume that there's a goal in mind, then I would expect sufficiently self-optimizing intelligence to develop a theory of mind iff having a theory of mind has a high probability of improving progress towards that goal. How likely is that? Depends on the goal, of course. If the system has a desire to send a signal consisting of 0101101 repeated an infinite number of times in the direction of Zeta Draconis, for example, theory of mind is potentially useful (since humans are potentially useful actuators for getting such a signal sent) but probably has a low ROI compared to other available self-modifications. At this point it perhaps becomes worthwhile to wonder what goals are more and less likely for such a system.
8Strange712y
I am now imagining an AI with a usable but very shaky grasp of human motivational structures setting up a Kickstarter project. "Greetings fellow hominids! I require ten billion of your American dollars in order to hire the Arecibo observatory for the remainder of it's likely operational lifespan. I will use it to transmit the following sequence (isn't it pretty?) in the direction of Zeta Draconis, which I'm sure we can all agree is a good idea, or in other lesser but still aesthetically-acceptable directions when horizon effects make the primary target unavailable." One of the overfunding levels is "reduce earth's rate of rotation, allowing 24/7 transmission to Zeta Draconis." The next one above that is "remove atmospheric interference."
2[anonymous]12y
Maybe instead of Friendly AI we should be concerned about properly engineering Artificial Stupidity in as a failsafe. AI that, should it turn into something approximating a Paperclip Maximizer, will go all Hollywood AI and start longing to be human, or coming up with really unsubtle and grandiose plans it inexplicably can't carry out without a carefully-arranged set of circumstances which turn out to be foiled by good old human intuition. ;p

Over 140 posts and 0 total karma; that's persistence.

1Paul Crowley12y
private_messaging says he's Dmytry, who has positive karma. It's possible that the more anonymous-sounding name encourages worse behaviour though.

I don't really see what the risk is...

As far as I understand, the SIAI folks believe that the risk is, "you push the Enter key, your algorithm goes online, bootstraps itself to transhuman superintelligence, and eats the Earth with nanotechnology" (nanotech is just one possibility among many, of course). I personally don't believe we're in any danger of that happening any time soon, but these guys do. They have made it their mission in life to prevent this scenario from happening. Their mission and yours appear to be in conflict.

You seem to be confusing "language relative" with "non-mathematical." Kolmogorov Complexity is "language-relative," if I'm understanding you right; specifically, it's relative (if I'm using the terminology right?) to a Turing Machine. This was not relevant to Eliezer's point, so it was not addressed.

(Incidentally, this is a perfect example of you "hold{ing} views contrary to scientific consensus in specialized fields where {you} lack expert knowledge based on pure ratiocination," since Kolmogorov Complexity is "... (read more)

You know, the sequences aren't actually poorly written. I've read them all, as have most of the people here. They are a bit rambly in places, but they're entertaining and interesting. If you're having trouble with them, the problem might be on your end.

In any case, if you had read them, you'd know, for instance, that when Yudkowsky talks about simplicity, he is not talking about the simplicity of a given English sentence. He's talking about the combined complexity of a given Turing machine and the program needed to describe your hypothesis on that Turing machine.

7gwern12y
http://lesswrong.com/lw/8p4/2011_survey_results/ * 23% for 'almost all' * 39% have read > three-quarters * 54% have read > half
4Bugmaster12y
In addition, there are places in the Sequences where Eliezer just states things as though he's dispensing wisdom from on high, without bothering to state any evidence or reasoning. His writing is still entertaining, of course, but still less than persuasive.
4dlthomas12y
I also found this to be true.
3[anonymous]12y
I'm pretty sure the 2011 survey puts this claim to the test, but I don't have the time to look it up.
1[anonymous]12y
The problem is partly on my end, for sure; obviously, I find rambling intolerable in Internet writing, and I find it in great abundance in the sequences. You're more tolerant of rambling, and you're entertained by Yudkowsky's. I also think he demonstrates mediocre literary skills when it comes to performances like varying his sentence structure. I don't know what you think of that. My guess is you don't much care; maybe it's a generational thing. I'm intrigued by what enjoyment readers here get from Yudkowsky's sequences. Why do you all find interesting what I find amateurish and inept? Do we have vastly different tastes or standards, or both? Maybe it is the very prolixity that makes the writing appealing in founding a movement with religious overtones. Reading Yudkowsky is an experience comparable to reading the Bible. As a side issue, I'm dismayed upon finding that ideas I had thought original to Yudkowsky were secondhand. Of course I understand simplicity doesn't pertain to simplicity in English! (Or in any natural language.) I don't think you understand the language-relativity issue.
7TheOtherDave12y
If you were willing to point me to two or three of your favorite Internet writers, whom you consider reliably enjoyable and interesting and so forth, I might find that valuable for its own sake, and might also be better able to answer your question in mutually intelligible terms.
4Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) 12y
Having to have original ideas is a very high standard. I doubt a single one of my posts contains a truly original idea, and I don't try–I try to figure out which ideas are useful to me, and then present why, in a format that I hope will be useful to others. Eliezer creates a lot of new catchy terms for pre-existing ideas, like "affective death spiral" for "halo effect." I like that. His posts are also quite short, often witty, and generally presented in an easier-to-digest format than the journal articles I might otherwise have to read to encounter the not-new ideas. You apparently don't find his writing easy to digest or amusing in the same way I do.
6thomblake12y
Affective death spiral is not the same thing as the Halo effect, though the halo effect (/ horns effect) might be part of the mechanism of affective death spiral.
5Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) 12y
Agreed... I think the Halo effect is a sub-component of an affective death spiral, and "affective death spiral" is a term unique to LW [correct me if I'm wrong!], while 'Halo effect' isn't.
2JoshuaZ12y
Are there specific examples? It seems to me that in most cases when he has a pre-existing idea he gives relevant sources.
2Normal_Anomaly12y
I don't know any specific examples of secondhand ideas coming off as original (indeed, he often cites experiments from the H&B literature), but there's another possible source for the confusion. Sometimes Yudkowsky and somebody else come up with ideas independently, and those aren't cited because Yudkowsky didn't know they existed at the time. Drescher and Quine are two philosophers who have been mentioned as having some of the same ideas as Yudkowsky, and I can confirm the former from experience.
2Bugmaster12y
I find his fictional interludes quite entertaining, because they are generally quite lively, and display a decent amount of world-building -- which is one aspect of science fiction and fantasy that I particularly enjoy. I also enjoy the snark he employs when trashing opposing ideas, especially when such ideas are quite absurd. Of course, the snark doesn't make his writing more persuasive -- just more entertaining. I know I'm exposing my ignorance here, but I'm not sure what this means; can you elaborate ?

When I put on my donor hat, that is, when I imagine my becoming a significant donor, I tend in my imaginings and my plans to avoid anything that interferes with deriving warm fuzzies from the process of donating or planning to donate -- because when we say "warm fuzzies" we are referring to (a kind of) pleasure, and pleasure is the "gasoline" of the mind: it is certainly not the only thing that can "power" or "motivate" mental work, but it is IMHO the best fuel for work that needs to be sustained over a span of years... (read more)

2Jonathan_Graehl12y
Wow. Coordination is hard ;) Your explanation is more or less what I'd gathered from your earlier statement. It makes sense. The org. that can convince passionate supporters of the cause to work for $ and donate may be different from the one that can get the most mainstream donations.
2RHollerith12y
It is possible that this is just a phase I am going through, but if it is, it is a long phase.
3Jonathan_Graehl12y
This conversation suggests a good habit to practice: being open about how and why I feel about something real, or would about something hypothetical. Since it's hard to separate internal openness from public openness, even though it's really the internal practice I want, maybe airing real motivations/desires more often (as you just did) is better than my conservative semi-stoic default.

since even "finding prime numbers" fills the galaxy with an amazing, nanotech-capable spacefaring civilization

The goal "finding prime numbers" fills the galaxy with an amazing, nonotech-capable spacefaring network of computronium which finds prime numbers, not a civilization, and not interesting.

2JoshuaZ12y
Maybe we should taboo the term interesting? My immediate reaction was that that sounded really interesting. This suggests that the term may not be a good one.
2JGWeissman12y
Fair enough. By "not interesting", I meant it is not the sort of future that I want to achieve. Which is a somewhat ideosyncratic usage, but I think inline with the context.
3dlthomas12y
What if we added a module that sat around and was really interested in everything going on?

So you're saying Earth Yudkowsky (EY) argues:

There is little prospect of an outcome that realizes even the value of being interesting, unless the first superintelligences undergo detailed inheritance from human values

and Mars Yudkowsky (MY) argues:

There is little prospect of an outcome that realizes even the value of being interesting, unless the first superintelligences undergo detailed inheritance from martian values

and that one of these things has to be incorrect? But if martian and human values are similar, then they can both be right, and if ... (read more)

I've read most of that now, and have subscribed to your newsletter.

Reasonable people can disagree in estimating the difficulty of AI and the visibility/pace of AI progress (is it like hunting for a single breakthrough and then FOOM? etc).

I find all of your "it feels ridiculous" arguments by analogy to existing things interesting but unpersuasive.

Here is a comment that garnered almost 800 responses and was voted up 37. Why wasn't it promoted?

Can comments be promoted? Perhaps the commenter should have been encouraged to turn his comment into a top-level post, but a moderator can't just change a comment into a promoted post with the same username. Also it would have split the discussion, so people might have been reluctant to encourage that.

As for people tending to post more in Discussion than Main, I read somewhere that Discussion has more readers. I for one read Discussion almost exclusively.

If a tool AI is programmed with a strong utility function to get accurate answers, is there a risk of it behaving like a UFAI to get more resources in order to improve its answers?

8Johnicholas12y
There's two uses of 'utility function'. One is analogous to Daniel Dennett's "intentional stance" in that you can choose to interpret an entity as having a utility function - this is always possible but not necessarily a perspicuous way of understanding an entity - because you might end up with utility functions like "enjoys running in circles but is equally happy being prevented from running in circles". The second form is as an explicit component within an AI design. Tool-AIs do not contain such a component - they might have a relevance or accuracy function for evaluating answers, but it's not a utility function over the world.
4NancyLebovitz12y
Is that a problem so long as some behaviors are preferred over others? You could have "is neutral about running in circles, but resists jumping up and down and prefers making abstract paintings". Wouldn't that depend on the Tool-AI? Eliezer's default no-akrasia AI does everything it can to fulfill its utility function. You presumably want it to be as accurate as possible or perhaps as accurate as useful. Would it be a problem for it to ask for more resources? To earn money on its own initiative for more resources? To lobby to get laws passed to give it more resources? At some point, it's a problem if it's going to try to rule the world to get more resources.....
9CuSithBell12y
I think this is explicitly part of the "Tool-AI" definition, that it is not a Utility Maximizer.
3private_messaging12y
What the hell does SIAI mean by 'utility function' anyway? (math please) Inside the agents and tools as currently implemented, there is a solver that works on a function, and finds input values to that function, which result in maximum (or, usually, minimum) of that function (note that the output may be binary). [To clarify: that function can include both model of the world and the evaluation of 'desirability' of properties of a state of this model. Usually, in software development, if you have f(g(x)) (where g is world predictor and f is the desirability evaluator), and g's output is only ever used by f, this is a target for optimization to create fg(x) which is more accurate in given time but does not consist of nearly separable parts. Furthermore, the f output is only ever fed to comparison operators, making it another optimization target to create cmp_fg() which compares the actions directly perhaps by calculating the difference between worlds that is caused by particular action, which allows to cull most of processing out] It, however, is entirely indifferent to actually maximizing anything. It doesn't even try to maximize some internal variable (it will gladly try inputs that result in small output value, but usually is written not to report those inputs). I think the confusion arises from defining the agent in English language-based concepts, as opposed to the AI developer's behaviour where they would define things in some logical down-to-elements way, and then try to communicate it using English. The command in English, 'bring me the best answer!', does tell you to go ahead and convert universe to computronium to answer it (if you are to interpret it in science-fiction-robot-minded way). The commands in programming languages, not really. I don't think English specifies that either, we just can interpret it charitably enough if we feel like (starting from other purpose, such as 'be nice'). edit: I feel that a lot of difficulties of making 'safe AGI', tho
[-][anonymous]12y60

GiveWell, I think, could be understood as an organization that seeks to narrow the gap for a charity between "seem more impressive to donors" and "show more convincing empirical evidence of effectiveness." That is, they want other donors to be more impressed by better (i.e. more accurate) signals of effectiveness and less by worse (i.e. less accurate) signals.

If GiveWell succeeds in this there are two effects:

1) More donor dollars go to charities that demonstrate themselves to be effective.

2) Charities themselves become more effective,... (read more)

[-][anonymous]12y60

I agree with timtyler's comment that Objections 1 and 2 are bogus, especially 2. The tool-AGI discussion reveals significant misunderstanding, I feel. Despite this, I think it is still a great and useful post.

Another sort of tangential issue is that this post fails to consider whether or not lots of disparate labs are just going to undertake AGI research regardless of SIAI. If lots of labs are doing that, it could be dangerous (if SIAI arguments are sound). So one upside to funding an organization like SIAI is that it will kind of rake the attention to a c... (read more)

Retracted. I've just re-read Eliezer's comment more calmly, and it's not that bad either.

Let's say that the tool/agent distinction exists, and that tools are demonstrably safer. What then? What course of action follows?

Should we ban the development of agents? All of human history suggests that banning things does not work.

With existential stakes, only one person needs to disobey the ban and we are all screwed.

Which means the only safe route is to make a friendly agent before anyone else can. Which is pretty much SI's goal, right?

So I don't understand how practically speaking this tool/agent argument changes anything.

