You are making an expected-value calculation as a teacher, perhaps subconsciously
No. I'm making the assumption that, until someone has actually tried something, they aren't in a position to say whether or not it works. Once someone has actually tried something, and it doesn't work, then I find something else for them to do. I don't give up and say, "oh, well I guess that doesn't work for you, then."
When I do a one-on-one consult, I don't charge someone until and unless they get the result we agree on as a "success" for that consultation. If I can't get the result, I don't get paid, and I'm out the time.
Do I make sure that the definition of "success" is reasonably in scope for what I can accomplish in one session? Sure. But I don't perform any sort of filtering (other than that which may occur by selection or availability bias, e.g. having both motivation and funds) to determine who I work with.
You are also taking EY's claim that not every technique works well for every person, and caricaturing it as the claim that there is a 1-1 correspondence between people and techniques that work for them. He never said that.
I didn't say he did, or that anybody did. What I said is that people assume they are unique and special and nothing will work for them. A LOT of people believe this, because they're under the mistaken impression that they tried 50 different things, when in fact they've been making the same mistakes, 50 different times, without ever being aware of the mistake.
The specific comments Eliezer has made, about people erroneously assuming that what worked for them should work for other people, were taken from real life and were, I think, also true and correct.
No argument there. However, when people assume that what worked for them will work for other people, they are actually mostly right.
What they are mistaken about is that 1) they're actually fully communicating what they did, and that 2) other people will be able to accurately reproduce the internal steps as well as the external and easy-to-describe ones.
So I agree at the level of the result, but I disagree about the cause. At the brain hardware level, human beings are just not that different from one another. We differ more at the software, filtering, and meta-cognitive levels, which is where the details of communication and teaching trip up the transfer of effective techniques.
In order to convince me that those specific examples were wrong,
Why would I want to? My point is only that Eliezer whining about things not working and demanding proof is counterproductive to his own goals and counter to his professed values and art. This is independent of whether he gives up or not, or whose advice or example he seeks.
I would rather see you narrow your claims to something reasonable
What claims do you mean?
I would rather see you narrow your claims to something reasonable
What claims do you mean?
The gist of your top-level comment here is that your techniques work for everyone; and if they don't work for someone, it's that person's fault.
Reply to: Practical Advice Backed By Deep Theories
Inspired by what looks like a very damaging reticence to embrace and share brain hacks that might only work for some of us, but are not backed by Deep Theories. In support of tinkering with brain hacks and self experimentation where deep science and large trials are not available.
Eliezer has suggested that, before he will try a new anti-akraisia brain hack:
This doesn't look to me like an expected utility calculation, and I think it should. It looks like an attempt to justify why he can't be expected to win yet. It just may be deeply wrongheaded.
I submit that we don't "need" (emphasis in original) this stuff, it'd just be super cool if we could get it. We don't need to know that the next brain hack we try will work, and we don't need to know that it's general enough that it'll work for anyone who tries it; we just need the expected utility of a trial to be higher than that of the other things we could be spending that time on.
So… this isn't other-optimizing, it's a discussion of how to make decisions under uncertainty. What do all of us need to make a rational decision about which brain hacks to try?
(can these books be judged by their covers? how does this chance vary with the type of exposure? what would you need to do to understand enough about a hack that would work to increase its chance of seeming deeply compelling on first exposure?)
… and, what don't we need?
How should we decide how much time to spend gathering data and generating estimates on matters such as this? How much is Eliezer setting himself up to lose, and how much am I missing the point?