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shminux comments on A (small) critique of total utilitarianism - Less Wrong
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Just wanted to note that this is too strong a statement. There is no requirement for the 1:1 ratio in "total utilitarianism". You end up with the "repugnant conclusion" to the Parfit's "mere addition" argument as long as this ratio is finite (known as "birth-death asymmetry"). For example, one may argue that killing 1 person to save 5 equally happy people is wrong, because killing is wrong, but as long as there is a ratio they would agree with (or, more generally, an equivalent number of saved people for each number of killed people), the repugnant conclusion argument still goes through.
I was more thinking of a total asymmetry rather that a ratio. But yes, if you have a finite ratio, then you have the repugnant conclusion (even though it's not total utilitarianism unless the ratio is 1:1).
Exactly! I've been pointing this out too. If you assume preference utilitarianism, then killing counts as wrong, at least if the beings you kill want to stay alive further (or have detailed future plans even). So the replecement only works if you increase the number of the new beings, or make them have more satisfied preferences. The rest of the argument still works, but this is important to point out.