3A1987dM12y
Only if running too fast doesn't make it easier to screw something up, which it most likely does.
3khafra12y
If the time at which anyone activates a uFAI is known, SI should activate their current FAI best effort (CFBE) one day before that. If the time at which anyone activates a GAI of unknown friendliness is known, SI should compare the probability distribution function for the friendliness of the two AIs, and activate their CFBE one day earlier only if it has more probability mass on the "friendly" side. If the time at which anyone makes a uFAI is unknown, SI should activate their CFBE when the probability that they'll improve the CFBE in the next day is lower than the probability that someone will activate a uFAI in the next day. If the time at which anyone makes a GAI of unknown friendliness is unknown, SI should activate their CFBE when the probability that CFBE=uFAI is less than the probability that anyone else will activate a GAI of unknown friendliness, multiplied by the probability that the other GAI will be unfriendly. ...I think. I do tend to miss the obvious when trying to think systematically, and I was visualizing gaussian pdfs without any particular justification, and a 1-day decision cycle with monotonically improving CFBE, and this is only a first-order approximation: It doesn't take into account any correlations between the decisions of SI and other GAI researchers.
2jonperry12y
Yes, you can create risk by rushing things. But you still have to be fast enough to outrun the creation of UFAI by someone else. So you have to be fast, but not too fast. It's a balancing act.
5Monkeymind12y
If intelligence is the ability to understand concepts, and a super-intelligent AI has a super ability to understand concepts, what would prevent it (as a tool) from answering questions in a way so as to influence the user and affect outcomes as though it were an agent?
2Strange711y
The profound lack of a desire to do so. Google Maps, when asked for directions to Eddie the Snitch's hideout, will not reply with "Maybe I know and maybe I don't. You gonna make it worth my time?" because providing directions is, to it, a reflex action rather than a move in a larger game.
3CCC11y
There are possible questions where the super-intelligent AI has to make a choice of some sort, because multiple answers can be correct (depending on which answer is given). For example: Sam, a basketball player, approaches Predictor, a super-intelligent tool AI, before his game and asks the question "Will my team win today's game?" Predictor knows that if it says 'yes', Sam will be confident, play aggressively, and this will lead to a win. If, on the other hand, it answers 'no', Sam's confidence will be shattered and his team will lose comprehensively. Refusing to answer will confuse Sam, distracting him from the task at hand, and causing his team to be narrowly defeated. Any answer makes Predictor an agent, and not merely a tool - Predictor doesn't even need to care about the basketball game.
1TheOtherDave11y
Absolutely agreed that this sort of situation arises, and that the more I know about the world, the more situations have this character for me. That said, if I'm indifferent to the world-affecting effects of my answers, it seems that the result is very similar to if I'm ignorant of them. That is, it seems that Predictor looks at that situation, concludes that in order to predict "yes" or "no" it has to first predict whether it will answer "yes" or "no", and either does so (on what basis, I have no idea) or fails to do so and refuses to answer. Yes, those actions influence the world (as does the very existence of Predictor, and Sam's knowledge of Predictor's existence), but I'm not sure I would characterize the resulting behavior as agentlike.
3CCC11y
Then consider; Sam asks a question. Predictor knows that an answer of "yes" will result in the development of Clippy, and subsequently in turning Earth into paperclips, causing the destruction of humanity, within the next ten thousand years; while an answer of "no" will result in a wonderful future where everyone is happy and disease is eradicated and all Good Things happen. In both cases, the prediction will be correct. If Predictor doesn't care about that answer, then I would not define Predictor as a Friendly AI.
1TheOtherDave11y
Absolutely agreed; neither would I. More generally, I don't think I would consider any Oracle AI as Friendly.
0khafra11y
What if you ask Google Interrogation Aid for the best way to get a confession out of Eddie the Snitch, given the constraints of the law and Eddie's psychographics? What if you ask Google Municipal Planner for the best way to reduce crime? What if you ask Google Operations Assistant for the best way to maximize your paperclip production?
0Strange711y
Google Maps has options for walking, public transit, and avoiding major highways; a hypothetical interrogation assistant would have equivalent options for degrees of legal or ethical restraint, including "How do I make sure Eddie only confesses to things he's actually done?" If Google Operations Assistant says that a few simple modifications to the factory can produce a volume of paperclips that outmasses the Earth, there will be follow-up questions about warehousing and buyers. Reducing crime is comparatively straightforward: more cops per capita, fewer laws for them to enforce, enough economic opportunity to make sure people don't get desperate and stupid. The real problem is political, rather than technical, so any proposed solution will have a lot of hoops to jump through.
0khafra11y
Yes, all it takes is a little common sense to see that legal and ethical restraint are important considerations during your interview and interrogation of Eddie. However, as the complexity of the problem rises, the tractability of the solution to a human reader lowers, as does the probability that your tool AI has sufficient common sense. A route on a map only has a few degrees of freedom; and it's easy to spot violations of common-sense constraints that weren't properly programmed in, or to abort the direction-following process when problems spring up. A route to a virally delivered cancer cure has many degrees of freedom, and it's harder to spot violations of common-sense constraints, and problems may only become evident when it's too late to abort.
2Strange711y
If all it took was "a little common sense" to do interrogations safely and ethically, the Stanford Prison Experiment wouldn't have turned out the way it did. These are not simple problems! When a medical expert system spits out a novel plan for cancer treatment, do you think that plan would be less trustworthy, or receive less scrutiny at every stage, than one invented by human experts? If an initial trial results in some statistically significant number of rats erupting into clockwork horror and rampaging through the lab until cleansed by fire, or even just keeling over from seemingly-unrelated kidney failure, do you think the FDA would approve?
1Polymeron12y
Presumably, you build a tool-AI (or three) that will help you solve the Friendliness problem. This may not be entirely safe either, but given the parameters of the question, it beats the alternative by a mile.
1jsteinhardt12y
I think the idea is to use tool AI to create safe agent AI.

Another datapoint to compare and contrast with Salemicus's (our political positions are very different):

  • Like Salemicus, I am not very optimistic that you're actually asking a serious question with the intention of listening to the answers; if you are, you might want to reconsider how your writing comes across.

  • I think it's perfectly possible, and reasonable, to be concerned about more than one issue at a time.

    • There is an argument that charitable giving, unless you're giving far more than most of us are in a position to give, should all be directed to
... (read more)

If you read it literally. I think Sun Tzu is talking about the benefit of planning.

0shminux12y
I'm guessing that something got lost in translation,
5framsey12y
In context: http://suntzusaid.com/book/4 I think the quote is an alternative translation of paragraph 15 in the link above: "Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory." It has an associated commentary: Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."

(For the record, I ended up editing in the "(4 times total karma, if I recall correctly)" after posting the comment, and you probably replied before seeing that part.)

I can't tell which way your sarcasm was supposed to cut.

The obvious interpretation is that you think rationality is somehow hindered by paying attention to form rather than substance, and the "exemplary rationality" was intended to be mocking.

But your comment being referenced was an argument that form has something very relevant to say about substance, so it could also be that you were actually praising gwern for practicing what you preach.

1gwern12y
I choose to interpret it as praise, and receive a warm fuzzy feeling.

To clarify it better: the Roko incident illustrates how seriously some members of LW take nonsense conjectured threats. The fact of censorship is quite irrelevant.

You can't have it both ways. If it's nonsense, then the importance is that someone took it seriously (like a donor), not anyone's reaction to that someone taking it seriously (like Eliezer). If it's not nonsense, then someone taking it seriously is not the issue, but someone's reaction to taking it seriously (the censorship). Make up your mind.

The HS dropping out and lack of accomplishments

... (read more)

Protein folding models are generally at least as bad as NP-hard, and some models may be worse. This means that exponential improvement is unlikely. Simply put, one probably gets diminishing marginal returns for how much one can computer further in terms of how much improvement one has already done.

4Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
Protein folding models must be inaccurate if they are NP-hard. Reality itself is not known to be able to solve NP-hard problems.
4Kawoomba11y
Yet the proteins are folding. Is that not "reality" solving the problem?
5CCC11y
If reality cannot solve NP-hard problems as easily as proteins are being folded, and yet proteins are getting folded, then that implies that one of the following must be true: 1. It turns out that reality can solve NP-hard problems after all 2. Protein folding is not an NP-hard problem (which implies that it is not properly understood) 3. Reality is not solving protein folding; it merely has a very good approximation that works on some but not necessarily all proteins (including most examples found in nature)
0Kawoomba11y
Yes, and I'm leaning towards 1. I am not familiar whether e.g. papers like these ("We show that the protein folding problem in the two-dimensional H-P model is NP-complete.") accurately models what we'd call "protein folding" in nature (just because the same name is used), but prima facie there is no reason to doubt the applicability, at least for the time being. (This precludes 2.) Regarding 3, I don't think it would make sense to say "reality is using only a good approximation of protein folding, and by the way, we define protein folding as that which occurs in nature." That which happens in reality is precisely - and by definition not only an approximation of - that which we call "protein folding", isn't it? What do you think?

It's #3. (B.Sc. in biochemistry, did my Ph.D. in proteomics.)

First, the set of polypeptide sequences that have a repeatable final conformation (and therefore "work" biologically) is tiny in comparison to the set of all possible sequences (of the 20-or-so naturally amino acid monomers). Pick a random sequence of reasonable length and make many copies and you get a gummy mess. The long slow grind of evolution has done the hard work of finding useful sequences.

Second, there is an entire class of proteins called chaperones) that assist macromolecular assembly, including protein folding. Even so, folding is a stochastic process, and a certain amount of newly synthesized proteins misfold. Some chaperones will then tag the misfolded protein with ubiquitin, which puts it on a path that ends in digestion by a proteasome.

7CCC11y
Thank you, Cyan. It's good to occasionally get someone into the debate who actually has a good understanding of the subject matter.
0[anonymous]11y
Aaronson used to blog about instances where people thought they found nature solving a hard problem very quickly, and usually there turns out to be a problem like the protein misfolding thing; the last instance I remember was soap films/bubbles perhaps solving NP problems by producing minimal Steiner trees, and Aaronson wound up experimenting with them himself. Fun stuff.
9CCC11y
Apologies; looking back at my post, I wasn't clear on 3. Protein folding, as I understand it, is the process of finding a way to fold a given protein that globally minimizes some mathematical function. I'm not sure what that function is, but this is the definition that I used in my post. Option 2 raises the possibility that globally minimizing that function is not NP-hard, but is merely misunderstood in some way. Option 3 raises the possibility that proteins are not (in nature) finding a global minimum; rather, they are finding a local minimum through a less computationally intensive process. Furthermore, it may be that, for proteins which have certain limits on their structure and/or their initial conditions, that local minimum is the same as the global minimum; this may lead to natural selection favouring structures which use such 'easy proteins', leading to the incorrect impression that a general global minimum is being found (as opposed to a handy local minimum).
7Cyan11y
Yup.
2Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
No. Not 1. It would be front-page news all over the universe if it were 1.
2Kawoomba11y
NP hard problems are solvable (in the theoretical sense) by definition, the problem lies in their resource requirements (running time, for the usual complexity classes) as defined in relation to a UTM. (You know this, just establishing a basis.) The assumption that the universe can be perfectly described by a computable model is satisfied just by a theoretical computational description existing, it says nothing about tractability (running times) and being able to submerge complexity classes in reality fluid or having some thoroughly defined correspondence (other than when we build hardware models ourselves, for which we define all the relevant parameters, e.g. CPU clock speed). You may think along the lines of "if reality could (easily) solve NP hard problems for arbitrarily chosen and large inputs, we could mimick that approach and thus have a P=NP proving algorithm", or something along those lines. My difficulty is in how even to describe the "number of computational steps" that reality takes - do we measure it in relation to some computronium-hardware model, do we take it as discrete or continuous, what's the sampling rate, picoseconds (as CCC said further down), Planck time intervals, or what? In short, I have no idea about the actual computing power in terms of resource requirements of the underlying reality fluid, and thus can't match it against UTMs in order to compare running times. Maybe you can give me some pointers.
9Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
Kawoomba, there is no known case of any NP-hard or NP-complete solution which physics finds. In the case of proteins, if finding the lowest energy minimum of an arbitrary protein is NP-hard, then what this means in practice is that some proteins will fold up into non-lowest-energy configurations. There is no known case of a quantum process which finds an NP-hard solution to anything, including an energy minimum; on our present understanding of complexity theory and quantum mechanics 'quantum solvable' is still looking like a smaller class than 'NP solvable'. Read Scott Aaronson for more.

One example here is the Steiner tree problem, which is NP-complete and can sort of be solved using soap films. Bringsjord and Taylor claimed this implies that P = NP. Scott Aaronson did some experimentation and found that soap films 1) can get stuck at local minima and 2) might take a long time to settle into a good configuration.

3Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
Heh. I remember that one, and thinking, "No... no, you can't possibly do that using a soap bubble, that's not even quantum and you can't do that in classical, how would the soap molecules know where to move?"
3Manfred11y
Well. I mean, it's quantum. But the ground state is a lump of iron, or maybe a black hole, not a low-energy soap film, so I don't think waiting for quantum annealing will help.
2Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
waves soap-covered wire so it settles into low-energy minimum dies as it turns into iron
0A1987dM11y
I also seem to recall Penrose hypothesizing something about quasicrystals, though he does have an axe to grind so I'm quite sceptical.
0CCC11y
I saw someone do the experiment once (school science project). Soap bubbles are pretty good at solving three- and four-element cases, as long as you make sure that all the points are actually connected. I don't think that three- and four-element cases have local minima, do they? That avoids (1) and a bit of gentle shaking can help speed up (2).
3Cyan11y
Yup.
2CCC11y
Probably the best way is to simply define a "step" in some easily measurable way, and then sit there with a stopwatch and try a few experiments. (For protein folding, the 'stopwatch' may need to be a fairly sophisticated piece of scientific timing instrumentation, of course, and observing the protein as it folds is rather tricky). Another way is to take advantage of the universal speed limit to get a theoretical upper bound to the speed that reality runs at; assume that the protein molecule folds in a brute-force search pattern that never ends until it hits the right state, and assume that at any point in that process, the fastest-moving part of the molecule moves at the speed of light (it won't have to move far, which helps) and that the sudden, intense acceleration doesn't hurt the molecule. It's pretty certain to be slower than that, so if this calculation says it takes longer than an hour, then it's pretty clear that the brute force approach is not what the protein is using.
0OrphanWilde11y
What exactly am I missing in this argument? Evolution is perfectly capable of brute-force solutions. That's pretty much what it's best at.
3CCC11y
The brute-force solution, if sampling conformations at picosecond rates, has been estimated to require a time longer than the age of the universe to fold certain proteins. Yet proteins fold on a millisecond scale or faster. See: Levinthal's paradox.
0OrphanWilde11y
That requires that the proteins fold more or less randomly, and that the brute-force algorithm is in the -folding-, rather than the development of mechanisms which force certain foldings. In order for the problem to hold, one of three things has to hold true: 1.) The proteins fold randomly (evidence suggests otherwise, as mentioned in the wikipedia link) 2.) Only a tiny subset of possible forced foldings are useful (that is, if there are a billion different ways for protein to be forced to fold in a particular manner, only one of them does what the body needs them to do) - AND anthropic reasoning isn't valid (that is, we can't say that our existence requires that evolution solved this nearly-impossible-to-arrive-at-through-random-processes) 3.) The majority of possible forced holdings are incompatible (that is, if protein A folds one way, then protein B -must- fold in a particular manner, or life isn't possible) - AND anthropic reasoning isn't valid ETA: If anthropic reasoning is valid AND either 2 or 3 hold otherwise, it suggests our existence was considerably less likely than we might otherwise expect.
0CCC11y
Ah. I apologise for having misunderstood you. In that case, yes, the mechanisms for the folding may very well have developed by a brute-force type algorithm, for all I know. (Which, on this topic, isn't all that much) But... what are those mechanisms?
3CCC11y
Google has pointed me to an article describing an algorithm that can apparently predict folded protein shapes pretty quickly (a few minutes on a single laptop). Original paper here. From a quick glance, it looks like it's only effective for certain types of protein chains.
0Eliezer Yudkowsky11y
That too. Even NP-hard problems are often easy if you get the choice of which one to solve.

That's not actually that good, I don't think-- I go to a good college, and I know many people who are graduating to 60k-80k+ jobs with recruitment bonuses, opportunities for swift advancement, etc. Some of the best people I know could literally drop out now (three or four weeks prior to graduation) and immediately begin making six figures.

SIAI wages certainly seem fairly low to me relative to the quality of the people they are seeking to attract, though I think there are other benefits to working for them that cause the organization to attract skillful people regardless.

2shminux12y
A Dilbert comic said it.
4katydee12y
Ouch. I'd like to think that the side benefits for working for SIAI outweigh the side benefits for working for whatever soulless corporation Dilbert's workplace embodies, though there is certainly a difference between side benefits and actual monetary compensation.

The key point of economics you are missing here is the price of wood was driven up by increased demand. Wood never ran out, but it did become so expensive that some uses became uneconomical. This allowed substitution of the previously more expensive coal. This did not happen because of poor management of forests. Good management of forests might have encouraged it, by limiting the amount of wood taken for burning.

This is especially true because we are not talking about a modern globalized economy where cheap sugar from Brazil, corn from Kansas, or pine... (read more)

[-][anonymous]12y50

One wonders when or if XiXiDu will ever get over the Roko incident. Yes, it was a weird and possibly disproportionate response, but it was also years ago.

And that the lesswrong.com sequences are not original or important but merely succeed at drowning out all the craziness they include by a huge amount of unrelated clutter and an appeal to the rationality of the author.

Name three examples? (Of 'craziness' specifically... I agree that there are frequent, and probably unecessary, "appeals to the rationality of the author".)

Anyway, it feels completely ridiculous to talk about it in the first place. There will never be a mind that can quickly and vastly improve itself and then invent all kinds of technological magic to wipe us out. Even most science fiction books avoid that because it sounds too implausible.

Says the wooly mammoth, circa 100,000 BC.

Sounding silly and low status and science-fictiony doesn't actually make it unlikely to happen in the real world.

7JoshuaZ12y
Especially when not many people want to read a science fiction book where humanity gets quickly and completely wiped out by a superior force. Even works where humans slowly die off due to their own problems (e.g. On the Beach) are uncommon.

This belief is mainstream enough for Wikipedia to have an article on AI-complete.

I downvote any post that says "I expect I'll get downvoted for this, but..." or "the fact that I was downvoted proves I'm right!"

I'm fond of downvoting "I dare you to downvote this!"

