endoself comments on Testing lords over foolish lords: gaming Pascal's mugging - Less Wrong

2 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 07 May 2013 06:47PM

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Comment author: endoself 08 May 2013 06:54:13AM 1 point [-]

If Pascal's mugger was a force of nature - a new theory of physics, maybe - then the case for keeping to expected utility maximisation may be quite strong.

There's still the failure of convergence. If the theory that made you think that it would be a good idea to accept Pascal's mugging tells you to sum an infinite series, and that infinite series diverges, then the theory is wrong.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 May 2013 07:41:52AM 1 point [-]

The convergence can be solved using the arguments I presented in: http://lesswrong.com/lw/giu/naturalism_versus_unbounded_or_unmaximisable/

Essentially, take advantage of the fact that we are finite state probabilistic machines (or analogous to that), and therefore there is a maximum to the number of choices we can expect to make. So our option set is actually finite (though brutally large).

Comment author: endoself 08 May 2013 08:10:47AM *  0 points [-]

I'm referring to an infinity of possible outcomes, not an infinity of possible choices. This problem still applies if the agent must pick from a finite list of actions.

Specifically, I'm referring to the problem discussed in this paper, which is mostly the same problem as Pascal's mugging.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 May 2013 09:07:55AM 1 point [-]

Interesting problem, thanks! I personally felt that there could be a good case made for insisting your utility be bounded, and that paper's an argument in that direction.

Comment author: endoself 09 May 2013 02:03:29AM 0 points [-]

Pascal's mugging is less of a problem if your utility function is bounded, and it completely goes away if the bound is reasonably low, since then there just isn't any amount of utility that would outweight the improbability of the mugger being truthful.

Comment author: Wei_Dai 08 May 2013 11:14:32PM 0 points [-]

Weren't you working on ways to compare infinite/divergent expectations? I'm confused that you're now writing as if the problem is new to you...

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 09 May 2013 09:46:18AM 0 points [-]

I was working on a way to do that - but I'm also aware that not all divergent expectations can be compared, and so that there might be a case to avoid using unbounded utilities.