JonahSinick comments on A Proposed Adjustment to the Astronomical Waste Argument - Less Wrong

19 Post author: Nick_Beckstead 27 May 2013 03:39AM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 May 2013 04:58:17PM 14 points [-]

I worry that this post seems very abstract.

The specific case I've made for "just build the damn FAI" does not revolve only around astronomical waste, but subtheses like:

  • Stable goals in sufficiently advanced self-improving minds imply very strong path dependence on the point up to where the mind is sufficiently advanced, and no ability to correct mistakes beyond that point
  • Friendly superintelligences negate other x-risks once developed
  • CEV (more generally indirect normativity) implies that there exists a broad class of roughly equivalently-expectedly-good optimal states if we can pass a satisficing test (i.e., in our present state of uncertainty, we would expect something like CEV to be around as good as it gets, given our uncertainty on the details of goodness, assuming you can build a CEV-SI); there is not much gain from making FAI programmers marginally nicer people or giving them marginally better moral advice provided that they are satisficingly non-jerks who try to build an indirectly normative AI
  • Very little path dependence of the far future on anything except the satisficing test of building a good-enough FAI, because a superintelligent singleton has enough power to correct any bad inertia going into that point
  • The Fragility of Value thesis implies that value drops off very fast short of a CEV-style FAI (making the kinds of mistakes that people like to imagine leading to flawed-utopia story outcomes will actually just kill you instantly when blown up to a superintelligent scale) so there's not much point in trying to make things nicer underneath this threshold
  • FAI is hard (relative to the nearly nonexistent quantity and quality of work that we've seen most current AGI people intending to put into it, or mainstream leaders anticipating a need for, or current agencies funding, FAI is technically far harder than that); so most of the x-risk comes from failure to solve the technical problem
  • Trying to ensure that "Western democracies remain the most advanced and can build AI first" or "ensuring that evil corporations don't have so much power that they can influence AI-building" is missing the point (and a rather obvious attempt to map the problem into someone's favorite mundane political hobbyhorse) because goodness is not magically sneezed into the AI from well-intentioned builders, and favorite-good-guy-of-the-week is not making anything like a preliminary good-faith-effort to do high-quality work on technical FAI problems, and probably won't do so tomorrow either

You can make a case for MIRI with fewer requirements than that, but my model of the future is that it's just a pass-fail test on building indirectly normative stable self-improving AI, before any event occurs which permanently prevents anyone from building FAI (mostly self-improving UFAI (possibly neuromorphic) but also things like nanotechnological warfare). If you think that building FAI is a done deal because it's such an easy problem (or because likely builders are already guaranteed to be supercompetent), you'd focus on preventing nanotechnological warfare or something along those lines. To me it looks more like we're way behind on our dues.

Comment author: JonahSinick 27 May 2013 05:16:31PM *  4 points [-]

I see Nick's post as pointing out a nontrivial minimum threshold that x-risk reduction opportunities need to meet in order to be more promising than broad interventions, even within the astronomical waste framework. I agree that you have to look at the particulars of the x-risk reduction opportunities, and of the broad intervention opportunities, that are on the table, in order to argue for focus on broad interventions. But that's a longer discussion.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 May 2013 06:33:20PM 9 points [-]

I agree but remark that so long as at least one x-risk reduction effort meets this minimum threshold, we can discard all non-xrisk considerations and compare only x-risk impacts to x-risk impacts, which is how I usually think in practice. The question "Can we reduce all impacts to probability of okayness?" seems separate from "Are there mundane-seeming projects which can achieve comparably sized xrisk impacts per dollar as side effects?", and neither tells us to consider non-xrisk impacts of projects. This is the main thrust of the astronomical waste argument and it seems to me that this still goes through.

Comment author: Nick_Beckstead 28 May 2013 01:25:53AM 3 points [-]

Another issue is that if you accept the claims in the post, when you are comparing the ripple effects of different interventions, you can't just compare the ripple effects on x-risk. Ripple effects on other trajectory changes are non-negligible as well.

Comment author: JonahSinick 27 May 2013 07:28:19PM 5 points [-]

It's important to note that:

  1. There may be highly targeted interventions (other than x-risk reduction efforts) which can have big trajectory changes (including indirectly improving humans' ability to address x-risks).

  2. With consideration #1 in mind, in deciding whether to support x-risk interventions, one has to consider room for more funding and marginal diminishing returns on investment.

(I recognize that the claims in this comment aren't present in the comment that you responded to, and that I'm introducing them anew here.)

Comment author: ygert 27 May 2013 07:59:34PM *  4 points [-]

There may be highly targeted interventions (other than x-risk reduction efforts) which can have big trajectory changes (including indirectly improving humans' ability to address x-risks).

This is, more or less, the intended purpose behind spending all this energy on studying rationality rather than directly researching FAI. I'm not saying I agree with that reasoning, by the way. But that was the initial reasoning behind Less Wrong, for better or worse. Would we be farther ahead if rather than working on rationality, Eliezer started working immediately on FAI? Maybe, but but likely not. I could see it being argued both ways. But anyway, this shows an actual, very concrete, example of this kind of intervention.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 May 2013 07:58:38PM 8 points [-]

Mm, I'm not sure what the intended import of your statement is, can we be more concrete? This sounds like something I would say in explaining why I directed some of my life effort toward CFAR - along with, "Because I found that really actually in practice the number of rationalists seemed like a sharp limiting factor on the growth of x-risk efforts, if I'd picked something lofty-sounding in theory that was supposed to have a side impact I probably wouldn't have guessed as well" and "Keeping in mind that the top people at CFAR are explicitly x-risk aware and think of that impact as part of their job".

Comment author: JonahSinick 27 May 2013 08:10:09PM 2 points [-]

Something along the lines of CFAR could fit the bill. I suspect CFAR could have a bigger impact if it targeted people with stronger focus on global welfare, and/or people with greater influence, than the typical CFAR participant. But I recognize that CFAR is still in a nascent stage, so that it's necessary to cooptimize for the development of content, and growth.

I believe that there are other interventions that would also fit the bill, which I'll describe in later posts.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 May 2013 08:49:50PM 7 points [-]

CFAR is indeed so cooptimizing and trying to maximize net impact over time; if you think that a different mix would produce a greater net impact, make the case! CFAR isn't a side-effect project where you just have to cross your fingers and hope that sort of thing happens by coincidence while the leaders are thinking about something else, it's explicitly aimed that way.

Comment author: Nick_Beckstead 27 May 2013 05:50:34PM 1 point [-]

I agree with Jonah's point and think my post supports it.