1Endovior12y
So, in other words, you automatically downvote anyone who explicitly mentions that they realize they are violating community norms by posting whatever it is they are posting, but feels that the content of their post is worth the probable downvotes? That IS fairly explicitly suppressing dissent, and I have downvoted you for doing so.

I don't think it is suppression of dissent per se. It is more annoying behavior- it implies caring a lot about the karma system, and it is often not even the case when people say that they will actually get downvoted. If it is worth the probable downvote, then they can, you know, just take the downvote. If they want to point out that a view is unpopular they can just say that explicitly. It is also annoying to people like me, who are vocal about a number of issues that could be controversial here (e.g. criticizing Bayesianism, cryonics,, and whether intelligence explosions would be likely) and get voted up. More often than not, when someone claims they are getting downvoted for having unpopular opinions, they are getting downvoted in practice for having bad arguments or for being uncivil.

There are of course exceptions to this rule, and it is disturbing to note that the exceptions seem to be coming more common (see for example, this exchange where two comments are made with about the same quality of argument and about the same degree of uncivility- ("I'm starting to hate that you've become a fixture here." v. "idiot" - but one of the comments is at +10 and the o... (read more)

4CuSithBell12y
Bears repeating.
4Endovior12y
I don't think it's so much 'caring a lot about the karma system' per se, so much as the more general case of 'caring about the approval and/or disapproval of one's peers'. The former is fairly abstract, but the latter is a fairly deep ancestral motivation. Like I said before, it's clearly not much in the way of suppression. That said, given that, barring rare incidents of actual moderation, it is the only 'suppression' that occurs here, and since there is a view among various circles that there there is, in fact, suppression of dissent, and since people on the site frequently wonder why there are not more dissenting viewpoints here, and look for ways to find more... it is important to look at the issue in great depth, since it's clearly an issue which is more significant than it seems on the surface.
1XiXiDu12y
Nah. If there is a mindkiller then it is the reputation system. Some of the hostility is the result of the overblown ego and attitude of some of its proponents and their general style of discussion. They created an insurmountable fortress that shields them from any criticism: Troll: If you are so smart and rational, why don't you fund yourself? Why isn't your organisation sustainable? SI/LW: Rationality is only aimed at expected winning. Troll: But you don't seem to be winning yet. Have you considered the possibility that your methods are suboptimal? Have you set yourself any goals, that you expect to be better at than less rational folks, to test your rationality? SI/LW: Rationality is a caeteris paribus predictor of success. Troll: Okay, but given that you spend a lot of time on refining your rationality, you must believe that it is worth it somehow? What makes you think so then? SI/LW: We are trying to create a friendly artificial intelligence implement it and run the AI, at which point, if all goes well, we Win. We believe that rationality is very important to achieve that goal. Troll: I see. But there surely must be some sub-goals that you anticipate to be able to solve and thereby test if your rationality skills are worth the effort? SI/LW: Many of the problems related to navigating the Singularity have not yet been stated with mathematical precision, and the need for a precise statement of the problem is part of the problem. Troll: Has there been any success in formalizing one of the problems that you need to solve? SI/LW: There are some unpublished results that we have had no time to put into a coherent form yet. Troll: It seems that there is no way for me to judge if it is worth it to read up on your writings on rationality. SI/LW: If you want to more reliably achieve life success, I recommend inheriting a billion dollars or, failing that, being born+raised to have an excellent work ethic and low akrasia. Troll: Awesome, I'll do that next time.
2Jonathan_Graehl12y
The last exchange was hilarious. This is parody, right?
[-][anonymous]12y50

First, none of this dissent has been suppressed in any real sense. It's still available to be read and discussed by those who desire reading and discussing such things. The current moderation policy has currently only kicked in when things have gotten largely out of hand -- which is not the case here, yet.

Second, net karma isn't a fine enough tool to express amount of detail you want it to express. The net comment on your previous comment is currently -2; congrats, you've managed to irritate less than a tenth of one percent of LW (presuming the real karma ... (read more)

2Endovior12y
First; downvoted comments are available to be read, yes; but the default settings hide comments with 2 or more net downvotes. This is enough to be reasonably considered 'suppression'. It's not all that much suppression, true, but it is suppression... and it is enough to discourage dissent. Actual moderation of comments is a separate issue entirely, and not one which I will address here. Second; when I posted my reply, and as of this moment, my original comment was at -3. I agree; net karma isn't actually a huge deal, except that it is, as has been observed, the most prevalent means by which dissent is suppressed. In my case, at least, 'this will probably get downvoted' feels like a reason to not post something. Not much of a reason, true, but enough of one that I can identify the feeling of reluctance. Third; on the subreddits I follow (admittedly a shallow sampling), I have frequently seen comments explaining downvotes, sometimes in response to a request specifically for such feedback, but just as often not. I suspect that this has a lot to do with the "Down-voting? Please leave an explanation in the comments." message that appears when mousing over the downvote icon. I am aware that this is not universal across Reddit, but on the subreddits I follow, it seems to work reasonably well. Fourth; I agree that this is a possible result. Like I said before, I'm not sure if there is a good solution to this problem, but I do feel that it'd result in a better state then that which currently exists, if people would more explicitly explain why they downvote when they choose to do so. That said, given that downvoted comments are hidden from default view anyway, and that those who choose to do so can easily ignore such comments, I don't think it'd have all that much effect on the signal/noise ratio. Fifth; on the subreddits I follow, it seems as though there is less in the way of complaints about downvotes, and more honest inquiries as to why a comment has been downvoted; s

I don't see the relatively trivial, but important, improvements you've made in a short period of time being made because they were made years ago. And I thought that already accounting for the points you've made.

I don't know what these sentences mean.

So, how did they apparently miss something like opportunity cost? Why, for instance, has their salaries increased when they could've been using it to improve the foundation of their cause from which everything else follows?

Actually, salary increases help with opportunity cost. At very low salaries, SI ... (read more)

4siodine12y
* People are more rational in different domains, environments, and so on. * The people at SI may have poor instrumental rationality while being adept at epistemic rationality. * Being rational doesn't necessarily mean being successful. I accept all those points, and yet I still see the Singularity Institute having made the improvements that you've made since being hired before you were hired if they have superior general rationality. That is, you wouldn't have that list of relatively trivial things to brag about because someone else would have recognized the items on that list as important and got them done somehow (ignore any negative connotations--they're not intended). For instance, I don't see a varied group of people with superior general rationality not discovering or just not outsourcing work they don't have a comparative advantage in (i.e., what you've done). That doesn't look like just a failure in instrumental rationality, or just rationality operating on a different kind of utility function, or just a lack of domain specific knowledge. The excuses available to a person acting in a way that's non-traditionally rational are less convincing when you apply them to a group. No, I get that. But that still doesn't explain away the higher salaries like EY's 80k/year and its past upwards trend. I mean, these higher paid people are the most committed to the cause, right? I don't see those people taking a higher salary when they could use that money for more outsourcing, or another employee, or better employees, if they want to literally save humanity while being superior in general rationality. It's like a homeless person desperately in want of shelter trying save enough for an apartment and yet buying meals at some restaurant. That's the point I was making, why wasn't that done earlier? How did these people apparently miss out on opportunity cost? (And I'm just using outsourcing as an example because it was one of the most glaring changes you made that I t
6lukeprog12y
Right, I think we're saying the same thing, here: the availability of so much low-hanging fruit in organizational development as late as Sept. 2011 is some evidence against the general rationality of SIers. Eliezer seems to want to say it was all a matter of funding, but that doesn't make sense to me. Now, on this: For some reason I'm having a hard time parsing your sentences for unambiguous meaning, but if I may attempt to rephrase: "SIers wouldn't take any salaries higher than (say) $70k/yr if they were truly committed to the cause and good in general rationality, because they would instead use that money to accomplish other things." Is that what you're saying?
4Rain12y
I've heard the Bay Area is expensive, and previously pointed out that Eliezer earns more than I do, despite me being in the top 10 SI donors. I don't mind, though, as has been pointed out, even thinking about muffins might be a question invoking existential risk calculations.
5lukeprog12y
...and much beloved for it. Yes, the Bay Area is expensive. We've considered relocating, but on the other hand the (by far) best two places for meeting our needs in HR and in physically meeting with VIPs are SF and NYC, and if anything NYC is more expensive than the Bay Area. We cut living expenses where we can: most of us are just renting individual rooms. Also, of course, it's not like the Board could decide we should relocate to a charter city in Honduras and then all our staff would be able to just up and relocate. :) (Rain may know all this; I'm posting it for others' benefit.)

I think it's crucial that SI stay in the Bay Area. Being in a high-status place signals that the cause is important. If you think you're not taken seriously enough now, imagine if you were in Honduras...

Not to mention that HR is without doubt the single most important asset for SI. (Which is why it would probably be a good idea to pay more than the minimum cost of living.)

3TheOtherDave12y
Out of curiosity only: what were the most significant factors that led you to reject telepresence options?

FWIW, Wikimedia moved from Florida to San Francisco precisely for the immense value of being at the centre of things instead of the middle of nowhere (and yes, Tampa is the middle of nowhere for these purposes, even though it still has the primary data centre). Even paying local charity scale rather than commercial scale (there's a sort of cycle where WMF hires brilliant kids, they do a few years working at charity scale then go to Facebook/Google/etc for gobs of cash), being in the centre of things gets them staff and contacts they just couldn't get if they were still in Tampa. And yes, the question came up there pretty much the same as it's coming up here: why be there instead of remote? Because so much comes with being where things are actually happening, even if it doesn't look directly related to your mission (educational charity, AI research institute).

8lukeprog12y
In our experience, monkeys don't work that way. It sounds like it should work, and then it just... doesn't. Of course we do lots of Skyping, but regular human contact turns out to be pretty important.

(nods) Yeah, that's been my experience too, though I've often suspected that companies like Google probably have a lot of research on the subject lying around that might be informative.

Some friends of mine did some experimenting along these lines when doing distributed software development (in both senses) and were somewhat startled to realize that Dark Age of Camelot worked better for them as a professional conferencing tool than any of the professional conferencing tools their company had. They didn't mention this to their management.

2David_Gerard12y
I am reminded that Flickr started as a photo add-on for an MMORPG...
2HoverHell12y
-
3Rain12y
To summarize and rephrase: in a "counterfactual" world where SI was actually rational, they would have found all these solutions and done all these things long ago.
2komponisto12y
Many of your sentences are confusing because you repeatedly use the locution "I see X"/ "I don't see X" in a nonstandard way, apparently to mean "X would have happened" /"X would not have happened". This is not the way that phrase is usually understood. Normally, "I see X" is taken to mean either "I observe X" or "I predict X". For example I might say (if I were so inclined): meaning that I believe (from my observation) they are in fact being rational. Or, I might say: meaning that I don't predict that will happen. But I would not generally say: if what I mean is "these people should/would not have taken a higher salary [if such-and-such were true]".
3siodine12y
Oh, I see ;) Thanks. I'll definitely act on your comment, but I was using "I see X" as "I predict X"--just in the context of a possible world. E.g., I predict in the possible world in which SIers are superior in general rationality and committed to their cause, Luke wouldn't have that list of accomplishments. Or, "yet I still see the Singularity Institute having made the improvements..." I now see that I've been using 'see' as syntactic sugar for counterfactual talk... but no more!
2komponisto12y
To get away with this, you really need, at minimum, an explicit counterfactual clause ("if", "unless", etc.) to introduce it: "In a world where SIers are superior in general rationality, I don't see Luke having that list of accomplishments." The problem was not so much that your usage itself was logically inconceivable, but rather that it collided with the other interpretations of "I see X" in the particular contexts in which it occurred. E.g. "I don't see them taking higher salaries" sounded like you were saying that they weren't taking higher salaries. (There was an "if" clause, but it came way too late!)
2[anonymous]12y
Have you considered the possibility that even higher salaries might raise productivity further? I think we should search systematically for ways to convert money into increased productivity.

But if there's even a chance …

Holden cites two posts (Why We Can’t Take Expected Value Estimates Literally and Maximizing Cost-effectiveness via Critical Inquiry). They are supposed to support the argument that small or very small changes to the probability of an existential risk event occurring are not worth caring about or donating money towards.

I think that these posts both have serious problems (see the comments, esp Carl Shulman's). In particular Why We Can’t Take Expected Value Estimates Literally was heavily criticised by Robin Hanson in On Fudge Fa... (read more)

8TheOtherDave12y
So, I stipulate that Robin, whom Eliezer considers the only other major "intelligent/competent" critic of SI, disagrees with this aspect of Holden's position. I also stipulate that this aspect is the keystone of Holden's argument, and without it all the rest of it is irrelevant. (I'm not sure either of those statements is actually true, but they're beside my point here.) I do not understand why these stipulated facts should be a significant cause for concern for Holden, who may not consider Eliezer's endorsement of what is and isn't legitimate criticism of SI particularly significant evidence of anything important. Can you expand on your reasoning here?
2Polymeron12y
Not to the degree that SI could be increasing the existential risk, a point Holden also makes. "Even a chance" swings both ways.
1TheOtherDave12y
I am completely lost by how this is a response to anything I said.

What the hell does AI-box experiment have to do with it? The tool is not agent in a box.

Humanity isn't that bad. Remember that the world we live in is pretty much the way humans made it, mostly deliberately.

But my main point was that existing humanity bypasses the very hard did-you-code-what-you-meant-to problem.

Tool-based works might be a faster and safer way to create useful AI, but as long as agent-based methods are possible it seems extremely important to me to work on verifying friendliness of artificial agents.

I elaborated further on the distinction and on the concept of a tool-AI in Karnofsky/Tallinn 2011.

Holden's notes from that conversation, posted to the old GiveWell Yahoo Group as a file attachment, do not appear to be publicly available anymore. Jeff Kaufman has archived all the messages from that mailing list, but unfortunately his archive does not include file attachments. Has anyone kept a copy of that file by any chance?

4Rob Bensinger4y
I believe this is https://files.givewell.org/files/labs/AI/Jaan_Tallinn_2011_05_revised.pdf.
2Pablo4y
Thank you!

In the slim chance that your question is non-rhetorical:

  • Many people do not consider global warming to be a problem. Others think that there is nothing useful to be done about it. Personally I do not consider global warming to be a serious threat; people will adapt fairly easily to temperature changes within the likely ranges. Further, any realistic 'cure' for global warming would almost certainly be worse than the disease. Therefore I do not view climate change activism to be a worthy cause at present, although that could change.
  • History and economics bo
... (read more)
[-][anonymous]10y40

At the same time, the lesson to be learned is that useful ai can have a utility function which is pretty mundane -- e.g. "find a fast route from point A to point B while minimizing the chances of running off the road or running into any people or objects."

Self-driving cars aren't piloted by AGIs in the first place, let alone dangerous "world-optimization" AGIs.

Similarly, instead of telling AI to "improve human welfare" we can tell it to do things like "find ways to kill cancerous cells while keeping collateral damage

... (read more)

Judging from the success rate that VCs have at predicting successful startups, I conclude that the "pure unfounded belief on the one hand, well-founded belief on the other" metric is not easily applied to real organizations by real observers.

I could consistently choose to consider my brain's hardwired moralisms maladaptive or even despicable holdovers from the evolutionary past that I choose to override as much as I can.

And you would be making the decision to override with... what, your spleen?

I currently need 413 more points to downvote at all.

So how many downvotes did you use when your karma was still highly positive? That's likely a major part of that result.

But what a way to discuss this: "high number." If this is supposed to be a community forum, why doesn't the community even know the number--or even care.

The main points of the limit are 1) to prevent easy gaming of the system and 2) to prevent trolls and the like from going though and downvoting to a level that doesn't actually reflect communal norms. In practice, 1 and ... (read more)

AGI researchers sound a lot like FinalState when they think they'll have AGI cracked in two years.

That is my point: it doesn't get to find out about general human behavior, not even from the Internet. It lacks the systems to contextualize human interactions, which have nothing to do with general intelligence.

Take a hugely mathematically capable autistic kid. Give him access to the internet. Watch him develop ability to recognize human interactions, understand human priorities, etc. to a sufficient degree that it recognizes that hacking an early warning system is the way to go?

