Most resources you might think to amass have decreasing marginal utility: for example, a marginal extra $1,000 means much more to you if you have $0 than if you have $100,000. That means you can safely apply the 80-20 rule to most resources: you only need to get some of the resource to get most of the benefits of having it.
At the most recent CFAR workshop, Val dedicated a class to arguing that one resource in particular has increasing marginal utility, namely attention. Initially, efforts to free up your attention have little effect: the difference between juggling 10 things and 9 things is pretty small. But once you've freed up most of your attention, the effect is larger: the difference between juggling 2 things and 1 thing is huge. Val also argued that because of this funny property of attention, most people likely undervalue the value of freeing up attention by orders of magnitude.
During a conversation later in the workshop I suggested another resource that might have increasing marginal utility, namely trust. A society where people abide by contracts 80% of the time is not 80% as good as a society where people abide by contracts 100% of the time; most of the societal value of trust (e.g. decreasing transaction costs) doesn't seem to manifest until people are pretty close to 100% trustworthy. The analogous way to undervalue trust is to argue that e.g. cheating on your spouse is not so bad, because only one person gets hurt. But cheating on spouses in general undermines the trust that spouses should have in each other, and the cumulative impact of even 1% of spouses cheating on the institution of marriage as a whole could be quite negative. (Lots of things about the world make more sense from this perspective: for example, it seems like one of the main practical benefits of religion is that it fosters trust.)
What other resources have increasing marginal utility? How undervalued are they?
How much time do you spend with normal people? What's your score on Murray's high-IQ bubble checklist?
No, but the original claim was clearly wrong. Society is dominated by high-IQ people. Diminishing returns seems to be weirdly interpreted as 'no returns' in a lot of people's minds.
It may help if I quote a bit of what I've written on a similar issue before about diminishing returns to research:
Similarly, arguing over diminishing returns to IQ is building in a rather strange premise to the argument: that the entities in discussion will be within a few standard deviations of current people. It may be true that people with IQs of 150 are only somewhat more likely to be billionaires ruling the world than 140, but how much does that help when you're considering the actions of people with IQs much much higher? The returns can really add up.
To take an example I saw today: Hsu posted slides from an April talk, which on pg10 points out that the estimates of the additive genetic influence on intelligence (the kind we can most easily identify and do stuff like embryo selection with) & estimates of number of minor alleles imply a potential upper bound of +25 SD if you can select all beneficial variants, or in more familiar notation, IQs of 475 (100 + 15 * 25). Suppose I completely totally grant all assumptions about diminishing marginal returns to IQ based on the small samples we have available of 130+; what happens when someone with an IQ of 475 gets turned loose? Who the heck knows; they'll probably rule the world, if they want.
One of the problems with discussing this is that IQ scores and all research based on it is purely an ordinal scale based on comparing existing humans, while what we really want is to measures of intelligence on a cardinal scale which lets us compare not just humans but potential future humans and AIs too.
For all we know, diminishing returns in IQ is purely an artifact of human biology: maybe each standard deviation represents less and less 'objective intelligence', and the true gains to objective intelligence don't diminish at all or in some cases increase (chimps vs humans)!
(Hsu likes to cite a maize experiment where "over 100 generations of selection have produced a difference in oil content between the high and low selected strains of 32 times the original standard deviation!"; so when we're dealing with something that's clearly on a cardinal scale - oil content - the promised increases can be quite literal. Intelligence is not a fluid, so we're not going to get 25x more 'brain fluid', but that doesn't help us calculate the consequences: an intelligent agent is competing against humans and other software, and small absolute edges may have large consequences. A hedge fund trader who can be right 1% more of the time than his competition may be able to make a huge freaking fortune. Or, a researcher 1% better at all aspects of research may, under the log-normal model of research productivity proposed by Shockley, be much more than 1% more productive than his peers.)
We know 'human' is not a inherent limit on possible cognition or a good measurement of all activities/problems: eg chess programs didn't stagnate in strength after Deep Blue beat Kasparov, having hit the ceiling on possible performance but they kept getting better. Human performance turned out to not run the gamut from worst to best-possible but rather marked out a fairly narrow window that the chess programs were in for a few decades but passed out of, on their trajectory upwards on whatever 'objective chess intelligence' metric there may be.
(I think this may help explain why some events surprise a lot of observers: when we look at entities below the human performance window, we just see it as a uniform 'bad' level of performance, we can't see any meaningful differences and can't see any trends, so our predictions tend to be hilariously optimistic or pessimistic based on our prior views; then, when they finally enter the human performance window, we can finally apply our existing expertise and become surprised and optimistic, and then the entities can with small objective increases in performance move out of the human window entirely and it becomes an activity humans are now uncompetitive at like chess but may still contribute a bit on the margin in things like advanced chess, and eventually becomes truly superhuman as computer chess will likely soon be.
For this reason, it seems to me that conjectures about people with no negative variants getting a 25 SD IQ gain are untestable. How would one distinguish such people from someone with a gain of only(!) 15 SD or 10 SD or even 7 SD, when the population available to norm IQ tests consists of only 7 billion people?