timtyler comments on No One Knows Stuff - Less Wrong
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As I recall, I made this up to suit my own ends :-(
Wikipedia quibbles with me significantly - stressing the idea that utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism:
"Utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall perceivable utility: that is, its contribution to happiness or pleasure as summed among an ill-defined group of people. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome."
I don't really want "utilitarianism" to refer to a form of consequentialism - thus my crude attempt at hijacking the term :-|
I hadn't even considered the possibility that your definition might lead to a 'utilitarianism' that is not consequentialist. In some circles, the two terms are used interchangeably. Sounds akin to 'rule utilitarianism', but more interesting - the right action is one that maximizes expected utility, regardless of its actual consequences. Does that sound like a good enough characterization?
I would still be prepared to call an agent "utilitarian" if it operated via maximising expected utility - even if its expectations turned out to be completely wrong, and its actions were far from those that would have actually maximised utility.
Humans are often a bit like this. They "expect" that hoarding calories is a good idea - and so that is what they do. Actually this often turns out to be not so smart. However, this flaw doesn't make humans less utilitarian in my book - rather they have some bad priors - and they are wired-in ones that are tricky to update.