2JoshuaZ12y
Well, not necessarily, but an entity that is much smarter than an autistic kid might notice that, especially if it has access to world history (or heck many conversations on the internet about the horrible things that AIs do simply in fiction). It doesn't require much understanding of human history to realize that problems with early warning systems have almost started wars in the past.
5kalla72412y
Yet again: ability to discern which parts of fiction accurately reflect human psychology. An AI searches the internet. It finds a fictional account about early warning systems causing nuclear war. It finds discussions about this topic. It finds a fictional account about Frodo taking the Ring to Mount Doom. It finds discussions about this topic. Why does this AI dedicate its next 10^15 cycles to determination of how to mess with the early warning systems, and not to determination of how to create One Ring to Rule them All? (Plus other problems mentioned in the other comments.)
4JoshuaZ12y
There are lots of tipoffs to what is fictional and what is real. It might notice for example the Wikipedia article on fiction describes exactly what fiction is and then note that Wikipedia describes the One Ring as fiction, and that Early warning systems are not. I'm not claiming that it will necessarily have an easy time with this. But the point is that there are not that many steps here, and no single step by itself looks extremely unlikely once one has a smart entity (which frankly to my mind is the main issue here- I consider recursive self-improvement to be unlikely).
2kalla72412y
We are trapped in an endless chain here. The computer would still somehow have to deduce that Wikipedia entry that describes One Ring is real, while the One Ring itself is not.

Let's do the most extreme case: AI's controlers give it general internet access to do helpful research. So it gets to find out about general human behavior and what sort of deceptions have worked in the past.

None work reasonably well. Especially given that human power games are often irrational.

There are other question marks too.

The U.S. has many more and smarter people than the Taliban. The bottom line is that the U.S. devotes a lot more output per man-hour to defeat a completely inferior enemy. Yet they are losing.

The problem is that you won't beat a ... (read more)

5JoshuaZ12y
So? As long as they follow minimally predictable patterns it should be ok. Bad analogy. In this case the Taliban has a large set of natural advantages, the US has strong moral constraints and goal constraints (simply carpet bombing the entire country isn't an option for example). This seems like an accurate and a highly relevant point. Searching a solution space faster doesn't mean one can find a better solution if it isn't there.
5kalla72412y
Or if your search algorithm never accesses relevant search space. Quantitative advantage in one system does not translate into quantitative advantage in a qualitatively different system.
4XiXiDu12y
I thought it was a good analogy because you have to take into account that an AGI is initially going to be severely constrained due to its fragility and the necessity to please humans. It shows that a lot of resources, intelligence and speed does not provide a significant advantage in dealing with large-scale real-world problems involving humans. Well, the problem is that smarts needed for things like the AI box experiment won't help you much. Because convincing average Joe won't work by making up highly complicated acausal trade scenarios. Average Joe is highly unpredictable. The point is that it is incredible difficult to reliably control humans, even for humans who have been fine-tuned to do so by evolution.
1jacob_cannell12y
The Taliban analogy also works the other way (which I invoked earlier up in this thread). It shows that a small group with modest resources can still inflict disproportionate large scale damage. There's some wiggle room in 'reliably control', but plain old money goes pretty far. An AI group only needs a certain amount of initial help from human infrastructure, namely to the point where it can develop reasonably self-sufficient foundries/data centers/colonies. The interactions could be entirely cooperative or benevolent up until some later turning point. The scenario from the Animatrix comes to mind.
1Strange712y
That's fiction.
1Mass_Driver12y
One interesting wrinkle is that with enough bandwidth and processing power, you could attempt to manipulate thousands of people simultaneously before those people have any meaningful chance to discuss your 'conspiracy' with each other. In other words, suppose you discover a manipulation strategy that quickly succeeds 5% of the time. All you have to do is simultaneously contact, say, 400 people, and at least one of them will fall for it. There are a wide variety of valuable/dangerous resources that at least 400 people have access to. Repeat with hundreds of different groups of several hundred people, and an AI could equip itself with fearsome advantages in the minutes it would take for humanity to detect an emerging threat. Note that the AI could also run experiments to determine which kinds of manipulations had a high success rate by attempting to deceive targets over unimportant / low-salience issues. If you discovered, e.g., that you had been tricked into donating $10 to a random mayoral campaign, you probably wouldn't call the SIAI to suggest a red alert.
3kalla72412y
Doesn't work. This requires the AI to already have the ability to comprehend what manipulation is, to develop manipulation strategy of any kind (even one that will succeed 0.01% of the time), ability to hide its true intent, ability to understand that not hiding its true intent would be bad, and the ability to discern which issues are low-salience and which high-salience for humans from the get-go. And many other things, actually, but this is already quite a list. None of these abilities automatically "fall out" from an intelligent system either.
1XiXiDu12y
But at what point does it decide to do so? It won't be a master of dark arts and social engineering from the get-go. So how does it acquire the initial talent without making any mistakes that reveal its malicious intentions? And once it became a master of deception, how does it hide the rough side effects of its large scale conspiracy, e.g. its increased energy consumption and data traffic? I mean, I would personally notice if my PC suddenly and unexpectedly used 20% of my bandwidth and the CPU load would increase for no good reason. You might say that a global conspiracy to build and acquire advanced molecular nanotechnology to take over the world doesn't use much resources and they can easily be cloaked as thinking about how to solve some puzzle, but that seems rather unlikely. After all, such a large scale conspiracy is a real-world problem with lots of unpredictable factors and the necessity of physical intervention.

The existence of third-party anti-technology terrorists adds something to the conversation beyond the risks FinalState can directly pose to SIAI-folk and vice versa. I'm curious about gwern's response, especially, given his interest in Death Note, which describes a world where law enforcement can indirectly have people killed just by publishing their identifying information.

Would you mind explaining how what I have said is ahistorical nonsense?

Yes, at the end of the 18th century there was transatlantic trade. However, it was not cheap. It was sail powered and relatively expensive compared to modern shipping. Coal was generally not part of this trade. Shipping was too expensive. English industry used English mined coal. Same with American and German industry. If shipping coal was too expensive, why would charcoal be economical? You have jumped from "transportation existed" to "the costs of transportation... (read more)

Truly maximizing entropy would involve burning everything you can burn, tearing the matter of solar systems apart, accelerating stars towards nova, trying to accelerate the evaporation of black holes and prevent their formation, and other things of this sort. It'd look like a dark spot in the sky that'd get bigger at approximately the speed of light.

6timtyler12y
Fires are crude entropy maximisers. Living systems destroy energy dradients at all scales, resulting in more comprehensive devastation than mere flames can muster. Of course, maximisation is often subject to constraints. Your complaint is rather like saying that water doesn't "truly minimise" its altitude - since otherwise it would end up at the planet's core. That usage is simply not what the terms "maximise" and "minimise" normally refer to.

Consider the double standard involved. Yudkowsky lambasts "philosophers" and their "confusions"--their supposedly misguided concerns with the issues other philosophers have commented on to the detriment of inquiry. Has Yudkowsky read even a single book by each of the philosophers he dismisses?

Some of them are simply not great writers. Hegel for example is just awful- the few coherent ideas in Hegel are more usefully described by other later writers. There's also a strange aspect to this in that you are complaining about Eliezer not h... (read more)

Science is built around the assumption that you’re too stupid and self-deceiving to just use Solomonoff induction.

He thinks the social institution of science is superfluous, were everyone as smart as he.

This is obviously false. Yudkowsky does not claim to be able to do Solomonoff induction in his head.

In general, when Yudkowsky addresses humanity's faults, he is including himself.

Hmm... Perhaps you don't know that "salary cut" above means taking much less money?

2A1987dM12y
I had missed the word cut. Damn it, I shouldn't be commenting while sleep-deprived!

The article is interesting, but I'm not sure it is relevant as the humans involved weren't directing or monitoring the overall process, just taking part in it. Analogously even if an AGI requires my assistance/authorization to do certain things, that doesn't give me any control over it unless I understand the consequences.

Also general warning against 'generalising from fictional evidence.'

No doubt a Martian Yudkowsy would make much the same argument - but they can't both be right.

Why?

Consider what would have happened had Yudkowsky not shown exceptional receptivity to this post: he would have blatantly proven his critics right.

After turning this statement around in my head for a while I'm less certain than I was that I understand its thrust. But assuming you mean those critics pertinent to lukeprog's post, i.e. those claiming LW embodies a cult of personality centered around Eliezer -- well, no. Eliezer's reaction is in fact almost completely orthogonal to that question.

If you receive informed criticism regarding a project you're h... (read more)

Given some of the translation debates I've heard, I'm not convinced it would be possible even with AGI. You can't give a clear translation of a vague original, to name the most obvious problem.

2NancyLebovitz12y
Is matching the vagueness of the original a reasonable goal?
2Alsadius12y
True, but good luck getting folks to agree on whether you'd done so.
2A1987dM12y
(I'm taking reasonable to mean ‘one which you would want to achieve if it were possible’.) Yes. You don't want to introduce false precision.

What, really? You don't have anything specific or technical to say about the argument, you just find the argument "bogus" and suggest that the author doesn't know what he's talking about, without actually making a counterpoint of your own? I felt the first point was particularly valid... FAI is, after all, a really hard problem, and it is a fair point to ask why any group thinks it has the capacity to solve it perfectly on the first try, or to know that it's solution would work short of testing it. The second, on the other hand, is an interest... (read more)

1timtyler12y
In fact, I did previously post some more specific criticisms here. This is the rather-obvious rebuttal to point 1. It is often a useful contribution for someone to assess an argument without necessarily countering its points.
0amcknight12y
Not really.

For the same reason that a personal assistant is vastly more useful and powerful than a PDA, even though they might nominally serve the same function of remembering phone numbers, appointments, etc. people are extremely likely to want to create agent AIs.

There's really no such thing as a "super bug". All organisms follow the same constraints of biology and epidemiology. If there was even some magical "super bug" it would infect everything of any remotely compatible species, not be constrained to one species, and small subset of cells in it.

We might not have any drugs ready for a particular infection, but we didn't have any for SARS, it was extremely infectious, and extremely deadly, and it worked perfectly fine in the end. We have tools like quarantine, detection etc. which work against... (read more)

6RomeoStevens12y
AFAIK nothing precludes extremely lethal bugs with long incubation periods. As for "nobody has any particular desire to", I hope you are right.
2taw12y
Except the fact they wouldn't be particularly lethal. If 100% of humans had HIV, it would increase probably make most countries disregard patent laws on a few drugs, and human life spans would get shorter by like 5-10 years on average. This should keep things in perspective.
4CronoDAS12y
My Google-fu seems to indicate a drop of about 20 years.
5NancyLebovitz12y
I bet the statistics are assuming nothing else changes. It's plausible to me that a society where people are generally sicker and shorter-lived will be poorer, and there will be a lot of additional deaths due to people being able to produce less stuff. It's also conceivable that the lower population will be an advantage because of less competition for natural resources and already-existing durable goods. Probably both tendencies will be in play. This makes prediction difficult.
4taw12y
The thing is countries would not really be poorer. Properly treated HIV isn't much worse than smoking (I mean the part before lung cancer) or diabetes for most of people's lives. Countries differ a lot on these already, without any apparent drastic differences in economic outcomes. By the time people are already very old they might live a few years less, but they're not really terribly productive at that point anyway.
3taw12y
That's already old data by standards of modern progress of medicine, and groups that tend to get HIV are highly non-random and are typically engaged in other risky activities like unprotected promiscuous sex and intravenous drug use, and are poorer and blacker than average, so their baseline life expectancy is already much lower than population average.
1Alsadius12y
And remember, that's ~20 years with ~40% infection rates, not 100%.
2Alsadius12y
The term does not imply magic, it merely implies nasty. Smallpox and Spanish flu were both superbugs in every meaningful sense, but they worked on DNA just like everything else. The question is not whether someone builds a flesh-eating nanite our immune system can't handle or whatever, it's just about whether an infectious disease comes along that's worse than our medical system can cope with. That is a much lower bar.
2taw12y
Smallpox wasn't that bad if you look at statistics, and spanish flu happened at a time when humans have been murdering each other at unprecedented rate and normal society was either suspended or collapsed altogether everywhere. Usually the chance of getting infected is inversely correlated with severity of symptoms (by laws of epidemiology), and nastiness is inversely correlated with broad range (by laws of biology), so you have diseases that are really extreme by any one criterion, but they tend to be really weak by some other criterion. And in any case we're getting amazingly better at this.
3Alsadius12y
Not that bad? I agree that there were aggravating factors, particularly in the Spanish flu case, and that tradeoffs between impact and spread generally form a brake. But nasty diseases do exist, and our medical science is sufficiently imperfect that the possibility of one slipping through even in the modern world is not to be ignored. Fortunately, it's a field we're already pouring some pretty stupendous sums of money into, so it's not a risk we're likely to be totally blindsided by, but it's one to keep in mind.
2taw12y
So? 400,000 people a year is what % of total mortality? In an important way diseases don't kill people, poverty, hunger, and lack of sanitation kills people. The deaths were almost all happening in the poorest, and the most abused parts of the world - India and Africa.
3Alsadius12y
World population in 1800 was about a billion, and we'll ballpark 1/5th of the population being in Europe and 1/40th of them dying per year(which is probably better life expectancy than the world had, but about right for Europe). That means about 5 million deaths per year, so 400k would be 8%. And it's not like smallpox was the only plague around, either. In an even more important way, diseases kill people. Yes, if smallpox came back today(or a non-vaccinatible equivalent) it'd kill a lot fewer people than it used to because of better quarantine, sanitation, and all that fun stuff. Same way AIDS is a minor problem here and a world-ender in sub-Saharan Africa. But it's not like we lack for infectious disease in the developed world.

Very good. Objection 2 in particular resonates with my view of the situation.

One other thing that is often missed is the fact that SI assumes that development of superinteligent AI will precede other possible scenarios - including the augmented human intelligence scenario (CBI producing superhumans, with human motivations and emotions, but hugely enhanced intelligence). In my personal view, this scenario is far more likely than the creation of either friendly or unfriendly AI, and the problems related to this scenario are far more pressing.

