Viliam_Bur comments on A (small) critique of total utilitarianism - Less Wrong

36 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 26 June 2012 12:36PM

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Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 26 June 2012 05:21:09AM 3 points [-]

(If someone believes that there is a way how these interpersonally comparable utilities could actually be grounded in physical reality, I'd be extremely curious to hear it.)

I asked about this before in the context of one of Julia Galef's posts about utilitarian puzzles and received several responses. What is your evaluation of the responses (personally, I was very underwhelmed)?

Comment author: Viliam_Bur 26 June 2012 08:43:42AM 1 point [-]

Thanks for the link, I am very underwhelmed too.

If I understand it correctly, one suggestion is equivalent to choosing some X, and re-scaling everyone's utility function so that X has value 1. Obvious problem is the arbitrary choice of X, and the fact that in some people's original scale X may have positive, negative, or zero value.

The other suggestion is equivalent to choosing a hypothetical person P with infinite empathy towards all people, and using the utility function of P as absolute utility. I am not sure about this, but seems to me that the result depends on P's own preferences, and this cannot be fixed because without preferences there could be no empathy.