SaidAchmiz comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (5th thread, March 2013) - Less Wrong

27 Post author: orthonormal 01 April 2013 04:19PM

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Comment author: SaidAchmiz 15 May 2013 03:51:31PM 0 points [-]

On reflection, the fact that an atheist would be able to come up with an argument for a god that's more persuasive to atheists is unsurprising, especially when you consider the fact that most religious people don't become religious via being persuaded by arguments. It's definitely still amusing, though.

I'm definitely aware of Tegmark's theory, though I admit I hadn't considered it as an argument for any kind of theism. That seems like an awfully parochial and boring application of the ultimate ensemble, although you're right that it can have that sort of application... although, if we define "supernatural" entities to mean "ontologically basic mental entities" a la Richard Carrier, would it really be the case that Tegmark's multiverse implies the existence of such? I'm not sure it does.

Meyer's argument begins with premises that are hilariously absurd. Defining entities as being able to be causes of themselves? Having "entities" even able to be "causes"? What? And all this without the slightest discussion of what kinds of things an "entity" can even be, or what it means to "exist"? No, this is nonsense.

Comment author: drnickbone 15 May 2013 05:16:25PM *  1 point [-]

Meyer's argument begins with premises that are hilariously absurd. Defining entities as being able to be causes of themselves? Having "entities" even able to be "causes"?

I think this is mostly a presentational issue. The purpose of the argument was to construct a non-strict partial order "<=" out of the causal relation, and that requires x<=x. This is just to enable the application of Zorn's Lemma.

To avoid the hilarity of things being causes of themselves, we could easily adjust the definition of <= so that "x<=y" if and only if "x=y or x is a cause of y". Or the argument could be presented using a strict partial order <, under which nothing will be a cause of itself. The argument doesn't need to analyse "entity" or "exists" since such an analysis is inessential to the premises.

And finally, please remember that the whole thing was not meant to be taken seriously; though rather amusingly, Alexander Pruss (whose site I linked to) apparently has been treating it as a serious argument. Oh dear.