= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
CCC comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (5th thread, March 2013) - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (1750)
That is entirely the right question to ask. And the answer is, I don't have the faintest idea.
The question there is, what would a universe without God look like? And that question is one that I can't answer. I'd guess that such a universe, if it were possible, would have more-or-less entirely arbitrary and random natural laws; I'd imagine that it would be unlikely to develop intelligent life; and it would be unlikely for said intelligent life, if it developed, to be able to gather any understanding of the random and arbitrary natural laws at all.
The trouble is, this line of reasoning promptly falls into the same trouble as any other anthropic argument. The fact that I'm here, thinking about it, means that there is intelligent life in this universe. So a universe without intelligent life is counterfactual, right from the start. I knew that when I started constructing the argument; I can't be sure that I'm not constructing an argument that's somehow flawed. It's very easy, when I'm sure of the answer, to create an argument that's more rationalising than rationality; and it can be hard to tell if I'm doing that.
Doesn't this argument Prove Too Much by also showing that without a Metagod, God should be expected to have arbitrary and random governing principles? The universe is ordered, but trying to explain that by appealing to an ordered God begs the question of what sort of ordered Metagod constructed the first one.
I don't think that necessarily follows. A sufficiently intelligent mind (and I think I can assume that if God exists, then He is sufficiently intelligent) can impose self-consistency and order on itself.
This also leads to the possible alternate hypothesis that the universe is, in fact, an intelligent mind in and of itself; that would be pantheism, I think.
Of course, this does not prevent the possibility of a Pebblesorter God, or a Paperclipper God. To find out whether these are the case, we can look at the universe; there certainly don't seem to be enough paperclips around for a Paperclipper God. There might well be a Beetler God, of course; there's plenty of beetles. Or a Planetsorter God, a large-scale variant on the Pebblesorter; as far as we know, all the planets are neatly sorted into groups around stars. Order, by itself, does not necessarily mean an order that we would have to agree with.
This begs Eliezer's question, I think. Intelligence itself is highly non-arbitrary and rule-governed, so by positing that God is sufficiently intelligent (and the bar for sufficiency here is pretty high), you're already sneaking in a bunch of unexplained orderliness. So in this particular case, no, I don't think you can assume that if God exists, then He is sufficiently intelligent, just like I can't respond to your original point by assuming that if the universe exists, then it is orderly.
I disagree. Intelligence makes its own rules once it is there; but the human brain is one of the most arbitrary and hard-to-understand pieces of equipment that we know about. There have been a lot of very smart people trying to build AI for a very long time; if the creation of intelligence were highly non-arbitrary and followed well-known rules, we would have working AI by now.
So, yes; I think that intelligence can arise from arbitrary randomness. I'd go further, and claim that if it can't arise from arbitrary randomness then it can't exist at all; either intelligence arose in the form of God who then created an orderly universe (the theist hypothesis), or an arbitrary universe came into existence with random (and suspiciously orderly) laws that then led to intelligence in the form of humanity (the atheist hypothesis).
Fair enough. Then let me put it this way; if God is not sufficiently intelligent, then God would be unable to create the ordered universe that we see; in this case, an ordered universe would be no more likely than it would be without God. An ordered universe is therefore evidence in favour of the claim that if God exists, then He is sufficiently intelligent to create an ordered universe.
I agree that intelligence itself is an optimizing process (which I presume is what you mean by "making its own rules"), but it is also the product of an optimizing process, natural selection. Your claim that it is arbitrary confuses the map and the territory. Just because we don't fully understand the rules governing the functioning of the brain does not mean it is arbitrary. Maybe it is weak evidence for this claim, but I think that is swamped by the considerable evidence that intelligence is exquisitely optimized for various quite complex purposes (and also that it operates in accord with the orderly laws of nature).
Also, smart people have been able to build AIs (albeit not AGIs), and the procedure for building machines that can perform intelligently at various tasks involves quite a bit of design. We may not know what rules govern our brain, but when we build systems that mimic (and often outperform) aspects of our mental function, we do it by programming rules.
I suspect, though, that we are talking past each other a bit here. I think you're using the words "random" and "arbitrary" in ways with which I am unfamiliar, and, I must confess, seem confused. In what sense is the second horn of your dilemma an "arbitrary universe [coming] into existence with random (and suspiciously orderly) laws"? What does it mean to describe the universe as arbitrary and random while simultaneously acknowledging its orderliness? Do you simply mean "uncaused", because (a) that is not the only alternative to theism, and (b) I don't see why one would expect an uncaused universe (as opposed to a universe picked using a random selection process) not to have orderly laws.
