The standards by which we judge the truth of mathematical claims are not just inside us.
How do we judge claims about transfinite numbers?
One object plus another object will continue to equal two objects whether or not there are any living beings to make that judgment. Math is not something we've created within ourselves, but something we've discovered and observed.
If our mathematical models ever stop being able to predict in advance the behavior of the universe, then we will have rather more reason to doubt that the math inside us is different from the math outside of us.
Mathematics isn't physics. Mathematicians prove theorems from axioms, not from experiments.
Provide evidence that ethics is a whole separate modue, and not part of general reasoning ability.
My assertion is that, if we judge ethics as a rational system, innate values are among the axioms that the system is predicated on.
Not necessarily. Eg, for utilitarians, values are just facts that are plugged into the metaethics to get concrete actions.
You cannot prove the axioms of a system within that system, and an ethical system predicated on premises like "happiness is good" will not itself be able to prove the goodness of happiness.
Metaethical systems usually have axioms like "Maximising utility is good".
While we could suppose that the axioms which our ethical systems are predicated on are objectively true, we have considerable reason to believe that we would have developed these axioms for adaptive reasons, even if there were no sense in which objective moral axioms exist, and we do not have evidence which suggests that objective, independently existing true moral axioms do exist.
I am not sure what you mean by "exist" here. Claims are objectively true if most rational minds converge on them. That doesn't require Objective Truth to float about in space here.
Please explain why moral intuitions don't work that way.
People can be induced to strongly support opposing responses to the same moral dilemma, just by rephrasing it differently to trigger different heuristics. Our moral intuitions are incoherent.
Does that mean we can;t use moral intuitions at all, or that they must be used with caution?
I don't think I understand this, can you rephrase it?
Philosphers talk about intuitions, because that is the term for something foundational that seems true, but can't be justified by anything more foundational. LessWrongians don't like intuitions, but don't see to be able to explain how to manage without them.
I do not recall any creditable attempts, which places me in a disadvantaged position with respect to locating them.
Did you post any comments explaining to the professional philosophers where they had gone wrong?
Imagine the conversation we're having now going on for eighty years, and neither of us has changed our minds. If you didn't find my arguments convincing, and I hadn't budged in all that time, don't you'd think you'd start to suspect that I was particularly thick?
I don;'t see the problem. Philosophical competence is largely about understanding the problem.
Mathematics isn't physics. Mathematicians prove theorems from axioms, not from experiments.
Yes, but the fact that the universe itself seems to adhere to the logical systems by which we construct mathematics gives credence to the idea that the logical systems are fundamental, something we've discovered rather than producing. We judge claims about nonobserved mathematical constructs like transfinites according to those systems,
Metaethical systems usually have axioms like "Maximising utility is good".
But utility is a function of values. A pa...
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