To be really clear, the problem with Pascal's Mugging is that even after eliminating infinity as a coherent scenario, any simplicity prior which defines simplicity strictly over computational complexity will apparently yield divergent returns for aggregative utility functions when summed over all probable scenarios, because the material size of possible scenarios grows much faster than their computational complexity (Busy Beaver function or just tetration).

That seems overly specific. There are many other ways in which priors assigned to highly speculative propositions may not be low enough, or when impact of other available actions on a highly speculative scenario be under-evaluated.

The problem with Pascal's Wager on the other hand is that it shuts down an ongoing conversation about plausibility by claiming that it doesn't matter how small the probability is, thus averting a logically polite duty to provide evidence and engage with counterarguments.

To me, Pascal's Wager is defined by a speculative scenario for which there exist no evidence, which has high enough impact to result in actions which are not based on any evidence, despite the uncertainty towards speculative scenarios.

How THE HELL does the above (ok, I didn't originally include the second quotation, but still) constitute confusion of Pascal's Wager and Pascal's Mugging, let alone "willful misinterpretation" ?