OK, but this doesn't respond to Eliezer's point. If you conditionalize on the existence of (a Christianish) God, then plausibly an intelligent God is more likely than an unintelligent one, given the orderliness of the universe. But Eliezer was contesting your claim that the orderliness of the universe is evidence for the existence of God, while also not being evidence for the existence of a Metagod.
So Eliezer's question is, if P(orderliness | God) > P(orderliness | ~God), then why not also P(intelligent God | Metagod) > P(intelligent God | ~Metagod)? Your response is basically that P(intelligent God | God & orderliness) > P(~intelligent God | God & orderliness). How does this help?
What I mean is, not planned. If I toss a fair coin ten thousand times, I have an outcome (a string of heads and tails) that would be arbitrary and random. It is possible that this sequence will be an exactly alternating sequence of heads and tails (HTHTHTHTHTHT...) extending for all ten thousand tosses (a very orderly result); but if I were to actually observe such an orderly result, I would suspect that there is an intelligent agent controlling that result in some manner. (That is what I mean by 'suspiciously orderly' - it's orderly enough to suggest planning).
Well, it makes sense that P(intelligent God | Metagod) > P(intelligent God | ~Metagod). And therefore P(Metagod | Metametagod) > P(Metagod | ~Metametagod), and so on to infinity; but an infinity of metagods and metametagods and so on is clearly an absurd result. The chain has to stop somewhere, and that 'somewhere' has to be with an intelligent being. Therefore, there has to be an intelligent being that can either exist without being created by an intelligent creator, or that can create itself in some sort of temporal loop. (As I understand it, the atheist viewpoint is that a human is an intelligent being that can exist without requiring an intelligent creator).
And my point was that P(intelligent God | ~Metagod) is non-zero. The chain can stop. P(Metagod | intelligent God) may be fairly high; but P(Metametagod | intelligent God) must be lower (since P(Metametagod | Metagod) < 1). If I go far enough along the chain, I expect to find that P(Metametametametametametametagod | intelligent God) is fairly low.
Does that help?
That's not clear.. There is presumably something like that in Tegmark's level IV.
You haven't established the 'has to' (p==1.0). You can always explain Order coming from Randomness by assuming enough randomness. Any finite string can be found with p>0.5 in a sufficiently long infinite string. Assuming huge amounts of unobserved randomness is not elegant, but neither is assuming stacks of metagods. Your prreferred option is to reject god-needs-a-metagod without giving a reason, but just because the alternatives seem worse. But that is very much a subjective judgement.
Assume that P(%5E{x+1})
god | ^{x})
god) = Q, where Q < 1.0 for all x. Consider an infinite chain; what is P(^{\infty})
god|god)?
This would be P(^{x})
god|god) = 
. Since Q<1.0, this limit is equal to zero.
...hmmm. Now that I think about it, that applies for any constant Q. It may be possible to craft a function Q(x) such that the limit as x approaches infinity is non-zero; for example, if I set Q(1)=0.75 and then Q(x) for x>1 such that, when multiplied by the product of all the Q(x)s so far, the distance between the previous product and 0.5 is halved (thus Q(2)=5/6, Q(3)=9/10, Q(4)=17/18, and so on); then Q(x) asymptotically approaches 1, while P(^{\infty})
god|god) = 0.5.
You're right, and thank you for pointing that out. I've now shown that p<1.0 (it's still pretty high, I'd think, but it's not quite 1).
You seem to be neglecting the possibility of a cyclical god structure. Something which might very well be possible in Tegmark level IV if all the gods are computable.
I don't really follow this. Things in Platonia or Tegmark level IV don't have separate probabilities Any coherent mathematical structure is guaranteed to exist. (And infinite ones are no problem). So the probabilty of a infinite stack of metagods depends on the coherence of a stack of metagods being considered a coherent mathematical structure, and the likelihood of our living in a Tegmark IV.
I don't really follow this. Things in Platonia or Tegmark level IV don't have separate probabilities Any coherent mathematical stucture is guranteed to exist. (And infinite ones are no problem). So the probabilty of a infinite stack of metagods depends on the coherence of a stack of metagods being considered a coherent mathematical structure, and the likelihood of our living in a Tegmark IV.
