Oh my god! You're right! How dare people on LessWrong mention their support for a view that's been argued for at great length on here! The horror! The horror!

I'm ambivalent about this, actually. I think that interpreting probability as subjective uncertainty is more sensible, I think the Bayesian toolkit is superior for a wide array of problems, and I think that any technique generally called 'Frequentist' probably has an equivalent Bayesian interpretation.

But I generally get the sense that the Bayesian-Frequentist divide is unproductive, and I am disappointed when LW seems to widen that divide.

Unless you're an active statistician, I don't think you should expect you have a solid view of what statisticians currently think. Consider this other comment, where JoshuaZ points out that, at this point, Bayesianism is part of 'orthodox statistics,' and if you meant to say she was a Frequentist you should have said that directly.