It means that one of your decisions places more weight on one sub-aspect of future outcomes (the suffering and injustice your progeny might have experienced or created) more than other aspects (the suffering and injustice your progeny might have directly or indirectly prevented) which third parties might see as equally important. If these decisions reflect your actual values then they aren't foolish or cretinous... but I'm not sure I understand your actual values. Is there a consequentialist argument by which potential future worlds which include your descendants would be inferior to worlds where that space is filled up by the marginal additional offspring of others instead? Is there a deontological ethic which you should follow but others shouldn't, or one which everyone should follow in which "we should undergo voluntary self-extinction" is the correct ethical result?
He writes this essay in response to someone who writes about their "gut level emotional response when [they] thought about dogs being likely killed by an as yet unproven and dangerous medical procedure."
I recommend the whole thing. If you are going to read it all, note that some text is duplicated near the end, though there is one paragraph at the very end which is not.
First, he describes how animals share empathy and emotions with humans:
Next, he explains ethics in a way that seems to correspond with a lot of Eliezer's writing:
Next, he tackles questions about whether animal research is, on net, beneficial:
Next, he goes into details of what animal lifespan research entails:
The ending is poignant, and I think an excusable violation of Godwin's law:
Darwin does not mention it in this essay, but he is a vegetarian, and his dog is cryopreserved at Alcor.