It's not arbitrary in the sense of random. It's arbitrary in the sense of not following obvious apriori principles. It may impose its own higher-order rules, but that is something that happens in a system that already combines order and chaos in a very subtle and hard to duplicate way. Simple, comprehensible order of the kind you detect and admire in the physical unverse at large is easier to do than designing a brain. No one can build an AGI, but physicists build models of physical systems all the time.
Agreed. The human brain is the output of a long, optimising process known as evolution.
Yes. Simple, comprehensible order is one of the easiest things to design; as you say, physicists do it all the time. But a lot of systems that are explicitly not designed (for example, the stock market) are very chaotic and extremely hard to model accurately.
I still don't see why you would think order of a kind comprehensible to humans in the universe is evidence it was designed by a much smarter entity.
I'm trying to use it as evidence that it was designed at all.
Would it's being designed by a Matrix Lord of non-superhuman intelligence help your case?
Did you mean to say "can not" in that sentence ?
No, I did not.
I'm not sure I understand your argument, then. If intelligence can arise from "arbitrary randomness", then a universe that contains intelligence is evidence neither for nor against a creator deity, once you take the anthropic principle into account.
Yes, intelligence can arise from arbitrary randomness; I'm not using intelligence as evidence of an intelligent Creator. Using intelligence as an indicator of anything falls foul of anthropic principles.
My argument is that a universe that's as straightforward, as comprehensible in its natural laws, as our universe seems about as unlikely as tossing a coin ten thousand times and getting an exact alternating pattern of heads and tails (HTHTHTHTHTHT...), or a lottery draw that consists of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 in that order.
Isn't this just the anthropic principle in action ? Mathematically speaking, the probability of "123456" is exactly the same as that of "632415" or any other sequence. We humans only think that "123456" is special because we especially enjoy monotonically increasing numbers.
Richard Dawkins does. The universe we see (he says somewhere; this is not a quote) is exactly what a world without God would look like: a world in which, on the whole, to live is to suffer and die for no reason but the pitiless working out of cause and effect, out of which emerged the blind, idiot god of evolution. A billion years of cruelty so vast that mountain ranges are made of the dead. A world beyond the reach of God.
To be fair, this type of argument only eliminates benevolent and powerful gods. It does not screen out actively malicious gods, indifferent gods, or gods who are powerless to do much of anything.
I don't see what's so bad about mountain ranges being made of dead bodies. The creatures that once used those bodies aren't using them anymore - those mere atoms might as well get recycled to new uses. The problem of death is countered by the solution of the afterlife; an omniscient God would know exactly what the afterlife is like, and an omniscient benevolent God could allow death if the afterlife is a good place. (I don't have any proof of the existance of the afterlife at hand, unfortunately).
Suffering, now; suffering is a harder problem to deal with. Which leads around to the question - what is the purpose of the universe? If suffering exists, and God exists, then suffering must have been put into the universe on purpose. For what purpose? A difficult and tricky question.
What I suspect, is that suffering is there for its long-term effects on the human psyche. People exposed to suffering often learn a lot from it, about how to handle emotions; people can form long-term bonds of friendship over a shared suffering, can learn wisdom by dealing with suffering. Yes, some people can shortcut the process, figuring out the lessons without undergoing the lesson; but many people can't.
This is using your brain as an outcome pump. Start with a conclusion to be defended, observations that prima facie blow it out of the water, and generate ideas for holding onto the conclusion regardless. You can do it with anything, and it's an interesting exercise in creative thinking to come up with a defence of propositions such as that the earth is flat, that war is good for humanity, or that you're Jesus. (Also known as retconning.) But it is not a way of arriving at the truth of anything.
What your outcome pump has come up with is:
War really is good for humanity! But what then is the optimal amount of suffering? Just the amount we see? More? Less?
I expect that the answer is that the omniscience and omnibenevolence of God imply that what we see is indeed just the right amount. God is perfect, therefore this is the best of all possible worlds. But that would just be more outcome-pumping. No new data or reasoning is entering the argument: the idea that God has got it just right has been generated by the desired conclusion.
At some point one has to ask, where did that conclusion come from? Why do I believe it so intensely as to make all of the retconning seem sensible? Why indeed? Because earlier you expressed only a lukewarm belief:
I don't see how this is any different with what Richard Dawkins is doing with his claim.