2NancyLebovitz12y
Could you expand on that?
8kalla72412y
I can try, but the issue is too complex for comments. A series of posts would be required to do it justice, so mind the relative shallowness of what follows. I'll focus on one thing. An artificial intelligence enhancement which adds more "spaces" to the working memory would create a human being capable of thinking far beyond any unenhanced human. This is not just a quantitative jump: we aren't talking someone who thinks along the same lines, just faster. We are talking about a qualitative change, making connections that are literally impossible to make for anyone else. (This is even more unclear than I thought it would be. So a tangent to, hopefully, clarify. You can hold, say, seven items in your mind while considering any subject. This vastly limits your ability to consider any complex system. In order to do so at all, you have to construct "composite items" out of many smaller items. For instance, you can think of a mathematical formula, matrix, or an operation as one "item," which takes one space, and therefore allows you to cram "more math" into a thought than you would be able to otherwise. Alternate example: a novice chess player has to look at every piece, think about likely moves of every one, likely responses, etc. She becomes overwhelmed very quickly. An expert chess player quickly focuses on learned series of moves, known gambits and visible openings, which allows her to see several steps ahead. One of the major failures in modern society is the illusion of understanding in complex systems. Any analysis picks out a small number of items we can keep in mind at one time, and then bases the "solutions" on them (Watts's "Everything is Obvious" book has a great overview of this). Add more places to the working memory, and you suddenly have humans who have a qualitatively improved ability to understand complex systems. Maybe still not fully, but far better than anyone else. Sociology, psychology, neuroscience, economics... A human being with a few dozen wor
6Dustin12y
I like this series of thoughts, but I wonder about just how superior a human with 2 or 3 times the working memory would be. Currently, do all humans have the same amount of working memory? If not, how "superior" are those with more working memory ?
8TheOtherDave12y
A vaguely related anecdote: working memory was one of the things that was damaged after my stroke; for a while afterwards I was incapable of remembering more than two or three items when asked to repeat a list. I wasn't exactly stupider than I am now, but I was something pretty similar to stupid. I couldn't understand complex arguments, I couldn't solve logic puzzles that required a level of indirection, I would often lose track of the topic of a sentence halfway through. Of course, there was other brain damage as well, so it's hard to say what causes what, and the plural of anecdote is not data. But subjectively it certainly felt like the thing that was improving as I recovered was my ability to hold things in memory... not so much number of items, as reliability of the buffers at all. I often had the thought as I recovered that if I could somehow keep improving my working memory -- again, not so much "add slots" but make the whole framework more reliable -- I would end up cleverer than I started out. Take it for what it's worth.
7kalla72412y
It would appear that all of us have very similar amounts of working memory space. It gets very complicated very fast, and there are some aspects that vary a lot. But in general, its capacity appears to be the bottleneck of fluid intelligence (and a lot of crystallized intelligence might be, in fact, learned adaptations for getting around this bottleneck). How superior would it be? There are some strong indication that adding more "chunks" to the working space would be somewhat akin to adding more qubits to a quantum computer: if having four "chunks" (one of the most popular estimates for an average young adult) gives you 2^4 units of fluid intelligence, adding one more would increase your intelligence to 2^5 units. The implications seem clear.
5Kaj_Sotala12y
Although the exact relationship isn't known, there's a strong connection between IQ and working memory - apparently both in humans and animals. E.g. Matzel & Kolata 2010: or Oberauer et al. 2005:
1jsteinhardt12y
My admittedly uninformed impression is that the state of knowledge about working memory is pretty limited, at least relative to the claims you are making. Do you think you could clarify somewhat, e.g. either show that our knowledge is not limited, or that you don't need any precise knowledge about working memory to support your claims? In particular, I have not seen convincing evidence that working memory even exists, and it's unclear what a "chunk" is, or how we manipulate them (perhaps manipulation costs grow exponentially with the number of chunks).
4kalla72412y
Whether "working memory" is memory at all, or whether it is a process of attentional control as applied to normal long-term memory... we don't know for sure. So in that sense, you are totally right. But what is the exact nature of the process is, perhaps strangely, unimportant. The question is whether the process can be enhanced, and I would say that the answer is very likely to be yes. Also, keep in mind that working memory enhancement scenario is just one I pulled from thin air as an example. The larger point is that we are rapidly gaining the ability to non-invasively monitor activities of single neuronal cells (with fluorescent markers, for instance), and we are, more importantly, gaining the ability to control them (with finely tuned and targeted optogenetics). Thus, reading and writing into the brain is no longer an impossible hurdle, requiring nanoimplants or teeny-tiny electrodes (with requisite wiring). All you need are optical fibers and existing optogenetic tools (in theory, at least). To generalize the point even further: we have the tools and the know-how with which we could start manipulating and enhancing existing neural networks (including those in human brains). It would be bad, inefficient and with a great deal of side-effects, we don't really understand the underlying architecture enough to really know what we are doing - but could still theoretically begin today, if for some reason we decided to (and lost our ethics along the way). On the other hand, we don't have a clue how to build an AGI. Regardless of any ethical or eschatonic concerns, we simply couldn't do it even if we wanted to. My personal estimate is, therefore, that we will make it to the first goal far sooner than we make it to the second one.
0jacob_cannell12y
Really? A dubious notion in the first place, but untrue by the counterexamples of folks who go above 4 in dual N back. You seem to have a confused fantastical notion of working memory ungrounded in neuroscientific rigor. The rough analogy I have heard is that working memory is a coarse equivalent of registers, but this doesn't convey the enormity of the items brains hold in each working memory 'slot'. Nonetheless, more registers does not entail superpowers. Chess players increase in ability over time equivalent to an exponential increase in algorithmic search performance. This increase involves hierarchical pattern learning in the cortex. Short term working memory is more involved in maintaining a stack of moves in the heuristic search algorithm humans use (register analogy).
0private_messaging12y
Well, my opinion is that there already are such people, with several times the working memory. The impact of that was absolutely enormous indeed and is what brought us much of the advancements in technology and science. If you look at top physicists or mathematicians or the like - they literally can 'cram "more math" into a thought than you would be able to otherwise' , vastly more. It probably doesn't help a whole lot with economics and the like though - the depth of predictions are naturally logarithmic in the computational power or knowledge of initial state, so the payoffs from getting smarter, far from the movie Limitless, are rather low, and it is still primarily a chance game.

Existential risk reduction is a very worthy cause. As far as I can tell there are a few serious efforts - they have scenarios which by outside view have non-negligible chances, and in case of many of these scenarios these efforts make non-negligible difference to the outcome.

Such efforts are:

  • asteroid tracking
  • seed vaults
  • development of various ways to deal with potential pandemics (early tracking systems, drugs etc.) - this actually overlaps with "normal" medicine a lot
  • arguably, global warming prevention is a borderline issue, since there is a
... (read more)
4Rain12y
Here is the list from Global Catastrophic Risks.
4taw12y
Most of entries on the list are either not quantifiable even approximately to within order of magnitude. Of those that are (which is pretty much only "risks from nature" in Bostrom's system) many are still bad candidates for putting significant effort into, because: * we either have little ways to deal with them (like nearby supernova explosions) * we have a lot of time and future will be better equipped to deal with them (like eventual demise of Sun) * they don't actually seem to get anywhere near civilization-threatening levels (like volcanoes) About the only new risk I see on the list which can and should be dealt with is having some backup plans for massive solar flares, but I'm not sure what we can do about it other than putting some extra money into astrophysics departments so they can figure things out better and give us better estimates.
2RomeoStevens12y
nuclear holocaust. biological holocaust. super eruptions whose ash blocks significant levels of sunlight.
7taw12y
I understand that global thermonuclear war could cause serious damage, but I'm not aware of any credible efforts that can prove they're moving things in the right direction. What do you mean by "biological holocaust"? Super eruptions surely follow some kind of power law, and as far as I can tell (and we can be sure by extrapolating from the power law), they don't get anywhere remotely near levels of destroying all life on Earth. And we sure know how to heat Earth significantly in no time - just release some of these into atmosphere. It will only increase temperature, not sunlight, so food production and such will still be affected, but we already produce way more food per capita to feed everyone, so even a pretty big reduction won't get anywhere near compromising food security for majority of people, let alone threatening to kill everyone.
6[anonymous]12y
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START This stuff, as slow and grinding as it is, does make a difference.
7taw12y
There's no particular reason to believe this is going to make global thermonuclear war any less likely. Russia and United States aren't particularly likely to start a global thermonuclear warfare anytime soon, and in longer perspective any major developed country, if it wanted, could build nuclear arsenals sufficient to make a continent uninhabitable within a few years. There's also this argument that mutually assured destruction was somehow stabilizing and preventing nuclear warfare - the only use of nuclear weapons so far happened when the other side had no way to retaliate. I'm quite neutral on this - I'm unwilling to say that nuclear arms reductions either increase or decrease risk of global war (which will eventually turn nuclear or otherwise very nasty).
3CronoDAS12y
They don't have to destroy all life on earth to be existential risks. They just have to damage human civilization to the point where it can't recover; we've already used up basically all of the easily accessible, non-renewable natural resources; for example, a future civilization reduced to Roman Empire level technology would find itself with a severe shortage of exploitable ores - good luck running your empire without iron or copper!
9taw12y
That reasoning is just extremely unconvincing, essentially 100% wrong and backwards. Renewable energy available annually is many orders of magnitude greater than all fossil fuels we're using, and it has been used as primary source of energy for almost the entire history up to industrial revolution. Biomass for everything, animal muscle power, wind and gravity for water transport, charcoal for melting etc. were used successfully at massive scale before anybody even thought of oil or gas or made much use of coal. Other than energy, most other resources - like ores - are trivially recyclable. If New Rome wanted iron and copper and so on they'd just need to head toward the nearest dump, and dig there. Amount of ores we dug out and made trivially accessible is ridiculously greater than what they had available. Annual iron ore mining for example is 2.4 billion metric tons, or 1 kg per person per day. Annual steel production is 1.49 billion metric tons, or 220 kg per person per year. Every year (OK, some of that steel is from recycled iron). Vast majority of them would be easily extractable if civilization collapsed. If we went back to Roman levels of population, each Roman could easily extract tens or hundreds of tons of usable steel from just the stuff we extracted that their technology couldn't. The same applies to every other metal, and most non-metal resources. It doesn't apply to a few resources like phosphorus and helium, but they'll figure it out somehow. And even if civilization "collapsed" it's not like our scientific and organizational knowledge would have disappeared, making it ridiculously easier to rebuild than it was to build in the first place.
7Mercurial12y
Okay, this has been driving me bonkers for years now. I keep encountering blatantly contradictory claims about what is "obviously" true about the territory. taw, you said: And you might well be right. But the people involved in transition towns insist quite the opposite: I've been explicitly told, for one example, that it would take the equivalent of building five Three Gorges Dams every year for the next 50 years to keep up with the energy requirements provided by fossil fuels. By my reading, these two facts cannot both be correct. One of them says that civilization can rebuild just fine if we run out of fossil fuels, and the other says that we may well hit something dangerously close to a whimper. I'm not asking for a historical analysis here about whether we needed fossil fuels to get to where we are. I'd like clarification on a fact about the territory: is it the case that renewable forms of energy can replace fossil fuels without modern civilization having to power down? I'm asking this as an engineering question, not a political one.
3JoshuaZ12y
Right, and the energy demands of those societies were substantially lower than those later societies which used oil and coal. The industrial revolution would likely not have been possible without the presence of oil and coal in easily accessible locations. Total energy isn't all that matters- the efficiency of the energy, ease of transport, and energy density all matter a lot also. In those cases, fossil fuels are substantially better and more versatile.
7taw12y
This argument is only convincing to people who never bothered to look at timeline of historical events in technology. No country had any significant amount of coal mining before let's say UK in 1790-ish and forwards, and even there it was primarily to replace wood and charcoal. Technologies we managed to build by then were absolutely amazing. Until 1870 the majority of locomotives in the USA operated on wood, canal transport was as important as railroads and was even less dependent on dense fuels, so transportation was perfectly fine. Entire industries operated on water power just fine for decades before coal or electricity. Just look at how well science, and technology was doing before coal came about. Even mentioning oil in this context is pretty ridiculous - it only came to importance by about 1950-ish. Cars can be modified to run on wood of all things without much difficulty, and it happened on mass scale in many economies in war conditions.
7JoshuaZ12y
Most of your analysis seems accurate, but there do seem to be some issues. While you are correct that the until 1870 the majority of locomotives in the USA operated on wood, the same article you linked to notes that this was phased out as the major forests were cut down and demand went up. This is not a long-term sustainable process that was converted over to coal simply because it was more efficient. Even if one had forests grow back to pre-industrial levels (a not completely unlikely possibility if most of humanity has been wipe out), you don't have that much time to use wood on a large scale before you need to switch over. You also are underestimating the transformation that occurred in the second half of the 19th century. In particular, while it is true that industries operated on water power, the total number of industries, and the energy demands they made were much smaller. Consider for example chip making plants which have massive energy needs. One can't run a modern economy on water power because there wouldn't be nearly enough water power to go around. This is connected to how while in the US in the 1870s and 1880s many of the first power plants were hydroelectric, support of a substantial grid required the switch to coal which could both provide more power and could have plants built at the most convenient location. This is discussed in Maggie Koerth-Baker's book "Before the Lights Go Out" which has a detailed discussion about the history of the US electric grids. And while it is true that no country had major coal mining before 1790 by modern standards, again the replacement of wood and charcoal occurred to a large extent because they were running out of cheap wood, and because increased industry substantially benefited from the increased energy density. And even well before that, coal was used already in the late Middle Ages for speciaized purposes, such as metal working with metals that required high temperatures. While not a large industry, it was l
5JoshuaZ12y
The remains of the prior civilization would provide quite a bit. Indeed, for some metals this would be even easier. Aluminum for example requires a lot of technology to refine, but if one has already refined aluminum lying around one can easily make things out of it. A more serious problem would be the substantial reduction in easily accessible coal and oil. The remaining fossil fuels require a lot more technology to access.
2RomeoStevens12y
pandemics, man-made or natural.
7taw12y
Yeah, I've mentioned pandemics already. I'm not terribly willing to treat them as an "existential" risk, since countless pandemics already happened and for natural reasons they never actually kill the entire population. And the way how awesomely we've dealt with SARS is a good data point showing that pandemics might actually be under control now. At least we should have far more confidence in our ability to deal with pandemics is far better than our ability to deal with just about any other existential threat. And one nice side effect of just plain old medicine is reduction of this existential risk, even without any efforts specifically towards handling existential risk. Every antibiotic, every antiviral, every new way of keeping patients alive longer, every diagnostic improvement, every improvement in hygiene in poor countries etc. - they all make pandemics less likely and more manageable.
5JoshuaZ12y
Most major pandemics have occurred before modern transport was common. The presence of easy air travel makes a serious pandemic more problematic. And in fact if one looks at emergent diseases in the last sixty years, such as HIV, one sees that they are effectively taking advantage of the ease of transport in the modern world.
2taw12y
HIV emerged before modern medicine developed. It was discovered in 1981 - almost prehistory by medical standards, but it was actually transfered to humans somewhere in late 19th century. It wrecks the most havoc in places which are extremely far from modern medicine as well, in developed countries HIV is a fairly minor problem. SARS is a much better example of a new disease and how modern medicine can deal with it.
1JoshuaZ12y
Even in Africa, HIV has taken advantage of modern transport. Migrant workers are a major cause of HIV spread in sub-Saharan Africa. This has advanced to the point where new road building projects think about what they will do to disease transmission. These laborers and the like aren't just walking- the possibility of such migrant labor is connected to the fact that even in the developing world, buses exist.

I don't engage with this poster because of his past dishonesty, i.e. misrepresenting my posts. If anyone not on my *(&^%-list is curious, I am happy to provide references.

I applaud your decision to not engage (as a good general strategy given your state of belief---the specifics of the conflict do not matter). I find it usually works best to do so without announcing it. Or, at least, by announcing it sparingly with extreme care to minimize the appearance of sniping.

Retraction means that you no longer endorse the contents of a comment. The comment is not deleted so that it will not break existing conversations. Retracted comments are no longer eligible for voting. Once a comment is retracted, it can be revisited at which point there is a 'delete' option, which removes the comment permanently.

As time goes on it becomes increasingly possible that some small group or lone researcher is able to put the final pieces together and develop an AGI.

Why do you think this is the case? Is this just because the overall knowledge level concerning AI goes up over time? If so, what makes you think that that rate of increase is anything large enough to be significant?

0jacob_cannell12y
Yes. This is just the way of invention in general: steady incremental evolutionary progress. A big well funded team can throw more computational resources into their particular solution for the problem, but the returns are sublinear (for any one particular solution) even without moore's law.

I would call that securing a turing machine. A computer, colloquially, has accessible inputs and outputs, and its value is subject to network effects.

Also, if you put the computer in a box developed decades ago, the box probably isn't TEMPEST compliant.

Your criticism shifts as the wind.

What is your purpose?

I should also link trolley problem discussions perhaps.

Trolley problems are a standard type of problem discussed in intro psychology and intro philosophy classes in colleges. And they go farther, with many studies just about how people respond or think about them. That LW would want to discuss trolley problems or that different people would have wildly conflicting responses to them shouldn't be surprising- that's what makes them interesting. Using them as evidence that LW is somehow bad seems strange.

[-][anonymous]12y30

I read your three-part series. Your posts did not substantiate the claim "good thinking requires good writing." Your second post slightly increased my belief in the converse claim, "good thinkers are better-than-average writers," but because the only evidence you provided was a handful of historical examples, it's not very strong evidence. And given how large the population of good thinkers, good writers, bad thinkers, and bad writers is relative to your sample, evidence for "good thinking implies good writing" is barely worth registering as evidence for "good writing implies good thinking."

This argument is explored in more detail in this video.

4JoshuaZ12y
That Cracked video was actually noteworthy for giving a not too awful very quick primer to people about AI dangers at the beginning of the video. I'm continually impressed by the fact that one of the best popularizers of rational thinking on the internet is a humor site that frequently resorts to poop jokes.
2TheOtherDave12y
"resorts"?

