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shminux comments on Welcome to Less Wrong! (6th thread, July 2013) - Less Wrong
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I don't know, but sounds like a good idea. Would be rather Talmudic in spirit. Unfortunately, most of the comments are fluff not worth reading, and separating the few percent that aren't is not that easy. Maybe pick the threads with top 10 comments by karma or something.
Oh, far from it. I think that some of his statements are flat out wrong, but I only make this determination where either I have the relevant expertise or several experts disagree with him after considering his point in earnest.
Don't many experts disagree with him on his MWI view on quantum mechanics?
Also note that replacing "Everett branches" with "possible worlds" works in 99% of the decision-theoretic arguments Eliezer makes, so there is no need to sweat MWI vs other interpretations. I would be more interested to hear your opinion on the Trolley problem, the Newcomb's problem, and the Dust specks vs Torture issue. Assuming, of course, that you have studied it in some depth and went over the various arguments on both sides, the process you must be intimately familiar with if you have attended a yeshiva.
I've seen Newcomb and Dust specks vs Torture but not Trolley (although I've seen that one before in other places). Which sequences do I need to finish for those?
If the trolley one is the same as the "standard" version, then it's fairly trivial within the framework of Orthodox Judaism (if I'm allowed to bring that in), because of strict rules about death. I'll elaborate further when I'm up to the question. The other two are a lot more complicated for me.
I don't think there's a Lesswrong-specific take on the trolley problem, so I'm assuming shminux is just referring to the usual one.
Yes, the standard Trolley problem, sorry. For more LW-specific problems, consider Parfit's hitchhiker.
Of course you are allowed to bring it in. And, unless you insist that it is the One True Way, as opposed to just one of many religious and moral frameworks, you probably will not be judged harshly. So, by all means!
So according to Orthodox Judaism, one is not allowed to (even indirectly) cause a death, even when the alternative is considered worse. The standard example is if you're in a city and the "enemy" demands you hand over a specific person to be killed (unjustly), and says if you don't do so, they will destroy the whole city and everyone will die (including that person). The rule in that situation is that you aren't allowed to hand them over. Accepting that as an axiom, the trivial answer to the trolley situation is “don't do anything”. Maintain the status quo. You cannot cause a death, even though it will save ten other people.
Parfit's hitchhiker also appears trivial. It seems to assume I place no value on telling the truth. As I do, in fact, place a high utility on being truthful (based on Judaism) , my saying "Yes" will translate into a truthful expression on my face and I will get the ride.
Note: I got the link from searching for "midvar sheker tirchak", which is the Bible's verse that says not to lie, roughly translated as "distance yourself from falsehood.
On another topic, if I think that it is the “One True Way”, but don't say that, is that OK?
Thank you, I appreciate your replies.
Hmm, I see. So, a clear and simple deontological rule. So, if you see your children being slaughtered in front of you, and all you need to do to save them and to kill the attacker is to press a button, you are not allowed to do it?
Also, does this mean that there cannot be Orthodox Jewish soldiers? If so, is this a recent development, given that ancient Hebrews fought and killed without a second thought? Or is there another reason why it was OK to kill your enemy in King David's time, but not now?
Right, ethical systems which value honesty absolutely have no difficulty with this. But
is this a utilitarian calculation or an absolute injunction, like in the previous case, where you are not allowed to kill, no matter what? Or is there some threshold of (dis)utility above which lying is OK? If so, what price demanded by the selfish driver would surely cause a good Orthodox Jewish hitchhiker to attempt to lie?
First, note that I do not represent LW in any way and often misjudge the reaction of others. But my guess would be that simply stating this is not an issue, but explicitly using this belief in an argument may result in downvoting. This community is mildly hypocritical in this regard, as people who push their transhumanist views here as "the best/objective/universal morality" (I am exaggerating) can get away with it, but what can you do.
I may not have given enough detail. The prohibition against killing is specifically innocent people. There is a death penalty for many crimes, including murder (although not as far as EY seems to think. He once said that the Bible gives the death penalty for crossdressing. Evidence suggests otherwise. But that's another topic.) So:
Assuming this attacker is the one killing or threatening to kill your kids, you are allowed to kill him (although you are supposed to try to injure them if killing isn't necessary to stop them). You wouldn't be allowed to kill someone else who is innocent, even to save many people.