You mean, Dawkins has latched onto atheism for irrational reasons and is generating whatever argument will sustain it, without regard to the evidence?
For anyone who has taken on the mantle of professional atheist, as Dawkins has, there is a danger of falling into that mode of argument. Do you have any reason to think he has in fact fallen?
YouTube source (44s)
I am itching to downvote Dawkins for that.
Dawkins's "the world looks like we would expect it to look like if there were no God argument" strikes me as a case of this. Notice how religious people claim to see evidence of God's work all around them.
Dawkins has a case for drawing that conclusion. He is not merely pointing at the world and saying "Look! No God!" I have not actually read him beyond soundbites, merely know his reputation, so I can't list all the arguments he makes, but one of them, I know, is the problem of evil. The vast quantity of suffering in the world is absolutely what you would expect if there is no benevolent deity overseeing the show, and is not what you would expect if there were one. (It could be what you would expect if there were an evil deity in charge, but Dawkins is arguing with the great faiths, none of which countenance any such being except in at most a subordinate role.)
Theists, on the other hand, must work hard to reconcile suffering with omnibenevolence, and what they work hard at is not the collecting of evidence, but the erection of an argumentative structure with the bottom line written in advance. For example, "suffering is good for the soul", or "suffering is punishment for past sins", or "man is inherently depraved and corrupt, and suffering is the inevitable consequence of his fallen state", or just "God works in mysterious ways".
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, so to someone for whom "There is no God" is a sufficiently extraordinary claim, the existence of suffering may be insufficiently extraordinary evidence. But then one must ask, according to the principle of Follow-the-Improbability, where did that extraordinariness come from? What evidence originally led from ignorance of God (for we are all born ignorant) to such certainty that the Problem Of Evil becomes the problem of reconciling Evil with God, not the problem of whether that God really exists?
If they're just pointing at things and saying "Look! God's work!", then that would be an example of the fallacy in the quote you linked. More often, though, they're making the argument from design, pointing at specific things in the world that looked designed, and concluding the existence of a designer. This is not a stupid argument, but in the end it didn't work. Historically, natural selection wasn't invented by atheists striving to explain away apparent design: Darwin was driven from his theism by the mechanism that he found.
I don't see how so.
I can imagine lots of ways in which the world would be different if a superpowerful superbeing was around with the ability and will to shape reality for whatever purpose -- but when I imagine the superbeing's absence it looks like the world around us.
When I try to ask the theists what the world would have looked like without God, I don't get very convincing answers.
The trouble with theists considering a "world without God" is they generally think God created the world, so without him there wouldn't be a world at all. Obviously, this is not what we observe.
On the other hand, attempting to point at things which clearly couldn't exist without a Creator generally falls into the category of "god of the gaps", both in terms of the criticisms it levies and, alarmingly often, in terms of already-understood science.
Perhaps a world of Boltzmann Brains? But then, I've never really seen the logic behind "if there was no God, everything would just be random" - where would this randomness come from, anyway?
On the other hand, a world without any life at all, or at least intelligent life, could be argued - after all, most of the universe is lifeless as it is, and probably always will be. But then we run into all sorts of awkward anthropic issues where nobody's quite sure how to reason about probabilities anymore. Still, if God leads to intelligent agents with high probability, then our very existence seems to count as evidence for Him - even if we're reasoning a priori from "I think therefore I am."
But let's assume life exists, which it does, so that's a fairly solid assumption. God is good, right? Clearly a torture-world would be proof of his nonexistance, as what sort of omnibenevolent superbeing would tolerate it? But then there is disagreement on how much pain would prove the nonexistence of God. Some say a sufficiently superintelligent God should be able to arrange for no pain at all without sacrificing what we value. Others claim that morality actually requires unfathomably vast numbers of people's horrific suffering because of Justice or somesuch.
And, of course, you get the people who claim that the world they observe fits exactly with what they deduce a priori about a world without God. On the other hand, these people never seem to make original predictions, which leads me to believe that their deductions are actually incorporating things science has already told them about this world instead of the logical consequences of their priors. (The same goes for believers who claim this is exactly what they would expect a world with God to look like if they found one.)
So ... yeah, I have no idea why I wrote this long, rambling comment.