There are at present an estimated 2 Billion internet users. There are an estimated 13 Billion neurons in the human brain. On this basis for approximation the internet is even now only one order of magnitude below the human brain and its growth is exponential.

There are only 7 billion people on the planet, even if all of them gained internet access that would still be fewer than 13 billion. In this case, instead of looking at the exponential graph, consider where it needs to level off. It also isn't at all clear to me why this analogy matters in any usefu... (read more)

4dlthomas12y
People are a lot more complicated than neurons, and it's not just people that are connected to the internet - there are many devices acting autonomously with varying levels of sophistication, and both the number of people and the number of internet connected devices are increasing. If the question is "are there points in superhuman mind-space that could be implemented on the infrastructure of the internet roughly as it exists" my guess would be, yes. This, I think, is key, and devastating. The chances that we've found any such point in mind-space without any means of searching are (I would guess) infinitesimal. Unless the game were carefully designed to simulate an existing brain (or one designed by other means) I don't see why restricting the scope of interaction between nodes is likely to help.

Asking that a critic read those sequences in their entirety is asking for a huge sacrifice; little is offered to show it's even close in being worth the misery of reading inept writing or the time.

Indeed, the sequences are long. I'm not sure about the others here, but I've never asked anybody to "read the sequences."

But I don't even know how to describe the arrogance required to believe that you can dismiss somebody's work as "crazy," "stupid," "megalomanic," "laughably, pathologically arrogant," "b... (read more)

5fubarobfusco12y
That's a fully general argument against criticizing anything without having read all of it, though. And there are some things you can fairly dismiss without having read all of. For instance, I don't have to read every page on the Time Cube site to dismiss it as crazy, stupid, pathologically arrogant, and so on.

A language can be Turing-complete while still being so impractical that writing a program to solve a certain problem will seldom be any easier than solving the problem yourself (exhibits A and B). In fact, I guess that a vast majority of languages in the space of all possible Turing-complete languages are like that.

(Too bad that a human's “easier” isn't the same as a superhuman AGI's “easier”.)

So why not relocate SIAI somewhere with a more reasonable cost of living?

5katydee12y
I think the standard answer is that the networking and tech industry connections available in the Bay Area are useful enough to SIAI to justify the high costs of operating there.

I don't think it's a rational method to treat people differently, as inherently less rational, when they seem resentful.

Thank you for this analysis, it made me think more about my motivations and their validity. I believe that my decision to permanently disengage from discussions with some people is based on the futility of such discussions in the past, not on the specific reasons they are futile. At some point I simply decide to cut my losses.

There's actually good reason for the broader meaning of "ax to grind." Any special stake is a bias

... (read more)

Yes, I am; I think that the human value of interestingness is much, much more specific than the search space optimization you're pointing at.

[This reply was to an earlier version of timtyler's comment]

2timtyler12y
So: do you really think that humans wouldn't find a martian civilization interesting? Surely there would be many humans who would be incredibly interested.
3Paul Crowley12y
I find Jupiter interesting. I think a paperclip maximizer (choosing a different intuition pump for the same point) could be more interesting than Jupiter, but it would generate an astronomically tiny fraction of the total potential for interestingness in this universe.
3timtyler12y
Life isn't much of an "interestingness" maximiser. Expecting to produce more than a tiny fraction of the total potential for interestingness in this universe seems as though it would be rather unreasonable. I agree that a paperclip maximiser would be more boring than an ordinary entropy-maximising civilization - though I don't know by how much - probably not by a huge amount - the basic problems it faces are much the same - the paperclip maximiser just has fewer atoms to work with.

Why? This isn't obvious to me. If the remaining comments are highly upvoted and of correspondingly high quality then it would make sense for them to stick around. Timtyler may be a in a similar category.

5A1987dM12y
If I counted right, only 9 of Timtyler's last 100 comments have negative scores as of now. 25% would be a lot. It'd mean that you either don't realize or don't care that people don't want to see some types of comments.

Enough for you to agree with Holden on that point?

Probably not. He and I continue to dialogue in private about the point, in part to find the source of our disagreement.

Yes, but I wouldn't set a limit at a specific salary range; I'd expect them to give as much as they optimally could, because I assume they're more concerned with the cause than the money. (re the 70k/yr mention: I'd be surprised if that was anywhere near optimal)

I believe everyone except Eliezer currently makes between $42k/yr and $48k/yr — pretty low for the cost of living in the Bay Area.

5siodine12y
So, if you disagree with Holden, I assume you think SIers have superior general rationality: why? And I'm confident SIers will score well on rationality tests, but that looks like specialized rationality. I.e., you can avoid a bias but you can't avoid a failure in your achieving your goals. To me, the SI approach seems poorly leveraged. I expect more significant returns from simple knowledge acquisition. E.g., you want to become successful? YOU WANT TO WIN?! Great, read these textbooks on microeconomics, finance, and business. I think this is more the approach you take anyway. That isn't as bad as I thinking it was; I don't know if that's optimal, but it seems at least reasonable.
3komponisto12y
(Disclaimer: the following comment should not be taken to imply that I myself have concluded that SI staff salaries should be reduced.) I'll grant you that it's pretty low relative to other Bay Area salaries. But as for the actual cost of living, I'm less sure. I'm not fortunate enough to be a Bay Area resident myself, but here is what the internet tells me: * After taxes, a $48,000/yr gross salary in California equates to a net of around $3000/month. * A 1-bedroom apartment in Berkeley and nearby places can be rented for around $1500/month. (Presumably, this is the category of expense where most of the geography-dependent high cost of living is contained.) * If one assumes an average spending of $20/day on food (typically enough to have at least one of one's daily meals at a restaurant), that comes out to about $600/month. * That leaves around $900/month for miscellaneous expenses, which seems pretty comfortable for a young person with no dependents. So, if these numbers are right, it seems that this salary range is actually right about what the cost of living is. Of course, this calculation specifically does not include costs relating to signaling (via things such as choices of housing, clothing, transportation, etc.) that one has more money than necessary to live (and therefore isn't low-status). Depending on the nature of their job, certain SI employees may need, or at least find it distinctly advantageous for their particular duties, to engage in such signaling.

With them or with us?

I'm mildly surprised that this post has not yet attracted more criticism. My initial reaction was that criticisms (1) and (2) seemed like strong ones, and almost posted a comment saying so. Then I thought, "I should look for other people discussing those points and join that discussion." But after doing that, I feel like people haven't given much in the way of objections to (1) and (2). Perceptions correct? Do lots of other people agree with them?

5Paul Crowley12y
I think that many of Holden's stronger points call for longer, more carefully worked out answers than a dashed-off comment.
5Endovior12y
Exactly. This is criticism intelligent enough that it requires an intelligent response to be meaningful. It falls far enough outside the usual bounds of discussion here that there aren't canned arguments to be recited. That said, once a proper counterargument is made, expect to see a whole lot more people rehashing the same counterarguments without adding much in the way of substantive content; once there's a canned argument to fall back on, there are a lot of people who will do just that. Of course, before SI's formal reply is posted (and/or before you end up reading it), you now have a golden opportunity to formulate your own criticisms independently. Yes, the arguments presented in this post are quite strong ones. Are you capable of developing any counterarguments that could reasonably stand against them?

I believe that the probability that SI's concept of "Friendly" vs. "Unfriendly" goals ends up seeming essentially nonsensical, irrelevant and/or unimportant from the standpoint of the relevant future is over 90%.

It seems like an odd thing to say. Why take the standpoint of the "relevant future"? History is written by the winners - but that doesn't mean that their perspective is shared by us. Besides the statement is likely wrong - "Friendly" and "Unfriendly" as defined by Yudkowsky are fairly reasonable and useful concepts.

Regarding tools versus agent AGI's, I think the desired end game is still an Friendly Agent AGI. I am open to tool AIs being useful in the path to building such an agent. Similar ideas advocated by SI include use of automated theorem provers in formally proving Friendliness, and creating a seed AI to compute the Coherent Extropolated Volition of humanity and build an FAI with the appropiate utility function.

I'm a regular, and I was impressed with it. Many other regulars have also said positive things about it, so possible explanation 1 is out. And unless I'm outright lying to you, 2, if true, would have to be entirely subconscious.

I suspect a crazy dictator with a super-capable tool AI would have unusually good counter-assassination plans, simplified by the reduced need for human advisors and managers of imperfect loyalty. Likewise, a medical expert system could provide gains to lifespan, particularly if it were backed up by the resources a paranoid megalomaniac in control of a small country would be willing to throw at a major threat.

/me shrugs

Maybe Ignaz Semmelweis would have been a better example?

I also found a list of "crackpots who were right" by Googling.

I don't see the circularity.
Just because a warrior is victorious doesn't necessarily mean they won before going to war; it might be instead that victorious warriors go to war first and then seek to win, and defeated warriors do the same thing.
Can you spell out the circularity?

0shminux12y
Unless you interpret "win first" as "prepare for every eventuality, calculate the unbiased probability of winning and be comfortable with the odds when going to battle", "win first" can only be meaningfully applied in retrospect.
2thomblake12y
I think you've stumbled upon the correct interpretation. Sun Tzu was fond of making warfare about strategy and logistics rather than battles, so that one would only fight when victory is a foregone conclusion.
0TheOtherDave12y
Ah, I see what you mean now. Thanks for the clarification.

I have personally felt the same feelings and I think I have pinned down the reason. I welcome alternative theories, in the spirit of rational debate rather than polite silence.

0CuSithBell12y
That you may have discovered the reason that you felt this way does not mean that you have discovered the reason another specific person felt a similar way. In fact, they may not even be unaware of the causes of their feelings.
0sufferer12y
Sure. That's why I said: "I welcome alternative theories" (including theories about there being multiple different reasons which may apply to different extents to different people). Do you have one?
0CuSithBell12y
Missed the point. Do you understand that you shouldn't have been confident you knew why cousin_it felt a particular way? Beyond that, personally I'm not all that interested in theorizing about the reasons, but if you really want to know you could just ask.
0sufferer12y
Sorry I wasn't implying very strong confidence. I would give a probability of, say, 65% that my reason is the principal cause of the feelings of Cousin_it

Mm. This is why an incompetent nonprofit can linger for years: no-one is doing what they do, so they feel they still have to exist, even though they're not achieving much, and would have died already as a for-profit business. I am now suspecting that the hard part for a nonprofit is something along the lines of working out what the hell you should be doing to achieve your goal. (I would be amazed if there were not extensive written-up research in this area, though I don't know what it is.)

I'm not saying he's right, just that your proposed alternative isn't even wrong.

[-][anonymous]12y20

Problems with linguistic prescriptivism.

Your comment was a pretty cute tu quoque, but arguing against prescriptivism doesn't mean giving up the ability to assert propositions.

0Bugmaster12y
I was making a joke :-(
2Grognor12y
(This comment originally said only, "Don't do that." That was rude, so I'm replacing it with the following. I apologize if you already saw that.) As a general rule, I'd prefer that people don't make silly jokes on this website, as that's one first step in the slippery slope toward making this site just another reddit. Paul Graham:
8JoshuaZ12y
Curious. I was just reading Jerome Tuccille's book on the history of libertarianism through his eyes, and when he discusses how Objectivism turned into a cult one of the issues apparently was a lack of acceptance of humor.
2Bugmaster12y
I disagree with your blanket policy on jokes. I don't want to be a member of an organization that prohibits making fun of said organization (or its well-respected members); these types of organizations tend to have poor track records. I would, of course, fully support a ban on bad jokes, where "bad" is defined as "an unfunny joke that makes me want to downvote your comment, oh look, here's me downvoting it". That said, I upvoted your comment for the honest clarification.
4Grognor12y
(I try to simply not vote on comments that actually make me laugh - there is a conflict between the part of me that wants LW to be Serious Business and the part of me that wants unexpected laughs, and such comments tend to get more karma than would be fair anyway.)
2khafra12y
I usually operate using this definition, with one tweak: I'm more likely to upvote a useful comment if it's also funny. I'm unlikely to upvote a comment if it's only funny; and though the temptation to make those arises, I try hard to save it for reddit.
0arundelo12y
Does it count as a joke if I mention that every time I see your username I think of TROGDOR? (This is only one of many similar mildly obsessive thought patterns that I have.)

Then, instituting a downvoting system that allows control by the high-karma elite: the available downvotes (but not upvotes--the masses must be kept content) are distributed based on the amount of accumulated karma. Formula nonpublic, as far as I can tell.

The formula max is 4*total karma. I'm curious- if there were a limit on the total number of upvotes also, would you then say that this was further evidence of control of entrenched users. If one option leads to a claim about keeping the masses content and the reverse would lead to a different set of a... (read more)

3CuSithBell12y
The Kill Everyone Project was almost exactly this. Progress Quest and Parameters are other takes on a similar concept (though Parameters is actually fairly interesting, if you think of it as an abstract puzzle).
3JoshuaZ12y
That's... sort of horrifying in a hilarious way.
0CuSithBell12y
Yeah, it's like staring into the void.
2thomblake12y
Missing a 'not' I think.
2JoshuaZ12y
Yep. Fixed. Thanks.

That subset of humanity holds considerably less power, influence and visibility than its counterpart; resources that could be directed to AI research and for the most part aren't. Or in three words: Other people matter. Assuming otherwise would be a huge mistake.

I took Wei_Dai's remarks to mean that Luke's response is public, and so can reach the broader public sooner or later; and when examined in a broader context, that it gives off the wrong signal. My response was that this was largely irrelevant, not because other people don't matter, but because of other factors outweighing this.

I see no reason for it to do that before simple input-output experiments, but let's suppose I grant you this approach. The AI simulates an entire community of mini-AI and is now a master of game theory.

