private_messaging comments on A (small) critique of total utilitarianism - Less Wrong

36 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 26 June 2012 12:36PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (237)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 26 June 2012 01:30:36AM *  9 points [-]

There is no natural scale on which to compare utility functions. [...] Unless your theory comes with a particular [interpersonal utility comparison] method, the only way of summing these utilities is to do an essentially arbitrary choice for each individual before summing. Thus standard total utilitarianism is an arbitrary sum of ill defined, non-natural objects.

This, in my opinion, is by itself a decisive argument against utilitarianism. Without these ghostly "utilities" that are supposed to be measurable and comparable interpersonally, the whole concept doesn't even being to make sense. And yet the problem is commonly ignored routinely and nonchalantly, even here, where people pride themselves on fearless and consistent reductionism.

Note that the problem is much more fundamental than just the mathematical difficulties and counter-intuitive implications of formal utilitarian theories. Even if there were no such problems, it would still be the case that the whole theory rests on an entirely imaginary foundation. Ultimately, it's a system that postulates some metaphysical entities and a categorical moral imperative stated in terms of the supposed state of these entities. Why would we privilege that over systems that postulate metaphysical entities and associated categorical imperatives of different kinds, like e.g. traditional religions?

(If someone believes that there is a way how these interpersonally comparable utilities could actually be grounded in physical reality, I'd be extremely curious to hear it.)

Comment author: private_messaging 26 June 2012 08:00:28AM 2 points [-]

And yet the problem is commonly ignored routinely and nonchalantly, even here, where people pride themselves on fearless and consistent reductionism.

Yes. To be honest it looks like local version of reductionism takes the 'everything is reducible' in declarative sense, declaring that concepts it uses are reducible regardless of their reducibility.

Comment author: David_Gerard 26 June 2012 01:35:04PM 4 points [-]
Comment author: private_messaging 26 June 2012 03:05:37PM *  1 point [-]

Thanks! That's spot on. It's what I think much of those 'utility functions' here are. Number of paperclips in the universe, too. Haven't seen anything like that reduced to formal definition of any kind.

The way humans actually decide on actions, is by evaluating the world-difference that the action causes in world-model, everything being very partial depending to available time. The probabilities are rarely possible to employ in the world model because of the combinatorial space exploding real hard. (also, Bayesian propagation on arbitrary graphs is np-complete, in very practical way of being computationally expensive). Hence there isn't some utility function deep inside governing the choices. Doing the best is mostly about putting limited computing time to best use.

Then there's some odd use of abstractions - like, every agent can be represented with utility function therefore whatever we talk about utilities is relevant. Never mind that this utility function is trivial 1 for doing what agent chooses 0 otherwise and everything just gets tautological.