I mean that value systems are a function of physically existing things, the way a 747 is a function of physically existing things, but we have no evidence suggesting that objective morality is an existing thing.

But I wans't saying that. I am arguing that moral claims truth values, that aren;t indexed to individuals or socieities. That epistemic claim can be justified by appeal to an ontoogy including Moral Objects, but that is not how I am justifying it: my argument is based on rationality, as I have said many times.

We have standards by which we judge beauty, and we project those values onto the world, but the standards are in us, not outside of us.

We have standards by which we jusdge the truth values of mathematical claims, and they are inside us too, and that doens't stop mathematics being objective. Relativism requires that truthvalues are indexed to us, that there is one truth for me and another for thee. Being located in us, or being operated by us are not sufficient criteria for being indexed to us.

We can see, in reductionist terms, how the existence of ethical systems within beings, which would feel from the inside like the existence of an objective morality, would come about.

We can see, in reductionistic terms, how the entities could converge on a unform set of truth values. There is nothing non reductionist about anything I have said. Reductionsm does not force one answer to metaethics.

reate a reasoning engine that doesn't have those ethical systems built into it, and it would have no reason to care about them.

Provide evidence that ethics is a whole separate modue, and not part of general reasoning ability.

You can't build a tower on empty air. If a debate has been going on for hundreds of years, stretching back to an argument which rests on "this defies our moral intuitions, therefore it's wrong," and that was never addressed with "moral intuitions don't work that way," then the debate has failed to progress in a meaningful direction, much as a debate over whether a tree falling in an empty forest makes a sound has if nobody bothers to dissolve the question.

Please explain why moral intuitions don't work that way.

Please provide some foundations for somethng that aren;t unjustofied by anything more foundationa.

That's not an example. Please provide an actual one

You can select one at random. obviously.

Sure, but it's also what philosophers say about each other, all the time.

No, philosophers don't regularly accuse each other of being incpompetent..just of being wrong. There's a difference.

Wittgenstein condemned practically all his predecessors and peers as incompetent, and declared that he had solved nearly the entirety of philosophy.

You are inferring a lot from one example.

Philosophy as a field is full of people banging their heads on a wall at all those other idiots who just don't get it. "Most philosophers are incompetent, except for the ones who're sensible enough to see things my way," is a perfectly ordinary perspective among philosophers.

Nope.