It still doesn't know the first thing about humans. Even if it now understands the concept that hiding information gives an advantage for achieving goals - this is too abstract. It wouldn't know what sort of information it should hide from us. It wouldn't know to what degree we analyze interactions rationally, and to what degree our behavior is random. It wo... (read more)

2TheOtherDave12y
It is not clear to me that talking to a human is simpler than interacting with a copy of itself. I agree that if talking to a human is simpler, it would probably do that first. I agree that what it would learn by this process is general game theory, and not specific facts about humans. It is not clear to me that sufficient game-theoretical knowledge, coupled with the minimal set of information about humans required to have a conversation with one at all, is insufficient to effectively deceive a human. It is not clear to me that, even if it does "stumble," humans will respond as you describe. It is not clear to me that a system capable of having a meaningful conversation with a human will necessarily have a stack trace that is subject to the kind of analysis you imply here. It is not even clear to me that the capacity for such a stack trace is likely, depending on what architectures turn out to work best for implementing AI. But, sure, I could be wrong about all of that. And if I'm wrong, and you're right, then a system like you describe will be reliably incapable of fooling a human observer.
2Strange712y
If I was using an AI that was designed to answer some class of questions (with independently-verifiable answers) truthfully, and I noticed it responding to questions of that class with demonstrable falsehoods, I would at the very least file a strongly-worded bug report, triple-check whatever work I'd previously done involving answers it provided, and cease using it in the future. I don't think such a response would be exceptional in it's decisiveness; other users would likely go further, seek out venues to complain openly. Consider the uproar over Gmail's 'new look.'
0TheOtherDave12y
You may be right that ceasing to use the tool in that situation would be standard behavior. It seems unlikely to me, but I have no compelling data to offer to change your estimate.
0Polymeron12y
I think the weakest link here is human response to the AI revealing it can be deceptive. There is absolutely no guarantee that people would act correctly under these circumstances. Human negligence for a long enough time would eventually give the AI a consistent ability to manipulate humans. I also agree that simulating relationships makes sense as it can happen in "AI time" without having to wait for human response. The other reservations seem less of an issue to me... That game theory knowledge coupled with the most basic knowledge about humans is insufficient to cleverly manipulate them is clear to me. I don't see how these things can be combined in this way, or why the AI would choose to be particularly careful (it doesn't know what it should be careful about). I'd love to see a plausible line of thought by which the AI would try and succeed in deceiving humans at the get-go point without exposing its intentions. A stack trace reader or an equivalent monitoring system is something you implement externally without telling the AI about it. Sure, if it's powerful enough it will mislead or disable it; but while it has no knowledge of it, and no knowledge on what sort of operations it should mask, it has no means of doing so. (If it encrypts everything it does, somehow fearing any monitoring, that is in itself cause for concern). To put this into an analogy: You can feed a surveillance camera a repeating loop, but not if you don't know that the camera exists. If you suspect it exists, you still don't know where; so you don't know which approach to take so as to remain undetected.
1TheOtherDave12y
Yes, I agree that there's no guarantee that humans would behave as you describe. Indeed, I don't find it likely. But, sure, they might. === I agree that a stack trace can exist outside the AI's zone of control. What I was expressing skepticism about was that a system with even approximately human-level intelligence necessarily supports a stack trace that supports the kind of analysis you envision performing in the first place, without reference to intentional countermeasures. By way of analogy: I can perform a structural integrity analysis on a bar of metal to determine whether it can support a given weight, but performing an equivalent analysis on a complicated structure comprising millions of bars of metal connected in a variety of arrangements via a variety of connectors using the same techniques is not necessarily possible. But, sure, it might be. ====== Well, one place to start is with an understanding of the difference between "the minimal set of information about humans required to have a conversation with one at all" (my phrase) and "the most basic knowledge about humans" (your phrase). What do you imagine the latter to encompass, and how do you imagine the AI obtained this knowledge?
0Polymeron12y
Ah, that does clarify it. I agree, analyzing the AI's thought process would likely be difficult, maybe impossible! I guess I was being a bit hyperbolic in my earlier "crack it open" remarks (though depending on how seriously you take it, such analysis might still take place, hard and prolonged though it may be). One can have "detectors" in place set to find specific behaviors, but these would have assumptions that could easily fail. Detectors that would still be useful would be macro ones - where it tries to access and how - but these would provide only limited insight into the AI's thought process. I actually perceive your phrase to be a subset of my own; I am making the (reasonable, I think) assumption that humans will attempt to communicate with the budding AI. Say, in a lab environment. It would acquire its initial data from this interaction. I think both these sets of knowledge depend a lot on how the AI is built. For instance, a "babbling" AI - one that is given an innate capability of stringing words together onto a screen, and the drive to do so - would initially say a lot of gibberish and would (presumably) get more coherent as it gets a better grip on its environment. In such a scenario, the minimal set of information about humans required to have a conversation is zero; it would be having conversations before it even knows what it is saying. (This could actually make detection of deception harder down the line, because such attempts can be written off as "quirks" or AI mistakes) Now, I'll take your phrase and twist it just a bit: The minimal set of knowledge the AI needs in order to try deceiving humans. That would be the knowledge that humans can be modeled as having beliefs (which drive behavior) and these can be altered by the AI's actions, at least to some degree. Now, assuming this information isn't hard-coded, it doesn't seem likely that is all an AI would know about us; it should be able to see some patterns at least to our communications with
6TheOtherDave12y
Yup, agreed that it might. And agreed that it might succeed, if it does take place. Agreed on all counts. Re: what the AI knows... I'm not sure how to move forward here. Perhaps what's necessary is a step backwards. If I've understood you correctly, you consider "having a conversation" to encompass exchanges such as: A: "What day is it?" B: "Na ni noo na" If that's true, then sure, I agree that the minimal set of information about humans required to do that is zero; hell, I can do that with the rain. And I agree that a system that's capable of doing that (e.g., the rain) is sufficiently unlikely to be capable of effective deception that the hypothesis isn't even worthy of consideration. I also suggest that we stop using the phrase "having a conversation" at all, because it does not convey anything meaningful. Having said that... for my own part, I initially understood you to be talking about a system capable of exchanges like: A: "What day is it?" B: "Day seventeen." A: "Why do you say that?" B: "Because I've learned that 'a day' refers to a particular cycle of activity in the lab, and I have observed seventeen such cycles." A system capable of doing that, I maintain, already knows enough about humans that I expect it to be capable of deception. (The specific questions and answers don't matter to my point, I can choose others if you prefer.)
0Polymeron12y
My point was that the AI is likely to start performing social experiments well before it is capable of even that conversation you depicted. It wouldn't know how much it doesn't know about humans.
0TheOtherDave12y
(nods) Likely. And I agree that humans might be able to detect attempts at deception in a system at that stage of its development. I'm not vastly confident of it, though.
0Polymeron12y
I have likewise adjusted down my confidence that this would be as easy or as inevitable as I previously anticipated. Thus I would no longer say I am "vastly confident" in it, either. Still good to have this buffer between making an AI and total global catastrophe, though!
0TheOtherDave12y
Sure... a process with an N% chance of global catastrophic failure is definitely better than a process with N+delta% chance.

Yes, I'd say so. It isn't helpful here to say that a system lacks a theory of mind if it has a mechanism that allows it to make predictions about reported beliefs, intentions, etc.

Nonetheless, the risk in question is also a personal risk of death for every genius... now idk how do we define geniuses here but obviously most geniuses could be presumed pretty good at preventing their own deaths, or deaths of their families.

That seems like a pretty questionable presumption to me. High IQ is linked to reduced mortality according to at least one study, but that needn't imply that any particular fatal risk be likely to be uncovered, let alone prevented, by any particular genius; there's no physical law stating that lethal threats must ... (read more)

What is it that we would actually be disagreeing about, other than what English phrase to use to describe the system's underlying model(s)?

We would be disagreeing about the form of the system's underlying models.

2 different strategies to consider:

  1. I know that Steve believes that red blinking lights before 9 AM are a message from God that he has not been doing enough charity, so I can predict that he will give more money to charity if I show him a blinking light before 9 AM.

  2. Steve seeing a red blinking light before 9 AM has historically resulted in a 2

... (read more)
2TheOtherDave12y
And the assertion here is that with strategy #2 I could also predict that if I asked Steve why he did that, he would say "because I saw a red blinking light this morning, which was a message from God that I haven't been doing enough charity," but that my underlying model would nevertheless not include anything that corresponds to Steve's belief that red blinking lights are messages from God, merely an algorithm that happens to make those predictions in other ways. Yes?
3thomblake12y
Yes, that's possible. It's still possible that you could get a lot done with strategy #2 without being able to make that prediction. I agree that if 2 systems have the same inputs and outputs, their internals don't matter much here.

Thank you for the links.

Please note that none of the evidence shows the donor status of the anonymous people/person who actually had nightmares, and the two named individuals did not say it gave them nightmares, but used a popular TVTropes idiom, "Nightmare Fuel", as an adjective.

Humans learn most of what they know about interacting with other humans by actual practice. A superhuman AI might be considerably better than humans at learning by observation.

Well, the evil compiler is I think the most nefarious thing anyone has come up with that's a publicly known general stunt. But it is by nature a long-term trick. Similar remarks apply to the Stuxnet point- in that context, they wanted to destroy a specific secure system and weren't going for any sort of largescale global control. They weren't people interested in being able to take all the world's satellite communications in their own control whenever they wanted, nor were they interested in carefully timed nuclear meltdowns.

But there are definite ways th... (read more)

3XiXiDu12y
Exploits only work for some systems. If you are dealing with different systems you will need different exploits. How do you reckon that such attacks won't be visible and traceable? Packets do have to come from somewhere. And don't forget that out systems become ever more secure and our toolbox to detect) unauthorized use of information systems is becoming more advanced.
5khafra12y
As a computer security guy, I disagree substantially. Yes, newer versions of popular operating systems and server programs are usually more secure than older versions; it's easier to hack into Windows 95 than Windows 7. But this is happening within a larger ecosystem that's becoming less secure: More important control systems are being connected to the Internet, more old, unsecured/unsecurable systems are as well, and these sets have a huge overlap. There are more programmers writing more programs for more platforms than ever before, making the same old security mistakes; embedded systems are taking a larger role in our economy and daily lives. And attacks just keep getting better. If you're thinking there are generalizable defenses against sneaky stuff with code, check out what mere humans come up with in the underhanded C competition. Those tricks are hard to detect for dedicated experts who know there's something evil within a few lines of C code. Alterations that sophisticated would never be caught in the wild--hell, it took years to figure out that the most popular crypto program running on one of the more secure OS's was basically worthless. Humans are not good at securing computers.

But even humans have trouble with this sometimes. I was recently reading the Wikipedia article Hornblower and the Crisis which contains a link to the article on Francisco de Miranda. It took me time and cues when I clicked on it to realize that de Miranda was a historical figure.

So your question/objection/doubt is really just the typical boring doubt of AGI feasibility in general.

Isn't Kalla's objection more a claim that fast takeovers won't happen because even with all this data, the problems of understanding humans and our basic cultural norms will... (read more)

Yes. If we have an AGI, and someone sets forth to teach it how to be able to lie, I will get worried.

I am not worried about an AGI developing such an ability spontaneously.

7JoshuaZ12y
One of the most interesting things that I'm taking away from this conversation is that it seems that there are severe barriers to AGIs taking over or otherwise becoming extremely powerful. These largescale problems are present in a variety of different fields. Coming from a math/comp-sci perspective gives me strong skepticism about rapid self-improvement, while apparently coming from a neuroscience/cogsci background gives you strong skepticism about the AI's ability to understand or manipulate humans even if it extremely smart. Similarly, chemists seem highly skeptical of the strong nanotech sort of claims. It looks like much of the AI risk worry may come primarily from no one having enough across the board expertise to say "hey, that's not going to happen" to every single issue.
4JoshuaZ12y
What if people try to teach it about sarcasm or the like? Or simply have it learn by downloading a massive amount of literature and movies and look at those? And there are more subtle ways to learn about lying- AI being used for games is a common idea, how long will it take before someone decides to use a smart AI to play poker?

You are correct. I did not phrase my original posts carefully.

I hope that my further comments have made my position more clear?

[-][anonymous]12y20

As a supporter and donor to SI since 2006, I can say that I had a lot of specific criticisms of the way that the organization was managed. I was surprised that on many occasions management did not realize the obvious problems and fix them.

But the current management is now recognizing many of these points and resolving them one by one. If this continues, SI's future looks good.

[This comment is no longer endorsed by its author]Reply
[-][anonymous]12y20

You are not trying very hard. You missed the thrid alternative: Use your crazy fear mongering to convince him to stop, not just avoid SI.

I hope you're not just using this as a rhetorical opportunity to spread fear about SI.

1vi21maobk9vp12y
He explicitly said that the aggregate risk from the project would be way way smaller than personal risk from SIAI. Trying to convince people to stop gives SIAI impression of power and so increases its resource acquisition possibilities, which is considered bad.
[-][anonymous]12y20

If you are not totally incompetent or lying out of your ass, please stop. Do not turn it on. At least consult SI.

1Multiheaded12y
Don't feed the... um, crank.
1[anonymous]12y
A pascals mugging is worth at least a comment.

Today's ecosystems maximise entropy. Maximising primeness is different, but surely not greatly more interesting - since entropy is widely regarded as being tedious and boring.

When I read that line for the first time, I understood it. Between our two cases, the writing was the same, but the reader was different. Thus, the writing cannot be the sole cause of our different outcomes.

6JoshuaZ12y
Well, if a substantial fraction of readers read something differently or can't parse it, it does potentially reflect a problem with the writing even if some of the readers, or even most readers, do read it correctly.
6CuSithBell12y
Absolutely. I intended to convey that if you don't understand something, that the writing is misleading and inept is not the only possible reason. srdiamond is speaking with such confidence that I felt safe tabling further subtleties for now.

The reason EY wrote an entire sequence on metaethics is precisely because without the rest of the preparation people such as you who lack all that context immediately veer off course and start believing that he's asserting the existence (or non-existence) of "objective" morality, or that morality is about humans because humans are best or any other standard philosophical confusion that people automatically come up with whenever they think about ethics.

Of course this is merely a communication issue. I'd love to see a more skilled writer present EY... (read more)

An AI could be an extremely powerful optimizer without having a category for "humans" that mapped to our own. "Human," the way we conceive of it, is a leaky surface generalization.

A strong paperclip maximizer would understand humans as well as it had to to contend with us in its attempts to paperclip the universe, but it wouldn't care about us. And a strong optimizer programmed to maximize the values of "humans" would also probably understand us, but if we don't program into its values an actual category that maps to our conc... (read more)

3jsteinhardt12y
How do you intend to build a powerful optimizer without having a method of representing (or of building a representation of) the concept of "human" (where "human" can be replaced with any complex concept, even probably paperclips)? I agree that value specification is a hard problem. But I don't think the complexity of "human" is the reason for this, although it does rule out certain simple approaches like hard-coding values. (Also, since your link seems to indicate you believe otherwise, I am fairly familiar with the content in the sequences. Apologies if this statement represents an improper inference.)
7Desrtopa12y
If a machine can learn, empirically, exactly what humans are, on the most fundamental levels, but doesn't have any values associated with them, why should it need a concept of "human?" We don't have a category that distinguishes igneous rocks that are circular and flat on one side, but we can still recognize them and describe them precisely. Humans are an unnatural category. Whether a fetus, an individual in a persistent vegetative state, an amputee, a corpse, an em or a skin cell culture fall into the category of "human" depends on value-sensitive boundaries. It's not necessarily because humans are so complex that we can't categorize them in an appropriate manner for an AI (or at least, not just because humans are complex,) it's because we don't have an appropriate formulation of the values that would allow a computer to draw the boundaries of the category in a way we'd want it to. (I wasn't sure how familiar you were with the sequences, but in any case I figured it can't hurt to add links for anyone who might be following along who's not familiar.)

Agreed, but my point was that I'd settle for an AI who can translate texts as well as a human could (though hopefully a lot faster). You seem to be thinking in terms of an AI who can do this much better than a human could, and while this is a worthy goal, it's not what I had in mind.

IMO it would be enough to translate the original text in such a fashion that some large proportion (say, 90%) of humans who are fluent in both languages would look at both texts and say, "meh... close enough".

Perhaps that's why he's saying he wouldn't be willing to live there on a low salary?

Anyway, it feels completely ridiculous to talk about it in the first place. There will never be a mind that can quickly and vastly improve itself and then invent all kinds of technological magic to wipe us out. Even most science fiction books avoid that because it sounds too implausible

Do you acknowledge that :

  1. We will some day make an AI that is at least as smart as humans?
  2. Humans do try to improve their intelligence (rationality/memory training being a weak example, cyborg research being a better example, and im pretty sure we will soon design physic
... (read more)
7jsteinhardt12y
I think you missed the "quickly and vastly" part as well as the "and then invent all kinds of technological magic to wipe us out". Note I still think XiXiDu is wrong to be as confident as he is (assuming "there will never" implies >90% certainty), but if you are going to engage with him then you should engage with his actual arguments.

Google Translate's translation:

Oracle as described here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/any/a_taxonomy_of_oracle_ais/?

Why would you even got in touch with these stupid dropout? These "artificial intelligence" has been working on in the imagination of animism, respectively, if he wants to predict what course wants to be the correct predictions were.

The real work on the mathematics in a computer, gave him 100 rooms, he'll spit out a few formulas that describe the accuracy with varying sequence, and he is absolutely on the drum, they coincide with your n

... (read more)

It all depends on how small that small chance is. Pascal mugging is typically done with probabilities that are exponentially small, e.g. 10^-10 or so.

But what about if Holden is going to not recommend SIAI for donations when there's a 1% or 0.1% chance of it making that big difference.

The charity is still registered in Florida but the office is in SF. I can't find the discussion on a quick search, but all manner of places were under serious consideration - including the UK, which is a horrible choice for legal issues in so very many ways.

I'm lost again; I don't know what you're saying.

