have the false memories removed
!!... I hope you mean explicit memory but not implicit memory -- otherwise there wouldn't be much of a being left afterwards...
"tricking" it into thinking it did certain things in the past
For a certain usage of "tricking" this is true, but that usage is akin to the way optical illusions trick one's visual system rather than denoting a falsehood deliberately embedded in one's explicit knowledge.
I would point out that the source of all the hypothetical suffering in this situation would the being's (and your) theory of identity rather than the fact of anyone's identity (or lack thereof). If this isn't obvious, just posit that the scenario is conceivable but hasn't actually happened, and some bastard deceives you into thinking it has -- or even just casts doubt on the issue in either case.
Of course that doesn't mean the theory is false -- but I do want to say that from my perspective it appears that the emotional distress would come from reifying a naïve notion of personal identity. Even the word "identity", with its connotations of singleness, stops being a good one in the hypothetical.
Have you seen John Weldon's animated short To Be? You might enjoy it. If you watch it, I have a question for you: would you exculpate the singer of the last song?
I take it that my death and the being's ab initio creation are both facts. These aren't theoretical claims. The claim that I am "really" a description of my brain (that I am information, pattern, etc) is as nonsensical as the claim that I am really my own portrait, and so couldn't amount to a theory. In fact, the situation is analogous to someone taking a photo of my corpse and creating a being based on its likeness. The accuracy of the resulting being's behaviour, its ability to fool others, and its own confused state doesn't make any difference...
In June 2012, Robin Hanson wrote a post promoting plastination as a superior to cryopreservation as an approach to preserving people for later uploading. His post included a paragraph which said:
This left me with the impression that the chances of the average cryopreserved person today of being later revived aren't great, even when you conditionalize on no existential catastrophe. More recently, I did a systematic read-through of the sequences for the first time (about a month 1/2 ago), and Eliezer's post You Only Live Twice convinced me to finally sign up for cryonics for three reasons:
I don't find that terribly encouraging. So now I'm back to being pessimistic about current cryopreservation techniques (though I'm still signing up for cryonics because the cost is low enough even given my current estimate of my chances). But I'd very much be curious to know if anyone knows what, say, Nick Bostrom or Anders Sandberg think about the issue. Anyone?
Edit: I'm aware of estimates given by LessWrong folks in the census of the chances of revival, but I don't know how much of that is people taking things like existential risk into account. There are lots of different ways you could arrive at a ~10% chance of revival overall:
is one way. But:
is a very similar conclusion from very different premises. Gwern has more on this sort of reasoning in Plastination versus cryonics, but I don't know who most of the people he links to are so I'm not sure whether to trust them. He does link to a breakdown of probabilities by Robin, but I don't fully understand the way Robin is breaking the issue down.