I agreed with that, although it seems
Well, the natural theology seems to suffer from the problem of arbitrary, easy-to-vary hypotheses. One could, as an alternative, engage in reflection on which hypotheses are non-arbitrary and hard to vary (otherwise know as, whisper it: metaphysics).
Looking at your examples, they all seem to boil down to "things that violate this-world!ArisKatsaris's intuitions about how the world works". If you lived in a world were any of the things you described in your comment occurred you wouldn't be impressed by them. To adapt the post I linked to: If you demand miracles, miracles won't convince you.
What does being "impressed" have to do with anything? I'm talking about believing in someone's existence.
I don't deny the existence of the Pope. I don't deny the existence of the American President. I'm not impressed by either but I don't deny them. I don't deny the past existence of dinosaurs. I don't even deny the existence of King David and Agamemnon as historical figures. I make fun of the people who deny the existence of historical Jesus (or Socrates or Mohammed). So why would I deny the existence of God, if I saw a world that looked to me like it has more evidence about his existence than his non-existence?
You are assuming that I started looking this from a non-believer's perspective, but it's what made me an unbeliever. Back when I was at school I started by just disbelieving in the Genesis story because the world looked like it would look as if evolution was true -- a God throwing around dinosaur bones to prank us was even more incompatible with Christianity than "look, it's not meant as a literal story". Then step-by-step, more and more things spoken by Christianity just didn't seem to fit the world around me. Not the omnibenevolence and omnipotence of god, not the nature of the soul (why does the mind depend so much on biochemistry of the brain). By my college years only some unanswered questions about the mystery of consciousness or existence could be said to even be used as a hole to fit a relevant God in.
From "Christian" in my childhood to "Christian mostly but I don't accept everything that religion says" in highschool, to "agnostic" in college, to "agnostic-leaning-atheist" in my post-college years, and finally having the guts to just say "atheist".
I didn't start from a position of disbelief which I found ways to maintain -- I started from a position of belief which could simply no longer be honestly maintained in the face of the evidence.
But they can only see it after the fact. I am not aware of any case in which a theist said "If God exists, we would expect to see X. Now we haven't seen X yet, but God exists so we probably will observe X some time in the near future." And then we observed X.
Religious people do this all the time; they call it "fulfilling prophecies". Atheists usually discover that such prophecies are hopelessly vague, but theists disagree; they believe the prophecies to be quite specific; or, at least, specific enough for their purposes, given the fact that their God obviously exists.
That may be what I am doing. But sometimes, there are things that really are different to what the prima facie evidence seems to suggest. Heat is not an effect of the transfer of a liquid called phlogiston; the Sun does not go round the Earth; the Sun is bigger than the Earth. Sometimes, there are hidden complexities that change the meaning of some of the evidence.
Ah, an excellent question. I can't be sure, but I expect that the optimal amount of suffering is a good deal less than we see.
This leads to the obvious question; why would a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent God create a universe with more suffering than is necessary? This requires that there be something that is more important than reducing suffering; such that the increased suffering optimises better for this other something. I do think that this something that is more important exists, and I think that it is free will. Free will implies the freedom to cause unnecessary suffering in others; and some people do this. War, for example, is a direct consequence of the free will of military leaders and politicians.
I don't see that as necessarily a statement of lukewarm belief. I just didn't couch it in impressive-sounding terms.
What about suffering which is not caused by humans ? For example, consider earthquakes, floods, volcano eruptions, asteroid impacts, plague outbreaks, and the like. To use a lighter example, do we really need as many cases of the common cold as we are currently experiencing all over the world ?
The common answer to this question is something along the lines of "God moves in mysterious ways" -- which does make sense once you posit such a God -- but you said that "the optimal amount of suffering is a good deal less than we see", so perhaps you have a different answer ?
I think that suffering that is limited only to what humans cannot prevent would be the optimal amount. This is because it is the amount that would exist in the optimal universe, i.e. where each individual human strives to be maximally good.
As for cases of the common cold, a lot of those are preventable; given proper medical research and distribution of medicines. Since they are preventable, I think that they should be prevented.
Well, technically, volcano eruptions and such can be prevented as well, given a sufficient level of technology. But let's stick with the common cold as the example -- why does it even exist at all ? If the humans could eventually prevent it, thus reducing the amount of suffering, then the current amount of suffering is suboptimal. When you said that "the optimal amount of suffering is a good deal less than we see", I assumed that you were talking about the unavoidable amount of suffering caused by humans exercising their free will. The common cold, however, is not anthropogenic.