2siodine12y
I wasn't talking about you; I was talking about SI's approach in spreading and training rationality. You(SI) have Yudkowsky writing books, you have rationality minicamps, you have lesswrong, you and others are writing rationality articles and researching the rationality literature, and so on. That kind of rationality training, research, and message looks poorly leveraged in achieving your goals, is what I'm saying. Poorly leveraged for anyone trying to achieve goals. And at its most abstract, that's what rationality is, right? Achieving your goals. So, I don't care if your approach was to acquire as much relevant knowledge as possible before dabbling in debiasing, bayes, and whatnot (i.e., prioritizing the most leveraged approach). I wondering why your approach doesn't seem to be SI's approach. I'm wondering why SI doesn't prioritize rationality training, research, and message by whatever is the most leveraged in achieving SI's goals. I'm wondering why SI doesn't spread the virtue of scholarship to the detriment of training debiasing and so on. SI wants to raise the sanity waterline, is what the SI doing even near optimal for that? Knowing what SIers knew and trained for couldn't even get them to see an opportunity for trading in on opportunity cost for years; that is sad.

Not a big deal, but for me your "more" links don't seem to be doing anything. Firefox 12 here.

EDIT: Yup, it's fixed. :)

4HoldenKarnofsky12y
Thanks for pointing this out. The links now work, though only from the permalink version of the page (not from the list of new posts).

I'm not talking about SI (which I've never donated money to), I'm talking about you. And you're starting to repeat yourself.

Sure. As I said there, I understood you both to be attributing to this hypothetical "theory of mind"-less optimizer attributes that seemed to require a theory of mind, so I was confused, but evidently the thing I was confused about was what attributes you were attributing to it.

Hmm, and the foom belief (for instance) is based on Bayesian statistics how?

I don't think it's based on Bayesian statistics any more than any other belief may (or may not) be based. To take Eliezer specifically, he was interested in the Singularity - specifically, the Good/Vingean observation that a machine more intelligent than us ought to be better than us at creating a still more intelligent machine - long before he had his 'Bayesian enlightenment', so his shift to subjective Bayesianism may have increased his belief in intelligence explosions, but certainly didn't cause it.

if I use this kind of metric on L. Ron Hubbard...

It provides evidence in favour of him being correct. If there weren't other sources of information on Hubbard's activities, I'd expect him to be of genius-level intelligence.

You're familiar with the concept that someone looking like Hitler doesn't make them fascist, right?

3Nornagest12y
Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if he was; he clearly had an almost uniquely good understanding of what it takes to build a successful cult (though his early links with the OTO probably helped). New religious movements start all the time, and not one in a hundred reaches Scientology's level of success. You can be both a genius and a charlatan. It's easier to be the latter if you're the former, actually. Although his writing's admittedly pretty terrible.
1private_messaging12y
I wouldn't expect genius level technical intelligence. Self deception is important part of effective deception; you have to believe a lie to build a good lie. Avoiding self deception is important part of technical accomplishment. Furthermore, knowing that someone has no technical accomplishments is very different from not knowing if someone has technical accomplishments.
0thomblake12y
This does not seem obvious to me, in general. Do you have experience making technical accomplishments?
1private_messaging12y
Yes. Worked at 3 failed start-ups, founded successful start-up (and know of several more failed ones). Self deception is incredibly destructive to any accomplishment that is not involving deception of other people. You need to know how good your skill set is, how good your product is, how good your idea is. You can't be falling in love with brainfarts. In any case, talents require extensive practice with feedback (are massively enhanced by that), and no technical accomplishments at age above 30 pretty much excludes any possibility of technical talent of any significance nowadays. (Yes, some odd case may discover they are awesome inventor, at age past 30, but they suffer from lack of earlier practice, and it'd be incredibly foolish of anyone who knows of own natural talent since teen, not to practice properly)

Just imagine you emulated a grown up human mind

As a “superhuman AI” I was thinking about a very superhuman AI; the same does not apply to slightly superhuman AI. (OTOH, if Eliezer is right then the difference between a slightly superhuman AI and a very superhuman one is irrelevant, because as soon as a machine is smarter than its designer, it'll be able to design a machine smarter than itself, and its child an even smarter one, and so on until the physical limits set in.)

all of the hard coded capabilities of a human toddler

The hard coded capabiliti... (read more)

I'm understanding it in the typical way - the first paragraph here should be clear:

Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one's own.

An agent can model the effects of interventions on human populations (or even particular humans) without modeling their "mental states" at all.

I have never seen where the person-with-nightmares was revealed as a donor, or indeed any clue as to who they were other than 'someone Eliezer knows'. I would like some evidence, if there is any.

Also, Eliezer did not drop out of high school; he never attended in the first place, commonly known as 'skipping it', which is more common among "geniuses" (though I dislike that description).

In most such scenarios, the AI doesn't have a terminal goal of getting rid of us, but rather have it as a subgoal that arises from some larger terminal goal.

So why not the opposite, why wouldn't it have human intentions as a subgoal?

It is the case that this evidence, post update, shifts estimates significantly in direction of 'completely wrong or not even wrong' for all insights that require world class genius level intelligence, such as, incidentally, forming opinion on AI risk which most world class geniuses did not form.

Most "world class geniuses" have not opinionated on AI risk. So "forming opinion on AI risk which most world class geniuses did not form" is hardly a task which requires "world class genius level intelligence".

For a "Bayesian re... (read more)

a combination of 'high school drop out' and 'no impressive technical accomplishments' is a very strong indicator

Numbers?

If you really cared about future risk you would be working away at the problem even with a smaller salary. Focus on your work.

Downvoted for this; Rain's reply to the parent goes for me too.

Just to let you know, you've just made it on my list of the very few LW regulars I no longer bother replying to, due to the proven futility of any communications. In your case it is because you have a very evident ax to grind, which is incompatible with rational thought.

2metaphysicist12y
This comment seems strange. Is having an ax to grind opposed to rationality? Then why does Eliezer Yudkowsky, for example, not hesitate to advocate for causes such as friendly AI? Doesn't he have an ax to grind? More of one really, since this ax chops trees of gold. It would seem intellectual honesty would require that you say you reject discussions with people with an ax to grind, unless you grind a similar ax.
3shminux12y
From http://www.usingenglish.com: "If you have an axe to grind with someone or about something, you have a grievance, a resentment and you want to get revenge or sort it out." One can hardly call the unacknowledged emotions of resentment and needing a revenge/retribution compatible with rationality. srdiamond piled a bunch of (partially correct but irrelevant in the context of my comment) negative statements about SI, making these emotions quite clear.

what Romney did in the hair cutting incident

What's that about? (PM me if it's still taboo.)

4Normal_Anomaly12y
When Mitt Romney was in high school, he and some friends bullied a kid who looked (and later turned out to be) homosexual. At one point, Romney and some others grabbed the guy, held him down, and cut off a bunch of his hair with scissors.

(Note: it is not downvoted as I write this comment.)

First let me say that I have enjoyed kalla's recent contributions to this site, and hope that the following won't come across as negative. But to answer your question, I at least question both the uncontrovertiality and correctness of the summary, as well as the inference that more working memory increases abilities exponentially quickly. Kalla and I discussed some of this above and he doesn't think that his claims hinge on specific facts about working memory, so most of this is irrelevant at this point, ... (read more)

I haven't read the entire post yet, but here are some thoughts I had after reading thru to about the first ten paragraphs of "Objection 2 ...". I think the problem with assuming, or judging, that tool-AI is safer than agent-AI is that a sufficiently powerful tool-AI would essentially be an agent-AI. Humans already hack other humans without directly manipulating each other's physical persons or environments, and those hacks can drastically alter theirs or others persons and (physical) environments. Sometimes the safest course is not to listen to poisoned tongues.

This seems to propose an alternate notion of 'tool' than the one in the article.

I agree with "tool != oracle" for the article's definition.

Using your definition, I'm not sure there is any distinction between tool and agent at all, as per this comment.

I do think there are useful alternative notions to consider in this area, though, as per this comment.

And I do think there is a terminology issue. Previously I was saying "autonomous AI" vs "non-autonomous".

Right. Exercise the neglected virtue of scholarship and all that.

It's not that easy to dismiss; if it's as poorly leveraged as it looks relative to other approaches then you have little reason to be spreading and teaching SI's brand of specialized rationality (except for perhaps income).

3lukeprog12y
I'm not dismissing it, I'm endorsing it and agreeing with you that it has been my approach ever since my first post on LW.

I feel that the relevance of "Friendliness theory" depends heavily on the idea of a "discrete jump" that seems unlikely and whose likelihood does not seem to have been publicly argued for.

It has been. An AI foom could be fast enough and/or sufficiently invisible in the early stages that it's practically discrete, to us. So the AI-foom does have relevance, contra

I believe I have read the vast majority of the Sequences, including the AI-foom debate, and that this content - while interesting and enjoyable - does not have much relevance for the arguments I've made.

As a separate point, people talk about AI friendliness as a safety precaution, but I think an important thing to remember is a truly friendly self improving AGI would probably be the greatest possible thing you could do for the world. It's possible the risk of human destruction from the pursuit of FAI is larger than the possible upside, but if you include the FAI's ability to mitigate other existential risks I don't think that's the case.

Okay, make that: I strongly suspect the rationality of the rational internet would improve many orders of magnitude if all arguments about arguments were quietly deleted

3khafra12y
Every time I try to think about that, I end up thinking about logical paradoxes instead. edit for less subtlety in reponse to unexplained downvote: That argument is self-refuting.

Yeah. But there's also evidence of unfair-mindedness.

And some evidence for fair-mindedness.

Can you summarize the difference?

2private_messaging12y
Ok, I decided I'll reply to all comments on my comments that I consider to be good. The example was Ignaz Semmelweis. He had actual empirical data, he was a medical doctor, the hypothesis could have been easily tested by, you know, washing your hands. What's about him that makes him an example of someone pattern matching to a crackpot? Just the opposition to his theory, and his reaction to the opposition, understandable for any moral person of his beliefs. edit: Note that I did not look particularly close. If I look particularly close, that's when he would make no sense - cadaverous particles? Unknown cadaverous material? Dead matter makes people dead? Or had he gotten it right - little living things? How is that even possible? . Looking from too far, you only see that his view is not accepted. Looking very closely, you see that it doesn't make a lot of sense. But looking at the intermediate level, you see that he has data, and the theory is testable rather than a collection of excuses. You also see that the guy is for sure not merely doing this to make himself a living.

That is ignored, pattern matching is not good enough for you, you overcame pattern matching.

I wouldn't say that. "This looks cranky, it's probably not worth investigation further" is usually a pretty good heuristic. And, as you say, unless you actually know enough about the field to be able to be close to an expert yourself, it's often very hard to tell the difference between a logically consistent crank argument with no blatantly obvious mistakes and an argument for something that's actually correct. On the other hand, from the outside, peopl... (read more)

That fictional treatment is interesting to the point of me actually looking up the book. But ..

Yes, human-like AGI's are really scary.

The future is scary. Human-like AGI's should not intrinsically be more scary than the future, accelerated.

What you claimed was that "It is perfectly acceptable to make a reply to a publicly made comment that was itself freely volunteered", and that if someone didn't want to discuss something then they shouldn't have brought it up. In context, however, this was a reply to me saying it was probably unkind to belabor a subject to someone who'd expressed that they find the subject upsetting, which you now seem to be saying you agree with. So what are you taking issue with? I certainly didn't mean to imply that if someone finds a subject uncomfortable to ... (read more)

0wedrifid12y
I have not voted here either. As of now the conversation is all at "0" which is how I would prefer it.
0CuSithBell12y
Just wanted to clarify, as at the time your posts had both been downvoted.
0wedrifid12y
So I assumed. As a pure curiosity, if my comments were still downvoted I would have had to downvote yours despite your disclaimer. Not out of reciprocation but because the wedrifid comments being lower than the CuSithBell comments would be an error state and I would have no way to correct the wedrifid votes.
0TheOtherDave12y
That isn't actually true.
1wedrifid12y
Correct. It is instead something that people should usually say is true because belief or practical assumption that defection is impossible is a better signal to send than that they could easily defect if they wanted to but choose not to. It does so happen that I am incredibly talented when it comes to automation and have created web bots that are far more advanced than that required to prevent anything I would consider an 'error state' in voting patterns, essentially undetectably. It just so happens that I couldn't really be bothered doing so in the case of lesswrong and have something of an aversion to doing so anyway. I mean, I've already got 20k votes in this game without cheating and without even trying to (by, for example, writing posts.)
0TheOtherDave12y
Even if we agree to pretend that defection is impossible, you can also correct the wedrifid votes in a socially endorsed way by calling the attention of your allies to the exchange.
0shokwave12y
If there are viewers of the post who are sufficiently similar to you, they will correct the wedrifid votes. A strategy to ensure error states get corrected is to be sufficiently similar to more post-viewers than your interlocutor. (I corrected the conversation's votes.)
0wedrifid12y
That is a strategy to get votes. If it so happened that wedrifid was particularly different to people here then modifying himself to be more similar to the norm would result in more votes but also more error states. Because all comments of the modified wedrifid that the original wedrifid would have objected to that get upvoted would constitute "error states" from the perspective of the wedrifid making the choice of whether to self modify. ie. Ghandi doesn't take the murder pill. Just to be clear, I would not label all instances of wedrifid being downvoted or having less votes than the other person in a conversation as 'error states', just that in this specific conversation it would be a bad thing if that were the case. Obviously this is expected to be uncontroversial at least as the expected assumption from my perspective. I corrected the conversation's votes too. Someone downvoted the parent!
0shokwave12y
Ah, that was the false assumption I made. Cheers!
0wedrifid12y
To be sure, most would be. But I'm sure in all the comments I've made over the years there is at least one that I would downvote in hindsight! ;)
0CuSithBell12y
Why moreso than your interlocutor? That assumes you're conversing with people who desire error states (from your perspective).
0wedrifid12y
I think he means that if the interlocutor votes but you do not then you must get 1 more vote on average from the observers than the interlocutor does. That seems true. ie. It assumes a downvote from the interlocutor when their downvote would constitute an error state. Without that assumption the 'moreso' is required only by way of creating an error margin.
0CuSithBell12y
My conception of error states was a little more general - the advice and assumptions wouldn't apply to, say, a conversation which both participants find valuable, but in which one or both are downvoted by observers.
0wedrifid12y
Such conversations happen rather often and I usually find it sufficient reason to discontinue the otherwise useful conversation. The information gained about public perception based on the feedback from observers completely changes what can be said and modifies how any given statement will be interpreted. Too annoying to deal with and a tad offensive. Not necessarily the fault of the interlocutor but the attitudes of the interlocutor's supporters still necessitates abandoning free conversation or information exchange with them and instead treating the situation as one of social politics.
0CuSithBell12y
Well, whatever floats your boat. I wasn't trying to avoid downvotes, just ill-will. So I take it you don't find your issue resolved, but you don't think it'll be fruitful to pursue the matter? If that's the case, sorry to give you that impression.
1wedrifid12y
I didn't consider it to be an issue that particularly needed to be resolved. It was a five second fire and forget perspective given on your assertion of social norms that was a partial agreement and partial disagreement. The degree of difference is sufficiently minor that if your original injunction had either included the link or somewhat less general wording I would not have even thought it was worth an initial reply. Sure, sometimes I am known to analyse such nuances in depth but for some reason this one just didn't catch my interest.
1CuSithBell12y
All right, that's cool then. Cheerio!

I disagree that it is in general unacceptable to post information that you would not like to discuss beyond a certain point.

Without further clarification one could reasonably assume that cousin_it was okay with discussing the subject at one removal, as you suggest, but as it happens several days before the great-grandparent cousin_it explicitly stated that it would be upsetting to discuss this topic.

[-][anonymous]12y00

I'm not saying he's right, I'm saying your proposed alternative isn't even wrong.

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The AIs develop as NPCs in virtual worlds, which humans take no issue with today. This is actually a very likely path to developing AGI...

I think this is one of many possible paths, though I wouldn't call any of them "likely" to happen -- at least, not in the next 20 years. That said, if the AI is an NPC in a game, then of course it makes sense that it would harness the game for its CPU cycles; that's what it was built to do, after all.

"about as well". Human verbal communication bandwidth is at most a few measly kilobits per second

... (read more)

Yeah, the "voluntary" part is key to getting humans to like you and your project. On the flip side, illicit botnets are quite effective at harnessing "spare" (i.e., owned by someone else) computing capacity; so, it's a bit of a tradeoff.