Sorry for the delay!
I forgot to clarify the rough argument for why (1) "value future people equally" is much less important or crucial than (2) "fill the universe with people" here.
If you accept (2), you're almost guaranteed to be on board with where Bostrom and Beckstead are roughly going (even if you valued present people more!). It's hardly possible to then block their argument on normative grounds, and criticism would have to be empirical, e.g. based on the claim that dystopian futures may be likelier than commonly assumed, which would decrease the value of x-risk reduction.
By contrast, if you accept (1), it's still very much an open question whether you'll be on board.
Also, intrinsic time preference is really not an issue among EAs. The idea that spatial and temporal distance are irrelevant when it comes to helping others is a pretty core element of the EA concept. What is an issue, though, is the question of what helping others actually means (or should mean). Who are the relevant others? Persons? Person-moments? Preferences? And how are they relevant? Should we ensure the non-existence of suffering? Or promote ecstasy too? Prevent the existence of unfulfilled preferences? Or create fulfilled ones too? Can you help someone by bringing them into existence? Or only by preventing their miserable existence/unfulfilled preferences? These issues are more controversial than the question of time preference. Unfortunately, they're of astronomical significance.
I don't really know if I'm suggesting any further specific change to the wording - sorry about that. It's tricky... If you're speaking to non-EAs, it's important to emphasize the rejection of time preference. But there shouldn't be a "therefore", which (in my perception) is still implicitly there. And if you're speaking to people who already reject time preference, it's even more important to make it clear that this rejection doesn't imply "fill the universe with people". One solution could be to simply drop the reference to the (IMO non-decisive) rejection of time preference and go for something like: "Many EAs consider the creation of (happy) people valuable and morally urgent, and therefore think that nearly all potential value..."
Beckstead might object that the rejection of heavy time preference is important to his general conclusion (the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future). But if we're talking that level of generality, then the reference to x-risk reduction should probably go or be qualified. For sufficiently negative-leaning EAs (such as Brian Tomasik) believe that x-risk reduction is net negative.
Perhaps the best solution would be to expand the section and start by mentioning how the (EA-uncontroversial) rejection of time preference is relevant to the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future. Once we've established that the far future likely dominates, the question arises how we should morally affect the far future. Depending on this question, very different conclusions can result e.g. with regard to the importance and even the sign of x-risk reduction.
I don't want to expand the section, because that makes it stand out more than is compatible with my aims for the post. And since the post is aimed at non-EAs and new EAs, I don't want to drop the point about time preference, as "intrinsic" time-discounting is a common view outside EA, especially for those with a background in economics rather than philosophy. So my preferred solution is to link to a fuller discussion of the issues, which I did (in particular, Beckstead's thesis). Anyway, I appreciate your comments.
Representatives from GiveWell, The Life You Can Save, 80,000 Hours, Giving What We Can, Effective Animal Altruism, Leverage Research, the Center for Applied Rationality, and the Machine Intelligence Research Institute either attended or gave presentations. My thanks to Leverage Research for organizing and hosting the event!
What do all these groups have in common? As Peter Singer said in his TED talk, effective altruism "combines both the heart and the head." The heart motivates us to be empathic and altruistic toward others, while the head can "make sure that what [we] do is effective and well-directed," so that altruists can do not just some good but as much good as possible.
Effective altruists (EAs) tend to:
Despite these similarities, EAs are a diverse bunch, and they focus their efforts on a variety of causes.
Below are four popular focus areas of effective altruism, ordered roughly by how large and visible they appear to be at the moment. Many EAs work on several of these focus areas at once, due to uncertainty about both facts and values.
Though labels and categories have their dangers, they can also enable chunking, which has benefits for memory, learning, and communication. There are many other ways we might categorize the efforts of today's EAs; this is only one categorization.
Focus Area 1: Poverty Reduction
Here, "poverty reduction" is meant in a broad sense that includes (e.g.) economic benefit, better health, and better education.
Major organizations in this focus area include:
In addition, some well-endowed foundations seem to have "one foot" in effective poverty reduction. For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has funded many of the most cost-effective causes in the developing world (e.g. vaccinations), although it also funds less cost-effective-seeming interventions in the developed world.
In the future, poverty reduction EAs might also focus on economic, political, or research-infrastructure changes that might achieve poverty reduction, global health, and educational improvements more indirectly, as when Chinese economic reforms lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. Though it is generally easier to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of direct efforts than that of indirect efforts, some groups (e.g. GiveWell Labs and The Vannevar Group) are beginning to evaluate the likely cost-effectiveness of these causes.
Focus Area 2: Meta Effective Altruism
Meta effective altruists focus less on specific causes and more on "meta" activities such as raising awareness of the importance of evidence-based altruism, helping EAs reach their potential, and doing research to help EAs decide which focus areas they should contribute to.
Organizations in this focus area include:
Other people and organizations contribute to meta effective altruism, too. Paul Christiano examines effective altruism from a high level at Rational Altruist. GiveWell and others often write about the ethics and epistemology of effective altruism in addition to focusing on their chosen causes. And, of course, most EA organizations spend some resources growing the EA movement.
Focus Area 3: The Long-Term Future
Many EAs value future people roughly as much as currently-living people, and think that nearly all potential value is found in the well-being of the astronomical numbers of people who could populate the long-term future (Bostrom 2003; Beckstead 2013). Future-focused EAs aim to somewhat-directly capture these "astronomical benefits" of the long-term future, e.g. via explicit efforts to reduce existential risk.
Organizations in this focus area include:
Other groups study particular existential risks (among other things), though perhaps not explicitly from the view of effective altruism. For example, NASA has spent time identifying nearby asteroids that could be an existential threat, and many organizations (e.g. GCRI) study worst-case scenarios for climate change or nuclear warfare that might result in human extinction but are more likely to result in "merely catastrophic" damage.
Some EAs (e.g. Holden Karnofsky, Paul Christiano) have argued that even if nearly all value lies in the long-term future, focusing on nearer-term goals (e.g. effective poverty reduction or meta effective altruism) may be more likely to realize that value than more direct efforts.
Focus Area 4: Animal Suffering
Effective animal altruists are focused on reducing animal suffering in cost-effective ways. After all, animals vastly outnumber humans, and growing numbers of scientists believe that many animals consciously experience pleasure and suffering.
The only organization of this type so far (that I know of) is Effective Animal Activism, which currently recommends supporting The Humane League and Vegan Outreach.
Edit: There is now also Animal Ethics, Inc.
Major inspirations for those in this focus area include Peter Singer, David Pearce, and Brian Tomasik.
Other focus areas
I could perhaps have listed "effective environmental altruism" as focus area 5. The environmental movement in general is large and well-known, but I'm not aware of many effective altruists who take environmentalism to be the most important cause for them to work on, after closely investigating the above focus areas. In contrast, the groups and people named above tend to have influenced each other, and have considered all these focus areas explicitly. For this reason, I've left "effective environmental altruism" off the list, though perhaps a popular focus on effective environmental altruism could arise in the future.
Other focus areas could later come to prominence, too.
Working together
I was pleased to see the EAs from different strands of the EA movement cooperating and learning from each other at the Effective Altruism Summit. Cooperation is crucial for growing the EA movement, so I hope that even if it’s not always easy, EAs will "go out of their way" to cooperate and work together, no matter which focus areas they’re sympathetic to.