I don't know if you're familiar with the current debate in Israel over the draft? It's not really related, though. Again, the “ancient Hebrews” fights, were usually either to reclaim parts of Israel which belonged to them from the gentile nations that were inhabiting them, or to defend themselves against attackers. In both scenarios, the “victims” weren't innocent. For some more info, see here, here, and here.
(By the way, I just saw this while looking up that last link, which (mostly) confirms what I said about the Trolley problem.
I realized after I posted that answer yesterday that I could conceive of a case that would work for me, in the spirit of the Parfit's hitchhiker example. Namely, if I knew that when I got to town there would be someone who's life I could save, but only with $100. (Also assuming that I've got only $100 cash total). That person's life would take precedence over telling the truth, and I wouldn't get the ride. There isn't anything I could do in terms of prior obligation that would override the life concern of that person later.
OK, that makes more sense.
Seems like a flimsy excuse to slaughter babies. Though I suppose the Amalekite case can be somewhat justified by an uncharacteristically utilitarian calculation on God's part if Amalekites presented an x-risk to Hebrews. But that is not how the issue is usually presented.
From your link:
...so they wiped out every woman and child? In any case, this inference seems like an extreme case of motivated cognition: "what we did was right, therefore they must have done something wrong even if we have no records of what they did". Further reading of your links provides a fascinating insight into how far this motivated cognition can lead otherwise very smart people.
That it is indeed a case of motivated cognition can be trivially shown by transplanting the question into a modern setting and asking under which circumstances it would be ok to wipe out a whole people today. The answer is clearly "none" (I hope). Yet what (ostensibly) happened then has to be justified at any cost, or admit that Saul and Samuel were little better than Hitler and Pol Pot. Or that human ethics has evolved and what was acceptable back then is a high crime now.
Eh, I take back the unnecessarily emotionally charged reference to the iconic supervillains.
What happens if instead of "causing" a death, you're doing something with some probability of causing a death? For instance, handing someone over to the enemy results in a 99% probability of them being killed by the enemy. What if it's only 10%? What if the enemy isn't going to kill him, but you need to drive through a war zone to give him the prisoner, and driving through the war zone results in a 10% chance of the person being killed? What if the enemy says that he's going to kill one person from his jail no matter what, and he puts the person in the same jail (so that instead of 1 person being killed out of 9 in the jail, 1 person is killed out of a group of 10 that includes the new person, thus increasing the chance this specific person is killed, but not increasing the number of people killed)?
I think that a 99% probability would be the same as 100% for this purpose. A “doubt of death” is considered as strong as a definite death in general. In the war zone example, I think (with a little less confidence) a 10% would work the same. You simply don't take into account the potential benefits, when weighed against an action that you must do that will cause a death. On the other hand, the person being requested is allowed to sacrifice their own life (or a 10% chance of doing so) to save others. I'll have to think about your last case a little more.
What if you just need to do ordinary driving, where there's a fraction of a percent chance of death?
If you couldn't do things which had any chance at all of killing innocent people, then you wouldn't be able to drive, or do to a lot of normal things. There's probably some non-zero chance that the next time you turn on your computer it will trigger a circuit fault that causes the building to burn down an hour later.
I think there's a point where the number is low enough that it can become insignificant, but I'm pretty sure it's less than 10%. There's a concept of what considered a "normal risk".
Incidentally, since you mentioned it, there have been attempts by some Rabbis to ban driving for that reason. I'm unable to find a better source currently, but see: this. Some (current ones) have also suggested that one shouldn't drive for pleasure, but only where there's an actual need.
I thought about that your last case earlier, and decided it would also not be allowed. You need to consider each person separately. This person will have a 10% chance of being killed due to your action, which forbids it.
Part of the rationale for the rules (I think), is valuing each moment of life, so, for example, someone is considered a murderer if they kill someone who would die anyway in an hour. So causing the person to die earlier, is worse than letting them die later with everyone else.
Some high-profile physicists disagree, others agree. Very few believe in some sort of objective collapse these days, but some still do. This strange situation is possible because MWI is not a well-formed physical model but more of an inspirational ontological outlook.