...that is a very good question. The best idea that I can come up with is that the optimal amount of suffering is time-dependent in some way. That, if the purpose of suffering is to try to improve people to some ideal, then a society that produces people who are closer to that ideal to start with would require less suffering. And that a society in which the cure to the common cold can be found, and can then be distributed to everyone, is closer to that ideal society than a society in which that is not the case.
That kind of makes sense. Of course, the standard objection to your answer is something like the following: "This seems like a rather inefficient way to design the ideal society. If I was building intelligent agents from scratch, and I wanted them to conform to some ideal; then I'd just build them to do that from the start, instead of messing around with tsunamis and common colds".
What makes suffering any harder a problem than death? Surely the same strategy works equally well in both cases.
More precisely... the "solution of the afterlife" is to posit an imperceptible condition that makes the apparent bad thing not so bad after all, despite the evidence we can observe. On that account, sure, it seems like we die, but really (we posit) only our bodies die and there's this other non-body thing, the soul, which is what really matters which isn't affected by that.
Applied to suffering, the same solution is something like "sure, it seems like we suffer, but really only our minds suffer and there's this other non-mind thing, the soul, which is what really matters and which isn't affected by that."
Personally, I find both of these solutions unconvincing to the point of inanity, but if the former is compelling, I see no reason to not consider the latter equally so. If my soul is unaffected by death, surely it is equally unaffected by (e.g.) a broken arm?
I don't think that the soul is entirely unaffected by death. I just think that it continues to exist afterwards. Death can still be a fairly traumatic experience, depending on how one dies; there's a difference between dying quietly in my sleep, and dying screaming and terrified.
This, in effect, reduces the problem of death to the problem of suffering; it may be unpleasant, but afterwards there's still a 'me' around to recover.
Of course, there's the question of what goes into a soul; what it is that the soul consists of, and retains. I'm not sure; but I imagine that it includes some elements of personality, and probably some parts of memory. Since personality and memory can be affected by e.g. a broken arm, I therefore conclude that the soul can be affected by e.g. a broken arm.
Absolutely agreed: if I assume that I have a soul and a body, that what happens to my soul is important and what happens to my body is unimportant, and that my soul suffers when I suffer but does not die when I die, then what follows from those assumptions is that suffering is important but dying isn't.
And if I instead assume that I have a soul and a body, that what happens to my soul is important and what happens to my body is unimportant, and that my soul does not suffer when I suffer and does not die when I die, then what follows from those assumptions is that neither suffering nor dying is important.
If assuming the former solves the problem of death, then assuming the latter solves both the problem of death and the problem of suffering.
I understand that you assume the former but not the latter, and therefore consider the problem of death solved but the problem of suffering open.
What I'm asking you is: why not make different assumptions, and thereby solve both?
I mean, if you were deriving the specific properties of the soul from your observations, and your observations were consistent with the first theory but not the second, that would make sense to me... but as far as I've understood you aren't doing that, so what makes one set of assumptions preferable to another?
This comes down to the question of, what is it that makes a soul? What is it that survives after death? For this, I will have to go to specifics, and start using a quote from the Bible:
(the numbers are verse numbers)
So. Here we have a list of certain criteria that souls can hold. A soul can be responsible for feeding the hungry; giving drink to the thirsty; welcoming and sheltering the homeless; clothing the naked; taking care of prisoners, and of the sick. In short, charitable works.
Now, there are people who experience some great loss (such as the death of an only child) and then, as a result, change their lives and begin to do a lot of charity work; often in some way related to the original source of their suffering.
Therefore, we have a change in behaviour, in a way that can be related to the soul, in people who have suffered. Therefore, suffering can have an observable effect on the soul.
I see. OK, thanks for answering the question.
You know, like CCC, I'm not sure what I would expect a world truly beyond the reach of God to look like - but I really doubt it would look like reality; even if God does not exist. I lack both the knowledge and, I suspect, the capacity to deduce arbitrary features of reality a priori. If our world is exactly what Dawkins would expect from a world without God, why isn't he able to deduce features that haven't been corroborated yet and make original discoveries based on this knowledge?
