seanwelsh77 comments on Effective Altruism Through Advertising Vegetarianism? - Less Wrong

20 Post author: peter_hurford 12 June 2013 06:50PM

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Comment author: seanwelsh77 14 June 2013 11:05:11PM -2 points [-]

Rule consequentialism is what a call a multi-threaded moral theory - a blend of deontology and consequentialism if you will. I advocate multi-threaded theories. The idea that there is a correct single-threaded theory of morality seems implausible. Moral rules to me are a subset of modal rules for survival-focused agents.

To work out if something is right run a bunch of 'algorithms' (in parallel threads if you like) not just one. (No commitment made to Turing computability of said 'algorithms' though...)

So...

assume virtue ethics

If I do X what virtues does this display/exhibit?

assume categorical imperative

If everyone does X how would I value the world then?

assume principle of utility

Will X increase the greatest happiness for the greatest number?

assume golden rule

If X were done to me instead of my doing X would I accept this?

emotions

If I do X will this trigger any emotional reaction (disgust, guilt, shame, embarrassment, joy, ecstasy, triumph etc)

laws

Is there is law or sanction if I do X?

precedent

Have I done X before, how did that go?

relationships

If I do X what impact will that have on relationships I have?

motives goal

Do I want to do X?

interest welfare prudence

Is X in my interest? Safe? Dangerous etc

value

Does X have value? To me, to others etc

Sometimes one or two reasons will provide a slam dunk decision. It's illegal and I don't want to do it anyway. Othertimes, the call is harder.

Personally, I find a range of considerations more persuasive than one. I am personally inclined to sentimentalism at the meta-ethical tier and particularism at the normative and applied ethical tiers.

Of course, strictly speaking particularism implies that normative ethical theories are false over-generalizations and that a theory of reasons rests on a theory of values. Values are fundamentally emotive. No amount of post hoc moral rationalization will change that.