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davidpearce comments on Arguments Against Speciesism - Less Wrong
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Birds lack a neocortex. But members of at least one species, the European magpie, have convincingly passed the "mirror test" [cf. "Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie (Pica pica): Evidence of Self-Recognition" http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?representation=PDF&uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202] Most ethologists recognise passing the mirror test as evidence of a self-concept. As well as higher primates (chimpanzees, orang utans, bonobos, gorillas) members of other species who have passed the mirror test include elephants, orcas and bottlenose dolphins. Humans generally fail the mirror test below the age of eighteen months.
You are right, the mirror test is evidence of self-concept. I do not take it to be nearly sufficient evidence, but it is evidence.
This supports my view that very young humans are not self-aware (and therefore not morally important) either.
Could you possibly say a bit more about why the mirror test is inadequate as a test of possession of a self-concept? Either way, making self-awareness a precondition of moral status has troubling implications. For example, consider what happens to verbally competent adults when feelings intense fear turn into uncontrollable panic. In states of "blind" panic, reflective self-awareness and the capacity for any kind of meta-cognition is lost. Panic disorder is extraordinarily unpleasant. Are we to make the claim that such panic-ridden states aren't themselves important - only the memories of such states that a traumatised subject reports when s/he regains a measure of composure and some semblance of reflective self-awareness is restored? A pig, for example, or a prelinguistic human toddler, doesn't have the meta-cognitive capacity to self-reflect on such states. But I don't think we are ethically entitled to induce them - any more than we are ethically entitled to waterboard a normal adult human. I would hope posthuman superintelligence can engineer such states out of existence - in human and nonhuman animals alike.
Surely it is a reach to say that the mirror test, alone, with all of its methodological difficulties, can all by itself raise our probability estimate of a creature's possessing self-awareness to near-certainty? I agree that it's evidence, but calling it a test is pushing it, to say the least. To see just one reason why I might say this, consider that we can, right now, probably program a robot to pass such a test; such a robot would not be self-aware.
As for the rest of your post, I'd like to take this opportunity to object to a common mistake/ploy in such discussions:
"This general ethical principle/heuristic leads to absurdity if applied with the literal-mindedness of a particularly dumb algorithm, therefore reductio ad absurdum."
Your argument here seems to be something like: "Adult humans are sometimes not self-aware, but we still care about them, even during those times. Is self-awareness therefore irrelevant??" No, of course it's not. It's a complex issue. But a chicken is never self-aware, so the point is moot.
Also:
Please provide a citation for this, and I will response, as my knowledge of this topic (cognitive capacity during states of extreme panic) is not up to giving a considered answer.
Having experienced a panic attack on one or two occasions, I am inclined to agree. However, I did not lose my self-concept at those times.
Finally:
"Ethically entitled" is not a very useful phrase to use in isolation; utilitarianism[1] can only tell us which of two or more world-states to prefer. I've said that I prefer that dogs not be tortured, all else being equal, so if by that you mean that we ought to prefer not to induce panic states in pigs, then sure, I agree. The question is what happens when all else is not equal — which it pretty much never is.
[1] You are speaking from a utilitarian position, yes? If not, then that changes things; "ethically entitled" means something quite different to a deontologist, naturally.
Um, "Why don't we stop caring about people who temporarily lose this supposed be-all and end-all of moral value" seems like a valid question, albeit one you hopefully are introspective enough to have an answer for.
Is the question "why don't we temporarily stop caring about people who temporarily lose this etc."?
If so, then maybe we should, if they really lose it. However, please tell me what actions would ensue from, or be made permissible by, a temporary cessation of caring, provided that I still care about that person after they return from this temporary loss of importance.
That depends on the details of your personal moral system, doesn't it? As I said already, you may well be consistent on this point, but you have not explained how.
Try telling a mother that her baby is not morally important.
(I would recommend some training in running and ducking before doing that...)
I find the idea that babies aren't morally important highly unlikely, but did you have to pick the most biased possible example?
Is this a rebuttal, or merely a snarky quip?
If the latter, then carry on. If the former, please elaborate.
Both. I like multiple levels of meaning.
In particular, think about it in the context of whether morality is objective or subjective, what makes subjective opinions morally acceptable, and what is the role of evidence in all this.
Specifically, do you think there's any possible evidence that could lead to you and a mother attaching the same moral importance to her baby?
Is there any evidence that could lead to the mother assigning her baby the same value as I do? Couldn't tell you. (I've never been a mother.)
Vice versa? Probably not.
After all, it's possible that two agents are in possession of the same facts, the same true beliefs, and nonetheless have different preferences. So evidence doesn't do very much for us, here.
In any case, your objection proves too much: after all, try telling a dog owner that his dog is not morally important. For extra laughs, try telling the owner of a custom-built, lovingly-maintained hot rod that his car is not morally important. People (myself included) get attached to all manner of things.
We have to distinguish between valuing something for its own sake (i.e. persons), and valuing things that those persons value (artwork, music, babies, cars, dogs, elegant math theorems, etc.).
I quite agree, but evidently that's a point of contention on this thread.
That is true, but I think my quip still stands. I suspect that the mother in my example would strongly insist that the moral value of the baby is high for its own sake and not just because she happens to love the baby (along with her newly remodeled kitchen). Would you call her mistaken?
Only if she agrees with me that self-awareness is a key criterion for moral relevance.
Of course, the real answer is that mothers are almost never capable of reasoning rationally about their children, especially in matters of physical harm to the child, and especially when the child is quite young. So the fact that a mother would, in fact insist on this or that isn't terribly interesting. (She might also insist that her baby is objectively the cutest baby in the maternity ward, but so what?)
Same would apply to other things in SaidAchmiz's list, too.
I don't think that is true. For a dog, maybe, for a hot rod, definitely not.
What about for the Mona Lisa?