(On the other hand, I note that Dawkins also endorses the theory that our physical laws are as a result of natural selection among black holes, does he not? So that could be a prediction, I guess, since it "explains" our laws of physics and so on.)
Just so I'm clear: if I observe an aspect of my environment which the prevailing religious establishment in my community explains the existence of by positing that God took certain actions, and I'm not confident God in fact took those actions (perhaps because I've seen no evidence to differentially support the hypothesis that He did so) so I look for an alternative explanation, and I find evidence differentially supporting a hypothesis that does not require the existence of God at all, and as a consequence of that I am able to make certain predictions about the world which turn out to be corroborated by later observations, what am I entitled (on your account) to infer from that sequence of events?
That the prevailing religious establishment was wrong, somehow. In what way they were wrong depends on the details.
OK, thanks for clarifying.
Because all of the deductions one can get from it have already been made, and amply confirmed. The basic idea that nature can be understood, if we look carefully enough and avoid resorting to the supernatural, has been enormously successful over the last few centuries. Awe at the mystery of God has not.
Even when a scientist is motivated by a religious urge to understand God's creation, he leaves ideas of divine intervention behind when he walks into the laboratory.
Funny how they were all made before anyone suggested they were deducible from atheism.
... was originally predicted as a result of a rational Creator, not the lack of one. Arguably it was the wrong deduction given the premise, but still.
Let me repeat myself.
If a hypothesis actually gave enough information to deduce our current model of the universe plus or minus how uncertain we are about it, what are the odds it wouldn't reveal more?
If an atheist from any period up to the present could have gained information not already discovered (but that we now know, of course) why does this effect mysteriously vanish when we move from a hypothetical past atheist to actual current atheists living in the modern world?
This reminds me of people who claim that they rationally evaluated everything they grew up being taught, and lo and behold they were right about everything already, despite having believed it for arational reasons.
Other way around, I would think. References? Everyone was a theist back in the days of Roger Bacon, they had to be. So did anyone decide, "God is rational", and then deduce "we can attain all manner of powers if we just investigate how things work"? Or was it a case of discovering the effectiveness of empirical investigation, then deducing the rationality of God -- either from genuine faith or just as a way of avoiding charges of heresy?
Because, as I said, it's been done, mined out before open atheism was even a thing. "There is no God" has precious little implication beyond "this is not a benevolent universe and it's up to us to figure everything out and save ourselves." In contrast, "There is a God (of the Christian/Jewish/Muslim type)" leads to the false prediction that the universe is benevolent, rescued by postulating hidden or mysterious benevolence. The theist can take their pick of it being understandable ("the rational works of a rational God") or not ("mysterious ways"), although the former is in some conflict with the postulate of benevolence passing human understanding.
Damn you, source amnesia! shakes fist
Here's a small piece of corroborating evidence while I try and remember:
-Lewis, C.S., Miracles: a preliminary study, Collins, London, p. 110, 1947.
It's possible I was generalizing from having people claim to deduce more, um, recent theories. You're right, it doesn't stand or fall on that basis.
As far as I can tell, most arguments of this kind hinge on that "slight evidence for the existence of God" that you mentioned. Presumably, this is the evidence that overcomes your low prior of God's existence, thus causing you to believe that God is more likely to exist than not.
Since the evidence is anecdotal and difficult (if not impossible) to communicate, this means we can't have any kind of a meaningful debate, but I'm personally ok with that.
Actually, I gave God's existence a fairly high prior from the start. The slight evidence merely reinforced that.
And yes, we can't really have a meaningful debate over it.
Why the high prior, out of curiosity ?
My parents are intelligent and thoughtful people. Anything that they agree is correct, gets a high prior by default. In general, that rule serves me well.
There are many other intelligent and thoughtful people who disagree. Why -- epistemically, not historically -- do you place particular weight on your parents' beliefs? How did they come by those beliefs?
I'm afraid my reasons are mainly historical. My parents were there at a very formative time in my life. The best epistemic reason that I can give is that my father is a very wise and experienced man, whose opinions and knowledge I give a very large weight when setting my priors. There are intelligent and thoughtful people who would disagree on this matter; but I do not know them as well as my father, and I do not weigh their opinions as highly when setting priors.
Ah; for that, we shall have to consider the case of my grandparents, one in particular... it's a long historical chain, and I'm not sure quite where it ends.
Fair enough, that does make sense.